From the book
Phaedrus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordPractice can strengthen memory and ability, but it can also perfect the handling of mistaken opinions. It becomes part of a craft when joined to knowledge, aptitude and discrimination of actual cases.
- In the PhaedrusPhaedrus’ opening ambition is to perform a speech from memory. Socrates imagines his repeated listening, rereading favourite parts and going outside to practise (228a–b). Once the book is discovered beneath the cloak, Socrates refuses to be a practice audience when Lysias himself is supposedly present in the written speech (228d–e). The exchange makes rehearsal a bodily and social activity: a walker needs a hearer, and the hearer may resist being used.
- In this editionThe edition’s “having practised the opinions” at 260c keeps the direct object of μελετᾶν visible: the speaker has not thereby acquired knowledge of good and bad. “Want of practice of memory” at 275a translates ἀμελετησίᾳ with its genitive μνήμης. The causal claim is Thamus’ within Socrates’ narrated exchange.
- A place to readRepeated listening, rehearsal and the refused practice audience.
Meaning
Practice is repeated exercise that develops an ability, such as rehearsing a speech or training memory. Socrates jokes that Phaedrus wants to practise Lysias’ speech on him (228e). Later he combines natural aptitude, knowledge and practice in becoming an accomplished speaker, calling the combination likely and perhaps necessary (269d). Practice can strengthen good judgement, but it can also perfect persuasion based on an audience’s mistaken beliefs.
Use in the book
Phaedrus’ opening ambition is to perform a speech from memory. Socrates imagines his repeated listening, rereading favourite parts and going outside to practise (228a–b). Once the book is discovered beneath the cloak, Socrates refuses to be a practice audience when Lysias himself is supposedly present in the written speech (228d–e). The exchange makes rehearsal a bodily and social activity: a walker needs a hearer, and the hearer may resist being used.
The rhetoric argument separates exercise from its standard. A speaker can have practised the multitude’s opinions and nevertheless persuade a similarly ignorant city to exchange good actions for bad (260c). Repetition and audience familiarity do not correct ignorance of good and bad. The craftless knack challenged at 260e is not defeated by denying that it sometimes works; it is defeated as a claim to explanatory and responsible expertise.
At 269d Socrates proposes the familiar combination of nature, knowledge and practice. If the native capacity is present, adding knowledge and practice can make an orator of note; lacking any ingredient leaves a corresponding deficiency. The statement is offered as likely, perhaps necessary, rather than as a demonstrated law about every person. It also rejects two reductions: natural talent is not sufficient, and written instruction alone does not manufacture the whole practitioner.
The later requirement of perceptive recognition supplies the practical dimension in detail (271d–272a). After learning kinds of souls and speeches, one must observe them in actual actions and keep pace with their manifestations. A pupil who cannot recognize the nature before him still has only the accounts once heard in lessons. Judgement of timeliness completes the transition from preparation to use.
Thamus’ warning about unexercised memory (275a) therefore belongs to a larger pattern. An external aid can weaken an ability if reliance on it replaces its exercise. Yet the knowledgeable writer can store reminders for an old age of forgetfulness (276d). The criticism is of substituting possession of aids for cultivation of the capacity, not of every aid or every act of writing.
Places to read
- 228a–e2Repeated listening, rehearsal and the refused practice audience.
- 260c–e2Practising public opinions without truth.
- 269dNature, knowledge and practice; learning to recognize actual cases.
- 271d–272b2Nature, knowledge and practice; learning to recognize actual cases.
- 273e–274aThe aim of practice, neglected memory and legitimate reminders.
- 275aThe aim of practice, neglected memory and legitimate reminders.
- 276dThe aim of practice, neglected memory and legitimate reminders.
Translation in this edition
The edition’s “having practised the opinions” at 260c keeps the direct object of μελετᾶν visible: the speaker has not thereby acquired knowledge of good and bad. “Want of practice of memory” at 275a translates ἀμελετησίᾳ with its genitive μνήμης. The causal claim is Thamus’ within Socrates’ narrated exchange.
Lexical detail
Μελέτη and μελετᾶν concern practice, rehearsal or sustained attention. Their object matters: a speech, public opinions and gratifying divine masters are different things on which one may practise. The negative noun ἀμελετησία names a lack of such exercise. Training is not restricted to memorizing words, and familiarity through repetition is not itself the completed art.
Attested forms
μελέτην (269d · Burnet p. 59) — “practice”. One ingredient alongside knowledge and natural rhetorical aptitude.
μελετῴη (228b · Burnet p. 2) — “practise”. Socrates imagines why Phaedrus went outside the wall.
μεμελετηκὼς (260c · Burnet p. 46) — “having practised”. The ignorant rhetorician has worked on the multitude’s opinions.
ἀμελετησίᾳ (275a · Burnet p. 67) — “through want of practice”. Thamus’ explanation of the forgetfulness fostered by reliance on writing.
Research and interpretation
Middle Liddell records exercise and an orator’s rehearsal under meletē. The native qualifications at 269d prevent turning the combination into an unqualified universal law. Thamus’s memory criticism at 275a concerns lack of practice through dependence on writing; useful written reminders remain possible.
Liddell and Scott, Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, μελέτη.
ἁρμονία
Harmony is the musical ordering for which isolated technical abilities are only preparations. Socrates imagines a musician telling someone who can produce high and low notes that these skills are necessary but do not yet amount to harmony’s art. The analogy recognizes their use while denying that they are sufficient.
Read: 268e.
harmonia · Harmony · dictionary headword
The ordered relation of musical notes, not mere ability to raise or lower a string.
The gentle musician tells the pretender that he possesses necessary studies before harmony but not harmony’s art. The analogy grants the preliminary ability while denying its sufficiency; it does not mock music or dismiss practical exercise.
Attested: ἁρμονίας (268e · Burnet p. 58) — “harmony”.