Φ Phi

sound

φωνή

The object of hearing, which a hearing that heard itself would have to have · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordVoice, the sound a living creature utters; by extension any sound, and the speech of a people. It is akin to φημί, “say”.
  • In the CharmidesThree times in two places: as what hearing hears, “a hearing which hears no sound” (167d) and “the hearing of nothing but sound” (168d); and as what a hearing that heard itself would have, “will hear itself as having a sound” (168d).
  • In this edition“Sound”.
  • A place to read167c–d and 168d–169a.
English renderings
φωνῆς, phōnēs, “(of) sound”; φωνήν, phōnēn, “a sound”

Meaning

In ordinary Greek φωνή is first a voice: the cry of an animal, the speech of a man, the dialect of a people. Philosophers also used it, as the Charmides does, for whatever is heard: sound is what hearing is of, as colour is what sight is of. The two uses sit uneasily together. Plato himself uses φωνή for sound in general in the Timaeus (67b) and the Republic (6.507c), and sets it against ψόφος, mere noise, as a term of art in the Theaetetus’ account of the letters (203b); Aristotle draws the line the Charmides leaves undrawn, keeping φωνή for voice and making ψόφος the name of sound in general.

Use in the book

The word comes in the second of Socrates’ parallels to a knowledge of itself. After the sight that sees no colour he asks after “a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings”, and Critias denies there is one (167d; see ἀκοή; μὴ ἀκοαί). The case shows that sound is what makes hearing hearing: take sound away, and a hearing would be a hearing in name only. Critias, who is to defend a knowledge with no object of its own, refuses the hearing without an object at once.

At 168d the word returns in the principle that whatever has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Hearing, Socrates says, “was the hearing of nothing but sound”, so that if it is to hear itself, “it will hear itself as having a sound”; Critias calls it “Absolutely necessary” (168d; see ἀκοή). The argument now asks what hearing would have to be, not what it hears. Since hearing hears only sound, a hearing that heard itself would itself have to have a sound, and so be a thing heard. Hearing is left undecided with sight (168e–169a; see ἀκοή; μέγας ἀνήρ).

The phrase at 168d6 is φωνὴν ἐχούσης, “as having a sound”, and in plain Greek φωνὴν ἔχειν is also “to have a voice”. Heard that way, the hearing that hears itself would be a hearing with a voice of its own. The English keeps the word the argument needs, but the Greek can be read as letting the absurdity be heard.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 167dA hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings: Critias denies there is one.
  2. 168dHearing is of nothing but sound; to hear itself it would have to have a sound.

Translation in this edition

“Sound” renders φωνή at all three places: “hears no sound” (167d4), “the hearing of nothing but sound” (168d4), and “as having a sound” (168d6). The English word covers what hearing hears in general, which is the sense the argument needs.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Timaeus defines the pair the Charmides sets side by side. Timaeus lays it down that sound in general is the blow passed by the air through the ears, by way of brain and blood, as far as the soul, and that hearing is the motion this blow sets going, starting from the head and coming to rest around the liver’s seat; the quick part of it is high in pitch, the slower part deeper (67b). Sound there is the cause and hearing the effect in the body, and neither is the other. In the Theaetetus Theaetetus, asked to give an account of the letter sigma as he had of the syllable, answers that an element has no elements to give: sigma is one of the voiceless letters, a noise only, ψόφος, like the hiss of the tongue; beta has neither voice nor noise; and the seven clearest letters, the vowels, “have voice only”, φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει (203b). The phrase is the one Socrates uses of the hearing that hears itself at 168d.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, in On the Soul, separates the two senses of the word. Voice, he says, is a sound belonging to a thing with soul: nothing without soul has a voice, though pipe and lyre are said to by likeness, because they have pitch, melody and articulation; and voice is the sound of a living creature, made not with any chance part of it.1 On his terms what the Charmides’ hearing hears is ψόφος, sound in general, and φωνή is one kind of it. In the Poetics he calls a vowel a letter that has audible voice without contact of tongue or lips.2

Source note

1. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 420b5–13.

2. Aristotle, Poetics 20, 1456b25–29.