DiotimosReading Desk

3 books

Vice and wickedness

Meanings and passages from 3 books in the library.

From the book

Lysis

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Wickedness

πονηρός

ponēros

Ponēros means wicked; bad in conduct; troublesome.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordPonēros means wicked; bad in conduct; troublesome.
  • In LysisAt 214b–c2, the closer one wicked person comes to another, the more hostile he becomes, because he does wrong.
  • Reading contextDo not import the specifically interpersonal wickedness of this example into every later use of “bad”.
  • A place to readThe Greek example means “the wicked person to the wicked person.”
English renderings
Wicked; bad in conduct; troublesome

Meaning

Wicked; bad in conduct; troublesome.

Grammatical category: adjective.

Use in the book

At 214b–c2, the closer one wicked person comes to another, the more hostile he becomes, because he does wrong. The word puts harmful conduct in the foreground. The argument then uses κακός in the wider discussion of instability and badness.

The two words overlap, but κακός also covers illness and ignorance later in the dialogue. Do not import the specifically interpersonal wickedness of this example into every later use of “bad”.

Places to read

  1. 214b–c2πονηρὸς τῷ πονηρῷ — the wicked person to the wicked person.

From the book

Stobaeus, Volume I

John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Vice and wickedness

κακία

kakia

Kakia is badness or vice, with the ethical sense prominent when opposed to virtue.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordKakia is badness or vice, with the ethical sense prominent when opposed to virtue.
  • In StobaeusThe Phaedo tests the claim that soul is harmony.
  • In this edition“Vice” preserves the ethical opposition to virtue; “badness” suits broader contexts.
  • A place to beginThe possibility of vice challenges the soul-as-harmony hypothesis.
English renderings
vice; wickedness; badness

Meaning

Kakia is badness or vice, with the ethical sense prominent when opposed to virtue.

Use in the book

The Phaedo tests the claim that soul is harmony. If vice is discord and soul wholly harmony, the hypothesis seems to exclude vice from every soul. This implausible consequence is used against the hypothesis. It must not be reported as Socrates’s positive teaching that no soul can be vicious.

Places to read

  1. I.49.13.10The possibility of vice challenges the soul-as-harmony hypothesis.

Translation in this edition

“Vice” preserves the ethical opposition to virtue; “badness” suits broader contexts.

Source note

Wachsmuth, volume I, printed pp. 336–337. The conditional structure governs the conclusion. The restored verb participate is supplied from Plato in the adopted text.

From the book

Centuries of Meditations

Thomas Traherne · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Wickedness

wickedness; wicked; perverseness — morally corrupt action or disposition

Wickedness is a strong name for moral evil.

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordWickedness is a strong name for moral evil.
  • In TraherneThe world lying in wickedness is the world of ingratitude, injury, and retaliation.
  • In this editionThe distinction between loving a wicked person and loving that person wickedly is essential in IV.85.
  • A place to beginWicked social conditions require remedial pity rather than retaliatory likeness.

Meaning

Wickedness is a strong name for moral evil. It may characterize an act, a settled disposition, or the disordered social condition within which one must live.

Use in the book

The world lying in wickedness is the world of ingratitude, injury, and retaliation. Traherne’s prescription is not withdrawal into a fantasy that such people do not exist. He asks the reader to regard sufferers from moral blindness as patients requiring pity and healing love.

The capacity to love also remains morally ambiguous until rightly directed. A soul can love a wicked person wickedly and reinforce the wrongdoing. This proves the reality of creaturely agency but does not justify its misuse. To love persons universally therefore requires judgment about how they are loved. Charity seeks their good, whereas complicity cherishes the very corruption from which they need release.

Places to read

  1. IV.20Wicked social conditions require remedial pity rather than retaliatory likeness.
  2. IV.85Irregular love can attach itself to a wicked person’s wickedness.
  3. IV.88Others’ wickedness can obstruct intended benefits without cancelling divine goodwill.

In this edition

The distinction between loving a wicked person and loving that person wickedly is essential in IV.85. Universal charity does not authorize approval of every object of attachment.

Source note

Primary text: IV.20, IV.85, IV.88. No 2026 editorial notes used.