Fitting and appropriate

Use in the book

At 154e Socrates says a good condition of soul would be fitting for someone of Charmides' family. The remark expresses the expectation being placed on his upbringing, rather than verifying that inheritance guarantees character. At 158c the boy's bashfulness is called becoming for his age. Its fitness is specifically contextual, and Socrates' approval of it can coexist with the later rejection of modesty as a complete definition of temperance.

Critias' oikeia at 163c–d2 does a different job: he assigns appropriateness to fine and beneficial productions and alienness to harmful ones. This is an argumentative reclassification intended to save doing one's own business. The path from social becomingness to what truly benefits a person is therefore a question the dialogue develops, not an identity already settled by a common English translation.

Places to read

1. 154eGood psychic character is said to befit Charmides’ family
2. 158cBashfulness becomes the youth at his age
3. 163c–d2Critias assigns an evaluative sense to oikeia

Translation in this edition

The edition distinguishes “ought to be” at 154e and “was becoming” at 158c from “appropriate to one” for οἰκεῖα. Keeping the Greek forms visible prevents ordinary English “proper” from concealing different arguments.

πρέπω

Attested: πρέπει / ἔπρεψεν (prepei / eprepsen). To be fitting or appropriate; good character should suit Charmides’ family, and his bashfulness suits his youth. References: 154e, 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: πρέπω. See Fitting and appropriate.

Use in the book

At 124d Alcibiades agrees that giving up or going soft would not be befitting. Socrates can appeal to the young man's existing sense of what suits his aspirations in order to keep the inquiry going. The more elaborate sequence appears at 135b–c: before virtue, being ruled by one's better is better than ruling; the better is finer, and the finer more befitting. Vice consequently befits a slave, virtue a free person.

This chain links an assessment of benefit to the social language of propriety. It is not simply an appeal to how aristocrats already behave. Alcibiades must accept that his current ethical condition fails the standard appropriate to the status of which he is proud. The contrast becomes especially sharp when Socrates avoids naming the condition too bluntly in the presence of a beautiful young man.

The compounds should therefore be kept visible. Saying merely “vice is slavery” would lose the argument's explicit intermediate question about fittingness and collapse an evaluative comparison into an asserted identity.

Places to read

1. 124dPerseverance in inquiry is said to be befitting
2. 135b–135cBetter leads to finer, then more befitting, and finally to the free/slave ethical contrast

Translation in this edition

The edition uses a series of “befit” renderings rather than alternating without explanation between “appropriate,” “proper,” and “servile.” This makes the progression into δουλοπρέπεια and ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς traceable.

πρέπω / πρεπώδης

Attested: πρέπει (prepei; 124d); πρεπωδέστερον (prepōdesteron; 135b). At 124d: It is befitting, used to reject giving up the shared inquiry. At 135b: More befitting, inferred from finer and used in the free/slave ethical contrast. Lexical identification: family label: πρέπω / πρεπώδης. See Befitting.

Use in the book

The farmer distributes “the seeds that are due to each soil” (317d). The phrase is relational. Neither the soil nor the seed has to be imagined as a claimant to a moral right. The agricultural point is that the seed is appropriate to this soil. The same expression then governs the musician's allocation of strokes to tunes, and the feminine singular refers back to the food appropriate to human bodies (317d–e).

These examples give the idea of good distribution a criterion beyond the act of dividing something up. One can distribute badly. The distributor's knowledge must govern the fit among what is given, its recipient, and the activity's good. This is why Socrates moves directly from the appropriate assignment to the rightness or excellence of the resulting laws and distributions.

The examples also place a useful limit on the earlier language of sameness. An expert can accept the same truth about how to cultivate while distributing different seeds to different soils. The dialogue does not explicitly formulate a theory of context-sensitive political rules from this fact, but the reader should not flatten its model into identical treatment of unlike cases. Its demand is for consistent knowledge of the same matters, not for one undifferentiated provision to every recipient.

When the sequence reaches souls, the corresponding appropriate object remains unnamed. Calling the king the best distributor does not yet answer what each soul needs. The final question draws out that gap rather than filling it with an abstract word such as “justice” or “virtue.” Such terms matter elsewhere, but they are not the answer spoken at 321d.

Places to read

1. 317dτὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ — Worth or appropriateness is determined in relation to each soil
2. 317dκαὶ τὰ ἄξια νεῖμαι — The musical distributor must allot what is due
3. 317eοὐχ ὅσπερ τὴν ἀξίαν — The feminine adjective supplies “the due food” from the preceding τροφήν
4. 317eΑἱ τούτου ἄρα διανομαὶ καὶ οἱ νόμοι βέλτιστοι — The excellence of distribution follows the appropriate assignment

Translation in this edition

“Due” is maintained across seed, music, and food examples. The reader should hear the common relation without assuming that it denotes monetary value, a legal entitlement, or moral desert in every case. In the food question the Greek leaves the noun understood; the English likewise lets “what is due” pick it up from the preceding clause.

Best — ἄριστος (aristos)

ἄριστος (aristos)

Best. Best at allocating appropriate nourishment to bodies; a comparative evaluation tied to a defined task and recipient. Attested: ἄριστος (317e). What is due and fitting to a recipient.

Due — ἄξιος (axios)

ἄξιος (axios)

Due. Fitting or appropriate to the recipient, first the seeds suited to each soil and then the musical strokes due to tunes. It does not automatically mean moral desert or a legal entitlement. Attested: ἄξια (317d). What is due and fitting to a recipient.

Due food — ἄξιος (axios)

ἄξιος (axios)

Due food. The feminine adjective picks up the preceding word for food: the right nourishment for the bodies receiving it. Attested: ἀξίαν (317e). What is due and fitting to a recipient.

Each — ἕκαστος (hekastos)

ἕκαστος (hekastos)

Each. Individually each recipient soil. The distributive expression allows different appropriate allocations within one competent practice. Attested: ἑκάστῃ (317d). What is due and fitting to a recipient.

Best — βέλτιστος (beltistos)

βέλτιστος (beltistos)

Best. The excellent laws and distributions of the practitioner who gives appropriate food. The form here is a predicate, unlike the courteous address “my excellent friend” elsewhere. Attested: βέλτιστοι (317e). What is due and fitting to a recipient.

The things due to each recipient (contextual phrase)

317d: τὰ ἄξια σπέρματα ἑκάστῃ γῇ. The distributive dative “to each soil” and the evaluative adjective “due” or “fitting” make allocation recipient-sensitive. The right seed is not identified merely by giving every plot the same portion. The construction prepares the analogous questions about musical strokes and bodily food, then makes the missing psychic object at the end particularly important. See Due and fitting.