Pretence and imposture

Use in the book

Critias' opening scheme asks Socrates to pretend to know a headache remedy (155b). The dialogue therefore places a staged claim to expertise at the entrance to the conversation that will later test the detection of false experts. This does not prove that every detail of Socrates' healing account is false, but it keeps the dramatic status of his role in view.

At 170d–171c2 the proposed temperate examiner cannot tell whether someone possesses the expertise he claims. The summary carefully includes a person who merely pretends and a person who thinks he knows. Deception of others and mistaken self-confidence are separate possibilities; successful examination must address both.

The dream grants the otherwise unsecured power. No false pilot, doctor, general or other professed knower would deceive us or escape notice (173b), and temperance would reject impostors among diviners (173c). The point is counterfactual: the argument has not shown that such a supervisory expertise exists. Even granting its success, the question whether the resulting knowledgeable life is beneficial remains.

The prologue and dream thus frame two different uses of pretence. One arranges a personal encounter; the other threatens public safety and the reliability of expertise. It is interpretation, not a lexical equivalence, to decide how strongly the former should undermine trust in Socrates' subsequent story.

Places to read

1. 155b–eThe initial pretense of knowing a remedy
2. 170d–171c2Pretended and merely supposed expertise distinguished
3. 173b–cFalse experts excluded in the conceded ideal case

Translation in this edition

“Pretends or thinks he does” at 171c preserves the crucial disjunction. “Impostors” at 173c translates alazonas; one should not use it indiscriminately for every person who lacks knowledge.

ἀλαζών

Attested: ἀλαζόνας (alazonas). Pretenders or impostors; those falsely professing prophetic expertise in the imagined supervised society. References: 173c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀλαζών. See Pretence and imposture.

ἐξαπατάω

Attested: ἐξαπατῷ (exapatōi). Deceive or mislead; false experts would be unable to deceive in the imagined life governed by temperance. References: 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξαπατάω. See Pretence and imposture.

προσποιέομαι

Attested: προσποιήσασθαι / προσποιούμενον / προσποιούμενός (prospoiēsasthai / prospoioumenon / prospoioumenos). To pretend or profess; Socrates adopts the role of one who knows a head remedy, whereas the later argument concerns false claims to professional expertise and the problem of exposing them. References: 155b, 170e, 171c, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: προσποιέομαι. See Pretence and imposture.

ἀποτρέπειν (apotrepein)

Turn away or exclude; the supervisory temperance would prevent impostors from serving as prophets. References: 173c. Lemma: ἀποτρέπω. See Pretence and imposture.

στρατηγὸς (stratēgos)

A general or military commander whose genuine expertise would be distinguished from imposture. References: 173b. Lemma: στρατηγός. See Pretence and imposture.

Use in the book

The word qualifies the lover rejected by the contrast “genuine and not pretended.” It is the authenticity of the lover’s stance that is being marked, not the truth or falsity of a particular sentence.

The contrast does not give a practical test for deciding who is genuine. Its role is to make the proposed result about being loved back specifically concern the authentic lover, within a line of reasoning that Socrates goes on to question.

Places to read

1. 222aκαὶ μὴ προσποιήτῳ — And not a pretended one.