From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- English renderings
- παρρησιάσομαι, parrēsiasomai, “I can speak … more frankly”
Meaning
Παρρησία was counted a mark of the free man in a democracy (the democratic city, Socrates says in the Republic, is “full of freedom and of frank speech”, 8.557b), and in private it was the frankness of a friend who says what others will not. To speak with παρρησία is to hold nothing back, whether out of fear or out of politeness.
Use in the book
Socrates claims the licence when the boy says he knows who Socrates is: he is talked about among the boy’s age-mates, and the boy remembers him from childhood, keeping company with Critias (156a; see μιμνῄσκομαι). “Good for you,” Socrates says. “Then I can speak to you more frankly about this charm and what it is like” (156a–b). The acquaintance permits the frankness, and what Socrates says frankly is what the charm really is: the Thracian’s teaching, that the soul must be treated before the body (156b–157c), which is not what the boy came over for.
The frankness the verb promises is the dialogue’s condition. Socrates speaks frankly to the boy about his soul, and asks the boy in turn to answer as it seems to him (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). The verb can be read as the opening of that exchange: Socrates gives frankness first and asks for it back.
Places to read
The passage in which the verb occurs, with the recognition that permits it.
Translation in this edition
“Then I can speak to you more frankly” renders μᾶλλον γάρ σοι παρρησιάσομαι (156a9–b1), the future “I shall speak frankly” given as permission.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Laches frankness opens the conversation. Lysimachus tells Nicias and Laches that he and Melesias think they should speak frankly to them (178a), and when he comes to it he repeats the verb in the future the Charmides uses, παρρησιασόμεθα, “we shall speak frankly” (179c). Each has a long record of his father’s achievements to recount to the young men, Lysimachus those of Aristides the Just, the Athenian statesman of the Persian Wars, Melesias those of Thucydides the statesman, in war and in peace, in running the business of the allies and of Athens; of his own, neither has a single achievement to report. They are ashamed of this before their sons, and they blame their fathers for letting them live softly once they were grown lads, while the fathers saw to other people’s business (179c–d). Callicles’ frankness, which Socrates names as one of the three things a tester of souls needs, is told elsewhere (Gorgias 487a–b; see αἰσχύνομαι; ὁμολογία).