Accepting, custom, and what is accepted

Use in the book

The companion first offers ta nomizomena as an apparently obvious answer to “What is law?” (313b). Socrates does not initially ask whether particular customs are good. He distinguishes what is accepted from that by which it is accepted, using speech, sight, and hearing as analogies. The deliberately repetitive formula “what is accepted is accepted by law” then makes law look like an activity, capacity, or source rather than the collected contents of a community's practice (314a). That is an argumentative construction. The etymological relationship alone does not prove that nomos operates like sight.

The companion's later examples return nomizein to its customary range. Different peoples sacrifice differently; the Athenians have changed their treatment of the dead. These are practices communities observe and regard as legitimate, not simply descriptions they assent to. Socrates' ensuing questions move toward judgment: do people accept just things as just, greater weights as heavier, and what is as being? (315e–316b2). A reader should hear the continuity of the word while noticing the change of examples. The argument gains force from a common root and exposes itself to an objection about whether agreement in the correct application of a predicate answers disagreement about which practices deserve it.

The next restriction is decisive: those who know accept the same things about the same things (316d). The companion himself supplies synnomizein when conceding agreement among knowledgeable Greeks and barbarians. The relevant community is now formed by knowledge rather than residence, ancestry, or enacted custom. Doctors write what they accept as being, and their writings become “laws of medicine.”

Minos provides a final personal application. Socrates says that what Minos accepted as fine he established as lawful usages for his citizens, and that he did not accept one thing but do something contrary to it (320a–b2). Acceptance, conduct, and legislation are brought into alignment through the presumed goodness of the lawgiver. This does not turn every sincere belief into law: the preceding argument requires rightness, and Socrates still owes an account of what genuinely improves the soul. The word thus joins three distinct questions: what people observe, what they take to be true or good, and what a good lawgiver embodies in action.

Places to read

1. 313bτὰ νομιζόμενα — The companion's first answer, “what is accepted”
2. 314aνόμῳ τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται — Socrates' threefold repetition of the law-family
3. 315dκατὰ ταὐτὰ νομίζομεν — The companion denies that people always accept things in the same way
4. 315eνομίζεις τὰ δίκαια ἄδικα εἶναι — A question about what the companion accepts as just or unjust
5. 316bτὰ ὄντα νομίζεται εἶναι — Acceptance now has a claim about what is as its content
6. 316dσυννομίζειν καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ βαρβάρους — Knowing Greeks and barbarians accept in common
7. 320aἃ ἐνόμιζεν καλὰ εἶναι, ταῦτα νόμιμα ἔθηκεν — Minos' accepted judgments become established usages

Translation in this edition

“Accept” is maintained throughout, with “what is accepted” and “accept in common.” This preserves repetition but cannot reproduce the audible relation to “law.” Reading every occurrence as either mere social convention or purely private belief would remove the very range through which the discussion moves.

Is accepted — νομίζειν (nomizein)

νομίζειν (nomizein)

Is accepted. The passive verb in the root-play that what is accepted is accepted by law. Attested: νομίζεται (314a). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted.

Accept — νομίζειν (nomizein)

νομίζειν (nomizein)

Accept. Accept or observe things in the same way, which the companion denies happens invariably within or across communities. Attested: νομίζομεν (315d). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted.

Accept or take to be — νομίζειν (nomizein)

νομίζειν (nomizein)

Accept or take to be. The companion's judgment that just things are just, a cognitive use following the discussion of customary practices. Attested: νομίζεις (315e). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted.

What is accepted — τὰ νομιζόμενα (ta nomizomena)

τὰ νομιζόμενα (ta nomizomena)

What is accepted. The companion's first proposed definition, covering things held or observed as customary. Attested: τὰ νομιζόμενα (313b). Accepting, custom, and what is accepted.