From the book
Theages
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Names, titles, and the name Theages
ὄνομα (onoma); ὀνομάζειν (onomazein); προσαγορεύειν (prosagoreuein); ἀνώνυμος (anōnymos); ἐπωνυμία (epōnymia); Θεάγης (Theagēs); ἱεροπρεπής (hieroprepēs)
Onoma is a name, onomazein to name, and prosagoreuein to address or call someone.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordOnoma is a name, onomazein to name, and prosagoreuein to address or call someone.
- In TheagesThe first naming problem is comic: Demodocus wonders whether to call his son's production planting or begetting (121c).
- In this editionNote 5 says that Theagēs is formed on theos, “god,” without presenting a complete etymology as the dialogue's own claim.
- A place to readδεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν — Demodocus considers naming planting or begetting.
Meaning
Onoma is a name, onomazein to name, and prosagoreuein to address or call someone. Anōnymos means nameless; epōnymia is a designation or title. Theagēs is the young man's personal name, and hieroprepēs means befitting the sacred. The dialogue's naming language ranges from naming a person to identifying a competence and classifying practitioners. These operations are analogous without being the same.
Use in the book
The first naming problem is comic: Demodocus wonders whether to call his son's production planting or begetting (121c). Socrates later asks the young man's name before questioning him, then praises the name as fine and befitting the sacred (122d–e). The exchange gives the previously reported object of paternal anxiety his own voice and address. The sacred description also continues the language used for counsel at 122b.
When the boy says he wants wisdom, names become instruments of inquiry. Piloting and charioteering supply recognizable names for determinate competencies. Socrates asks whether the desired wisdom is nameless, whether Theages knows the thing without the name, or knows the name as well (123c). Theages confidently claims both, then answers “wisdom.” His answer retains the generic term where the question requires discrimination among its instances.
The subsequent discussion shifts from naming skills to naming people by a common activity. Bakis, the Sibyl, and Amphilytus have the designation oracle-singers. By that model, Hippias and Periander are called tyrants on account of their rule (124d–e2). The move is rhetorically effective because the boy can readily supply the familiar classification. Nevertheless, correctness of a title for those two men does not establish that every conceivable ruler of the same population belongs to that class. Theages' later appeal to willing subjects exposes the missing qualification.
Names therefore do more than decorate the text. They help Socrates test whether a broad aspiration has an identifiable content and whether an accepted classification fits it. But the dialogue also shows the limits of naming: answering with a recognized label can conceal an underdescribed object or an unproved inference. Neither “wisdom” nor “tyranny” ends the inquiry.
The personal name Theages similarly should not be made into a prophecy. Its sacred coloring is explicit; a claim that its bearer is guaranteed a divine educational destiny is not. His final proposal still asks whether the daimonic will permit the association.
Places to read
- 121cδεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν — Demodocus considers naming planting or begetting
- 122d–eΘεάγης ὄνομα; ἱεροπρεπές — The boy's name and Socrates' praise of it
- 123cἀνώνυμός τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἔχει ὄνομα — A competence is asked to declare its name
- 123dἀλλ’ ἢ σοφίαν — Theages replies with the generic name wisdom
- 124d–e2τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν — Socrates asks for the collective designations of oracle-singers and tyrants
Translation in this edition
Note 5 says that Theagēs is formed on theos, “god,” without presenting a complete etymology as the dialogue's own claim. Burnet retains καλὸν in the question at 122d despite Baiter's proposed deletion. “Fine name” and “befitting the sacred” should therefore both be represented in an account of the supplied text.
Befitting the sacred — ἱεροπρεπής (hieroprepēs)
ἱεροπρεπής (hieroprepēs)
Befitting the sacred. The explicit religious coloring Socrates attributes to Theages' name. Attested: ἱεροπρεπές (122e). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Call or address — προσαγορεύειν (prosagoreuein)
προσαγορεύειν (prosagoreuein)
Call or address. Socrates asks how they should address the boy. Attested: προσαγορεύωμεν (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Fine — καλός (kalos)
καλός (kalos)
Fine. Socrates' favorable description of the name, retained in the printed text. Attested: καλὸν (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Name — ὄνομα (onoma)
ὄνομα (onoma)
Name. The personal designation needed before Socrates addresses Theages directly. Attested: ὄνομα (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Name — ὀνομάζειν (onomazein)
ὀνομάζειν (onomazein)
Name. Demodocus hesitates over the appropriate description of begetting. Attested: ὀνομάζειν (121c). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Nameless — ἀνώνυμος (anōnymos)
ἀνώνυμος (anōnymos)
Nameless. Socrates asks whether the desired wisdom lacks any distinguishing name. Attested: ἀνώνυμός (123c). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Theages — Θεάγης (Theagēs)
Θεάγης (Theagēs)
Theages. The son's name, then praised as fine and befitting the sacred. Attested: Θεάγης (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages.
Knowing the thing and knowing its name (contextual phrase)
123c: αὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ὄνομα. Socrates distinguishes knowing the wisdom itself from knowing its name. Theages claims both but offers the broad term “wisdom”, which also fits the crafts already named. A correct general label need not identify the distinctive thing sought. The dialogue tests specificity, not merely the ability to remember a word. See Names and Theages.
From the book
Stobaeus, Volume I
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Name
ὄνομα
onomaOnoma is a name by which a person or thing is designated.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordOnoma is a name by which a person or thing is designated.
- In StobaeusThe Platonist account applies divine names to the maker and discusses the cosmos as divine.
- In this edition“Name” is direct.
- A place to beginNames of the maker occur within an account distinguishing maker and cosmos.
- English renderings
- name
Meaning
Onoma is a name by which a person or thing is designated. A shared name does not necessarily establish identity between its bearers.
Use in the book
The Platonist account applies divine names to the maker and discusses the cosmos as divine. Its use of naming must be read alongside its distinctions between the maker, the model, and the ordered product. The vocabulary can relate levels of reality without collapsing them into one object.
Places to read
- I.1.28aNames of the maker occur within an account distinguishing maker and cosmos.
Translation in this edition
“Name” is direct. Where a name is applied or transferred, make the act of designation clear.
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 32. The excerpt’s author is uncertain; associations with Porphyry or Iamblichus should not become an unqualified attribution.
From the book
The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert, Volumes I–II
Joseph Joubert · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Name
nom
Nom can identify a person or thing, while having a name to lose concerns literary standing or reputation.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordNom can identify a person or thing, while having a name to lose concerns literary standing or reputation.
- In JoubertThe early address to unnamed lovers refuses to invent names for them.
- In this editionThe English translation retains name in both settings.
- A place to beginThe narrator refuses to replace unknown lovers’ names with invented ones.
- English renderings
- name
Meaning
Nom can identify a person or thing, while having a name to lose concerns literary standing or reputation.
Use in the book
The early address to unnamed lovers refuses to invent names for them. The refusal makes naming an act affecting the beloved’s identity within the story, not a harmless literary convenience. By contrast, the note on Bayle and Leclerc says they had a name to lose and regard to preserve, making reputation a constraint on critical judgment. They are said to think of the learned when giving their verdicts. The two uses show why a literal name and public standing should remain distinguishable even when the same English word conveniently serves both.
Places to read
- I, p. 34–35, entry 3, ¶5The narrator refuses to replace unknown lovers’ names with invented ones.
- II, p. 525, entry 13, ¶1A critic’s name is a reputation vulnerable to loss.
Translation in this edition
The English translation retains name in both settings. The lovers’ story has only a conjectural chronological placement in Beaunier; it should not be treated as a precisely dated manifesto about fictional naming. Its paired male and female beloveds remain distinct.
Source note
Beaunier 1938, I, pp. 34, 35; II, pp. 525.