Ο Omicron

what he knows and that he knows

ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν

What one knows, and that one knows: the distinction that reduces the knowledge of knowledge to knowing that, not what · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTwo clauses after the same verb: ὅ, the relative, “what” he knows; ὅτι, the conjunction, “that” he knows.
  • In the CharmidesAt 170c: “Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.”
  • In this edition“What he knows”, “that he knows”.
  • A place to read170a–d.
English renderings
ὃ οἶδεν … ἀλλ’ ὅτι οἶδεν μόνον, ho oiden … all’ hoti oiden monon, “what he knows, but only that he knows”

Meaning

Greek can make the object of “know” a thing (ὅ, “what”) or a fact (ὅτι, “that”), and the two clauses differ by a syllable. To know what one knows is to know the content of one’s knowledge, that it is medicine and of the healthy; to know that one knows is to know only that there is some knowledge in one. The distinction is the instrument by which Socrates takes the knowledge of knowledge apart.

Use in the book

Socrates first asks what a knowledge that is of knowledge alone could distinguish: “will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?” “No, only that much” (170a; see διαιρέω). Then the consequence: a man who knows only knowledge “would know that he knows something and that he has some knowledge”, but “how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows?” (170b). For he knows the healthy by medicine, the harmonious by music, and so on (170c; see μουσική; οἰκοδομική). “Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows” (170c). The formula Critias accepted at 167a, “knowing what one knows and what one does not know”, has lost its object: temperance would be, “it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know” (170d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν).

The distinction has a practical consequence at once. The temperate man could not examine another who claims to know: “He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know” (170d; see ἐξετάζω). At the end Socrates lists the ὅτι-clause among the concessions they made against the argument, so that “our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it” (175c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The single syllable between ὅ and ὅτι is where the claim for temperance as self-knowledge breaks: a man may know that he knows without knowing what.

Places to read

The passage in which the distinction is drawn, with its consequence and its return.

  1. 170a–bKnowledge of knowledge can distinguish only that this is knowledge and that is not; its possessor knows that he knows something.
  2. 170cWithout medicine or the other kinds of knowledge he will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.
  3. 170dSo temperance would be knowing only that one knows and does not know, and could not examine another.
  4. 175b–c2They conceded that this knowledge knows the works of the other kinds, so that the temperate man would know, of what he knows, that he knows it.

Translation in this edition

“What he knows” renders ὃ οἶδεν and “that he knows” ὅτι οἶδεν (170c9–10), with “only” for μόνον. At 170a the English keeps the formula “to know what one knows and to know what one does not know” with the same verb throughout, as the Glossary explains under “know”.