Appetite

Use in the book

An unnamed speaker calls appetites the pegs fastening soul into body and necessary conditions of attachment to life. The image of the body as a mount with appetites of its own can help conduct, yet Joubert explicitly rejects it as a fixed metaphysical doctrine. That qualification is essential: practical discipline is not an anatomical partition of personhood. Literary taste also needs appetite, whereas the comparison of soul and body distinguishes a taste loving the good from an appetite loving pleasure. The repeated bodily language supplies relations and contrasts rather than one universal appetite theory.

Places to read

1. I, p. 107, entry 10, ¶1Appetites fasten the soul into bodily life in a reported saying.
2. I, p. 405, entry 3, ¶1The body-as-mount image is allowed for practice but rejected as fixed doctrine.
3. II, p. 668, entry 12, ¶1Literature requires appetite as well as taste.
4. II, p. 671, entry 11, ¶1Soul and body are compared through taste for good and appetite for pleasure.

Translation in this edition

The English translation retains pegs, mount and the final squinting-mind fragment. It differentiates the usefulness of an image in morals from its validity in metaphysics. The speaker introduced by he said in the first maxim remains unidentified.

Use in the book

In the Adamic confession, appetite deceives the speaker into exchanging the giver of the world for an apple. The smallness of the object makes the misjudgment startling: a natural power has been directed against a far greater good. II.69 makes the distinction explicit. Human love should not proceed merely as appetite or brutish propensity; its causes and purposes should be understood. Yet Traherne does not imagine felicity as the extinction of wanting. The lyric of Sabbaths on earth describes a delight exceeding all appetites, indicating fulfilment on a scale ordinary cravings cannot measure. Appetite requires interpretation and government, while the capacity for desire remains essential to happiness.

Places to read

1. I.75The first-person confession associates deceptive appetite with the fall through an apple.
2. II.69Rational, well-ordered love is distinguished from mere appetite.
3. III.47The poem’s life of Sabbaths exceeds the measure of ordinary appetites.

In this edition

“Appetite” should not automatically be narrowed to eating: II.69 applies it to the manner of loving. The apple in I.75 is a specific devotional example.

Use in the book

Aëtius first groups Parmenides and Empedocles under the claim that appetite arises from lack of nourishment. He then attributes to Empedocles an account in which the deficient thing desires its like and pleasure accompanies replenishment. A second notice specifies deficiencies of the elements composing each animal.

The progression from nourishment to constituent elements matters. Appetite is not merely named as an abstract wish; its object is related to the animal's composition and what is missing from it. Yet the notices say appetite arises according to or from deficiency; they do not explicitly argue that wanting and shortage are numerically identical. The edition's phrase “the wanting is the shortage” is consequently stronger than the compressed report. Nor do these sentences enumerate every appetite or rule out every non-nutritive form of desire. They preserve one reported physical explanatory scheme, not a complete psychology of motivation.

Places to read

1. A 95 (testimony)Aëtius, first notice. Relates appetite to lack of nourishment and desire for the like.
2. A 95 (testimony)Aëtius, second notice. Relates appetites to deficiencies of the constitutive elements.

Translation in this edition

Keep the shared attribution to Parmenides and Empedocles in the opening clause distinct from the following Empedocles-only formulations. Compression in a compilation should not be mistaken for a continuous original passage.

Use in the book

Appetite is directed tendency toward good, whether the good is absent and sought or present and embraced. It extends beyond bodily hunger and conscious human wishes. Ficino distinguishes insentient nature's inclination, sensation's appetite, and intellect's will. An object moves desire as good rather than simply as large or numerous: among things judged bad, people prefer the fewer or smaller. A thing in motion likewise seeks a completion it lacks, revealing dependence upon a more perfect source.

The universal orientation of desire supports an argument about origin and end. Effects seek the goodness from which they receive being, preservation, and perfection. All things desire good, whereas not all can attain or desire mind. Goodness thus has wider scope than intelligence, and the mind itself seeks understanding because it is good. A proposed principle beyond goodness would either be undesired or desirable through goodness, defeating its supposed superiority. A first source and final end supply what moves and settles appetite; an endless sequence of higher goals would leave it without ultimate orientation. In the reported account of mind's presence, essential, vital, and intellectual inclinations toward God are distinguishable, with essential orientation preceding deliberate thought.

This necessity does not make each particular judgment correct. A person can seek a harmful thing under an apparent good, or choose among means while remaining necessarily oriented toward goodness as such. Ficino compares appetite to sight finding light in every color: the common object does not erase differences among particular objects. Even a wish to desire nothing presents freedom from desire as a good. Apparent wisdom may satisfy someone who lacks it, although life requires possession of what that person actually judges beneficial.

Book IV gives desire a cosmological role. God moves heaven as a desired end, while an interior living form desires that good and brings about bodily movement. Celestial desire is portrayed as rational rather than blind like a stone's tendency or irrational like a beast's appetite. Thought arouses appetite within the soul's ordered or fated activity. Euclid's projected journey illustrates the difference between a general plan and particular execution: imagination presents a step, appetite selects it, and the feet perform it.

Ficino also attributes desire to matter and celestial bodies without implying human-like deliberation. Matter seeks forms it cannot possess simultaneously, so succession offers a qualified fulfillment. Saturn's sphere seeks through movement to enjoy everywhere the soul that is already wholly present everywhere. Desire here expresses an inferior mode of being's orientation toward fuller realization; the subject and object determine its particular meaning.

Further passage references. I.2.14; I.5.4–I.5.623; I.6.14, I.6.16–I.6.19234; II.1.2; II.1.6–72; II.3.9–102; II.6.23; II.7.4–52; II.11.29–302; II.12.5–62; II.13.29–302; IV.1.61–IV.1.622; IV.2.1–IV.2.22; IV.2.13–IV.2.16234; IV.2.20; IV.2.25

Places to read

1. I.2.14Choosing smaller or fewer bad things shows that quantity alone is not desire’s object.
2. I.5.4–623Motion seeks a completion lacking in the moving thing.
3. I.6.16–19234Desire for the Good has wider scope and greater priority than desire for mind.
4. II.13.30Free judgement selects among means to the good rather than cancelling the basic orientation toward good.

Translation in this edition

The translation distinguishes desire, inclination, appetite and will according to the subject and object. “As good” or “in respect of good” translates ratione boni: an apparent good may be pursued without the agent’s judgement being correct.

absens / praesens

absens / praesens. Printed forms: absens; praesens; praesenti.

Absent / present. The good is sought when absent and embraced when present; appetite is not confined to unsatisfied desire. References: II.11.29. See Appetite and desire.

appetibile / effectrix

appetibile / effectrix. Printed forms: appetibile; effectrixque.

An object of desire; a producer of motion. God moves as the good sought, while an interior desiring form produces the body's movement toward that end. References: IV.1.61. See Appetite and desire.

appetibilis / appetere

appetibilis / appetere. Printed forms: appetant; appetere; appetibilia; appetibilis; appetitum; appetitus.

Desirable, and directed appetite toward what presents itself as good. Desire requires a first source and final end; intelligence is itself desired as a good. References: II.1.5, II.1.6, II.3.9, II.9.2. See Appetite and desire.

appetitus excitatus

appetitus excitatus. Printed forms: appetitum; excitatur.

Appetite aroused by cognition. Heavenly motion is compared with a human soul moving its body through appetite awakened by thought. References: IV.2.1. See Appetite and desire.

aviditas caeca

aviditas caeca. Printed forms: aviditas; caeca; irrationalis.

Desire that is blind or nonrational. Ficino denies these descriptions of the heavenly desire because of its superior order and proximity to truth. References: IV.1.62. See Appetite and desire.

cupere / avidus

cupere / avidus. Printed forms: avida; cupere; cupiunt.

To desire or yearn, with avidus marking eager orientation. The desire of effects for unity, truth, and goodness is used to identify the source they seek again. References: II.1.2, II.1.7. See Appetite and desire.

expetere / desiderare

expetere / desiderare. Printed forms: desideratur; expetendaque; expetunt.

To seek or desire something considered good. Existence, life, and knowledge are desirable; seeking beyond goodness would contradict the stated ground of desire. References: II.1.6, II.2.15, II.6.10. See Appetite and desire.

gustus

gustus. Printed forms: gustus.

Taste, savor, or appetite. Being devoid of every gustus is rejected as an absurd account of God’s relation to good; the sense is appetitive, not bodily tasting. References: II.12.12. See Appetite and desire.

illicere

illicere. Printed forms: illecta.

Attract or entice. Things’ desire for divine goodness is itself explained as a good attraction proceeding from that source. References: II.13.3. See Appetite and desire.

impulsus / incitamentum

impulsus / incitamentum. Printed forms: impulsu; incitamentum.

An impulse or prompting. Reason prompts the search for wisdom, but desire for the Good is said to precede rational prompting and to govern it. References: I.6.17, I.6.18, I.6.19. See Appetite and desire.

inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas

inclinatio / appetitus / voluntas. Printed forms: appetitum; inclinationem; voluntatem.

Inclination / appetite / will. The three terms distinguish the modes attributed to insentient nature, sensation, and intellect, not three unrelated final goods. References: II.11.29. See Appetite and desire.

instinctus / niti

instinctus / niti. Printed forms: conaretur; instinctu; instinctum; nititur.

An inclination or directed impulse; to strive toward. Essential, vital, and intellectual orientations are distinguished in that order before the theory infers mental presence. References: II.6.23. See Appetite and desire.

nixus / nitor / conor

nixus / nitor / conor. Printed forms: conatur; nititur; nixum; nixus.

Striving, to strive, and to endeavour. Pure mind’s striving must improve it rather than worsen or leave it unchanged, so Ficino argues it receives goodness from a superior source. References: I.6.16, I.6.17. See Appetite and desire.

opto / cupio

opto / cupio. Printed forms: cupit; optat.

To desire or long for an object. Desiring to know God and the mind’s desire for truth’s light concern intellectual orientation rather than bodily appetite alone. References: Proem.4, I.1.6. See Appetite and desire.

ratio appetendi

ratio appetendi. Printed forms: ratio appetendi.

The ground or rationale of desiring. Ficino says the entire ground of desire is contained in goodness, excluding a desirable source beyond it. References: II.1.7. See Appetite and desire.

ratio boni

ratio boni. Printed forms: ratione boni.

In respect of good or because of goodness. Objects move appetite as good, not simply as large or numerous; among things judged bad, smaller or fewer can be preferred. References: I.2.14. See Appetite and desire.

vacatio appetendi

vacatio appetendi. Printed forms: appetendi vacationem.

Cessation or freedom from desiring. Even wanting to desire no further is presented as choosing that rest under the aspect of good. References: II.13.29. See Appetite and desire.

Use in the book

V.4.6 connects natural action with propagation of the agent's perfection. An element, plant or animal produces something like itself as far as its powers permit. Ficino uses this to deny that an agent's natural aim is the annihilation of the very subject required for a new work. The claim does not deny that one living organism destroys or consumes another; it distinguishes destruction of a particular form from a directed act whose end would be absolute nothingness.

V.4.7 makes the underlying teleology explicit. Natural appetite tends toward good, identified here with life, being and similar perfections, rather than their contraries. The supreme good implants that direction in all subordinate things. From their source of being they receive movement, and toward that same source they are borne. Every appetite and operation arising from good therefore tends and turns back toward good.

The repeated directional expressions do real work. Source is not simply the earliest item in a chronology. It is the cause from which an existent receives being and the end toward which its natural activity is ordered. The passage thus prepares the later efficient-and-final dependence that soul retains even while free from matter. It also complements circular self-return without making the two identical: one concerns an effect's return toward its good source, the other the soul's gathering activity into itself.

The proof remains framed by the claim of divine governance in V.4.2. Ficino is not deriving providence from contemporary observation of every natural event, nor saying every particular human desire is morally admirable. He is specifying the good that natural appetite seeks under the metaphysical description of preserving or communicating form and life. Later appetitive arguments can therefore distinguish natural vivification from deliberate wishing and can criticize desires without retracting this general direction.

Places to read

1. V.4.2Nature’s nonannihilating aim is grounded in divine goodness.
2. V.4.6, V.4.7Propagation of perfection is connected explicitly to movement from and return toward good.
3. V.5.1, V.14.2Efficient/final dependence and natural rather than deliberate vivification clarify the scope.

Translation in this edition

The edition preserves the unde/inde/illuc sequence and reflectiturque, “and turns back.” Omnibus sequentibus means things following after the supreme good in the hierarchy; it need not mean events occurring later on a timeline.

unde / inde / illuc

unde / inde / illuc. Printed forms: illuc; inde; Unde.

Unde means from where or from which source; inde means from there or from that source; illuc means toward there. In the coordinated sentence at V.4.7 the source from which things have being is also that from which they are moved and toward which they are borne. The adverbs articulate origin, impulse and return to the good; unde here should not be flattened into a mere inferential “therefore.” References: V.4.7. See Natural striving, source and return.

Use in the book

An inclination and a faculty

The account of movement reports a threefold appetite, expressly introduced as the view of “some.” Natural appetite includes a stone’s tendency to fall, vegetative retention and expulsion, and hunger and thirst. Sensitive appetite is shared by humans and other animals. Voluntary or intellectual appetite should command the other two in humans, but Burton says that it is commonly overruled by them. The first kind does not require conscious wanting; the third is not automatically successful self-command.

The sensitive account then makes appetite pursue what sense approves as good and avoid what it judges evil. “Omnia appetunt bonum” is immediately qualified: things seek their good, or at least their apparent good. The classification is therefore about the object as apprehended, not a guarantee that every desire is morally sound or beneficial. The concupiscible and irascible powers divide this appetitive life into attraction and aversion, and anger or resistance. The later rope image stresses their intermixture; both may be good when moderate and harmful when excessive.

Will is separately defined as “our rationall Appetite.” It responds to what understanding has apprehended and judged, whereas sensitive appetite follows sense. Burton distinguishes their objects: the particular and pleasant for the latter, the universal, immaterial and morally honourable for the former. He also distinguishes freedom: sensitive appetite cannot help desiring an apparently suitable good, while will retains freedom in some operations despite its corruption. The following theological limitation concerns spiritual matters and explicitly excepts those regenerated and led by the Spirit. Neither sensitive appetite’s necessity nor the will’s freedom should be transferred indiscriminately across these distinctions.

The apparent good can be disastrously mistaken. Burton repeats “Omnia appetunt bonum” when explaining why severely distressed sufferers hope to find relief in death. “As they hope” and “in shew at least” place the supposed benefit in their apprehension; the next paragraph challenges that hope with the image of escaping one danger into a worse one. The maxim explains an intended object, not the goodness or success of every choice. In consolation for rejection, Burton makes a different conditional argument: granting everything that “unsatiable appetite” desires would produce another Chaos. Neither passage turns desire into a guarantee of sound judgment.

Desire becoming movement

Burton’s movement account distinguishes an end from an efficient cause. The end is what is sought or avoided, as the hare a dog pursues. Reason or subordinate imagination supplies the efficient cause in humans; imagination alone does so in other animals. Imagination moves appetite, appetite moves the locomotive faculty, and that faculty commands the bodily organ through the spirit. Appetite is one stage in this account; it is neither the pursued object nor the spirit that mediates bodily action.

The sleepwalking explanation gives a memorable chain: vapours disturb imagination; imagination stirs appetite; appetite moves the animal spirits; the body walks as if awake. The apparent purposefulness of the movement is thus explained without describing an ordinary conscious decision to get up. Burton goes on to report theories of trance and extraordinary visions. Those reports extend the discussion of imagination, but their supernatural and physiological explanations are not all interchangeable.

The ethical account emphasizes rebellion: appetite refuses reason’s limits, like horses carrying off a chariot. In practical counsel, however, the moving faculty can refuse to execute appetite’s demand: the urge to drink in a fever or rub itching eyes need not be acted on. The original margin says that nerves obey imagination and appetite through a natural alliance. When reason and will cannot govern, Burton’s next recourse is a friend’s help. This is an account of possible restraint and support, alongside acknowledged failure, rather than a claim that every impulse can simply be wished away.

Hunger, digestion and individual liking

In the bodily anatomy, the spleen is said to send remaining black bile towards the stomach “to stir up appetite.” Here the object is food. Later, appetite may exceed digestion: a person eats much but remains poorly nourished. Burton also records contrary patterns according to the supposed affected part, including little or no appetite. “Caninus Appetitus,” literally dog-like appetite, names ravenous hunger in reported cases that mix melancholy with other disorders; these mixtures help explain physicians’ difficulty in classification.

The Latin “multa appetunt, pauca digerunt,” attributed to Rhazes, makes the contrast verbal: they crave much but digest little. Desire is also distinguished from consumption itself. In Cardano’s claim, human beings eat and drink “without appetite,” indulging beyond felt need. Conversely, the satirical drinkers deliberately increase appetite through salted foods and use supposed aids to sustain their drinking; the context concerns taking in more, rather than simply restoring a normal hunger.

Mental distress can remove appetite in the historical account. Crato’s marginal “appetitum destruit” says that sadness destroys it; the corresponding original body has “takes away stomack.” Social comparisons give its absence another role. The fastidious eater tries to buy back appetite through costly preparations yet remains seldom satisfied, while the rich man in Burton’s expanded Apuleian example is either forbidden food or has no desire for it, even as his poorest servant feasts. Prohibition and lack of appetite remain alternatives.

Appetite can mean a liking for a particular food rather than hunger in general. Such liking qualifies a general dietary prohibition: food classified as unsuitable may nevertheless be more readily received when it gives pleasure. The continuation allows necessity as a further exception and then distinguishes those who can afford to choose. The cure section likewise reports strict limits on quantity but admits qualifications for habit and individual liking. Its instruction to “rise with an appetite” means to leave the table still hungry. These historical regimens distinguish desire from digestive capacity; they are not present-day nutritional instructions.

Burton also lets an imagined patient protest that restrictions on appetite make the remedy worse than the illness. “So thou thinkest” identifies the complaint’s speaker; Burton answers that a lesser hardship should be borne to avoid a greater one. The complaint should therefore remain part of the exchange, rather than be quoted as his final rejection of restraint.

In the discussion of wormwood preparations, the body says that the remedy “helps appetite.” The margin uses the related noun “appetentiam,” but its grammar is troublesome: “renews” governs undigested matter and nausea as well as appetite. The supplied edition retains that anomalous list. The clearly favourable body paraphrase does not license silently repairing the original marginal construction.

The construction can also name a bodily impulse other than hunger. “Appetite to vomit” means an urge to vomit; “an appetite to sleep” a desire for sleep. The latter occurs in a disputed discussion of vinegar, with supporters, opponents and conditional allowances. Identifying the sense does not endorse the remedy.

Ambition, love and the appetite for reading

“Appetite and Desire of Honor” defines ambition as an excessive desire. The original Platter note expressly allows its object to be honourable or dishonourable: excess, rather than a necessarily shameful object, is what the quotation says harms imagination. Erotic appetite is another particular form. Burton recasts Philinna’s treatment of her lover as a device for sharpening his appetite; the edition notes that Lucian’s scene gives retaliation a different role. The argument for avoiding a beloved’s sight then compares erotic stimulation with food increasing hunger.

The opposite of ambitious seeking occurs in a Pliny margin: the contented man does not serve his passions or seek honours, “non appetit honores.” Burton applies this to poverty, whereas the supplied note identifies illness as the context of the adapted Plinian passage. The love discussion elsewhere makes lovers alone desire or be willing to die for friends, in a claim attributed to Plato. Its “soli,” only, belongs to that praise of courage, not to a general definition of the verb.

Sexual desire is explicitly named by “coitus appetitum,” appetite for intercourse, in a catalogue of supposed remedies. A nearby fragment attributed to Juvenal has the Greek-derived “Orexin,” appetite, qualified as ravenous; its future participle leaves the person who will make it so unexpressed. These are recorded lexical uses, with the historical catalogue and the marginal fragment kept at their respective source status.

The definitions of love stage an actual disagreement. Plato’s reported definition makes love an appetite for a good to be present. Scaliger rejects appetite as love’s definition because appetite ceases when possession satisfies it, whereas love may continue as union. Burton then distinguishes kinds of love by their objects, again allowing apparent good. Valesius’s account calls human love an affection of appetite and reason, with the heart affected by both. The margin has “nunc appetitivæ potentiæ, nunc rationalis,” now of the appetitive faculty, now of the rational, where the body speaks of both powers. Its compressed organ assignment also differs from the body’s explicit account of brain, liver and heart. Both the alternating construction and the different organ formulations remain visible.

The natural tendency of matter provides another application: “ut materia appetit formam, sic mulier virum,” as matter desires form, so woman desires man. Burton uses this gendered philosophical analogy to praise married love, with the promised peace qualified by living lovingly and without quarrels. Elsewhere, after defending unforced and reciprocal affection, he endorses parental choice and a woman’s outward reserve. The margin’s “appetentiæ procacioris” is an overbold desire which she should not be reputed to initiate. The verbs of seeming and reputation matter: this is a social prescription about the appearance of desire, set beside his criticism of parents who impose or delay marriages.

Finally, hunger supplies two images for reading. Sharp sauces increase appetite, Burton says in defending the tartness of satire; his writings should also go down like gilded pills that tempt the appetite while doing medicinal work. Pleasure attracts a reader to corrective instruction. In the final consolations, loss of bodily appetite has a different illustrative task: an exhausted faculty can recover, so present spiritual inability need not establish permanent loss.

The sauce maxim’s original Latin has “orexim,” separately translated before Burton’s own English restatement. Earlier, “orexin” names the appetite produced by an author’s celebrity: readers prize a prestigious name rather than the work’s worth. The edition openly reads the printed “authores” as “authoris” in that sentence. Here the figure criticizes the reader’s attraction, while the later pill and sauce comparisons defend an attraction Burton hopes to use well.

Related entries

Concupiscible and irascible; Concupiscence; Passion; Pleasure; Will and nill; Imagination; Moving faculty; Spirits; Concoction; Spleen; Stomach; Ambition; Love; Form

Places to read

1. Celebrity whets the readerOrexin, judgments by reputation and the disclosed interpretation of authores
2. Satirical sauceThe appetite image defends sharp writing
3. Bodily hungerThe spleen and stomach in humoral physiology
4. Divisions and movementNatural, sensitive and voluntary appetite; object, end and efficient cause
5. Rational appetite and its limitsWill, ordinary choice, spiritual qualification and rebellious lower powers
6. Mixed disordersRavenous hunger among the complications of melancholy
7. The marginal translation of gulaThe English appetite in the note translates another Latin word
8. Appetite stimulated for drinkingSalted foods, excess and Burton’s censure
9. Liking particular foodsPleasure, necessity and limits to the exception
10. SleepwalkingVapours, imagination, appetite and animal spirits
11. Sadness destroys appetiteCrato’s marginal appetitum and the body’s stomack
12. Excessive desireIntertwined powers, ambition and the Platter marginal qualification
13. Buying back appetiteExpensive fastidiousness and continuing dissatisfaction
14. Hunger greater than digestionThe distinction between eating and nourishment
15. Appetite and urgesUrge to vomit and opposed hunger patterns
16. Good only in the sufferer’s hopeThe maxim, perceived relief and the challenge to that expectation
17. Quantity and personal likingHistorical regimens and qualifications
18. The patient objects to restraintRestricted appetite, the complaint and Burton’s reply
19. Desire for sleepA disputed remedy
20. Restraint and a friend’s helpAppetite, bodily movement and the limits of self-government
21. Abundance without enjoymentThe rich man’s alternative obstacles and the servant’s feast
22. Not seeking honoursThe negative marginal verb and the changed application of Pliny
23. Insatiable wishes and rejectionA counterfactual about granting every desire
24. Appetentia and an anomalous listThe body’s claimed benefit and the margin’s unrepaired shared verb
25. Corrective pleasureThe book as a gilded pill
26. Disputed definitions of loveAppetite, possession and continued union; reason and appetite
27. Matter, form and marriageThe philosophical analogy and conditional praise of married life
28. Erotic eagernessBurton’s account of Philinna and the edition’s source qualification
29. The lovers’ attributed willingnessSoli amantes and appetunt in the praise of courage
30. The ravenous appetite fragmentOriginal marginal Orexin with an unexpressed agent
31. Desire for intercourseAppetitum in the historical remedy catalogue
32. Sight as a stimulusHunger compared with renewed love
33. Desire and its public appearanceUnforced affection, parental choice and marginal appetentiæ
34. An analogy of recoveryLost bodily appetite illustrates a faculty that may return

In this edition

The sleepwalking clause “the Phantasie the Appetite” becomes “the imagination stirs the appetite.” “Stirs” is supplied from the preceding verb “move,” making the original ellipsis explicit. The faculty remains appetite; interpreting it as hunger would break the causal chain. Elsewhere “appetite, to such and such meats” becomes “a liking for particular foods,” “appetite to vomit” becomes “an urge to vomit,” and “Caninus Appetitus” becomes “ravenous hunger.” These are checked local equivalents, not a uniform substitution rule.

The original marginal “appetitus” and the English word appetite in an editorial translation are different evidence layers. For example, the diet note’s translated “appetite” renders Latin “gula,” not an original occurrence of appetitus. The records here retain original wording and identify translations separately.

The related forms require their own grammar. “Appetunt” may mean craving food, seeking apparent good or, in an attributed claim, being willing to die for friends. “Appetitivæ” is adjectival and modifies “potentiæ,” faculty. The negative Pliny construction shares its English “does not” across two predicates, while the marriage analogy supplies “desires” in its second clause from the first. The original “appetentiæ” about courtship and “appetentiam” about food are inflections of the same noun with different local objects.

appetentia · appetentiam

Printed “appetentiam” (Latin; lemma).

Appetite or desire for food, one object of renovat, renews, in the original marginal list.

Context: The margin belongs to Codronchus’s praise of wormwood preparations. Its verb grammatically also governs undigested matter and nausea, producing the anomaly explicitly retained by the edition; the body instead gives an uncomplicated sequence of benefits.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: cruditatem, nauseam, appetentiam mirum in modum renovat

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: wonderfully renews undigested matter, nausea and appetite

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Notes: The problematic shared construction is recorded without silently deleting its first two objects or changing renovat. No efficacy or present-day use is asserted.

appetentia · appetentiæ

Printed “appetentiæ” (Latin; lemma).

Desire or inclination; procacioris qualifies it as overbold in the marginal criticism of a woman appearing to initiate courtship.

Context: Burton endorses the passage attributed to Ambrose, but its concern is how a woman may be reputed or seem. This limits his preceding defence of unforced reciprocal love; the surrounding argument also addresses parents who delay marriage.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Ne appetentiæ procacioris reputetur author

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Lest she be regarded as the source of an overbold desire

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Supplied words: she (the understood female subject is made explicit in translation)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetere · appetunt · local use 1

Printed “appetunt” (Latin; related verb form).

They desire or crave; the context restricts this plural verb to wanting food.

Context: The maxim is attributed to Rhazes and distinguishes wanting much from digesting little. The following claim is that substantial eating may coexist with wasting, not that all appetite entails good nourishment.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: multa appetunt, pauca digerunt

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: They crave much but digest little

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetere · appetunt · local use 2

Printed “appetunt” (Latin; related verb form).

Seek or desire; the maxim is used to explain pursuing what appears to be good or relieving.

Context: Burton applies it to distressed sufferers who hope for relief in death, retaining as they hope and in show at least. The following paragraph explicitly challenges the hoped-for outcome with the frying-pan/fire comparison; this is an account of perceived good, not endorsement of the conclusion.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Omnia appetunt bonum

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: All things seek the good

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetere · appetit · local use 1

Printed “appetit” (Latin; related verb form).

Seeks or desires; non negates the pursuit of honours in the original marginal description.

Context: Burton applies the passage to the contented poor man. The supplied note identifies the adapted Pliny context as conduct during illness, so neither its original application nor Burton’s changed subject is concealed.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Non amoribus inservit, non appetit honores

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: He does not serve his passions or seek honours

Alignment convention

Qualification: The complete two-clause negative coordination is aligned with its editorial translation. English shares does not across both predicates where Latin repeats non; the unit is not an isolated positive seek honours.

Supplied words: He (subject supplied in the editorial translation)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetere · appetit · local use 2

Printed “appetit” (Latin; related verb form).

Seeks or desires; the verb connects the natural-philosophical inclination of matter towards form to an analogy of woman’s desire for man.

Context: Burton uses the gendered analogy to praise married love. The paragraph’s promised peace is qualified by the couple’s living lovingly without quarrelling; the analogy is not a modern account of either sex.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: ut materia appetit formam, sic mulier virum

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: As matter desires form, so woman desires man

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Supplied words: desires (repeated in the second English clause from the first clause’s appetit)

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetere · appetunt · local use 3

Printed “appetunt” (Latin; related verb form).

Desire or are willing; the plural verb governs dying for friends in the reported praise of lovers’ courage.

Context: The claim is attributed to Plato and restricted by soli, only. Burton then supplies his separate English expansion and illustrates chivalric courage. The supplied note identifies a Symposium parallel and retains the different Laws citation printed in the margin.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: For soli amantes as Plato holds, pro amicis mori appetunt

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: For, as Plato holds, “only lovers desire to die for their friends”

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering. The indexed appetunt is Latin; the wider construction includes Burton’s English attribution.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 1

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire to eat; the culinary claim supplies a comparison for the appeal of sharp satire.

Context: Burton’s defence of tart writing, not a literal account of the reader’s digestion.

Source: original body

Source wording: sharp sauces increase appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 2

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Hunger or desire for food; the stated purpose of black bile sent towards the stomach.

Context: Burton’s inherited account assigns the conveying action to the spleen.

Source: original body

Source wording: to stir up appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · Appetite · local use 1

Printed “Appetite” (English; lemma).

Citation key, Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: appetite

The faculty of inclination or desire; one division of the moving faculty.

Context: The subsequent threefold division is explicitly attributed to some writers.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: the power of Appetite

Alignment convention

Qualification: The modern list compresses power of Appetite to appetite after the introductory two faculties.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 3

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

A specific preference for a food, distinguished from hunger generally.

Context: A qualification to general dietary prohibitions, followed by necessity and the limits of choice.

Source: original body

Source wording: appetite, to such and such meats

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · Appetite · local use 2

Printed “Appetite” (English; lemma).

The impulse or desiring faculty moved by imagination, which then moves the animal spirits.

Context: Sleepwalking is explained through a causal sequence; conscious deliberation is not asserted.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: the Phantasie the Appetite

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: the imagination stirs the appetite

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Supplied words: stirs (verb supplied from the preceding move)

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · Appetite · local use 3

Printed “Appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire or inclination; exorbitant marks its excessive degree, and the desire for honour so qualified is called ambition.

Context: Burton selects ambition from many harmful forms of excessive desire.

Source: original body

Locator qualification: Do not remove bracketed or repeated-page qualifier.

Source wording: that exorbitant Appetite and Desire of Honor

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 4

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire for food, distinguished from the power to digest it.

Context: Burton reports a symptom pattern, with Rhazes and Aretaeus as authorities, not an invariant universal.

Source: original body

Source wording: their appetite is greater then their concoction

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 5

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Impulse or desire whose bodily execution can be restrained by the moving faculty.

Context: Conditional instruction, followed by fever and itching examples and later recourse to a friend.

Source: original body

Source wording: If appetite will not obey

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 6

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire to ingest, figuratively the reader’s readiness to accept pleasurable instruction.

Context: Burton hopes his writings will act like gilded medicinal pills.

Source: original body

Source wording: to tempt the appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 7

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Unsatisfied desire, considered as ceasing once its object is possessed.

Context: Scaliger’s objection to defining love by appetite, not Burton’s unqualified conclusion that love ceases.

Source: original body

Source wording: there remaines no more appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · Appetite · local use 4

Printed “Appetite” (English; lemma).

The appetitive faculty, paired with rational power in an attributed account of human love.

Context: Valesius’s definition in Burton’s body; the margin’s alternating formulation is kept separate.

Source: original body

Source wording: Appetite, and Reason

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 8

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Erotic desire or eagerness; greater marks the increased degree Philinna is said to seek in her lover.

Context: Purpose ascribed by Burton to Philinna’s conduct; the supplied note qualifies his use of Lucian.

Source: original body

Source wording: with a greater appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 9

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire for food; its loss is one apparent failure of bodily power in an analogy allowing possible recovery.

Context: Burton’s analogy answers a sufferer’s objection, and the next paragraph applies it to spiritual distress.

Source: original body

Source wording: loseth his appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite · local use 10

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

An urge to consume, here stimulated in the course of excessive drinking; the surrounding catalogue links salted foods to the drinkers’ attempts to take in more.

Context: Burton censures deliberate stimulation and the supposed antidotes used to sustain drinking. The marginal statement gives the purpose as taking in more; the account is not a recommendation.

Source: original body

Source wording: innumerable salt-meats to increase their appetite

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 11

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Appetite for food or pleasure in eating; redeems represents its attempted restoration as something bought at great expense.

Context: Burton’s example is an excessively fastidious eater who remains seldom pleased with a meal despite expensive preparations, contrasted with an ordinary stomach that enjoys what it receives.

Source: original body

Source wording: Thus he redeems his appetite with extraordinary charge to his purse

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 12

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Hunger or the bodily desire for food and drink; its absence distinguishes indulgence from felt need.

Context: Cardano is the authority for the claim that human beings alone eat and drink without appetite. Burton uses it to introduce harmful timing and excess, before reporting regimens and their qualifications.

Source: original body

Source wording: eates and drinks without appetite

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 13

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire to eat and enjoy food; the imagined complaint treats restraint of that desire as an intolerable restriction.

Context: The patient’s resistant voice is marked by so thou thinkest. Burton’s next paragraph answers that the lesser hardship should be endured to avoid a greater one; the complaint is not his final rejection of dietary restraint.

Source: original body

Source wording: as good be buried, as so much debarred of his appetite

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 14

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire for food; its lack is one alternative reason the wealthy man cannot enjoy his abundance.

Context: Burton expands an Apuleian example and distinguishes prohibition from lack of desire. The poor servant’s enjoyment contrasts with the master’s inability; the two reasons are alternatives, not a single asserted condition.

Source: original body

Source wording: is forbidden to eat, or else hath no appetite

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 15

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire or inclination; unsatiable describes a wish that admits no satisfaction or limit.

Context: Burton’s consolation for rejection makes a counterfactual argument: if all that hope, appetite and perverse judgment proposed were granted, utter confusion would follow. The predicted Chaos is conditional, not an event reported as occurring.

Source: original body

Source wording: unsatiable appetite affects

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite · local use 16

Printed “appetite” (English; lemma).

Desire for food; its improvement is one claimed benefit of the preparation praised here.

Context: Codronchus is the reported authority. This clear body formulation is kept separate from the anomalous original marginal list governed by renovat.

Source: original body

Source wording: helps appetite

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetite to sleep

Printed “appetite” (English; phrase).

Inclination towards sleep, the effect claimed for a disputed remedy.

Context: Attributed supporters, opponents and conditional approvals are all named.

Source: original body

Source wording: an appetite to sleep

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetite to vomit

Printed “appetite” (English; phrase).

Citation key, Source wording: appetite to vomit

A bodily impulse towards vomiting.

Context: Conditional symptom account: if the disorder proceeds from the myrache.

Source: original body

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetitivus

Printed “appetitivæ” (Latin; related adjective form).

Appetitive, belonging to the power of desire; the adjective modifies potentiæ, faculty.

Context: The margin associated with Valesius alternates now one faculty, now the other, whereas the body calls love an affection of both powers. Its compressed organ assignment also differs from the body’s explicit account.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Affectus nunc appetitivæ potentiæ, nunc rationalis

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: An affection now of the appetitive faculty, now of the rational

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetitus

Printed “appetitus” (Latin; lemma).

Desire, specified as excessive and directed to an object of either moral kind.

Context: Platter’s marginal claim is that such excessive desire harms imagination; a good object does not remove excess.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: appetitus, seu concupiscentia nimia rei alicujus, honestæ vel inhonestæ

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: appetite, or excessive desire for anything honourable or dishonourable

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its supplied editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

appetitus · appetitum · local use 1

Printed “appetitum” (Latin; lemma).

Appetite for food, described as destroyed by sadness in the marginal physiological account.

Context: Crato is cited for the marginal claim. The original body instead says takes away stomack, which the modern body also renders as loss of appetite; the Latin attestation is kept distinct from that English equivalent.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Locator qualification: Do not remove bracketed or repeated-page qualifier.; This source group includes repeated printed 96–97 and supplied 98–99; see SUPPLIED_OPENING and SOURCE_DJR_040.

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: appetitum destruit

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: destroys appetite

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appetitus · appetitum · local use 2

Printed “appetitum” (Latin; lemma).

Appetite or desire; coitus specifies intercourse as its object.

Context: The phrase occurs in the extended Latin catalogue of supposed remedies for erotic desire. The source provides no separate authority for this sentence, and the supplied note leaves it for collation; no method or efficacy is recommended here.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: coitus appetitum

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: the desire for intercourse

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

appeto

Printed “appetunt” (Latin; lemma).

Seek or desire; the plural verb predicates the pursuit of good of all things.

Context: The following qualification allows merely apparent good.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Omnia appetunt bonum

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: all things seek their own good

Alignment convention

Qualification: The modern sentence combines the Latin maxim and Burton’s following English gloss; their own occurs in that English gloss, not explicitly in the Latin.

Supplied words: their own (made explicit in the combined Latin-and-English modernization)

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

caninus appetitus

Printed “Caninus Appetitus” (Latin; phrase).

Printed form, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Caninus Appetitus

Dog-like or ravenous hunger, a named condition occurring alongside melancholy in reported cases.

Context: Montanus and Trincavellius supply examples; mixtures confound classification.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: ravenous hunger

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

gula

Printed “gula” (Latin; lemma). Attestation: word form.

Citation key, Printed form, Original wording: gula

Meaning: Appetite in this marginal rendering.

Here: The supplied marginal translation renders gula as appetite in the mother-of-diseases claim. This bounded rendering does not exhaust the noun’s possible senses.

Context: The Fernel margin uses gula, whereas the body says diet. Neither this Latin form nor its contextual English rendering is an attestation of appetitus.

Source: original marginal quotation

Source wording: una gula est omnium morborum mater

Modern rendering: appetite

Alignment convention

Alignment scope: Component alignment in the supplied translation of the original marginal Latin, separate from the body.

Edition note: checked against the supplied source; editorial interpretation explicitly qualified where applicable

orexis · orexin

Printed “orexin” (Latin (Greek loan); related noun form).

Appetite or eagerness, figuratively the reader’s interest stimulated by a writer’s reputation rather than the quality of the writing.

Context: The saying is attributed to Erasmus in the original margin. Burton criticizes judging authors by outward standing. The supplied edition interprets the printed authores as authoris; that is an editorial interpretation, not the exact printed Latin.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: orexin habet authores celebritas

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: The author’s celebrity gives an appetite

Alignment convention

Qualification: The full Latin construction is aligned with the modern body. The rendering reads printed authores as authoris, of the author, as the supplied editorial note expressly states; habet is rendered idiomatically gives.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

orexis · orexim

Printed “orexim” (Latin (Greek loan); related noun form).

Appetite, here desire for food; the culinary maxim supplies Burton’s analogy for sharp satire.

Context: Burton quotes an unnamed speaker and follows the Latin with his own English restatement. The Latin’s modern translation and the restatement are separate units.

Source: original body

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: acriora orexim excitant embammata

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: Pungent sauces stimulate the appetite

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase or construction alignment; the entire unit carries the rendering.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

orexis · Orexin

Printed “Orexin” (Latin (Greek loan); related noun form).

Appetite; rabidam supplies ravenous, while facturus expresses the future act of making it so.

Context: This is a short marginal fragment attributed to Juvenal beside a prognosis of persistent love melancholy. Its grammatical subject is unexpressed; the record does not invent who will make the appetite ravenous.

Source: original marginal wording in Burton-labelled note

Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: Rabidam facturus Orexin

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: About to make the appetite ravenous

Alignment convention

Qualification: Original marginal quotation aligned with its separately identified editorial translation, not with the modern body.

Notes: Historical attributions remain Burton’s; no fresh collation of cited historical works is claimed.

rational appetite

Printed “Appetite” (English; phrase).

The desiring power; rationall specifies its direction through reason, and the full phrase names will as a faculty responding to understanding.

Context: Attributed to Aristotle; sensitive and rational appetite are expressly contrasted.

Source: original body

Source wording: our rationall Appetite

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.

rise with an appetite

Printed “appetite” (English; phrase).

Citation key, Source wording, Original wording, Original construction: rise with an appetite

Hunger or desire for food; the direction to rise with it means leaving the table still hungry rather than fully satisfied.

Context: Burton says melancholy patients generally have good appetites but poor digestion.

Source: original body

Modern rendering, Modern wording, Modern construction: leave the table still hungry

Alignment convention

Qualification: Equal-scope phrase alignment; the entire phrase, not each component separately, carries the stated rendering.

Supplied words: the table (context supplied in the idiomatic rendering of rise)

Notes: Historical source attributions are Burton’s; no fresh collation of the cited works is claimed.