From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordἈδικεῖν is to do wrong, to act against δίκη, right; with a person as its object, to wrong him.
- In the CharmidesOnce, as a courtesy. Asked whether he is sure he has Socrates’ name right, Charmides says he would be doing him an injustice if he had not, since Socrates is much talked about among the boy’s age-mates (156a).
- In this edition“I’d be doing you an injustice if I didn’t.”
- A place to read155e–156b, from the leaf and its charm to Socrates’ promise to speak frankly.
- English renderings
- ἀδικῶ, adikō, “I’d be doing you an injustice”
Meaning
Ἀδικεῖν (adikein) is the verb of ἄδικος, “unjust”, the negative of δίκη, which is both custom and the right that custom secures. Its range runs from crime to a breach of manners: to wrong someone is to fail to give him what is his due. Charmides’ εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε is literally “unless I am doing wrong”, and it makes knowing a man’s name a matter of what is owed to him.
Use in the book
The exchange comes just after the boy has chosen persuasion over compulsion. He will copy the charm down “If I persuade you, Socrates” (156a; see πείθω). Socrates asks, “And you are sure you have my name right?” “I’d be doing you an injustice if I didn’t,” he said. “You’re talked about a good deal among people my age, and I remember you from when I was a boy, keeping company with Critias here.” “Good for you,” I said. “Then I can speak to you more frankly about this charm” (156a–b; see παρρησιάζομαι). The joke is that the visiting doctor of Critias’ ruse is no stranger: the boy knows him by reputation and by sight, and it is his knowing that lets Socrates speak to him more frankly about the charm, which he goes on to expound (156b–157c).
Justice is not one of the dialogue’s subjects. The just appears only once more, as the object of statesmanship, beside the healthy as the object of medicine, in Socrates’ question whether knowledge of knowledge is the same as “knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just” (170a–b; see δίκαιος). The temperate man of Critias’ definition, knowing only knowledge, would not know it. Elsewhere the root is only the ordinary “right” (157d, 175a).
The courtesy of 156a can be read against the end. The boy who would think it a wrong not to know Socrates’ name will, in the last lines, use force on him at his guardian’s order and refuse him even “a preliminary hearing”, the first step of due process (176c; see ἀνάκρισις; βιάζομαι). The dialogue opens with a young man giving Socrates his due, and closes with the same young man taking it away in fun.
Places to read
The one passage in which the verb occurs, and the dialogue’s other mention of the just.
Translation in this edition
“I’d be doing you an injustice if I didn’t” renders Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, literally “unless I am doing wrong”, with the condition turned round into English idiom. Socrates’ reply, Καλῶς γε σύ … ποιῶν, literally “you do well”, is “Good for you”, as again at 162e.
Elsewhere in Plato
The Laches shows the same reputation among the boys. Lysimachus, an elderly Athenian looking for teachers for his son, recalls as Socrates is named that the boys, talking among themselves at home, often mention Socrates and praise him, and he asks them, “is this the Socrates you are always talking about?” “Certainly, father, this is the one” (180e–181a). In both dialogues the young know Socrates by talk before their elders introduce him.