Presence and possession

Use in the book

The medical story says that temperance, once present in the soul, facilitates health. Socrates next asks whether Charmides has a sufficient share of it. The proposed test at 159a assumes that the virtue’s being in him yields some awareness and opinion. The subsequent instructions ask what sort of person its presence makes him. Critias later relies on a related pattern: possessing speed makes someone fast, beauty makes someone beautiful, and knowledge makes someone knowing. He uses this to move from possessing a knowledge that knows itself to the possessor’s knowing himself. That transition is contested territory, even though Socrates provisionally sets it aside to question the next inference. At the end the original practical question returns: is temperance present in Charmides, and does he need the charm? The lexicon therefore distinguishes possession, awareness of possession, an account of what is possessed, and the effect it has. They are linked in the inquiry but not proved identical.

Places to read

1. 157aThe presence of temperance is connected with the proposed treatment of the body.
2. 158b–159a2Having a share in temperance leads to the proposed test through awareness and opinion.
3. 160dCharmides is asked what temperance makes him by being present.
4. 169e–170aCritias argues from a possessor’s quality to self-knowledge.
5. 175e–176b2Possession and need remain questions after the definitions fail.

Translation in this edition

The supplied translation appropriately varies “present,” “possess,” “have” and “share.” Reading metechein here as a fully developed theory of participation in Forms would outrun the local argument.

ἀπών

Attested: ἀπούσης (apousēs). Absent; describes what would happen to the benefits claimed for other knowledges if knowledge of good and bad were missing. References: 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄπειμι (be absent); participial lookup ἀπών. See Presence and possession.

ἔχω

Attested: ἔχει / ἔχῃ / ἔχοντι (echei / echēi / echonti). Have or possess; the analogy asks whether having knowledge of knowledge makes its possessor knowledgeable about particular things. References: 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔχω. See Presence and possession.

κτάομαι

Attested: κέκτησαι (kektēsai). You possess or have acquired; the perfect of κτάομαι has a present possessive force as Socrates proposes testing whether Charmides has temperance. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: κτάομαι. See Presence and possession.

παρεῖναι

Attested: παρεῖναι / παρῇ (pareinai / parēi). To be present with someone; Homer’s modesty is no good companion to a needy man, whereas temperance is said to make good the people in whom it is present. References: 161a. Lexical identification: lemma: πάρειμι; παρεῖναι is the infinitive. See Presence and possession.

παρών

Attested: παρούσης / παροῦσα (parousēs / parousa). Present or being present; the charm generates temperance whose presence enables bodily health, and Charmides is asked to consider what kind of person temperance’s presence makes him. References: 157a, 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: πάρειμι; παρών is the participle. παρών and παρεῖναι are participle and infinitive of the same verb πάρειμι. Both lookup records are retained for their explicitly stated local contexts. See Presence and possession.

ἐνοῦσαν (enousan)

Being within; the argument supposes that temperance present in Charmides should give him some awareness of it. References: 159a. Lemma: ἔνειμι. See Presence and possession.

κέκτησαι (kektēsai)

You possess or have acquired; the perfect describes Charmides’ present possession of temperance, still to be investigated. References: 158d. Lemma: κτάομαι. See Presence and possession.