Τ Tau

the things that are

τὰ ὄντα

The things that are: the whole of what exists, over which the dialogue asks what becomes plain, what relates to itself, and what the name temperance names · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseThe neuter plural participle of εἰμί, “be”: the things that are, everything there is, reality.
  • In the CharmidesFour times, always in the genitive: three times of all things together, that “each of the things that are should become plain” (166d), whether “none of the things that are” relates to itself (169a), and “to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name” (175b); and once, at 174b, of the present beside the past and the future, in the knowledge “of the things that are and have been and are going to be”.
  • In this edition“The things that are”.
  • A place to read166c–d and 175b.
English renderings
τῶν ὄντων, tōn ontōn, “(of) the things that are”

Meaning

Τὰ ὄντα in ordinary Greek can mean one’s property, or the facts, or the truth of a matter. In philosophy it is the whole of what is, and in Plato often what truly is as against what only appears. The Charmides uses it in the widest sense, a range over which a question is asked.

Use in the book

Each use asks a question of everything at once. The first states the inquiry’s aim. Critias has accused Socrates of trying to refute him, and Socrates answers that he examines the argument for his own sake, and perhaps for his friends’: “Or is it not a common good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is?” (166d; see καταφανής; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). The things that are form the object of the inquiry, and their becoming plain is its good.

The second asks a question no one present can answer. It needs a great man to determine “whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or whether some are and some are not” (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἄλλο). The question about temperance has become a question about all things, and Socrates declines it.

The third is the scope of the imagined man’s knowledge, “of the things that are and have been and are going to be” (174b; see τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα). The fourth is the ending: “we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance” (175b; see νομοθέτης; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα).

The four uses can be read as the dialogue’s arc. It sets out to make each of the things that are plain as it is; it meets a question about the things that are too large for it; it imagines a man who knows them all and finds that this knowledge does not make him happy; and it ends unable to say which of them temperance is. The name was given by a lawgiver to one of the things that are, and the inquiry has not found which.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

  1. 166dIt is a common good that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is.
  2. 169aIt needs a great man to determine whether any of the things that are has its power in relation to itself.
  3. 174bWhich knowledge, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes the man happy?
  4. 175bThey cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave the name temperance.

Translation in this edition

“The things that are” at all four places, 166d6, 169a3, 174b1 and 175b3. At 175b3 “cannot discover” follows εὑρεῖν, a variant recorded in T, where B and T have ἔχειν; at 175b4 later manuscripts read ὀνοματοθέτης, “name-giver”, for νομοθέτης, “lawgiver” (apparatus; see νομοθέτης).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Phaedo Socrates divides the things that are into two kinds. What is always the same, beauty itself and equality itself, can be grasped only by the reasoning of thought, and is unseen; what is never the same, beautiful men and horses and cloaks, can be touched and seen and perceived. “Shall we then posit two kinds of the things that are, the one visible, the other unseen?” Cebes agrees, and that the unseen is always the same and the visible never (78d–79a). The Charmides’ things that are are not yet divided, and its question about temperance asks among which of them to look.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle calls it the question sought of old, sought now and always, and always a puzzle: what being is, which comes to the question what substance is.1 Socrates’ last words on temperance, that he cannot discover which of the things that are bears its name, can be read as putting the Charmides inside that perplexity, in miniature.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.1, 1028b2–4.