From the book
Pensées
Blaise Pascal · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA condition of insufficiency encompassing error, dependence, mortality, and disappointed aspiration, not poverty alone.
- In the bookKnowing misery can attest the greatness that makes the deprivation felt.
- In this editionMisery, wretchedness, miserable, and unhappy preserve related but distinct words and local emphases.
- A place to readFragment 397 and Fragment 409, with Fragment 434's religious explanation of the divided condition.
Meaning
Misère reaches beyond lack of possessions. It can include ignorance, weakness, mortality, unhappy dependence, and failure to attain a good one nevertheless desires. Misérable names the subject's condition; malheureux may emphasize unhappiness or misfortune. Their relation to grandeur is central. The human being experiences not merely a brute deficiency but a lack measured against an aspiration or capacity. Pascal's Christian account interprets that lack as a damaged condition. This argument is neither a clinical judgment about a particular reader nor a claim that worldly hardship is insignificant.
Use in the book
Fragment 60's outline pairs human wretchedness without God with happiness with God, then restates the plan as corrupted nature shown through nature and a Restorer shown through Scripture. It establishes the projected relation between diagnosis and religious remedy. The early observations supply many different experiences of lack: shifting desires in Fragment 109, the dependence and need of Fragment 126, the boredom exposed by inactivity in Fragment 131. Material comfort cannot remove the condition. Fragment 139's king and disgraced officials may retain wealth and servants while becoming unable to bear undiverted reflection.
The same fragment identifies mortality as the deeper reason for restless pursuits. Diversion provides a real temporary change of attention, but Fragment 171 calls that consolation itself the greatest misery because it prevents thought and a search for something more solid. Thus an activity can relieve felt misery while sustaining the condition that makes relief necessary. Fragment 174 pairs Solomon and Job, abundance and extreme affliction, as opposed experiential routes to understanding it. The first knows pleasures' vanity, the second the reality of evils. The pairing denies that only destitution or catastrophe can disclose the subject.
Fragment 397 makes knowing oneself miserable both misery and greatness. Fragment 399 insists on awareness, excluding a ruined house from misery in this sense. Fragment 398's dispossessed king and Fragment 409's fuller comparisons explain why a deprivation is not simply the absence of any imaginable advantage. Ordinary people do not grieve not being kings as a deposed king does; lacking a third eye is not like losing one's sight. What counts as loss depends on what properly belongs to the being. Pascal infers a better original nature from the pain of a present condition that resembles animals while remaining experienced as a falling short.
Fragment 416 shows how greatness and misery continually become evidence for one another. A greater height makes a fall worse; consciousness of the fall reveals a surviving greatness. Fragment 418 accordingly warns against showing only one side. Fragment 423 distinguishes the natural capacity for good, which should not be despised, from its present emptiness and baseness. This discriminating account is more precise than either celebrating human potential without qualification or representing the person as nothing but contemptible. Fragment 420's alternating praise and humiliation aims to prevent repose in either partial description.
Fragment 434 brings rival philosophical explanations to an impasse before proposing creation, corruption, and grace as the key. If humanity had never been corrupted, it would securely enjoy truth and happiness; if it had never been other than corrupt, it would have no idea of either. The transmission of sin is then acknowledged as deeply offensive to human reason before being claimed as necessary for self-understanding. This is the theological explanation Pascal advances, not a proof contained in the ordinary meaning of misery. Fragment 425's empty trace of former happiness supplies a related account of desire. Both explanations retain that argumentative status; the images do not certify themselves.
Places to read
- Fragment 60FrenchA working outline joins the diagnosis of wretchedness to a proposed religious remedy.
- Fragment 131FrenchDependence and emptiness emerge when occupation ceases.
- Fragment 139FrenchRank and material comfort do not abolish mortal unhappiness.
- Fragment 171FrenchDiversion consoles misery while postponing a more solid remedy.
- Fragment 174FrenchSolomon and Job exemplify opposed experiences of the same condition.
- Fragment 397FrenchKnowledge of misery attests greatness without removing misery.
- Fragment 399FrenchThe ruined house distinguishes damage from aware misery.
- Fragment 409FrenchDeprivation is measured against what properly belongs to a being.
- Fragment 416FrenchThe reciprocal inference from greatness and misery explains the philosophers’ circle.
- Fragment 418FrenchGreatness and baseness must be represented together.
- Fragment 423FrenchA capacity worth loving is distinguished from its empty condition.
- Fragment 434FrenchCreation, corruption, and grace are offered as the divided condition's explanation.
Translation in this edition
“Wretchedness” avoids reducing misère to economic poverty, but the edition also uses “misery,” including in Fragment 397 and Fragment 409. There is no invariant English equivalent. Malheureux is generally “unhappy” in these examples, and déchu carries the fallen condition in Fragment 409; neither should be silently counted as an occurrence of misère. The dispossessed king remains an analogy within the argument. Its precise relation between status and deprivation does not mean that the metaphor alone establishes the doctrine of the Fall.
French forms and English renderings
misère — wretchedness; misery [printed form]; misérable — miserable [printed form]; déchu — fallen [printed form]; malheureux — unhappy [printed form]