Error

Use in the book

Socrates uses practical examples to connect error with false confidence. A nonexpert who knows his limits can leave cooking or steering to the expert. Someone who incorrectly supposes that he knows instead undertakes the action himself. The tripartite distinction at 117e–118a assigns error to this third class, since genuine knowers and appropriately deferential nonknowers have been excluded.

The claim is strong and relies on idealized premises. It assumes that the knowledgeable agent does not commit the relevant error and that the nonknower successfully entrusts the matter to knowledge. The dialogue does not survey accidental mishaps, incomplete expertise, or mistaken identification of an expert. These limits should be stated without hiding the inference the speakers accept.

At 134a the theme returns after the account of self-knowledge. Someone ignorant of self and relevant affairs will not know what he is doing; he will make mistakes and do badly, both privately and publicly. Others for whom he acts will suffer too. Error consequently supplies the bridge between epistemic failure and the danger of political power.

The two arguments belong together. The earlier passage shows why admitting a limit can protect action; the later one shows why an aspiring ruler cannot substitute unlimited license for the understanding he lacks. The remedy is knowledge where possible and appropriate dependence where it is not yet possessed.

Places to read

1. 117d–118a2Mistakes in action are linked with ignorance that thinks it knows
2. 134aA manager’s ignorance harms himself and those for whom he acts
3. 134e–135b2Medical, nautical, and political examples show the danger of power without understanding

Translation in this edition

“Make mistakes” preserves the practical sense. “Without making mistakes” at 117e concerns the matters handed over to others; it should not be expanded into the claim that an acknowledged nonknower is universally morally infallible.

ἁμαρτάνω

Attested: ἁμαρτάνοντες (hamartanontes; 117e). At 117e: Those making mistakes in the practical contrast between knowers, deferential nonknowers, and falsely confident nonknowers. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁμαρτάνω. See Error.

ἁμάρτημα

Attested: ἁμαρτήματα (hamartēmata; 117d). At 117d: Mistakes in action, rather than merely an incorrect statement, which Socrates links to conceit of knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: ἁμάρτημα. See Error.

ἀναμάρτητος

Attested: ἀναμάρτητοι (anamartētoi; 117e). Free from error; nonexperts avoid mistakes in the specified matters by leaving them to those who know, not by possessing universal expertise themselves. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀναμάρτητος. See Error.

ἐξαμαρτάνω

Attested: ἐξαμαρτάνων (examartanōn; 134a). At 134a: Making mistakes in managing affairs, leading to bad action and bad fortune for oneself and others. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξαμαρτάνω. See Error.

Use in the book

At 146a the expert can hit the technical standard of his craft while missing what is best for city and self. The contrast distinguishes success within an operation from success in the life the operation serves. At 146c the many similarly miss the best because they rely on opinion without sense. This failure is specified by its object, not merely by an unsuccessful physical execution.

The mistakes at 147a grow with the force of favourable fortune when guiding knowledge is absent. Resources and strength can enlarge the scale of what goes wrong. The claim is conditional and comparative: apparent advantages increase exposure under the absence of direction. It does not establish that every fortunate person necessarily makes more mistakes than every unfortunate one.

At 148a Socrates asks how Alcibiades could hit the right mark in accepting a divine offer or framing a prayer. The same practical deficiency now affects the immediate errand. At 150a mistakes are explicitly directed against gods and human beings, showing that the vocabulary can include ethically serious wrongs; “mistake” need not mean an innocent trivial slip. Costly sacrifice remains compatible with such wrongdoing and does not cancel it.

Places to read

1. 146aA technically accomplished person can miss the best for city and self.
2. 146cThe many’s reliance on senseless opinion misses the best.
3. 147aLack of guidance lets favourable resources enlarge mistakes.
4. 148aAlcibiades cannot securely hit the appropriate mark in asking or accepting.
5. 150aMistakes against gods and people can coexist with lavish ritual expenditure.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps “miss” for diamartanein and “mistake” for hamartēma and hamartanein. Its “right mark” at 148a belongs to kairos with tychein. The different expressions support a thematic connection without being made into a single invented Greek formula.

Use in the book

Socrates allows at 315d that the companion may be speaking rightly and that the matter has escaped him. The perfect lelēthen locates the possible failure in his own awareness. This acknowledgment precedes his proposal for common examination; it is not an admission that he has accepted every conclusion of the companion's speech.

At 316b hamartanein receives its central philosophical use: whoever misses what is misses the lawful. The parallel genitives give the two failures the same verbal structure. The conclusion makes truth relevant to lawfulness, following the questions about correct judgments. But the text has not examined a particular sacrificial act to establish whether it is in fact just or holy. Its rule tells us that error matters without giving a procedure that resolves every contested case.

The later compound examartanein adds interpersonal and religious stakes. One can err against gods and divine human beings in word or deed (318e), and the companion is warned not to err verbally against Minos as a hero and son of Zeus (319b). Correctly identifying a good person has become a responsibility. Speech based on inherited reputation may itself be wrong even when it repeats what many people say.

Socrates then uses the same compound about Minos' own mistake: making war on Athens and incurring its hatred exposed him to the poets' power (320e–321a). The context makes this a mistake with reputational consequences. It is not presented as a retraction of the claim that Minos was a good lawgiver, and the text does not explicitly adjudicate the justice of the war. The difference matters: error in managing one's reputation, false judgment of a person's goodness, and missing the truth relevant to law are not simply identical offenses.

Places to read

1. 315dἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν — The possibility that the companion's point has escaped Socrates
2. 316bὋς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἁμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἁμαρτάνει — Missing what is means missing the lawful
3. 318eεἰς θεοὺς καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐξαμαρτάνειν — Mistakes against gods in speech and action
4. 319bεἰς ἥρω Διὸς ὑὸν λόγῳ ἐξαμαρτάνῃς — The companion's danger in speaking about Minos
5. 320eὃ δὴ καὶ ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως — Minos' mistake introduces the account of war and hostile poets
6. 321aτοῦτο οὖν ἐξήμαρτεν ὁ Μίνως — The point is repeated as incurring Athenian hatred

Translation in this edition

Hamartanein is “miss,” while examartanein is “make a mistake.” The distinction retains the target-like construction at 316b without forcing the later uses into a single modern moral or theological vocabulary.

Has escaped notice — λανθάνειν (lanthanein)

λανθάνειν (lanthanein)

Has escaped notice. The possible oversight Socrates allows concerning the companion's argument. Attested: λέληθεν (315d). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness.

Make a mistake against — ἐξαμαρτάνειν (examartanein)

ἐξαμαρτάνειν (examartanein)

Make a mistake against. To err or do wrong against someone; with εἰς and its object, the warning concerns wrongs in word and deed against gods and then divine human beings. Attested: ἐξαμαρτάνειν (318e). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness.

Make a consequential mistake — ἐξαμαρτάνειν (examartanein)

ἐξαμαρτάνειν (examartanein)

Make a consequential mistake. The mistake Socrates attributes to Minos in incurring Athenian hostility and exposing his reputation to the poets' vengeance; the passage does not thereby revoke the claim that he was a good lawgiver. Attested: ἐξήμαρτεν (321a). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness.

Miss — ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein)

ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein)

Miss. With what is as its object, the failure that Socrates links directly to missing the lawful. Attested: ἁμαρτάνῃ (316b). Error, missing the mark, and lawfulness.

Whoever misses what is (contextual phrase)

316b: Ὃς ἂν … ἁμαρτάνῃ. The relative with ἄν and subjunctive gives a general condition: whoever misses what is misses the lawful. The genitive marks what is missed. The sentence connects correctness about the object with lawfulness, but does not identify which of the companion's disputed sacrifices meets the condition. Its scope is general; the unworked applications still matter. See Error and missing.

Use in the book

Illusion is explicitly separated from error in the speculative account of sensory relations. Seeing colors without seeing any object is the example of error; the contrary case can place one in both illusion and truth. A different distinction gives physical errors contempt and metaphysical errors the power to please even when recognized or not adopted. The ensuing discussion retains the difficult printed immaterial and should not be silently normalized to material in order to make the contrast simpler. The late false-light passage depicts discussion leaving the mind suspended without a fixed point: falsity there takes a spatial and orientational form.

Places to read

1. I, p. 167, entry 4, ¶3Error differs from the illusion compatible with truth.
2. II, p. 572, entry 2, ¶1Recognized metaphysical error may still please or be admired.
3. II, p. 863, entry 7, ¶1False light and position leave the mind without a resting point.

Translation in this edition

The English translation keeps error, illusion and truth distinct. “In the air” on I.167 renders airs, not arts. The lexicon treats these as Joubert’s specific comparisons; it does not derive a unified theory explaining away their tensions.

Refutation

French: réfutation.

The two related maxims make a reader’s involvement relevant to the tedium of refutation. The first excludes errors belonging to ourselves, friends or enemies and specifies length; the second excludes participation through ourselves or friends without naming enemies or length. The English translation retains the differences instead of producing a composite maxim. Neither witness says that an error is true merely because its refutation is tedious.

Places to read: II, p. 745, entry 8, ¶1; II, p. 748, entry 6, ¶1.

Use in the book

Traherne’s errors are often errors of use: people cannot enjoy what they have misunderstood. The wrong conception of a tool makes it unusable; a wrong conception of the world or soul has correspondingly greater consequences. Monetary valuations learned in childhood illustrate how something artificial can acquire the appearance of nature. Recovery requires more than exposing a false proposition. The newly understood principle must be practised until knowledge, esteem, gratitude, and joy regain their proper sequence.

Places to read

1. III.9Training in the value of money and ornaments confuses invented riches with natural goods.
2. IV.15Misunderstanding a saw or knife illustrates the far greater danger of misapprehending the world.
3. IV.54Simple principles of thankful enjoyment have been submerged in errors and customs.

In this edition

“Error” need not imply a deliberate lie. The book is especially concerned with inherited and sincerely maintained mistakes whose practical effects resemble those of conscious vice.