From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈναγκαῖος is “necessary”, what ἀνάγκη imposes; its neuter with εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον, is “it is necessary”, “one must”.
- In the CharmidesFive times, always as the impersonal ἀναγκαῖον. The good doctors say one “must treat the head” with the eyes (156b); Critias refuses to accept what “necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier” (164c); whoever wants to examine medicine “must look into it” where it is found (171a–b); those who act without error “must necessarily do finely and well” (172a); and “one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random” (173a).
- In this edition“Must” at 156b, 171a–b and 173a; “necessarily” at 164c; “must necessarily” at 172a.
- A place to read164c–d.
- English renderings
- ἀναγκαῖον, anankaion, “must”, “necessarily”
Meaning
Ἀναγκαῖος (anankaios) is the adjective of ἀνάγκη (see ἀνάγκη). It covers what cannot be otherwise, what is needed for something else, and what is binding on a person; the impersonal ἀναγκαῖον, with an infinitive, says that a thing must be done or must follow. In argument it names the consequence that a partner is bound to grant once he has granted the premises.
Use in the book
The word marks two kinds of “must”, the must of a consequence and the must of a duty, and the dialogue sets them against each other.
The consequence is what Critias will not accept. Socrates has drawn from his definition, the doing of good things, the result that a doctor may act temperately without knowing that he does so. Critias answers that it could never happen, and that if Socrates thinks “that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier”, he would sooner take back some of his agreements than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate (164c–d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀνατίθημι). Faced with a necessary consequence he dislikes, he gives up the premises rather than accept it, and proposes a new definition. The move is legitimate; but it can be read as the first time Critias lets a conclusion decide which premises he will keep, a habit that returns when he tries to bring the knowledge of good and bad under temperance (174d–e).
The chain that leads from temperance to happiness uses the word for a consequence: those without error “must necessarily do finely and well in every action”, and those who do well must be happy (172a; see ἁμαρτία). Socrates does not deny the logic; he withdraws the premise that fed it, that it would be a great good for each of us to do what we knew and hand over the rest to those who knew (172d).
The duty is to look, as the good doctors’ rule is a duty to treat (156b; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). Whoever wants to examine medicine “must look into it in the things in which it is found” (171a–b); and when the dream comes to him, Socrates says, “I think I’m talking nonsense … All the same, one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little” (173a; see εἰκῇ; ληρέω). The necessity of inquiry outranks the speaker’s doubt about his own sense, and it is tied to care of oneself, the very thing the dialogue is trying to define.
The two necessities meet at the end. The argument there has many steps that “did not follow” (175b; see ἄλογος), and Socrates counts them as concessions the partners made, not as consequences the argument forced. The duty to look can be read as reaching back to what one has already agreed to.
Places to read
Every passage in which the word occurs.
- 156bGood doctors say that one cannot cure the eyes alone, but must treat the head at the same time.
- 164c–dIf what Socrates draws necessarily follows from Critias’ earlier agreements, Critias would sooner take some of them back.
- 171a–bWhoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found.
- 172aThose so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy.
- 173aOne must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little.
Translation in this edition
The English never uses the adjective “necessary” for ἀναγκαῖον: it says “must” at 156b8, 171a11 and 173a4, “necessarily follows” for ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν at 164c9, and “must necessarily … must” at 172a2, where the one ἀναγκαῖον governs both καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, “do finely and well”, and εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, “be happy”. The order of the words is Burnet’s: B has καλῶς πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, with the verb twice, and T and W ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν (apparatus, a1). The noun ἀνάγκη has its own renderings (see ἀνάγκη).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Gorgias Socrates claims the opposite strength for a conclusion. Doing wrong, he says, is worse and more shameful than suffering it, and these results, “if one may put it a little coarsely, are pinned down and tied with arguments of iron and adamant, or so at least it would seem as things stand”, which Callicles, or someone more vigorous than he, must undo if he can; yet he adds that his own account is always the same, that he does not know how these things are, only that no one he has met can say otherwise without making himself ridiculous (508e–509a). Necessity there is the strength of an argument that no one has yet undone, and it sits beside a confession of ignorance. Critias, by contrast, treats a consequence he dislikes as a reason to retract.