From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The word“Not only … but also”: a construction that grants one thing and adds another.
- In the CharmidesThree times: of the boy, thought to surpass his fellows “not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for” (157d), of temperance: “Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well” (160e); and, with μή, of each kind of knowledge, defined “not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge” (171a).
- In this edition“Not only … but … as well”, “not only … but”.
- A place to read160d–161b.
- English renderings
- οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί, ou monon … alla kai, “not only … but … as well”, “not only … but”; μὴ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί, mē monon … alla kai, “not just … but”
Meaning
The construction adds without taking away: the first member is kept, and the second goes beyond it. In an argument it marks an escalation: a thing already granted to be one sort is shown to be a further sort too.
Use in the book
The phrase does its work at 160e. The boy has offered his second definition, that temperance is modesty. Socrates asks whether he agreed that temperance is fine, and that temperate men are good; nothing could be good that does not make men good; “Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well” (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; καλός). The first definition fell because quietness is not always fine; the second will fall because modesty is not always good, and Homer is brought in to show it (161a; see αἰδὼς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ). The phrase raises the standard between the two refutations: fine was enough to test the first answer, and the second must meet a second quality as well.
Of the other two uses, the first belongs to the frame. Critias says that Charmides is thought to surpass those his age “not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for” (157d; see διαφέρω). Each time the construction moves beyond what is first granted: from looks to temperance, from fine to good, from knowledge in general to a knowledge of something (171a; see ὁρίζω). It can be read as the grammar of the dialogue’s ascent, from the beauty everyone can see to the goodness that has to be examined.
Places to read
Every passage in which the construction occurs.
Translation in this edition
“Not only fine, but good as well” renders Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν (160e13), with “as well” for καί; at 157d2 the construction is “not only … but”, without “as well”, and μὴ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί at 171a5–6 is “not just … but”.