Ο Omicron

household

οἰκία

House, family, household: the word that joins the boy’s descent, the work of a craft and the city run by knowledge · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordA house; the people of a house, a family; the household with its property and management.
  • In the CharmidesSeven times, in three senses: of the boy’s family (154e, 157e, 158a), of a house as the work of house-building (165e), and of the household run by temperance (171e, 172d).
  • In this edition“Family”, “house”, “household”.
  • A place to read171d–172a.
English renderings
οἰκίας, oikias, “family”, “household”; οἰκίαι, oikiai, “houses”; οἰκία, oikia, “family”, “house”, “household”

Meaning

Οἰκία and οἶκος overlap. Οἰκία is first the building; then the family that lives in it and its line of descent, as in English “the house of”; then the household as a unit of property and management, the sphere of οἰκονομία, “household management”. A great family was a house, and its standing was a matter of the house’s fame.

Use in the book

The three senses follow the dialogue’s course. In the prologue the word is the boy’s descent. Socrates says he ought to be well made in his soul, “coming from your family” (154e; see εὖ πέφυκα), and praises the “two houses in Athens” the boy is sprung from, his father’s, the house of Critias son of Dropides, and his mother’s, of which “that whole house is in no way inferior to the other” (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; πατρῷος). Here οἰκία is a lineage and a reputation, the beauty and virtue of a house praised by poets.

In the argument with Critias it becomes a thing made: “a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving” (165e; see ἔργον; οἰκοδομική), the visible product of a craft, against which Critias sets the kinds of knowledge with no such product. And at the end of that argument it is the household, managed: a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city too (171e; see οἰκέω), and at 172d Socrates withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good as the guide of the management of both (see διοίκησις). The household stands beside the city as the two fields a ruling knowledge would govern.

The movement can be read as a change in what makes a house good. The house praised at 157e–158a is good by birth, and the boy is expected to be good because of it (see γεννάω); the household of 171e would be good because knowledge ran it. Between them is the house as a craftsman’s work, good if it is well built. The dialogue begins by praising a house for what it has inherited, and ends by asking what knowledge could make any house well run.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 154eThe boy ought to be well made in his soul, coming from Critias’ family.
  2. 157eNo two houses in Athens could produce finer offspring; the father’s side is the house of Critias son of Dropides.
  3. 158aThe mother’s house, for which the boy’s uncle Pyrilampes stands, is in no way inferior.
  4. 165eA house is the work of house-building, as a cloak is of weaving.
  5. 171eA household run by temperance would be bound to be run well.
  6. 172dSocrates withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good as guide of the management of household and city.

Translation in this edition

“Family” renders οἰκίας at 154e3 and οἰκία at 157e5, where the English adds “the house of Critias son of Dropides” for the apposition ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου; “houses” renders οἰκίαι (157e2), and “house” οἰκία at 158a6 and 165e7; “household” renders οἰκία at 171e5 and οἰκίας at 172d4. At 157e5 οἰκία is the reading of T and W; B has οὐσία, “property”. At 157e2 Burnet prints δύο from the Aldine, the first printed edition of Plato (Venice, 1513), (B, T and W δυοῖν), and “whose union would be likely to produce” follows T’s συνελθοῦσαι and γεννήσειαν (B καὶ νῦν ἐλθοῦσαι, B and W γενήσεται).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, a Socratic conversation on running a household, begins by asking what household management is, and then what the household is. Socrates and Critobulus agree that household management is a knowledge like carpentry, and that a man who had it could manage another’s household for pay, as a builder builds for others. Then Socrates asks whether the household, οἶκος, is the same as the house, οἰκία, or whether everything a man owns outside the house belongs to the household too. Critobulus says it includes all he owns, even in another city. But some men own enemies: are they part of a man’s possessions? That would be absurd. So the household is possession, and possession only what is good for its owner; what harms him, Critobulus says, he reckons damage, not wealth.1 The argument can be read as drawing, independently of Plato, the same line as Critias at 163c–d, where what is one’s own is what is good for one and the harmful belongs to others (see οἰκεῖος).

Aristotle makes the household the first of human communities. Out of the partnerships of man and woman and of master and slave the household comes first, and Hesiod spoke rightly, “A house first of all, a woman, and a plough-ox”, since for the poor the ox stands in for a servant. The household is the community formed by nature for the needs of every day, whose members Charondas, the lawgiver of Catana in Sicily, calls “sharers of the bread-bin”, and Epimenides the Cretan, the seer, “sharers of the manger”; the village is the first community of several households, for more than daily needs, and the city is formed from villages.2

Source note

1. Xenophon, Oeconomicus 1.1–7.

2. Aristotle, Politics 1.2, 1252b9–16, 27–28; Hesiod, Works and Days 405.