From the book
The Renaissance
Walter Pater · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe religious sense is the capacity in human nature from which religions spring: a feeling toward the unseen, common to all peoples, which takes different forms in different ages.
- In The RenaissanceA modern scholar "might go on to observe that each has contributed something to the development of the religious sense" (PIC §3); the fifteenth-century scholars would reconcile the religions "not as successive stages in a regular development of the religious sense, but as subsisting side by side" (PIC §4).
- In this editionThe note at PIC §4 calls the sentence on the historic sense "a Victorian judgment about the past", and speaks of "Pater's historical account of beliefs as the products of different cultures and times".
- A place to readPIC §§3–4.
Meaning
To speak of a religious "sense" is to treat religion as a faculty, like the sense of beauty or the sense of humour: something in the mind before it is something in a creed. The idea took shape at the end of the century before Pater's. Friedrich Schleiermacher, the German theologian, defined religion in his Speeches on Religion (1799) as "sense and taste for the infinite";1 and Max Müller, in the first of his lectures on the science of religion, published in the year of The Renaissance, called religion a mental faculty which "enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names, and under varying disguises".2 On this view the religions of the world are the many expressions of one human capacity.
Use in the book
The phrase belongs to the modern scholar's method, which the Pico essay describes and Pico's age lacked. The religions, he might observe, "arise spontaneously out of the human mind, as expressions of the varying phases of its sentiment concerning the unseen world" (PIC §3; see Natural product). That sentiment can be read as the religious sense, and it grows: each religion "has contributed something to the development of the religious sense" (PIC §3; see Development). The fifteenth century could not see this; it sought to reconcile the religions as subsisting side by side (PIC §4; see Successive stages; Allegorical interpretation).
The phrase makes a large claim quietly. If religions are expressions of a human sense, then no one of them is the whole truth and none is merely false; each is a phase. The modern scholar might "justify the existence of each" (PIC §3), and the basis of reconciliation would then be "the inexhaustible activity and creativeness of the human mind itself, in which all religions alike have their root, and in which all alike are reconciled" (PIC §3; see Reconciliation). The religious sense can be read as Pater's way of reconciling Christianity with the religion of Greece where Pico failed: not by making them say the same thing, but by finding both in the same faculty.
The Winckelmann essay shows the sense in a single life. Winckelmann's religious profession was insincere, and Pater suggests that "at the bar of the highest criticism, perhaps, Winckelmann may be absolved": the insincerity "was only one incident of a culture in which the moral instinct, like the religious or political, was merged in the artistic" (WIN §12). In him the religious sense was one of the instincts the artistic absorbed. The book does not deny the religious sense; it studies it, as one faculty among the others, with a history.
Places to read
Every paragraph in which the phrase occurs, in the order of the book.
In this edition
The note at PIC §4 calls the sentence on the historic sense "a Victorian judgment about the past", marking "a difference between Pico's search for truths he believed traditions shared and Pater's historical account of beliefs as the products of different cultures and times".
Source note
1. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (Berlin, 1799), second speech: "Sinn und Geschmak fürs Unendliche".
2. F. Max Müller, Introduction to the Science of Religion (London, 1873), lecture I.