Speech, perception, and their objects

Use in the book

The companion's first definition makes law “what is accepted.” Socrates asks whether speech is the things spoken, sight the things seen, or hearing the things heard (313b–c). Once the companion distinguishes each pair, he distinguishes law from accepted things too. The pattern is grammatically clear and rhetorically forceful. Its philosophical leverage depends on accepting the analogy between law and the capacities in the examples.

Socrates then asks what the relevant capacity is. Sight is perception that reveals through the eyes; hearing perception that reveals sounds through the ears. The repeated instrumental construction, “by sight,” “by hearing,” “by law,” invites an account of that through which the objects become manifest or accepted. It is not merely a request to rename a heap of cases.

The move is not an account of sense organs in physiological detail. Nor does the source assert that all laws are literally sensations or that lawmaking occurs in a special sensory faculty. Perception is one candidate model, joined by revealing and finding. Medicine and prophecy then introduce crafts whose objects are known or discovered through an expertise. The argument passes from the structure of a relation to possible accounts of its explanatory term.

The speech example is less straightforward than the sensory pair: speech and things spoken can overlap in ordinary usage in ways sight and visible objects do not. The dialogue does not pause over that complication. Its purpose is to make the companion withdraw his first equation and ask what law itself is. A careful commentary can register the analogy's demand without pretending that grammatical similarity proves all the relations identical.

Logos continues to matter. The companion's long speech presents evidence for variation; Socrates' argument later rehabilitates Minos; Minos' association with Zeus is construed as an association “in words.” The word that first illustrates the difference between activity and content becomes a medium through which judgments are examined and education is claimed. The closing inability to give an answer exposes the limit of merely possessing a persuasive account.

Places to read

1. 313bλόγος σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὰ λεγόμενα — The first analogy asks whether speech is its spoken contents
2. 313bὄψις τὰ ὁρώμενα, ἢ ἀκοὴ τὰ ἀκουόμενα — Sight and hearing with their objects
3. 313cἄλλο δὴ νόμος, ἄλλο δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα — The distinction is transferred to law
4. 313c–314a2ὄψει φατὲ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι — The instrumental pattern: visible things are seen by sight
5. 314aδιὰ τῶν ὤτων δηλούσῃ ἡμῖν τὰς φωνάς — Hearing reveals sounds through the ears
6. 319cσυγγίγνεσθαι ἐνάτῳ ἔτει τῷ Διὶ ἐν λόγοις — The later educational use of words

Translation in this edition

“Speech,” “sight,” “hearing,” and “perception” preserve the different terms. The heard objects become “sounds” in the definition of hearing. At 314a the Greek is τὰ πράγματα, “things,” for sight's objects; the alternative “colors” belongs to the apparatus and is not silently adopted.

Be seen — ὁρᾶν (horan)

ὁρᾶν (horan)

Be seen. Passive form in the claim that visible things are seen by sight. Attested: ὁρᾶσθαι (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Different — ἄλλος (allos)

ἄλλος (allos)

Different. One thing as distinct from another in the separation of a capacity or activity from its objects; the word carries the companion’s acknowledgment that law and accepted things now appear different. Attested: ἄλλο (313c). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Ears — οὖς (ous)

οὖς (ous)

Ears. The organs through which hearing reveals sounds. Attested: ὤτων (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Eyes — ὀφθαλμός (ophthalmos)

ὀφθαλμός (ophthalmos)

Eyes. The bodily organs through which sight reveals things. Attested: ὀφθαλμῶν (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Hearing — ἀκοή (akoē)

ἀκοή (akoē)

Hearing. The capacity distinguished from heard objects and explained through the ears. Attested: ἀκοὴ (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Is heard — ἀκούειν (akouein)

ἀκούειν (akouein)

Is heard. The hearing example's passive verb, used with hearing as its means. Attested: ἀκούεται (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

By law — νόμος (nomos)

νόμος (nomos)

By law. Instrumental dative, parallel to by sight and by hearing, inviting an explanation of law as the means of acceptance. Attested: νόμῳ (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Perception — αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)

αἴσθησις (aisthēsis)

Perception. The explanatory kind to which sight and hearing are assigned. Attested: αἰσθήσει (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Sight — ὄψις (opsis)

ὄψις (opsis)

Sight. The capacity or activity distinguished from visible objects and then explained as perception through the eyes. Attested: ὄψις (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Sounds — φωνή (phōnē)

φωνή (phōnē)

Sounds. The immediate objects made manifest through hearing; not a divine voice in this passage. Attested: φωνάς (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

Speech — λόγος (logos)

λόγος (logos)

Speech. The activity or expression contrasted with the things spoken in Socrates' first analogy. Attested: λόγος (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects.

The things heard — τὰ ἀκουόμενα (ta akouomena)

τὰ ἀκουόμενα (ta akouomena)

The things heard. Hearing's objects in the analogy separating law from accepted contents. Attested: τὰ ἀκουόμενα (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects.

The things seen — τὰ ὁρώμενα (ta horōmena)

τὰ ὁρώμενα (ta horōmena)

The things seen. The visible objects, not the capacity of sight by which they are seen. Attested: τὰ ὁρώμενα (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects.

The things spoken — τὰ λεγόμενα (ta legomena)

τὰ λεγόμενα (ta legomena)

The things spoken. The contents or objects of speech, distinguished from speech itself for the analogy with accepted things. Attested: τὰ λεγόμενα (313b). Speech, perception, and their objects.

We would have answered — ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

We would have answered. The hypothetical joint answer defining sight as a kind of perception. Attested: ἀπεκρινάμεθ’ (314a). Speech, perception, and their objects.

What kind of thing the means is (contextual phrase)

314a: τίνι ὄντι τῇ ὄψει ὁρᾶται; The question asks what sight is, such that visible things are seen by it. The instrumental dative is repeated for hearing and law. Socrates is seeking an explanatory account of the means, not merely naming its objects. The construction gives the analogy its structure while leaving open whether law works like a perceptual capacity. See Speech and perception.