Τ Tau

everything that is now

τὰ νῦν ὄντα

The things that are now: the present, the third of the times the imagined man of perfect knowledge knows · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseThe things that are now, the present state of affairs.
  • In the CharmidesAt 174a, where Socrates imagines a man who, besides the future, “knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing”, and at 174b, where the present heads the list: “the things that are and have been and are going to be”.
  • In this edition“Everything that is now”; “the things that are”.
  • A place to read173e–174b.
English renderings
τὰ νῦν ὄντα, ta nyn onta, “everything that is now”

Meaning

Νῦν, “now”, limits τὰ ὄντα, “the things that are”, to the present. The adverb makes the difference between being in time and being simply, which the phrase τὰ ὄντα without it can also mean (see τὰ ὄντα).

Use in the book

The present is the last thing Socrates adds to the prophet’s knowledge, and the least remarkable. The prophet knows the future; the other man knows the past as well, “and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing” (174a; see τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ μέλλοντα). To know what is now seems the easiest of the three, and yet it is the one that completes the figure. Everyone sees something of the present, and no one sees all of it: the boy, asked at 158b–c whether temperance is present in him, ends by saying that he does not know whether he has it (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω), and the doctor, Critias allows, may not know whether the treatment he is giving is beneficial (164b). The imagined man’s knowledge of all that is now would include both, and Socrates’ question at once reduces it to a part: which of his knowledges makes him happy? Not the knowledge of the present either, but the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

The order of 174b, the things “that are and have been and are going to be”, is the seer’s old order, the present first (Iliad 1.70; see τὰ μέλλοντα), and here it can be read as fitting the dialogue’s question: its question is what temperance is, now, in the boy, and whether it would benefit him; the past is his ancestry and the future what Socrates says he is likely to be, “first in everything” (158a–b), and neither answers it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the present is named among the objects of knowledge.

  1. 174aThe imagined man knows everything that has happened and everything that is now.
  2. 174bWhich knowledge, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes him happy?

Translation in this edition

“Everything that is now” for τὰ νῦν ὄντα at 174a5, and “the things that are” for τῶν ὄντων at 174b1, where the present heads the sequence.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Timaeus says that “was” and “will be” belong only to what comes to be in time. Days and nights, months and years, are parts of time, and “was” and “will be” are forms of time that has come to be, which we wrongly carry over to eternal being: we say that it was, is and will be, but “is” alone belongs to it in truth, while “was” and “will be” fit becoming, which moves in time. And even of things in time, Timaeus adds, we speak inexactly when we say that what has come to be is come to be, and what is coming to be is coming to be (37e–38b). The Charmides’ omniscient man knows the three times of the seer; on the Timaeus’ account all three, the present included, are times of what comes to be, and the “is” proper to eternal being is no tense of time, so that his knowledge, however complete, can be read as reaching only what comes to be.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle divides oratory by the times. The hearer is either a spectator or a judge, and a judge either of what has happened or of what will be; so there are three kinds of speech: the counsellor’s, about the future, since he advises for or against what will be; the litigant’s, about the past, since he accuses or defends what was done; and the speaker of praise and blame, whose most proper time is the present, since all praise or blame according to what is there, though they often recall the past and guess at the future. Each kind has its own end besides: the advantageous and the harmful for the counsellor, the just and the unjust for the litigant, the noble and the shameful for the speaker of praise.1 Aristotle’s three times can be read as the seer’s, divided among three speakers; and the one whose end is benefit and harm, the counsellor, speaks of what will be, not of what is or was.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3, 1358a36–b29.