From the book
Hipparchus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordΠοιεῖν means to do or make; πάσχειν means to undergo, be affected or experience something.
- In HipparchusAt 230b Socrates generalizes from food to things that, while the same in one respect, differ as good and bad.
- In this editionThe edition gives “are so affected” at 230b and “do or undergo” at 230d.
- A place to readτὰ μὲν πέπονθεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι — Goodness and badness are described as conditions.
Meaning
Ποιεῖν means to do or make; πάσχειν means to undergo, be affected or experience something. Πρᾶγμα is a thing, affair or matter under discussion, not necessarily a physical object. Προσεῖναι means to belong to or be present in something. Together they form the general claim at 230d about acting or undergoing with a thing to which neither more nor less belongs.
The forms πέπονθεν at 230b and πάσχοι at 230d belong to the same verb. The former describes things as so affected that they are good or bad; the latter stands beside doing. “Undergo” need not mean to suffer harm. Good conditions can also be undergone, so the verb must not be equated with the dialogue’s specific vocabulary of loss.
Use in the book
At 230b Socrates generalizes from food to things that, while the same in one respect, differ as good and bad. The perfect πέπονθεν presents goodness or badness as a condition in which examples stand. This supports the separation between kind and quality: an object’s condition need not alter the description under which it is classed.
At 230c–d the vocabulary becomes more ambitious. If neither of two gains has more or less belonging to it, Socrates asks, how could anyone do or undergo anything more or less with such a thing? The companion answers “Impossible.” The broadness of “anything” matters. The claim would be harmless if it meant only that two equal quantities produce no difference in the very respect in which they are equal. But the premises have established equality as gain, not equal quantity or equal causal effects.
The formulation thus risks importing a general relation between a thing’s degree and the degree of activity or experience involving it. Food that is equally food can be eaten in unequal amounts or nourish differently. People who are equally human can act differently. The earlier examples do not supply the stronger principle required to rule those differences out. This is the local logical issue, not a need to accuse Socrates of teaching that all actions are identical.
Later the verb of belonging returns when worth must “belong to” gain (231d). The change is instructive: the deficiency in the quantitative account is repaired by adding a relevant property. What belongs to a thing must be specified, and belonging in one respect cannot settle every question about its use or consequences. The dialogue’s ordinary verbs carry much of this work without a separate technical vocabulary of properties.
Places to read
- 230bτὰ μὲν πέπονθεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι — Goodness and badness are described as conditions.
- 230dὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιοῖ ἢ πάσχοι — Doing and undergoing are generalized beyond gaining.
- 230dᾧ μηδέτερον τούτων προσείη — The premise denies the presence of either more or less.
- 231dτῷ κέρδει τοῦτο προσεῖναι — Worth is subsequently required to belong to gain.
Translation in this edition
The edition gives “are so affected” at 230b and “do or undergo” at 230d. Its Note on this Edition says a proposed “be in a condition” at the earlier place was rejected because it would obscure the later verbal connection. The two renderings preserve an ordinary semantic family without making πάσχειν a synonym of being harmed.