Weight

Use in the book

The weight example occurs between questions about justice and a statement about the fine and shameful (316a–b). Socrates asks whether things weighing more are accepted as heavier and those weighing less as lighter, or the opposite. The companion rejects the opposite. Socrates then asks whether this also holds in Carthage and Lycaea, the very places just named for their unsettling sacrificial customs.

The geographical repetition has argumentative purpose. Ritual differences do not put those communities outside all common judgment. The same comparative standard can apply there and here. The example gives nomizein a clearly cognitive use: accepting a relation of weight as what it is, not enacting a local ordinance that makes one object heavier.

The inference to justice requires care. If “things weighing more” already specifies the same feature as “heavier,” the question receives an easy answer by correctly understanding the expressions. It does not show that all observers invariably estimate every object's weight accurately. Likewise, agreeing that just things are just does not establish that every community correctly identifies every concrete just act. Socrates' generalization to what is depends on distinguishing correct acceptance from mistaken acceptance, the latter appearing immediately as “missing” what is.

The passage is therefore stronger as an illustration of a common standard of correctness than as an empirical survey proving universal agreement. That interpretation fits the next stage, in which Socrates limits the authoritative agreement to those who know. It also preserves the companion's continued dissatisfaction: his objection concerned contested practices, and the weight question has not adjudicated any of them.

The example does not introduce a complete doctrine of moral measurement. No units, scales, or quantitative calculus of justice appear. Its local achievement is to make invariant correct judgment familiar before Socrates applies that structure more widely.

Places to read

1. 316aτὰ πλεῖον ἕλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται — Things weighing more are accepted as heavier
2. 316aτὰ δὲ ἔλαττον κουφότερα — Those weighing less as lighter
3. 316aἢ τοὐναντίον — The opposite predication is explicitly offered and rejected
4. 316aκαὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι καὶ ἐν Λυκαίᾳ — The return of the companion's sacrificial locations
5. 316a–bπανταχοῦ νομίζεται καλὰ — The ensuing extension to fine things everywhere

Translation in this edition

“Weigh more” is the contextual sense of the participle, not a generic action of dragging. Burnet prints πλεῖον, while the apparatus reports πλείονα in F. The comparative relation, rather than an alleged distinction between those variants' physical theories, is what the dialogue uses.

Carthage — Καρχηδών (Karchēdōn)

Καρχηδών (Karchēdōn)

Carthage. The place now included in the shared judgment about weight after its inhabitants' different sacrifices were cited. Attested: Καρχηδόνι (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

Heavier — βαρύτερος (baryteros)

βαρύτερος (baryteros)

Heavier. The correct comparative predicate for things weighing more. Attested: βαρύτερα (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

Less — ἔλαττον (elatton)

ἔλαττον (elatton)

Less. The lesser amount of weight in the weighing comparison. Attested: ἔλαττον (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

Lighter — κουφότερος (kouphoteros)

κουφότερος (kouphoteros)

Lighter. The correct comparative predicate for things weighing less. Attested: κουφότερα (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

More — πλεῖον (pleion)

πλεῖον (pleion)

More. The greater amount of weight in the weighing comparison. Attested: πλεῖον (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

The opposite — τοὐναντίον (tounantion)

τοὐναντίον (tounantion)

The opposite. The reversed identification of heavy and light, explicitly rejected by the companion. Attested: τοὐναντίον (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

Weighing — ἕλκειν (helkein)

ἕλκειν (helkein)

Weighing. In the weighing idiom, things drawing more weigh more; not a generic description of dragging objects. Attested: ἕλκοντα (316a). Weight and the judgment of what is heavier.

Use in the book

The Platonic notice makes heaviness and lightness dependent upon displacement from a proper place. The Aristotelian notice ranks earth and fire at opposite extremes. Democritus is reported to deny weight to the primary solid bodies and to explain their motion through collisions. The lexicon records this last claim as transmitted rather than reconciling it with other ancient testimonies.

Places to read

1. I.14.1a.2Weight depends on a body’s relation to its proper place.
2. I.14.1a.3Earth and fire occupy opposite extremes.
3. I.14.1f.3The primary solid bodies are said to lack weight.
4. I.1.23cThe compound baruēchēs characterizes the sea’s deep roar.

Translation in this edition

“Heavy” and “light” are relational in some passages and natural classifications in others. The English does not settle that difference in advance.

Weight in the language of sound

Barus can characterize sound as low, deep, or heavy, as well as physical weight. The compound baruēchēs describes the deep-roaring sea in the cosmic hymn at I.1.23c. This is a poetic characterization of its sound, not a measurement of the sea’s mass. The word family illustrates how physical qualities furnish auditory descriptions.