From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordFinely, well, rightly; the adverb of καλός.
- In the CharmidesFifteen times: “And you think it well said, and you accept the principle?” (156c); “a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well” (171e); “those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well” (172a); “I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to” (172d); and “if I were of any use at inquiring well” (175b).
- In this edition“Well”, “finely”, “right”; “Good for you” for the formula of thanks.
- A place to read171d–172e.
- English renderings
- καλῶς, kalōs, “well”, “finely”, “right”, “(in) good condition”; καλῶς λέγεις, kalōs legeis, “you’re right”; καλῶς ποιῶν, kalōs poiōn, “good for you”
Meaning
Καλῶς is the adverb of καλός and shares its range: finely, handsomely, well, rightly. In conversation it makes two everyday Attic formulas, of assent and of thanks, καλῶς λέγεις, “you’re right”, and καλῶς ποιεῖς, “good for you”, “thank you”. With ἔχειν it means to be in good condition (see ἔχειν καλῶς); with πράττειν, to act finely and to fare well (see εὖ πράττειν).
Use in the book
The adverb has three kinds of use. The first is conversational. Critias agrees to call the boy, “You’re right … We’ll call him”, where the Greek chimes καλῶς with καλοῦμεν, “we call” (155a); Socrates thanks the boy for remembering him, “Good for you” (156a), and thanks Critias in the same words for taking the argument over (162e); Critias assents when Socrates says that one must look into what comes to light, “if one cares for oneself even a little”: “Yes, you’re right” (173a). Between these the adverb carries agreements of substance: the boy thinks the doctors’ principle “well said” (156c; see ἀποδέχομαι), the Thracian grants that the Greeks “were right to say” it (156d; see Ζάλμοξις), and Charmides believes that Homer “is right” about modesty (161a; see αἰδὼς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ).
The second use is of condition: the part cannot be well “when the whole is not in good condition” (156e–157a; see ἔχειν καλῶς).
The third use belongs to the picture of temperance as knowledge of what one knows. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, “a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too” (171e; see ἄρχω; διοίκησις), and, with error removed, those so disposed would “do finely and well in every action” (172a; see εὖ πράττειν). Then Socrates withdraws the agreement in the same adverb: “I don’t think, Critias, we were right to agree to” (172d), and Critias protests, “Then weren’t we right to agree to that?” (172e; see ὁμολογέω). The formula of easy assent that runs through the conversation can be read as the thing examined at 172d: what they were “right to agree” to turns out to have been agreed too easily. At the end Socrates blames his own inquiring: temperance would not have proved of no use, “if I were of any use at inquiring well” (175b; see ζητέω).
Places to read
Every passage in which the adverb occurs.
- 155aCritias: “You’re right … We’ll call him.”
- 156aSocrates thanks the boy: “Good for you.”
- 156c–d2The boy thinks the doctors’ principle well said; the Thracian grants that the Greeks were right.
- 156e–157aThe part cannot be well when the whole is not in good condition.
- 161aHomer is right about modesty.
- 162eSocrates thanks Critias for taking the argument over.
- 163cThings made finely and beneficially Hesiod called works.
- 171eA household and a city run by temperance would be run well.
- 172aThose so disposed would do finely and well in every action.
- 172d–e2Socrates: they were not right to agree; Critias: were they not?
- 173aCritias: “Yes, you’re right.”
- 175bTemperance would not have proved useless if Socrates were any good at inquiring well.
Translation in this edition
“You’re right” for καλῶς λέγεις (155a8, 173a6), “Good for you” for καλῶς ποιῶν (156a9, 162e7), “well said” (156c8), “were right” (156d7), “is right” (161a2), “in good condition” with ἔχειν (156e5, 157a3), “finely” (163c3, 172a1), “run well” (171e6), “right to agree” (172d5, 172e1) and “well” (175b2). At 171e6 “would be bound to be run well” renders οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, the reading of B and W; T has οἰκονομουμένη, “managed”, and puts καλῶς before ἔμελλεν.
Elsewhere in Plato
The First Alcibiades can be read as drawing the reverse of 171e. Socrates leads Alcibiades to agree that whoever does not know his own things will not know those of others, nor the city’s; such a man would be neither a statesman nor a household manager; he will not know what he is doing, and not knowing he will err, and erring he will fare badly in private and in public, and be wretched, and so will those for whom he acts: “so it is not possible, unless one is temperate and good, to be happy” (133e–134a).