Household and city

Use in the book

The first political example rejects a crude reading of doing one's own business. Socrates asks whether a city would run well under a law requiring every citizen to manufacture all his own necessities (161e–162a). Charmides says no, while agreeing that a temperately managed city would be managed well. The example depends on the inadequacy of isolated self-sufficiency; it does not present a constitution or a detailed economic division of labour.

Household and city later become the main beneficiaries of the imagined knowledge-guided life (171e–172a). People would do what they knew and delegate the rest to experts. The house in this context is an organised group, unlike the houses produced by building at 165d. Socrates immediately goes on to question whether such administration is sufficient for good life, even if its technical competence is granted (172c–d).

The political dimension therefore expands the problem of temperance beyond an individual's outward composure. It asks what personal or supervisory knowledge could make collective action go well. The dialogue offers no unconditional endorsement of rule by someone who merely knows that knowledge exists. Its final appeal to knowledge of good and bad shows why efficient organisation cannot settle its own ethical aim.

Places to read

1. 154eOikia is family or house in the praise of Charmides’ lineage
2. 157e–158a2Oikia is family or house in the praise of Charmides’ lineage
3. 161e–162aA self-sufficiency law is tested against good civic management
4. 165d–eHouses are the products of house-building
5. 171e–172d2Household and city become sites of hypothetical expert management and its benefit test

Translation in this edition

The English differentiates “family,” “house,” and “household” by context. At 171e Burnet prints οἰκουμένη; the apparatus records οἰκονομουμένη in T. Both support a management context, but the variant should not be silently cited as the accepted text.

διοίκησις

Attested: διοικήσεως (dioikēseōs). Management or administration; the proposed benefit of temperance is reconsidered as it guides the management of household and city. References: 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: διοίκησις. See Household and city.

νόμος

Attested: νόμου (nomou). Law; the hypothetical rule requiring every citizen to make all his own possessions tests the literal reading of doing one’s own business. References: 161e. Lexical identification: lemma: νόμος. See Household and city.

οἰκέω

Attested: οἰκοῦσα / οἰκοῖτο / οἰκουμένη / οἰκεῖσθαι (oikousa / oikoito / oikoumenē / oikeisthai). To be managed or administered, of a city or household; the discussion contrasts good management with literal private self-sufficiency and later imagines management under temperance. References: 162a, 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: οἰκέω. See Household and city.

πόλις

Attested: πόλις / πόλεως (polis / poleōs). City or civic community; the thought experiments ask whether it could be well managed under literal self-sufficiency and then under temperance’s knowledgeable supervision. References: 161e, 171e, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: πόλις. See Household and city.

πολιτεύω

Attested: πολιτευομένη (politeuomenē). Being governed or administered as a civic community; the hypothetical city comes under the rule of temperance alongside a well-run household. References: 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: πολιτεύω. See Household and city.

πολιτική

Attested: πολιτική (politikē). Statesmanship or political expertise; provisionally identified as knowledge of the just, distinct from medicine’s subject and from knowledge of knowledge. References: 170b. Lexical identification: lemma: πολιτική. See Household and city.

Use in the book

The first appearance in the usefulness test makes the house a place where expert help is sought. If one or a cared-for friend is ill, the doctor is the preferred arrival. Bringing a specialist into the house is a rational response to a need the householder cannot meet through general learning alone.

Later the household becomes a model of governance. One person who orders it rightly is called manager and master, and the ordering is done by justice. This joins the domestic sphere to the city through the claim of one governing knowledge. The analogy takes unity of right judgment to survive a change of scale without elaborating the differences between family, property, dependents and civic institutions.

The philosopher’s own household then becomes the first concrete test of the alternative to second-place expertise. He must not merely hand it to another while accepting second prizes; he must himself judge rightly if it is to be well ordered. The demand is personal before it becomes public. It is followed by friends’ arbitrations and a civic commission, widening the sphere of trust.

The household passage should not be converted into a claim that the philosopher needs no doctor or should personally perform every craft. The earlier medical choice has not been revoked. The issue is competent responsibility for ordering human affairs, not self-sufficiency in all services. Nor does the dialogue specify modern family arrangements or a universal domestic hierarchy for readers to adopt. It uses the household of its dramatic world as the nearest arena of accountable judgment.

Places to read

1. 136cεἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν — The house first receives a potential helper in illness.
2. 138cοἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς — The household later becomes an object of right ordering.
3. 138eεἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία — Good order is the stated end of the philosopher’s personal judgment.

Translation in this edition

The English alternates “house” and “household” according to the work being done by the word. This is not a contradiction or a claim that two unrelated Greek terms are present. The shift in emphasis mirrors the progression from receiving an expert to exercising responsible rule.