Accident and substance

Use in the book

Traherne moves between these senses. “Accidental” riches are additions generated by custom rather than indispensable gifts of nature. God's simplicity excludes composition from substance and accident, while the soul's invisible substance is nonetheless rich and real. The ordinary noun need not invoke that technical distinction: the fact that the same treasures belong to everyone is a delightful “accident,” an advantageous circumstance. The reader should therefore follow the local argument rather than impose one scholastic definition everywhere. When practical principles are seeds, their “substance” is what produces joy; verbal embellishment is the attractive husk. His preference for reality over ornamental circumstance thus has theological, economic, and literary forms.

Places to read

1. II.79Shared and undiminished ownership is called a delightful accident.
2. III.63God is not compounded of substance and accident, but is a simple being and pure act.
3. IV.81The immaterial soul is described as possessing a rich and precious substance.
4. IV.94The fruitful substance of principles matters more than the refinement of their expression.

In this edition

Do not translate every “accident” mentally as a mishap, or every “substance” as physical matter. Traherne's immaterial substance explicitly rules out the latter equation.

Use in the book

Substance contrasts with a condition inhering in something else. Ficino calls indivisible essence the foundation and origin of accidents, a stable hinge for changing conditions. Quantity and quality are accidents in this context, but “accidental” means dependent on a subject rather than irrelevant, random, or merely coincidental. The subject is the underlying bearer, not necessarily a conscious observer. An accident may have real causal effects while remaining unable to subsist or act independently of its substantial source.

The ascent differentiates accidental qualitative form, substantial corporeal form, and substantial incorporeal form. Heated wool illustrates the distinction: accidental heat prepares a condition in which the substantial form of fire is produced, but heat as a mere accident does not independently account for the substantial result. Substance's priority to quantity in nature and dignity likewise supports Ficino's argument for substance without quantitative division. Self-subsistence is compatible with receiving existence or power from a higher cause; it does not automatically confer divine independence.

Book IV makes causal sufficiency especially important. An influence descending from a celestial soul is an accident separated from its substantial source and cannot by itself generate a living substance on earth. It needs a proximate living substance whose instrument it can be. IV.1.5 contrasts what remains substantial in an external bodily agent with the accidental effect entering another body, and infers the need for an incorporeal living agent present within. IV.1.19 allows qualities to contribute while denying their independent sufficiency. The claim therefore distinguishes instrumental preparation from a sufficient substantial producer rather than excluding qualities from generation. The supplied apparatus records a substantial later-witness addition after IV.1.4 reinforcing this argument; that addition is not part of the edition's base reading.

Further passage references. I.3.4, I.3.13–I.3.1523, I.3.22, I.3.25–I.3.28234; I.5.9; I.6.6; IV.1.3–IV.1.523; IV.1.19; apparatus

Places to read

1. I.3.13–1523Indivisible substantial essence grounds changing accidents and supports the ascent beyond divisible forms.
2. I.3.22 and I.3.25–28234Substantial form is distinguished from preparatory accidental quality and bodily extension.
3. IV.1.3–523A remote celestial accident needs a proximate living substantial agent to produce a living substance.
4. IV.1.19Qualities may contribute while remaining insufficient without a substantial generative cause.

Translation in this edition

The IV.1.4 apparatus records a later-witness addition about accidental preparation; it must remain separate from the supplied continuous base text. The retained text itself differentiates an accident’s contribution from the sufficient role of a proximate substantial source.

condicio / accidens

condicio / accidens. Printed forms: accidentalem; conditionibus.

Condition or circumstance; accidental as contrasted with substantial. Temporal flux is called accidental compared with eternity’s substantial stability, and intelligibility abstracts material conditions. References: II.5.2, II.9.1. See Substance and accident.

essentialis / accidentalis

essentialis / accidentalis. Printed forms: accidentales; essentiales.

Belonging to essence / belonging as an accident. Both proposed kinds of internally distinct divine forms are rejected, although for different reasons. References: II.11.2. See Substance and accident.

proprietas

proprietas. Printed forms: proprietas; proprietatem; Proprietates.

A characteristic property. Quality retains a feature of indivisible nature, but life cannot be reduced to a bare property of the conflicting bodily constituents. References: I.2.17, I.3.23. See Quality.

Property or characteristic. Properties of substance are known through its idea, whereas common qualities receive their proper ideas. References: II.11.19, II.11.20. See Substance and accident.

vicem gerere

vicem gerere. Printed forms: gerit subiecti vicem; vicem genitricis substantiae gerit; vicem gerit.

Occupy or perform another role. The same hypothetical subject would count as efficient cause insofar as giving and as recipient insofar as receiving. References: II.11.3. See Receiving and giving.

To perform the office of a generative substance. Living nature supplies the substantial role that accidental qualities cannot adequately perform alone. References: IV.1.19. See Substance and accident.

Use in the book

A constitution results when matter receives contrary qualities and they are mixed. The qualities do not simply receive one another, since they oppose one another. Their bodily subject is therefore indispensable. The constitution also has a contrary: an excessive foreign quality can disrupt its composition. Its nature, power and operation increase and decrease. Ficino uses all these features to distinguish it from substance.

The stone example gives the intended sense of “more and less.” Once something is a stone, one stone is not more a stone than another by the manner in which a constitution is more intense. This does not mean that stones cannot differ in size, strength or other properties. Nor does the absence of a proper substantial contrary mean that substances cannot be destroyed. Ficino assigns contrariety, as such, to the genus of quality and denies that substantial identity itself is graded like a quality.

The chapter’s logical joint deserves attention. The first unit concludes conditionally: if soul is substance, it is not constitution. The next unit supplies the positive argument from a living thing’s determinate kind and the soul’s making, maintaining and repairing its body. Treating the conditional conclusion alone as the entire proof would omit this essential work. Conversely, the body-building proof does not make every form called “substantial” in the preceding elemental discussion equivalent to soul.

Places to read

1. VII.9.1Material dependence, contrariety and more-and-less distinguish constitution from substance.
2. VII.9.2The soul’s substantial status is argued positively through species and productive care.

Translation in this edition

The source paragraph is editorially divided between its negative and positive arguments. “This stone more or less a stone than that” concerns the stone’s being what it is. The word species in the following unit names the living thing’s kind, not the sensory species of VII.4.2.

excessus / extraneus / dissociare

excessus / extraneus / dissociare. Printed forms: dissociantis; excessum; extraneae.

An excess of foreign quality that separates or breaks a composition. The constitution’s vulnerability to a contrary excess marks its status as a variable quality. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

genus substantiae / genus qualitatis

genus substantiae / genus qualitatis. Printed forms: contrarietas; genere qualitatis; qualitatis; substantiae.

The categories of substance and quality and the contrariety proper to quality. The claim that substance has no proper contrary concerns categorical identity, not a denial that substances perish. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

lapis

lapis. Printed forms: lapis; lapis iste.

Stone as the example of nongraded substantial identity. One stone is not more stone than another as a quality is more intense; this does not exclude differences in size or strength. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

magis ac minus / intensio / remissio

magis ac minus / intensio / remissio. Printed forms: intenditur; Intenditur; magis; magis ac minus; minus; remittitur.

More and less, intensification and diminution. Constitution varies in nature, power and operation, while substantial identity is not intensified in that same way. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

subsistere / subiectum

subsistere / subiectum. Printed forms: subiectum; subsistit.

To subsist and the subject in which something inheres. The constitution depends on the body receiving its qualities; it does not subsist in itself. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.