From the book
Pensées
Blaise Pascal · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordDifferent kinds of greatness, not positions on one continuous scale of quantity or prestige.
- In the bookKings, Archimedes, and Christ reveal what each order can display and what it cannot produce.
- In this editionIntellectual greatness in Fragment 793 must not be confused with the supernatural order of charity.
- A place to readFragment 793 is the central account; Fragment 460 offers a related but differently phrased threefold distinction.
Meaning
Ordre here concerns a domain and its proper measure. Bodily force, intellectual achievement, and charity do not become interchangeable by enlargement. A vast collection of bodies cannot amount to a thought; a vast collection of thoughts cannot amount to a movement of true charity. This does not deny all relations among the orders: the distance from bodies to minds itself figures the further distance to charity. But an analogy is not a common unit of measurement. Pascal’s “infinitely more infinite” expresses the theological disproportion and should not be treated as a mathematical computation.
Use in the book
Fragment 793 begins with the relation between seeing and valuing. Worldly grandeur has no brilliance for someone absorbed in intellectual inquiry. Intellectual greatness is in turn invisible to kings, the rich, and commanders insofar as they judge by fleshly power. Wisdom is invisible to both worldly and merely inquisitive observers. The orders therefore concern not only objects but the capacity and orientation of the observer. Failure to admire does not prove absence of worth; it may expose the inappropriateness of the measure being applied.
The image of empire is repeated without becoming literal political rule. Great minds have their empire, victory, and brilliance, but are seen by minds rather than bodily eyes. Saints likewise have their own glory without needing either worldly or intellectual grandeur. Those other forms of greatness add nothing to or subtract nothing from holiness as holiness. The argument is not that a saint cannot be learned or a ruler cannot be good; it is that learning and rank do not constitute the good that makes a saint holy.
Archimedes supplies the central intellectual example. He does not need battles to make his inventions visible to minds, and playing the prince in geometrical books would be irrelevant. Pascal says he was a prince, but the edition identifies that as Pascal’s assertion rather than an independently verified biographical fact. The force of the example does not require accepting the historical claim: a proof is not improved by the social title of its author. External display is simply not what demonstrates the achievement.
Jesus Christ supplies the third-order example. He has neither possessions nor an outward production of learning; he invents no scientific discovery and does not rule as a king. Yet his humility, patience, holiness, freedom from sin, and relation to God constitute magnificence for the eyes of the heart. The repeated “holy” gives the passage a different emphasis from the inventor’s achievement. The scandal of Christ’s lowliness arises when readers demand evidence of a kind of greatness he is not there to display.
The examples lead to the claims about production. Bodies, even including the stars and kingdoms, do not know themselves or their world; the least mind does. All minds and all their productions cannot yield the least movement of charity because charity is supernatural. The argument is about difference of kind and divine gift, not a competition to accumulate the greatest stock of natural capacity. It also explains why pride in intellectual accomplishment cannot be cured merely by adding still more accomplishment.
Fragment 460 must be read alongside, not substituted for, Fragment 793. It names flesh, mind, and will, with body, intellectual inquiry, and justice as their objects. Its emphasis falls on characteristic disorders: concupiscence, curiosity, and pride. It allows that pride can attach to possessions or learning while identifying wisdom as its proper temptation if someone imagines having made himself wise. God alone gives wisdom, so glory belongs in God. The two fragments are related through their refusal of self-sufficiency, but their terms and immediate arguments differ. A rigid universal table would erase that difference.
Places to read
- Fragment 460FrenchFlesh, mind, and will are distinguished through objects and characteristic temptations.
- Fragment 547FrenchKnowledge of God without recognition of misery can become self-glorification.
- Fragment 765FrenchContrary descriptions of Christ require distinction of natures and advents.
- Fragment 785FrenchChrist’s divine greatness and mortal lowliness give him a relation to every condition.
- Fragment 786FrenchWorldly historians scarcely perceive the kind of importance Christ has.
- Fragment 792FrenchBrilliance and disgrace coexist without Christ enjoying worldly prestige.
- Fragment 793FrenchThe central argument distinguishes measures, observers, and capacities of production.
- Fragment 862FrenchThe refusal to exclude one truth for another provides a related model of disciplined distinction.
Translation in this edition
The English renders the relevant spirituelles in Fragment 793 as “intellectual,” since calling the middle order simply “spiritual” could confuse it with supernatural charity. The clause about wisdom being nowhere except in God uses the edition’s expressly disclosed conjecture, nulle [part] sinon [en] Dieu; it is not a recovered manuscript reading. “Their abandonment” remains deliberately unresolved in the supplied edition. Orders here must also be distinguished from ordre as the arrangement of an argument or a sequence of instruction.
French forms and English renderings
trois ordres différents de genre — three orders different in kind [phrase]; corps — bodies [printed form]; esprits — minds [printed form]; charité — charity, Christian love [printed form]; la chair, l’esprit, la volonté — flesh, mind, will [phrase]; trois ordres — three orders [phrase]; chair — flesh [printed form]