Care

Use in the book

Care is first a doctor's duty. Good doctors treat the part with the whole (156b–c; see Whole and part). The Thracian from whom Socrates learned the charm, a doctor of Zalmoxis, god and king of the Thracians (156d), carries the principle to the soul on Zalmoxis' word: one must not try to cure the body without the soul either. That, he says, is why most diseases elude the Greek doctors: "they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for, and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e). The soul is to be treated first, and no one's head before he hands over his soul to the charm (156e–157b; see Body). In the manuscripts B, the Bodleian Plato written in 895, and T, the Venice manuscript, the doctors' fault is ignorance, not neglect: τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, "they do not know the whole". The rest of the dialogue can be read as joining the two readings.

Ἐπιμέλεια returns once, as the pains a man has taken over a question. When Critias, cousin and guardian of the young Charmides, turns angrily on the boy (162c–d), Socrates tells him, "You, though, may reasonably be expected to know, both because of your age and because of the study you have given it" (162e; see Age and maturity). The rest of the dialogue tests that expectation, and Critias' study does not bring him to an account of temperance that survives the argument.

Care for oneself comes at the low point of the argument. Having granted Critias' definition for argument's sake (172c–d), Socrates says, "even if temperance is entirely of this kind, it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good" (172e–173a). Asked to explain, he answers, "I think I'm talking nonsense," and goes on: "All the same, one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see Babbling and self-deprecation). The word here is κήδεσθαι, not the ἐπιμέλεια the doctors owed the whole, and its object is oneself. The condition asks very little: care for oneself "even a little" is enough to oblige one to look. Socrates had given a like reason for refuting Critias, the one for which he would scrutinize even himself: "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166c–d; see Common good). Set beside the Thracian's instruction, these passages can be read as giving the charm its content, and as joining the two readings of 156e: the soul is treated first, by looking into what one thinks one knows. The Greek doctors neglect the whole; whoever cares for himself even a little must not let a doubt go by.

Places to read

1. 156b–157c23Good doctors treat the part with the whole; the Thracian, on Zalmoxis' word, says that the Greek doctors neglect the whole they ought to care for and that the soul must be treated first, with charms, and he charges Socrates to treat no one's head before its owner hands over his soul to the charm.
2. 162d–eCritias may be expected to know what temperance is, because of his age and the study he has given it, and he takes the argument over.
3. 166c–dSocrates refutes Critias for the reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking, without noticing, that he knows what he does not, and examines the argument for his own sake above all.
4. 172e–173aDoubting that temperance does us any good, Socrates says that one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by, if one cares for oneself even a little.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders ἐπιμέλεια by sense: "caring for" in the Thracian's ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι (156e), and "study" for the pains Critias has given the question (162e). Ἀμελεῖν is "neglect" (156e), κήδεσθαι "cares for" (173a) and παριέναι "let … go by" (173a). "Care" in the English answers to two Greek words only, ἐπιμέλεια and κήδεσθαι. Θεραπεύειν is "treat" at all seven of its places (156b, 156c twice, 157a twice, 157b twice), though "treat" does not always render it: "treating human beings" at 157b supplies a verb the Greek lacks, and "treating" and "treatment" at 164b render ἰᾶσθαι (iasthai), which is "cure" at 156b and 156e and "heal" at 156c.

At 156e the edition prints Burnet's text, τοῦ ὅλου ἀμελοῖεν, "they neglect the whole", which no single manuscript or ancient quotation has as it stands. The manuscripts B and T read τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, "they do not know the whole"; T records ἀμελοῖεν as a variant; and Stobaeus, the anthologist of the fifth century AD, who quotes 156d–157b, reads τοῦ ἄλλου ἀμελοῖεν, "they neglect the rest". The genitive τοῦ ὅλου, which ἀμελεῖν needs for its object, is Burnet's own correction, as the edition's note at 156e says. Burnet records no variant in the clause "which is what they ought to be caring for", so the duty of care stands in every text. What the reading ἀμελοῖεν adds, against the ἀγνοοῖεν of B and T, is that the doctors fail through neglect rather than ignorance, with the echo of ἀμελεῖν in ἐπιμέλεια; what Burnet himself adds is that the thing neglected is the whole.

ἀμελέω

Attested: ἀμελοῖεν (ameloien; 156e). To have no care for, to neglect. Zalmoxis teaches, as the Thracian reports him, that most diseases elude the Greek doctors because "they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e). The verb is the variant recorded in T and read by Stobaeus; B and T have ἀγνοοῖεν, "they do not know". Lemma: ἀμελέω.

ἐπιμέλεια

Attested: ἐπιμέλειαν (epimeleian; 156e), ἐπιμελείας (epimeleias; 162e). Care, the pains taken over a thing. The whole is what the Greek doctors "ought to be caring for" (156e); and Socrates tells Critias, "You, though, may reasonably be expected to know, both because of your age and because of the study you have given it" (162e). Lemma: ἐπιμέλεια.

κήδομαι

Attested: κήδεται (kēdetai; 173a). To be concerned for, to care for, with the person in the genitive. One must look into what comes to light and not let it go by, Socrates says, "if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a). Lemma: κήδομαι.

παριέναι (parienai)

Attested: παριέναι (parienai; 173a). To let pass, let go by, disregard. One must look into what comes to light "and not let it go by at random" (173a). B has παρεῖναι, the aorist of the same verb; Burnet prints T's present. Lemma: παρίημι.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Apology, Socrates' defence at his trial, care for the soul is the whole of his demand. He asks every Athenian he meets whether he is not ashamed to care for money, that he may have as much as possible, and for reputation and honour, while about wisdom and truth and his soul, how it may be as good as possible, he takes no care and gives no thought (29d–e). He urges young and old to care for neither bodies nor money before the soul, nor so intensely (30a–b): the soul first and most, as in the Thracian's "first and foremost" (157a). And proposing his own penalty, he says that he neglected what the many care for, and went to each Athenian in private, trying to persuade him to care for nothing of his own before he had cared for himself, how he might be as good and as wise as possible (36b–c): the care for oneself of Charmides 173a, in the verb of the Thracian's ἐπιμέλεια. The Alcibiades I, in which Socrates questions the young Alcibiades, Pericles' ward, argues the demand out. Socrates asks what caring for oneself is, lest perhaps, without noticing it, they are not caring for themselves when they think they are (127e–128a), the same fear, in the same turn of phrase, as his fear at Charmides 166d of thinking, without noticing, that he knows. He gets Alcibiades to agree that no doctor knows himself insofar as he is a doctor, and that whoever tends his body tends what is his own, not himself (131a–b), and concludes that we must care for the soul and hand over the care of bodies and money to others (132b–c). The Laches, where Socrates and two Athenian generals, Laches and Nicias, look for a definition of courage, puts the question in the doctors' word: Socrates tells Nicias that they must ask whether any of them has the craft of treating the soul (θεραπεία, therapeia) and can treat it well, and who has had good teachers in it (185e).

Use in the book

Alcibiades first complains of Socrates' conspicuously careful presence wherever he goes. At 104d the adverb belongs to a lover's persistent attention, before self-care becomes the philosophical demand. At 113c Socrates turns neglect against Alcibiades: he means to teach what he does not know after neglecting to learn. Neglect here is not merely an absence of anxious feeling. It is a failure to undertake the preparation his intended action requires.

At 120b Socrates ironically urges him to look at mediocre politicians and neglect himself, neither learning nor training. The surrounding argument makes the irony unmistakable. At 122b the complaint that almost no one cares about an Athenian's upbringing, except a lover, contrasts private educational neglect with the elaborate preparation attributed to royal rivals. These are parts of Socrates' motivational speech, not a neutral census of every household's affection.

Tending has a more variable object. At 126b organs and the city are better tended when the relevant good is present. At 131b–c2 someone tending body or money does not by that fact tend the self. At 135e the love Socrates has fostered is itself to be tended in return. The verb can therefore serve bodily, material, civic, and affectionate contexts.

The common question is not merely how much attention is expended, but whether its object and purpose are right. Energetic maintenance of possessions may coexist with neglect of self. Equally, delegating bodily and financial care at 132c is not neglect if it frees attention for the soul and entrusts the auxiliary tasks appropriately.

Places to read

1. 104dSocrates’ attendance is described as exceptionally careful
2. 113cTeaching without knowledge follows neglected learning
3. 120b–122b234Ironic neglect and deficient educational concern motivate preparation
4. 126bTending concerns the improvement of organs and city
5. 131b–132c23Tending body or money is distinguished from care of soul
6. 135eLove is to be tended reciprocally

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps the care family audible through “care for,” “take no care,” and “care about,” and generally uses “tend” for θεραπεύειν. “If you care to” is avoided for ordinary wishing, since it would introduce the key care vocabulary where the Greek does not.

ἀμελέω

Attested: ἀμελήσας (amelēsas; 113c); ἀμελεῖν (amelein; 120b). At 113c: Having neglected to learn: Socrates makes Alcibiades' lack of preparation the reason his attempt to teach is reckless. At 120b: To take no care of oneself, ironically recommended when mediocre politicians are chosen as one's standard. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμελέω. See Care and neglect.

ἐπιμελής

Attested: ἐπιμελέστατα (epimelestata; 104d). At 104d: With the greatest care or attentiveness: Alcibiades describes Socrates' persistent attendance wherever he goes. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιμελής. See Care and neglect.

θεραπεύω

Attested: θεραπεύει (therapeuei; 131b); θεραπεύσεται (therapeusetai; 135e). At 131b: To tend a body: an activity directed to something belonging to the person, distinguished here from tending the self. At 135e: To be tended in return: the love Socrates fosters is pictured as receiving reciprocal care from its offspring. To tend or care for, here love being tended in return. Lexical identification: lemma: θεραπεύω. See Care and neglect; Stork and reciprocal love.

μέλω

Attested: μέλει (melei; 122b). At 122b: It is a concern to someone: Socrates claims that hardly anyone except a lover concerns himself with an Athenian youth's education. Lexical identification: lemma: μέλω. See Care and neglect.

Use in the book

Demodocus begins from the work of those who farm. Preparation and planting are comparatively easy; once the planted thing lives, continued tending becomes extensive, difficult, and troublesome (121b–c). His inference moves from personal experience to a broader likeness among living things. He expressly says that he judges other cases from his own affairs, so the comparison has the standing of an experienced father's analogy, not an exhaustive biological argument.

Its humor lies partly in the blunt transition to begetting. Demodocus pauses over whether the production of his son should be called “planting” or “begetting,” and declares that the easy part is already over. The troublesome task is continued nurture of a growing person whose wishes do not simply obey the cultivator. The son's emerging independence makes care harder than initial production.

The educational complaint develops the same word-family. Theages thinks his father should care for him and pay a sophist (121d). Socrates subsequently asks whether there is some knowledge still missing for which the father ought to care on his behalf (123a). Care therefore becomes a contested practical duty. The boy equates adequate provision with access to the desired teacher; the father fears that precisely such provision might do harm. Neither denies the duty itself.

The later return to farmers in the classification of crafts (124a–b) is an illuminating change of function. There, farming coordinates reapers, planters, sowers, and threshers, and the desired political wisdom is to rule farmers themselves along with everyone else. The opening analogy concerns the difficulty of nurture; the later example concerns the scope of a governing competence. Their common vocabulary should not conceal this difference.

Nor does the ending establish Socrates as a superior cultivator able to produce improvement at will. His account places benefit under a daimonic condition and distinguishes temporary from lasting growth. That result answers the father's practical anxiety by complicating the picture of education as controlled husbandry. The question remains how to care responsibly when neither parental effort nor selection of a companion guarantees the desired development.

Places to read

1. 121bπάντα τὰ φυτά; τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν — Living growth is considered from the farmer's standpoint
2. 121b–cθεραπεία τοῦ φύντος — The difficult tending of what has grown
3. 121cεἴτε φυτείαν εἴτε παιδοποιίαν — The comic hesitation between planting and begetting
4. 121cἡ δὲ τροφὴ δύσκολος — Rearing is the troublesome phase
5. 121dἐπιμεληθῆναί με ἑαυτοῦ — The son demands paternal care
6. 123aτὸν πατέρα ἐπιμεληθῆναι — Socrates asks what further care properly falls to the father

Translation in this edition

“Things that grow,” “tending,” “rearing,” and “care” keep the stages and activities distinct. At 121c the apparatus records a different punctuation and distribution of the clause about rearing in B; the supplied translation follows Burnet's printed wording. Therapeia here should not be silently translated “medical therapy”: the object is what has grown from planting.

Affairs — πρᾶγμα (pragma)

πρᾶγμα (pragma)

Affairs. Demodocus' own experience supplies his basis for comparison with other cases. Attested: πραγμάτων (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Animals — ζῷον (zōion)

ζῷον (zōion)

Animals. Animal life is expressly included alongside plants. Attested: ζῷα (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Begetting children — παιδοποιία (paidopoiia)

παιδοποιία (paidopoiia)

Begetting children. The alternative literal name for the production of a son. Attested: παιδοποιίαν (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Care for — ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (epimeleisthai)

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (epimeleisthai)

Care for. The son's claim upon paternal attention and provision. Attested: ἐπιμεληθῆναί (121d). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Earth — γῆ (gē)

γῆ (gē)

Earth. The ground from which growing plants arise. Attested: γῆς (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Easiest — ῥᾴδιος (rhaidios)

ῥᾴδιος (rhaidios)

Easiest. Preparing and planting are comparatively the easy part of cultivation. Attested: ῥᾷστον (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Extensive — πολύς (polys)

πολύς (polys)

Extensive. The amount of continued tending is large. Attested: πολλὴ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Growing — φύεσθαι (phyesthai)

φύεσθαι (phyesthai)

Growing. Things growing from the earth are one component of the broad living comparison. Attested: φυόμενα (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Hard — χαλεπός (chalepos)

χαλεπός (chalepos)

Hard. Continued tending demands difficult work. Attested: χαλεπὴ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

The human being — ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

The human being. The printed crasis of ὁ ἄνθρωπος includes humanity among the living cases. Attested: ἅνθρωπος (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Infer — τεκμαίρεσθαι (tekmairesthai)

τεκμαίρεσθαι (tekmairesthai)

Infer. The father expressly reasons from his own affairs to the rest rather than asserting an independently proven universal law. Attested: τεκμαίρομαι (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

It is one's part — προσήκειν (prosēkein)

προσήκειν (prosēkein)

It is one's part. Socrates asks whether further provision properly belongs to the father's responsibility. Attested: προσήκει (123a). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Live — βιοῦν (bioun)

βιοῦν (bioun)

Live. Once what has been planted lives, continued care is required. Attested: βιῷ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Plant — φυτεύειν (phyteuein)

φυτεύειν (phyteuein)

Plant. The agricultural act used as the first term in the analogy with begetting. Attested: φυτεύειν (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Do the planting — φυτεύειν (phyteuein)

φυτεύειν (phyteuein)

Do the planting. The completed act of planting itself is distinguished from subsequent care. Attested: φυτεῦσαι (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Planting — φυτεία (phyteia)

φυτεία (phyteia)

Planting. The father's intentionally earthy possible name for producing his son. Attested: φυτείαν (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Prepare — παρασκευάζεσθαι (paraskeuazesthai)

παρασκευάζεσθαι (paraskeuazesthai)

Prepare. Getting everything ready before planting is contrasted with later tending. Attested: παρασκευάσασθαι (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Rearing — τροφή (trophē)

τροφή (trophē)

Rearing. The continuing nurture of the son contrasted with the easy initial begetting. Attested: τροφὴ (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Tending — θεραπεία (therapeia)

θεραπεία (therapeia)

Tending. Attendance on what has grown, specifically horticultural rather than medical treatment. Attested: θεραπεία (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Things that grow — φυτόν (phyton)

φυτόν (phyton)

Things that grow. Demodocus' broad category explicitly includes plants, animals, and human beings. Attested: φυτὰ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

Troublesome — δύσκολος (dyskolos)

δύσκολος (dyskolos)

Troublesome. Cultivation after planting is difficult to manage, anticipating the father's complaint about rearing. Attested: δύσκολος (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy.

From my own affairs I judge the rest (contextual phrase)

121c: ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τἆλλα. Demodocus explicitly infers from his own case to others. Tekmairomai marks an inference based on signs or evidence; ta alla, contracted to talla, is “the rest”. His plant-and-child comparison is an experienced parent's generalization, not a biological law the dialogue establishes independently. See Care and growth.

Use in the book

The verb describes the care that someone else gives Lysis’ body, paired with ποιμαίνει, “shepherds.” Socrates uses the pair to show that the boy’s movements and bodily care are managed by others despite his distinguished physique.

Here θεραπεύω is broader than medically treating a disease. No illness of Lysis is alleged. The later hypothetical eye-treatment supplies a medical example, but should not retroactively force that specialized meaning onto this ordinary vocabulary of attendance, upbringing, and supervision.

Places to read

1. 209aἄλλος ποιμαίνει καὶ θεραπεύει — another person shepherds and tends it.

Use in the book

The description of an instant of piety removes care and worry alongside disquiet and effort. That freedom is brief but affects the larger course of months and years. In the governmental address, great cares should fall on governors so private people can be relieved of them. Literary care has another value: it produces elegance and ease in the work, even when the writer’s labor is difficult. The file-and-oil images reverse the expected complaint that effort has been excessive; awkwardness may show that polishing has not gone far enough. The word therefore cannot be translated or judged uniformly as anxiety.

Places to read

1. I, p. 134, entry 10, ¶1A spiritual instant suspends care and worry.
2. I, p. 461–462, entry 7, ¶1Public responsibilities are cares borne on behalf of private people.
3. II, p. 524, entry 1, ¶1Care can produce an ease belonging to the work rather than the worker.

Translation in this edition

The English translation uses care for the painstaking literary process and cares for public burdens, with worry for souci. In the elegance paragraph the pronoun refers to care, not elegance; its transformation into facility is preserved.

Use in the book

The sun's complex services manifest the Creator's care, and the last meditation presents divine care as everywhere active. Concern is part of goodness, not a defect overcome by indifference. The account of choosing study over a great estate, however, treats care as time-consuming solicitude. Freedom from that burden permits attention to goods that anxiety would obscure. These claims need not imply that material needs are imaginary or that ordinary provision is wrong. IV.23 acknowledges toil and the risk of want in a fallen world, while seeking a foundation deeper than uncertain human generosity. True care sustains life and love; disordered care consumes the life it means to secure.

Places to read

1. II.8The sun’s coordinated services display divine power and care.
2. III.46A modest provision is preferred to an estate that would devour time in care and labour.
3. IV.23Fallen conditions involve real labour, care, and risk of want.
4. V.10Divine care is everywhere operative in the completion of creaturely bliss.

In this edition

“Without any care at all” in the narrative of III.46 should not be expanded into a claim that the speaker never attended responsibly to anything. The contrast there concerns burdensome provision and study.

Use in the book

Providence is introduced through a maker’s care for what he has made. Productive fruitfulness and diligence in preserving the product share their source in the first agent. God is called the procurator of things as children: the image supplies continuing care rather than merely an original act of making. Ficino later distinguishes the abilities to make, consider, and conserve, arguing that an intelligent creator can also preserve his works and does not begrudge their well-being after giving being. Care for the whole is then used to reject neglect of any part, because the whole’s best condition depends on its constituents. This does not remove the subsequent argument that a part’s appropriate perfection is measured by its contribution to the whole.

Selected annotated passages.

Places to read

1. II.13.2Creative fruitfulness is joined to diligence in preservation.
2. II.13.11Making, observing, conserving, and willing well-being are distinguished.
3. II.13.21Care of the whole is said to exclude neglect of its parts.
4. II.13.23A part’s perfection remains relative to the whole’s order.

Translation in this edition

“Watches over them all as his children” conveys procuratoris without turning it into a modern legal office. The printed II.13.21 has negligit; the register distinguishes that attested spelling from the conventional lemma neglegere. “Well-being” concerns bene esse, a fuller gift than existence alone.

custodire / cura

custodire / cura. Printed forms: curam; custodiendis; custodire.

Guard or preserve / care. Providence includes preservation, not merely knowledge in advance; care of the whole is said to reach every part. References: II.13.2, II.13.11, II.13.21. See Care and custody.

diligentia / procurator

diligentia / procurator. Printed forms: diligentia; diligentior; procuratoris.

Attentive care / one who looks after. Productive fruitfulness is joined to continuing care for works regarded as children. References: II.13.2. See Care and custody.

invidere

invidere. Printed forms: invidet; invidit.

Begrudge or withhold from envy. Having given existence, God is said not to begrudge gifts of well-being; envy is excluded from creative care. References: II.13.11. See Care and custody.

munus / donum

munus / donum. Printed forms: dona; munus.

Gift or bestowed benefit. The gift of being and gifts that enable well-being are differentiated without separating their divine source. References: II.13.11. See Care and custody.

neglegere

neglegere. Printed forms: negligit.

Neglect or fail to attend to. Care for the complete work is said to exclude neglect of any constituent part. The printed form has negl-, not the fuller lemma spelling. References: II.13.21. See Care and custody.