From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe idiom hoti malista intensifies a claim or degree; in these conditional settings it presses an assumption as far as the argument needs.
- In the CharmidesAt 160c Socrates strengthens the rival case for quietness: suppose quiet actions are fine no less often than quick ones.
- In this editionThe edition varies “at the very most,” “as hard as I can,” “entirely possible,” “most certainly,” “as fully as could be” and “in the fullest sense.”
- A place to readThe objection grants the strongest relevant comparison on behalf of quiet action.
Meaning
The idiom hoti malista intensifies a claim or degree; in these conditional settings it presses an assumption as far as the argument needs. Its translation depends on what is being intensified. It is not a formula that turns every condition into an accepted truth.
Use in the book
At 160c Socrates strengthens the rival case for quietness: suppose quiet actions are fine no less often than quick ones. At 166c he allows Critias’ description of him to stand in its strongest form, even if he is refuting him as vigorously as possible; he then distinguishes that activity from the hostile motive Critias imputes. The concession is about refutation, not about the existence of knowledge of knowledge.
At 167b the phrase helps divide two questions: even if the proposed knowledge is entirely possible, its benefit still needs investigation. At 169b existence, maximally granted, would not by itself license identifying it with temperance. At 169d the same force sustains the provisional grant while Socrates asks whether the promised discrimination follows. These are deliberate suspensions of a disputed question.
At 172e–173a the assumption is strengthened again before the dream: let temperance be as defined and govern us as fully as possible. The scope shifts from possibility to the imagined operation of the faculty. Critias finally employs the idiom in his defence of supervision at 174d: if temperance is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of knowledges and oversees them, it should benefit through ruling the knowledge of good. Socrates’ response contests what follows from that status. In each case the idiom marks argumentative generosity or intensity; it does not remove the need to track the precise antecedent and the conclusion proposed from it.
Places to read
- 160cThe objection grants the strongest relevant comparison on behalf of quiet action.
- 166c–166dRefutation at its most forceful is separated from a personally hostile purpose.
- 167bMaximal possibility leaves benefit as a further question.
- 169b–169dExistence is entertained or granted without an established identification with temperance.
- 172e–173aThe dream assumes full operation of the proposed governing expertise.
- 174d–174e2Critias intensifies the premise of his final supervisory defence.
Translation in this edition
The edition varies “at the very most,” “as hard as I can,” “entirely possible,” “most certainly,” “as fully as could be” and “in the fullest sense.” Keeping one mechanical English wording throughout would obscure the changing scope.
μεγαλοπρεπῶς
Attested: μεγαλοπρεπῶς (megaloprepōs). Magnificently or lavishly; ironic description of the disputants’ extravagant concessions, made without testing whether the claims were possible. References: 175c. Lexical identification: lemma: μεγαλοπρεπῶς. See Maximal concession.
ὅτι μάλιστα
Attested: ὅτι μάλιστα (hoti malista). As fully or as much as possible; strengthens the provisional supposition without converting it into an established conclusion. References: 160c, 166c, 167b, 172e. Lexical identification: expression / normalized lookup: ὅτι μάλιστα. See Hypothesis; Maximal concession.