From the book
The Renaissance
Walter Pater · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA code of conduct held as general rules, apart from the persons and the cases it governs.
- In The Renaissance"The theory, or idea, or system, which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract morality we have not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us" (C73 §6).
- In this editionThe edition has no note on the phrase; in the revised text it reads "some abstract theory" (CON §5; see Abstract theory).
- A place to readC73 §6.
Meaning
"Abstract" is the Latin abstractus, drawn away: an abstract morality is one drawn away from the lives it is meant to rule, a set of precepts held in general and applied from outside. Pater's qualifying clause names what such a morality lacks. It has not been "identified with ourselves", and so it stands over the person as a demand rather than within him as a disposition.
The contrast had a philosophical form in the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel, whom Pater names in the same paragraph (C73 §6; see Facile orthodoxy). Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1821) sets Moralität, the morality of the single conscience bound to a universal law, below Sittlichkeit, the ethical life of a people, in which the individual lives the good as his own element in its customs and institutions; and it calls Immanuel Kant's law of duty, taken by itself, an empty formalism.1 Pater's clause can be read beside that contrast, with the difference that what Hegel finds in the community Pater looks for in the single temperament.
Use in the book
The phrase stands in the last sentence of the sixth paragraph of 1873, in a list of three things for whose sake a theory may ask us to give up part of experience: an interest into which we cannot enter, an abstract morality, and what is only conventional (C73 §6; see Conventional orthodoxy). All three can be read as one condition: each is something outside the self. As with theory in the revised sentence (CON §5; see Abstract theory), what is refused is not morality but a morality kept from outside the person, and the paragraph has just allowed theories and ideas their use as instruments of criticism (C73 §6; see Religious or philosophical ideas).
The essays had already shown morality standing apart from a life. The medieval Renaissance of the French stories had its "antinomianism", its "spirit of rebellion and revolt against the moral and religious ideas of the time" (FRE §32; see Antinomianism), and in Winckelmann "the moral instinct, like the religious or political, was merged in the artistic" (WIN §12; see Religious sense). In the one, the search after the pleasures of the senses and the imagination impels people "beyond the bounds of the Christian ideal" (FRE §32); in the other, the insincerity of Winckelmann's religious profession is "only one incident of a culture" in which the moral instinct was merged in the artistic (WIN §12). In both a life goes another way than the moral or religious ideas it lives among, and the Conclusion of 1873 can be read as stating as a rule what the essays had told as history.
Places to read
The paragraph in which the phrase occurs, with the revised sentence, the paragraph on the antinomianism of the medieval Renaissance and the paragraph on Winckelmann's merged moral instinct, in the order of the book.
- FRE §32The medieval Renaissance had its antinomianism, its spirit of revolt against the moral and religious ideas of the time.
- WIN §12In Winckelmann the moral instinct, like the religious or political, was merged in the artistic.
- CON §5A system that asks the sacrifice of any part of experience to some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves has no real claim upon us.
- C73 §6In 1873 a system that asks the sacrifice of any part of experience to some abstract morality we have not identified with ourselves has no real claim upon us.
Later readings
Pater's colleague at Brasenose, the chaplain John Wordsworth, the poet's great-nephew, wrote to him soon after the book appeared that its Conclusion amounted to an assertion "that no fixed principles either of religion or morality can be regarded as certain, that the only thing worth living for is momentary enjoyment".2 The revised text put "theory" where "morality" had stood, and the change can be read as Pater's reply to such readers: the sentence that had seemed to free the reader from morality now frees him only from a theory he has not made his own (CON §5; see Abstract theory).
Source note
1. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Berlin, 1821), §§105–141 ("Die Moralität") and §§142–157 (the opening of the third part, "Die Sittlichkeit"); on the empty formalism of the Kantian standpoint, §135, Remark.
2. John Wordsworth to Walter Pater, 1873, in Letters of Walter Pater, ed. Lawrence Evans (Oxford, 1970), pp. 12–14.