Only and nothing else · Lexicon

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordMonē, a feminine adjective, can mark a particular knowledge as the only one of its kind.
In the CharmidesCritias at 166c and 166e singles out temperance as uniquely knowing itself and the other knowledges.
In this editionThe edition’s “alone,” “only,” “nothing but” and “of nothing else” deserve separate attention to grammatical scope.
A place to readCritias claims uniqueness for the knowledge that knows itself and other knowledges.

Meaning

Monē, a feminine adjective, can mark a particular knowledge as the only one of its kind. Monon also functions adverbially to restrict what is known or what follows. “Of nothing else” restricts an object-domain. These uses of exclusiveness are not equivalent merely because English can render all of them with “only.”

Use in the book

Critias at 166c and 166e singles out temperance as uniquely knowing itself and the other knowledges. The uniqueness claim concerns which faculty has this characteristic. Socrates’ restatement then restricts its objects: it concerns itself, other knowledges and ignorance, rather than the first-order subjects of those knowledges. The exclusion is crucial to the analogies of sight without colour and hearing without sound. A faculty that also retained its ordinary subject matter would not be the same hypothesis.

At 170c–d a further “only” marks the limited result: under the separation of domains the possessor recognizes that knowledge is present, not what it concerns. This is a restriction on the promised discrimination. It should not be confused with a general definition of all reflective awareness. At 174b–c the exclusive expression shifts again: Socrates identifies knowledge of good and bad alone as the decisive knowledge in the happiness argument, rather than all the other sciences together. Finally at 174e he recalls that temperance was assigned knowledge and lack of knowledge as its only objects, and nothing else. That last restriction drives the objection to Critias’ proposed supervisory benefit. A lexicon that drops the exclusive phrases makes the refutation look broader, and less intelligible, than the stipulated account permits.

Places to read

166c–166e2Critias claims uniqueness for the knowledge that knows itself and other knowledges.
167b–168a2 3The analogies preserve exclusion of ordinary first-order objects.
170c–170dThe result is limited to recognizing that someone knows, not the field known.
174b–174cThe source of happiness is narrowed to knowledge of good and bad.
174e–175aThe stipulated restriction of temperance’s objects supports the final objection.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s “alone,” “only,” “nothing but” and “of nothing else” deserve separate attention to grammatical scope. They are not ornamental repetitions.

μόνον

Attested: μόνον (monon). Only or merely; restricts the proposed temperance to knowing that someone knows or does not know, without identifying what the knowledge is about. References: 170d. Lexical identification: lemma: μόνος; μόνον is restrictive or adverbial neuter. See Only and nothing else.