Ψ Psi

a liar

ψευδής

The word of the boy’s dilemma: to deny that he is temperate would make his guardian a liar · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordFalse, untrue; of a person, lying or mistaken, a liar. Akin to ψεύδομαι, “lie”, “be deceived”.
  • In the CharmidesOnce, in the boy’s reason for not answering: “I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar” (158d).
  • In this edition“A liar”.
  • A place to read158c–e.
English renderings
ψευδῆ, pseudē, “a liar”

Meaning

Ψευδής is said of words, of things and of men. A false statement is one that is not so; a false man is one whose statements are not so, whether he means to deceive or has been deceived himself. The boy’s sentence uses the second sense in its mildest form. Critias would be shown to have said something untrue about his ward, not to be a cheat.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked the boy whether he agrees with Critias that he already has a sufficient share of temperance. The boy blushes and says that it is not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny (158c; see ἀνερυθριάω). To deny, he says, would be an odd thing to say against oneself, and “at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate, by his account”; to affirm would be self-praise (158d; see αἰσχυντηλός; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ἔξαρνος). Socrates calls the answer sensible, and proposes that they look into it together (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι).

The dilemma rests on testimony. Whether the boy is temperate has been settled, so far, by what Critias says and many others think, and the boy cannot answer for himself without contradicting them. Socrates’ remedy is to replace testimony with inquiry: the boy is to say what temperance seems to him to be, and from that they can make a guess whether he has it (159a). The boy’s fear can be read as fulfilled in another way. Critias is not shown a liar about his ward, but his own definitions are shown false one after another, and when he is caught at a loss he hides it, “ashamed in front of the company” (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). Socrates’ own fear at 166d is of a different falsehood: he refutes, he says, for the reason he would scrutinize himself, “for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don’t” (166d; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι). The boy fears making another man false in words; Socrates fears being false in his own mind.

Places to read

The word’s place.

  1. 158dTo deny that he is temperate would show up Critias as a liar; to affirm it would be self-praise.

Translation in this edition

“Showing up Critias here as a liar” renders καὶ Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῆ ἐπιδείξω (158d3); a conjecture on the verb is told elsewhere (see ἐπιδείκνυμι). “A liar” gives the adjective, used of a person, the English noun.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic can be read as naming the falsehood Socrates fears. All gods and men, Socrates tells Adeimantus, hate what is truly a lie, if one may call it that: no one is willing to be deceived in the most sovereign part of himself about the most sovereign things, and everyone is most afraid of having falsehood there. To be deceived in the soul about the things that are, and to be ignorant, and to hold the lie there, is what men would least accept; so the ignorance in the soul of the deceived man would most rightly be called the true lie, while the lie in words is an imitation of what the soul undergoes, an image that comes after it (2.382a–c). On those terms the boy’s fear concerns the imitation, and Socrates’ the original.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, distinguishes the senses in which things, accounts and men are false. A false account is an account of what is not; a false man is one who takes up such accounts readily and by preference, as an end and not as a means to something further, and also one who plants them in others. So, he says, the argument of the Hippias leads us astray when it concludes that the same man is false and true: it counts as false the man with the power to lie, and that is the man of knowledge and good sense.1 On the first part of that definition Critias, who believed what he said of his ward, can be read as mistaken at worst, not false; on the second, since many others think the boy temperate by his account (158d), he would come nearer to it. The Hippias Minor’s argument itself is told elsewhere (366e–367a; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης).

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.29, 1024b17–1025a13.