Speech, knowledge and method

Opportunity and fitting speech

καιρός, kairos, “right occasion; opportune moment”; εὐκαιρία, eukairia, “timeliness”; ἀκαιρία, akairia, “untimeliness”

The right speech is not simply a good text: it is a speech fitting this soul, this purpose and this occasion. Knowing when not to speak belongs to the same expertise.

From the book

Phaedrus

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe right speech is not simply a good text: it is a speech fitting this soul, this purpose and this occasion. Knowing when not to speak belongs to the same expertise.
  • In the PhaedrusThe opening provides an ordinary, concrete use. Phaedrus happens to be barefoot “opportunely”, since the friends propose to walk along the Ilissus (229a). The appropriateness belongs to a situation, not to bare feet considered in isolation. Later the first speech describes the beloved’s misery at hearing praises that are untimely and excessive (240e). Praise is not made beneficial merely by being praise. Both scenes anticipate, without constituting a technical theory, the later demand for discriminating application.
  • In this editionAt 272a the edition includes “and untimeliness” on the basis of T, W and Galen; B lacks the phrase. The pair is retained in the printed Greek and English. “The right moments” renders καιρούς together with the following specification of when speech and restraint are called for; it is not a free-standing theory of opportunism.
  • A place to readOrdinary opportunity and the burden of untimely praise.

Meaning

Opportunity is the fitting moment and manner for an action. A complete speaker must recognize the actual listener and judge when to speak, when to hold back, and when brevity, pity or emphasis fits (272a). Knowing a speech type in the abstract is therefore insufficient. The written speech exposes the difficulty by circulating among suitable and unsuitable readers alike, unable to choose whom to address (275e).

Use in the book

The opening provides an ordinary, concrete use. Phaedrus happens to be barefoot “opportunely”, since the friends propose to walk along the Ilissus (229a). The appropriateness belongs to a situation, not to bare feet considered in isolation. Later the first speech describes the beloved’s misery at hearing praises that are untimely and excessive (240e). Praise is not made beneficial merely by being praise. Both scenes anticipate, without constituting a technical theory, the later demand for discriminating application.

The pretend doctor’s missing knowledge is precisely whom to treat, when, and to what extent (268b). The defect is not a lack of powerful interventions; it is their separation from a patient and a measure. Likewise a speech’s parts must fit one another and its whole, and the rhetorical practitioner must fit a kind of speech to a kind of soul (264c; 271b).

At 271d–272b the learner must move beyond abstract types. He needs to identify the person before him as the nature discussed in instruction, know which speeches to apply and for what persuasion, and add recognition of the right moments for speaking and holding back. Brief speech, appeals to pity and exaggeration are not approved everywhere or rejected everywhere. Each has timely and untimely employment. Socrates says the craft is complete only when these requirements are present.

The criticism of writing later turns on the loss of this responsive discrimination. Once written, a speech circulates alike among those who understand and those for whom it is unsuitable; it does not know to whom it ought to speak (275e). The living account, by contrast, knows how to speak and remain silent before the appropriate people (276a). Silence is consequently not an accidental absence of rhetoric. It can express the same knowledge that makes effective speech possible.

The final summary gives a subtle, many-harmonied speech to a subtle soul and a simple speech to a simple soul (277c). This is not licence to tell each hearer whatever pleases him. The summary has already made truth, definition and division prerequisites. Adaptation concerns the mode of teaching or persuasion within those requirements.

Places to read

  1. 229aOrdinary opportunity and the burden of untimely praise.
  2. 240eOrdinary opportunity and the burden of untimely praise.
  3. 264cFitting parts and the doctor’s questions of patient, time and measure.
  4. 268a–bFitting parts and the doctor’s questions of patient, time and measure.
  5. 271b–272b23Causal matching, perception of the actual person and timely speech.
  6. 275e–276aWriting’s indiscriminate circulation and the living account’s discretion.
  7. 277b–cWriting’s indiscriminate circulation and the living account’s discretion.

Translation in this edition

At 272a the edition includes “and untimeliness” on the basis of T, W and Galen; B lacks the phrase. The pair is retained in the printed Greek and English. “The right moments” renders καιρούς together with the following specification of when speech and restraint are called for; it is not a free-standing theory of opportunism.

Lexical detail

Καιρός names a fitting or decisive occasion, not merely elapsed time. Its family includes εὐκαιρία, timeliness, and ἀκαιρία, untimeliness. The language of fitting is broader: προσήκειν concerns what belongs or is appropriate, πρέπον what becomes its setting, and προσαρμόττειν the adjustment of one thing to another. In the rhetoric discussion these words connect the structure of a speech with the condition of its hearer.

Attested forms

καιρόν (229a · Burnet p. 3) — “Opportunely”. Phaedrus’ bare feet suit the proposed walk in the stream.

καιροὺς (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “the right moments”. When to speak and when to hold back.

εὐκαιρίαν (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “timeliness”. Judgement of each form of speech’s appropriate occasion.

ἀκαιρίαν (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “untimeliness”. The opposite is part of the same expertise.

Research and interpretation

Middle Liddell includes fitness and the right time of action under kairos. The native account makes silence part of good timing, not merely a failure to speak. The phrase about untimeliness at 272a has the manuscript qualification retained in the original article.

Liddell and Scott, Intermediate Greek–English Lexicon, καιρός.

βραχυλογία

Brief-speech is a concise manner of speaking. Socrates includes it among the techniques whose right and wrong occasions the rhetorician must recognize. For example, at the completion of rhetorical training, knowing a concise form is insufficient without knowing when and to whom it should be used.

Read: 272a.

brachylogia · Brief-speech · dictionary headword

Concise speech or a compressed manner of expression.

It is among the techniques recalled at 269a and among the forms whose timeliness or untimeliness must be recognized at 272a. Brevity is therefore not made a universal virtue: its fitness depends on the hearer, purpose and occasion.

Attested: βραχυλογίας (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “brief-speech”.

See: Craft and expertise; Opportunity and fitting speech

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δείνωσις

Exaggeration or intensification makes a matter striking or formidable in speech. Socrates lists it with brief-speech and appeals to pity among forms whose appropriate occasion must be understood. The point is choosing a fitting effect for a particular hearer, rather than always speaking in the strongest possible terms.

Read: 272a.

deinōsis · Exaggeration or intensification · dictionary headword

Making a matter formidable or striking in speech; here the edition’s “exaggeration”.

It is listed with brief-speech and pity-speech as something whose opportune and inopportune employment the practitioner must discern. The entry follows that local technical sense rather than assigning every use of the adjective “formidable” to this device.

Attested: δεινώσεως (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “exaggeration”.

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ἐλεινολογία

Pity-speech aims to arouse a hearer’s pity. Socrates requires the rhetorician to recognize when it is suitable or unsuitable, rather than merely learn how to produce it. Appeals concerning age and poverty earlier illustrate how such emotional resources can be powerful before a crowd.

Read: 272a; 267c–d.

eleinologia · Pity-speech · dictionary headword

Speech designed to awaken pity.

Socrates requires knowledge of when this form is timely or untimely. The earlier catalogue associates piteous appeals over age and poverty with Thrasymachus’ power, but effectiveness with a crowd does not by itself establish the complete craft.

Attested: ἐλεινολογίας (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “pity-speech”.

See: Opportunity and fitting speech; Rhetoric and soul-leading

The 272 witness retains pity among the forms needing judgement of occasion.

Plato, Phaedrus 272, independent public-domain English witness (Bookstacks).

ἐπέχω

To hold back means to refrain, here from speaking at an unsuitable time. Socrates makes knowing when to speak and when to remain silent part of complete rhetorical judgement. Restraint is therefore a positive skill, rather than evidence that speech is always suspect or silence always best.

Read: 272a.

epechō · Hold back · dictionary headword; verbal adjective attested

Refrain or check action; here, withhold speech at an unsuitable moment.

The verbal adjective at 272a belongs to the knowledge of when one should speak and when hold back. It makes restraint a positive part of complete rhetorical judgement. The entry does not claim that silence is always appropriate or that speaking is intrinsically suspect.

Attested: ἐπισχετέον (272a · Burnet p. 63) — “to hold back”.

See: Living speech and defence; Opportunity and fitting speech

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Ἱππίας

Hippias is the man from Elis whom Socrates thinks would agree with Prodicus about the proper length of a speech. His appearance is deliberately brief and hypothetical: Socrates does not quote him or describe all his accomplishments. The point is fitting measure, rather than length or brevity by itself.

Read: 267b.

Hippias · Hippias · proper name

The stranger from Elis whom Socrates thinks would agree with Prodicus.

His role in this passage is brief and modal: Socrates thinks he would cast the same vote. The text does not quote a speech by him or enumerate his arts. The point is support for a fitting measure rather than mere longness or shortness.

Attested: Ἱππίαν (267b · Burnet p. 56) — “Hippias”.

See: Craft and expertise; Opportunity and fitting speech

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κυλινδέομαι

A written speech rolls about by circulating among readers without choosing who is ready to understand it.

At 275e the same writing reaches both knowledgeable readers and people for whom it is unsuitable.

kylindeomai · Roll about · dictionary headword

Move about without discriminating one destination from another.

Once written, a speech rolls everywhere among expert and unsuitable recipients alike. The metaphor names indiscriminate circulation, not a literal physical action required of every book. Its limitation is the absence of the judgement of audience demanded by the rhetorical craft.

Attested: κυλινδεῖται (275e · Burnet p. 68) — “rolls about”.

See: Opportunity and fitting speech; Writing and letters

Fowler’s rendering stresses indiscriminate circulation. Socrates’ complaint concerns the text’s inability to select or answer its audience, rather than physical movement alone.

Plato, Phaedrus 275e — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

μέτριος

Moderate means appropriately measured, here in a speech’s length. It offers an alternative to praising either brevity or length without qualification.

At 267b Prodicus says that needed speeches should be neither long nor short but moderate.

metrios · Measured or moderate · dictionary headword

Having an appropriate measure rather than an extreme of length.

Prodicus claims that the needed speeches are moderate, not long or short. Phaedrus answers with conspicuous praise. The anecdote gives a corrective to verbal extremes but does not itself supply the account of souls and occasions required later.

Attested: μετρίων (267b · Burnet p. 56) — “moderate”.

See: Craft and expertise; Opportunity and fitting speech

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Πρόδικος

Prodicus is the teacher represented as claiming that suitable speeches need an appropriate measure of length.

At 267b he laughs at the competing claims for long and short speeches and recommends moderate ones.

Prodikos · Prodicus · proper name

The teacher represented as preferring measured speeches to both long and short extremes.

In Socrates’ reported anecdote Prodicus laughs at the rival claims and says he alone discovered the craft of needed speeches, which must be moderate. Phaedrus’ “most wisely” maintains the catalogue’s elevated, possibly teasing tone; the passage does not itself establish the exclusive claim.

Attested: Πρόδικος (267b · Burnet p. 56) — “Prodicus”.

See: Craft and expertise; Opportunity and fitting speech

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προσαρμόττω

To fit means to match a kind of speech to a kind of soul, with an account of why that interaction persuades or fails.

At 271b the teacher must explain which souls are persuaded by which speeches and through what causes.

prosarmottō · Fit one to another · dictionary headword

Adjust or suit each kind of speech to the corresponding kind of soul.

The rhetorician must explain the causes through which one soul is persuaded and another remains unpersuaded. Matching is therefore not merely decorative congruity. It connects differentiated recipients, differentiated speeches and a causal account of their interaction.

Attested: προσαρμόττων (271b · Burnet p. 61) — “suiting”.

See: Opportunity and fitting speech; Rhetoric and soul-leading

Decorative harmony alone is not the proposed expertise.

Plato, Phaedrus 271b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).

σιγάω

Keeping silent can mean either being unable to answer or knowing when an answer should be withheld. Socrates distinguishes these conditions.

At 275d painted figures remain silent when questioned; at 276a living speech knows before whom it should speak or keep silent.

sigaō · Keep silent · dictionary headword

Remain silent, either from inability to answer or from knowledgeable restraint.

The painted offspring keep silent when questioned. The living speech, by contrast, knows when and before whom to be silent. The same family can therefore mark two different conditions: unresponsiveness and discriminating control. Silence is not inherently ignorance.

Attested: σιγᾷ (275d · Burnet p. 68) — “keep silent”.

Attested: σιγᾶν (276a · Burnet p. 68) — “keeping silent”. The living account knows appropriate speaking and silence.

See: Living speech and defence; Opportunity and fitting speech

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συντομία

Concision is compactness or shortening of speech. The catalogue presents it as one device whose suitability still needs judgement.

At 267a–b Gorgias and Tisias are credited with concision as well as unlimited length, before Prodicus recommends measured speeches.

syntomia · Concision · dictionary headword

Cutting speech short or expressing it compactly.

Tisias and Gorgias are credited with both concision and lengths without limit. Prodicus responds that the appropriate speech is neither simply long nor simply short but measured. The contrast prepares the later subordination of stylistic devices to occasion.

Attested: συντομίαν (267a–b · Burnet p. 56) — “concision”.

See: Craft and expertise; Opportunity and fitting speech

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