Ε Epsilon

fewer, smaller, less

ἐλάττων

The quiet actions no fewer, and the smaller than which the greater is greater · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἘλάττων, the comparative used for μικρός and ὀλίγος: smaller, less, fewer; also inferior.
  • In the CharmidesFour times: in the concession that the fine quiet actions might be “no fewer” than the quick (160c), and in the argument about relatives, “Than something smaller” (168b), “smaller than itself” (168c) and “less” (168c).
  • In this edition“Fewer”, “smaller”, “less”.
  • A place to read160b–d and 168b–d.
English renderings
ἐλάττους, elattous, “fewer”; ἐλάττονος, elattonos, “Than something smaller”; ἔλαττον, elatton, “smaller”, “less”

Use in the book

The first use counts. Socrates has argued that quiet actions are finer than quick ones either nowhere or in very few places, and makes a concession: suppose that the quiet actions which turn out finer are “no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones”; even so temperance would not be quietness any more than quickness (160c; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα). The comparison is of numbers, how many actions of each kind turn out finer, and the argument wins by granting equality.

The other uses are the correlate of the greater. The greater is greater than something smaller, “if it is to be greater” (168b), so that a greater than itself would also be smaller than itself (168b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον); and what is more than itself will also be less (168c). Here the smaller is not counted but required: without it the greater is not greater.

The two halves of the dialogue’s argument use the word in two ways. Against the boy, Socrates compares quantities and concedes as much as he can; against Critias, he uses the comparative itself, and the concession is not available, since a greater cannot be granted to be smaller than itself in any measure.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

  1. 160cEven if the quiet actions that turn out finer are no fewer than the quick ones, temperance would not be quietness.
  2. 168bThe greater is greater than something smaller.
  3. 168b–cA greater than itself would be smaller than itself.
  4. 168cWhat is more than itself will also be less.

Translation in this edition

Μηδὲν ἐλάττους (160c3) is “no fewer than”. At 168b8 ἐλάττονός τινος, “Than something smaller”, continues Socrates’ question after Critias’ “It has”, and the English begins the line with “Than”. Ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ (168c2) is “smaller than itself”, and ἔλαττον beside πλέον (168c9) “less”.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Phaedo Socrates takes the comparatives as his example of a safe answer. Cebes should not say that one man is bigger than another by a head, and the smaller smaller by the same head, for then the bigger would be bigger and the smaller smaller by the same thing, and the bigger bigger by a head, which is small, and that would be monstrous; he should say that the bigger is bigger only by bigness and the smaller smaller by smallness; and he should not say that ten is more than eight by two, but by number (100e–101b). He then applies it to persons: Simmias is bigger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, not because he is Simmias but by the bigness and smallness he happens to have, so that he has both names, small and big, standing between the two (102b–c). In the Theaetetus Socrates becomes smaller than Theaetetus without losing anything (155b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle denies that great and small are quantities at all. Nothing, he says, is called great or small in itself, but by reference to something else: a mountain is called small and a grain of millet large, because the one is smaller and the other larger than others of its kind.1 On that account the Charmides’ greater and smaller, the comparatives of great and small, can be read as relatives, as the argument of 168b–c assumes; in the next chapter Aristotle names the greater, with the double and knowledge, among the relatives (see διπλάσιος).

Source note

1. Aristotle, Categories 6, 5b15–22.