Timing and duration

Use in the book

At 145b the adviser must know whether it is better to advise and when it is better. War requires the further discrimination of how long it is better to continue, and coercive action requires knowing when and against whom it is better. These are not incidental embellishments to an already complete account of intelligence: they are the examples through which the difference between technical ability and guiding judgment becomes visible.

At 145e–146a the imagined commonwealth lacks the person who knows when to use each expert and toward whom. Here timing belongs to the coordination of people and capacities, not simply to the internal technique of one craft. At 148a Socrates applies the wider problem to Alcibiades’ immediate choice before a god: accepting an offered gift or specifying a request still requires hitting what is appropriate.

The end turns temporal discrimination into action. Alcibiades must wait until he learns; he asks when that time will arrive; and he postpones the sacrifice until then. This is a practical boundary linked to readiness, not a scheduled date. His hope at 151b that the day will come before long remains conditional on the gods’ willingness and does not show that the education has already been completed.

Places to read

1. 145bAdvice, war and coercion require discriminating time, duration and object.
2. 145e–146aThe right user of specialists must know when to employ each.
3. 148aThe choice of a request is described as hitting the appropriate mark.
4. 150d–151a2Waiting is tied to learning and postponement to readiness.
5. 151bThe hoped-for day remains future and dependent on divine willingness.

Translation in this edition

At 145b Burnet’s “when” follows a correction in the Venetus 184; B and T have ho, which would yield “what is better”. The edition follows the printed reading but makes the variation explicit. Kairos at 148a is translated by a target image, not mechanically as “time”.