Soul and divine life

Self-motion and immortality

τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν, to hauto kinoun, “What moves itself”; ἀθάνατος, athanatos, “Immortal”; ἀεικίνητος, aeikinētos, “Ever-moving”; ἀρχή, archē, “Beginning and source”; ἀγένητος, agenētos, “Ungenerated”; ἀδιάφθορος, adiaphthoros, “Indestructible and uncorrupted”

The proof argues from self-originating, unceasing motion to the immortality of soul; it should be read before, and distinguished from, the chariot myth (245c–246a).

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe proof argues from self-originating, unceasing motion to the immortality of soul; it should be read before, and distinguished from, the chariot myth (245c–246a).
  • In the PhaedrusSocrates begins with “All soul is immortal”, then argues that what is ever-moving is immortal. Something that moves another but is itself moved by another can cease moving and thereby cease living. By contrast, only what moves itself never abandons itself and therefore never leaves off moving. The “only” identifies the condition of uninterrupted motion; it does not say that only souls ever move anything (245c).
  • In this editionAt 245d the translation follows Buttmann’s reading printed by Burnet: a derived beginning would “no longer be a beginning”. The apparatus gives a different transmitted construction, “would not come to be from a beginning”. At 245e the printed text follows the reading giving “all the earth” and “into one”, rather than “all coming to be”. These are material textual choices within the proof, not merely changes of punctuation.
  • A place to readThe complete demonstration, from ever-moving life through the beginning of motion to soul.

Meaning

What moves itself is the source of motion that Socrates identifies with soul. His argument is that, unlike something moved only by another, it never leaves itself and so never ceases moving and living (245c–246a). He then argues that this source is ungenerated and indestructible. This is the palinode’s reasoning for immortality; the following chariot story separately offers a likeness of what soul is like.

Use in the book

Socrates begins with “All soul is immortal”, then argues that what is ever-moving is immortal. Something that moves another but is itself moved by another can cease moving and thereby cease living. By contrast, only what moves itself never abandons itself and therefore never leaves off moving. The “only” identifies the condition of uninterrupted motion; it does not say that only souls ever move anything (245c).

He next treats this self-moving as a source for other motions. A beginning must be ungenerated: if it derived from something, it would no longer be a beginning. Since it cannot come to be, it cannot be destroyed either, for the destruction of the beginning would leave neither it nor what depends on it able to arise anew. The counterfactual picture of heaven and earth collapsing into immobility illustrates the consequence of losing the source of motion (245d–e).

The argument still has to join the source to soul. Socrates does this through the contrast between externally moved, soulless bodies and bodies whose motion comes from within, from themselves. This is declared the nature of soul. If the self-moving is nothing other than soul, the conclusion follows that soul is necessarily ungenerated and immortal (245e–246a). The identification is thus an explicit premise in the reasoning, not an inference supplied later by the chariot picture.

The next paragraph sets a limit to what has been established. Immortality has been treated sufficiently; the figure of soul will now be narrated by likeness. Similarly, the description of a god as an immortal animal composed of soul and body is said to be something we fashion without adequate seeing or understanding (246c–d). That qualification concerns the imagined divine animal and does not simply retract the immediately preceding motion-proof.

The adjective “immortal” later acquires different applications. A lawgiver may be an immortal speech-writer in his city, in the sense of enduring authority or fame (258c). The seeds of knowledgeable discourse can keep their propagation immortal through new growth in other characters (277a). These contexts extend the word’s reach without repeating the argument that identifies soul with an underived moving source.

Places to read

  1. 245c–246a2The complete demonstration, from ever-moving life through the beginning of motion to soul.
  2. 246a–d2The boundary between the demonstration, the likeness and the fashioned image of an immortal animal.
  3. 258b–cThe transferred immortality of a lawgiver’s written work.
  4. 276e–277a2Immortal continuation through the seeds of living discourse.

Translation in this edition

At 245d the translation follows Buttmann’s reading printed by Burnet: a derived beginning would “no longer be a beginning”. The apparatus gives a different transmitted construction, “would not come to be from a beginning”. At 245e the printed text follows the reading giving “all the earth” and “into one”, rather than “all coming to be”. These are material textual choices within the proof, not merely changes of punctuation.

The edition’s “what itself moves itself” preserves both the emphatic and the reflexive force of the Greek at 245d. Its “ever-moving” at 245c should not be weakened into merely “moved”: the continuity of motion is necessary to the argument.

Lexical detail

The central Greek expression is a substantive phrase, “what moves itself”, not an abstract noun for a detached faculty called self-motion. The reflexive forms make the same thing both origin and recipient of the motion. Aei-kinēton means “ever-moving”; athanatos, “immortal”; agenēton, “ungenerated”; and adiaphthoron, “indestructible”. These words name different steps of the argument rather than four freely interchangeable descriptions.

Archē is a beginning, here also an originating source. Calling the self-moving a “spring and beginning of motion” combines the image of a fountain with the logical requirement that what originates motion cannot itself depend on a prior origin in the same way.

Attested forms

τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “what moves itself”.

τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν (245e · Burnet p. 27) — “what itself moves itself”. Phrase continues across the printed line break; the reflexive is preserved.

ἀθάνατος (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “immortal”.

ἀθάνατόν (246d · Burnet p. 28) — “immortal”.

ἀθάνατος (258c · Burnet p. 43) — “immortal”.

ἀθάνατον (277a · Burnet p. 70) — “immortal”.

ἀεικίνητον (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “ever-moving”.

ἀρχῆς (241a · Burnet p. 20) — “rule”. The former lover’s senseless rule, not the origin of cosmic movement.

ἀρχὴ (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “beginning”.

ἀρχῇ (253c · Burnet p. 36) — “at the beginning”. Here the beginning of the tale, not the metaphysical source.

ἀγένητον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — “ungenerated”.

ἀγένητόν (246a · Burnet p. 27) — “ungenerated”.

ἀδιάφθορον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — “indestructible”.

ἀδιάφθορος (252d · Burnet p. 35) — “uncorrupted”.

Research and interpretation

O’Rourke’s indexed discussion notes the ambiguity of all soul. The native proof depends on continuous self-originating motion, not merely movement. The Buttmann and Philoponus readings are reported in apparatus 26-3 and 26-5, not independently collated here.

Fran O’Rourke, Immortality of the Soul in Plato and Aquinas, printed 368.

Printed textual evidence

The supplied edition’s reported readings can be checked in its Greek apparatus: 245d (apparatus); 245e (apparatus).

ἀγένητος

Ungenerated means having no coming into being. Socrates applies it to the beginning of motion: if that beginning came from something else, it would no longer be the beginning. His argument then identifies self-moving soul as ungenerated, rather than simply very old or long-lived.

Read: 245d; 246a.

agenētos · Ungenerated · lemma

Not having come into being.

Socrates argues that a beginning would cease to count as a beginning if it were derived from something. Ungenerated is therefore not a synonym for long-lived: it denies an originating event for the source under discussion.

Attested: ἀγένητον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — “ungenerated”.

Attested: ἀγένητόν (246a · Burnet p. 27) — “ungenerated”.

See: Self-motion and immortality

LSJ gives unoriginated and specifically cites the beginning at 245d.

Liddell–Scott–Jones, ἀγένητος (Scaife ATLAS).

ἀδιάφθορος

The adjective means indestructible in the argument about motion, but uncorrupted in the account of lovers. Socrates says that an ungenerated beginning cannot perish; later he limits a lover’s imitation of his god to the time while the lover remains uncorrupted. The ethical condition is distinct from the proof of immortality.

Read: 245d; 252d.

adiaphthoros · Indestructible and uncorrupted · lemma

Not destroyed; in an ethical condition, not corrupted.

The source of motion is said necessarily to be indestructible. A lover’s imitation of his god at 252d continues while he is uncorrupted: there the adjective describes a condition of conduct, not a demonstration that an individual cannot perish.

Attested: ἀδιάφθορον (245d · Burnet p. 26) — “indestructible”.

Attested: ἀδιάφθορος (252d · Burnet p. 35) — “uncorrupted”.

See: Divine following and imitation; Self-motion and immortality

Research and sources for this word.

ἀεικίνητος

Ever-moving means never ceasing to move. Socrates begins his immortality argument by calling what is ever-moving immortal, then asks how motion can continue without depending on an external mover that may stop. The argument concerns self-motion, rather than immortality for every moving object.

Read: 245c.

aeikinētos · Ever-moving · lemma

Always in motion.

The opening premise makes the ever-moving immortal. The next sentence asks what can sustain motion without depending on a mover that can cease; it is not a claim that every observed moving body is immortal.

Attested: ἀεικίνητον (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “ever-moving”.

See: Self-motion and immortality

The independent 245 witness keeps the contrast with externally dependent motion.

Plato, Phaedrus 245, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

ἀθάνατος

Immortal means not subject to death in Socrates’ argument about soul. He claims that soul, as a source of its own movement, cannot cease to live. Elsewhere the dialogue also calls an enduring lawgiver an immortal speech-writer, so this adjective does not always carry the proof’s precise metaphysical sense.

Read: 245c; 258c; 246a.

athanatos · Immortal · lemma

Not subject to death; also, in a transferred use, enduring in fame or transmission.

The argument predicates immortality of soul. The myth separately acknowledges that calling a god an immortal animal rests on a fashioned account. An “immortal speech-writer” at 258c and immortal propagation of discourse at 277a use the adjective beyond the proof’s immediate subject.

Attested: ἀθάνατος (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “immortal”.

Attested: ἀθάνατόν (246d · Burnet p. 28) — “immortal”.

Attested: ἀθάνατος (258c · Burnet p. 43) — “immortal”.

Attested: ἀθάνατον (277a · Burnet p. 70) — “immortal”.

See: Self-motion and immortality; Soul

The 245 witness confirms that soul is the proof’s subject.

Plato, Phaedrus 245, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

ἀρχή

A beginning is the source from which something comes, but the same word can also mean rule. In the immortality argument, Socrates says that the beginning of motion cannot itself derive from another beginning. By contrast, the first speech calls love’s former authority within the lover a senseless rule.

Read: 245c; 241a.

archē · Beginning and source · lemma

A beginning or originating source; also rule or governing authority.

The premise that whatever comes to be comes from a beginning is joined to the claim that the beginning itself cannot derive from another. Elsewhere the same ordinary word can mark the beginning of the myth, not an eternal principle. The first speech’s “former senseless rule” at 241a uses the same noun for the authority that love and madness had exercised within the lover.

Attested: ἀρχῆς (241a · Burnet p. 20) — “rule”. The former lover’s senseless rule, not the origin of cosmic movement.

Attested: ἀρχὴ (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “beginning”.

Attested: ἀρχῇ (253c · Burnet p. 36) — “at the beginning”. Here the beginning of the tale, not the metaphysical source.

See: Self-motion and immortality

The 245 witness preserves the source argument; the rule sense is separately checked in native 241a.

Plato, Phaedrus 245, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

πηγή

A spring is a source of flowing water, extended to the source of motion and of an imagined current of longing.

At 230b Socrates tests the cold spring with his foot; at 245c self-motion is called the spring of other motion.

pēgē · Spring · lemma

A source from which water, motion or an imagined stream flows.

The cold spring under the plane tree is tested by Socrates’ foot. The same source-word later helps describe what moves itself as the spring of motion and the stream that passes between the lovers. The concrete spring is therefore one useful starting-point for following the dialogue’s explanatory water imagery.

Attested: πηγὴ (230b · Burnet p. 5) — “spring”. A physical source beneath the plane tree.

Attested: πηγὴ (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “spring”. Self-motion as source of other motion.

Attested: πηγή (255c · Burnet p. 39) — “spring”. Source of the imagined stream of longing.

See: Counter-love and mirror; Leisure and walking; Self-motion and immortality

Research and sources for this word.

τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν

What moves itself is the self-moving source of motion that Socrates identifies with soul in his argument for immortality.

At 245c he argues that what moves itself never abandons itself and so never ceases moving; the identification with soul follows at 245e–246a.

to hauto kinoun · What moves itself · phrase

The self-moving, distinguished from what both moves something else and is moved by something else.

The article and participle make the expression a substantive. Its not abandoning itself supplies the argument for uninterrupted motion; its identification with soul is articulated at 245e–246a. This is an argumentative phrase, not a printed abstract noun meaning “self-motion”.

Attested: τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν (245c · Burnet p. 26) — “what moves itself”.

Attested: τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν (245e–246a · Burnet p. 27) — “what itself moves itself”. Phrase continues across the printed line break; the reflexive is preserved.

See: Self-motion and immortality

Fowler confirms the argumentative sequence. The second attested phrase crosses 245e–246a: κινοῦν follows the 246a marker. Preserve the distinct reflexive wording of each occurrence.

Plato, Phaedrus 245c, 245e, 246a — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

Citation note: τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ precedes the native 246a marker; κινοῦν follows it. Preserve the printed reflexives and cite the complete phrase across the section break.