Φ Phi

seem, appear

φαίνομαι

How things look and what seems so: the boy’s appearance in the prologue, and the answerer’s own view in the argument · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo be brought to light, to appear; with a dative, to seem to someone: the middle and passive of φαίνω, “bring to light”.
  • In the CharmidesOften, from the boy’s approach (154a) to the last page. In the prologue it is how the boy looks: “nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me” (154b). In the argument it is what the answerer thinks: “you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?” (159a).
  • In this edition“Look”, “seem”, “strike as”, “appear”, and in answers “It seems so”, “It appears so”.
  • A place to read154b–d and 158c–159a.
English renderings
φαίνονται, phainontai, “looks”; ἐφάνη, ephanē, “struck me as”, “looked”; φαίνεται, phainetai, “do you think”, “seems”

Meaning

Φαίνομαι is to come to light and so to be seen. With a participle it means to be evidently so; with an infinitive or a dative, to seem so to someone, which may or may not be so. Greek kept both senses in one verb, and the difference between appearing and being was one Plato’s Socrates pressed on his partners. In conversation the verb is also the plainest way of asking what someone thinks, “how does it seem to you?”, and of answering, “it seems so”.

Use in the book

The prologue is a story of appearances. Socrates confesses that “nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me” (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη); when the boy came in, “he struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty” (154c); Chaerephon asks, “what do you think of the young man?” (154d; see ὑπερφυῶς); and when Socrates asks whether he is temperate, the boy blushes and “he looked even more beautiful” (158c; see αἰσχυντηλός). Each of these is about how the boy looks, and the beauty that appears is unquestioned.

Then the verb turns from the boy’s looks to the boy’s mind. Socrates asks him to say what temperance seems to him to be: “Well then, this opinion of yours … since you know how to speak Greek, you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?” (159a; see δοξάζω; ἑλληνίζω). After the first definition fails he asks him again to look within himself and say “what it seems to you to be” (160d–e; see ἐμβλέπω); and when Critias complains that Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about, Socrates tells him to “answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted” (166d–e; see ἐάω; ἐλέγχω). The appearance asked for is now an opinion, and it is to be given honestly, as it seems, and then tested.

The dialogue can be read as moving through the verb’s range. What appeared in the prologue was taken as it appeared: the boy is beautiful. What seems so in the argument is taken only to be examined, and most of what seems so to the boy and to Critias does not survive. At the end the verb carries Socrates’ reproach to himself: what is agreed to be the finest of all things “would not have turned out to be of no use to us”, if he were of any use at inquiring (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής). The beauty that appeared at the door is the one appearance the dialogue never tests.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb concerns how the boy looks, or asks what seems so to the answerer; its other uses, among them Critias’ guess at 154a and the answerers’ “It seems so” and “It appears so”, are not listed.

  1. 154bNearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to Socrates.
  2. 154cThe boy struck Socrates as a marvel of stature and beauty.
  3. 154dChaerephon: what do you think of the young man?
  4. 158cBlushing, the boy looked even more beautiful.
  5. 159aThe boy could surely say what temperance seems to him to be.
  6. 160eOnce more: what does temperance seem to him to be?
  7. 166dCritias is to answer as it seems to him.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders by context: “looks” for φαίνονται (154b10), “struck me as” and “looked” for ἐφάνη (154c1, 158c6), “do you think” for τί σοι φαίνεται (154d1), “seems” in the requests of 159a7, 160e1 and 166d9, and “It seems so”, “It appears so”, “So it appears” in the answerers’ replies. At 154b9 the English completes Plato’s proverb, as the edition’s note at 154b explains (see λευκὴ στάθμη).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Theaetetus builds a theory of knowledge on the verb. Protagoras says, Socrates recalls, that a human being is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not; which means that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you. When the same wind blows, one of us shivers and the other does not; is the wind cold in itself, or cold for the one who shivers? And “it appears” is “he perceives”, so that appearance and perception are the same, and perception is always of what is and cannot be false, as knowledge is (152a–c). On Protagoras’ account what seems so to the answerer is so, for him; on Socrates’ practice in the Charmides, what seems so is where the examination begins.