Plato’s Theages Lexicon

Introduction

Theages asks what it would mean for a young man to become wise and what grounds a parent has for entrusting him to another person's company. Its first answers appeal to familiar practices and public accomplishments. Its last answer concerns an association whose benefit cannot be guaranteed by Socrates' willingness, a teacher's reputation or the payment of a fee. Between those points the dialogue distinguishes the scope of rule from its manner, expertise from an ability to impart it, and permission to associate from improvement that endures.

This companion accompanies the supplied Diotimos Editions Greek and English Theages, translated in 2026 from the text of John Burnet's third Oxford volume, in the corrected second impression of 1909. The articles are written around the words, examples, persons, constructions and questions actually doing work in this dialogue. A separate defined register supplies shorter lexical explanations; contextual glosses examine phrases; three indexes provide access by wording, passage and theme. These are complementary routes into the same text, not independent piles of items whose totals should be added together.

Authorship title and dramatic setting

The transmitted Greek title is ΘΕΑΓΗΣ, Theages, the name of the young interlocutor. The source's Introduction reports the ancient subtitle “or On Philosophy” and the work's position at the beginning of the fifth tetralogy, before Charmides, Laches and Lysis. That catalogue information is not spoken dialogue. In particular, neither philosophia nor philosophein occurs in the conversation itself. The title and ancient classification can orient a reader without creating an unattested lexical entry.

The work belongs to the transmitted Platonic corpus, but its authorship is disputed. This companion therefore speaks of the dialogue, its argument and its Socrates rather than assuming that every position voiced here is a settled doctrine of Plato or secure testimony to the historical Socrates. It does not adjudicate the attribution. Nor does it flatten the differences between the sign described here, the voice in Apology 31c–d and the selective associations described in Theaetetus 150e–151a. The supplied edition introduces those comparisons; this companion uses them as comparisons.

Demodocus, his son Theages and Socrates speak directly, without a framing narrator. They withdraw into the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios for a private discussion. The father speaks from experience of farming and child-rearing. Socrates' later stories introduce reported voices within this three-person encounter. A statement in those stories can therefore have several levels of attribution: Socrates reports Aristides' account of his own condition, or reports what Timarchus said in the hearing of another witness. Those levels are part of the evidence, not ornamental complications.

The source proposes a dramatic date around the summer of 409 BC from Archelaus' recent rule, the past Sicilian disaster and Sannion's present campaign with Thrasyllus. That is an inference from the internal notices and the historical identifications supplied by the edition. It is not a date of composition. The lexicon does not require a more precise chronology than the text can bear.

What an article establishes

Each full article begins with an English heading and a Greek line. Dictionary citation forms make families recognizable; exact printed inflections appear under The places. A lemma does not have to occur in that precise grammatical form. Where an English heading is an interpretive category, such as the craft model, the article says so rather than presenting it as a quoted Greek technical term.

The word explains lexical sense and relevant distinctions. In Theages follows the expression through its dramatic and argumentative use. The places gives selected exact attestations with Stephanus references and local explanations. In this edition describes the supplied translation or editorial treatment. See also directs the reader to related discussions. An article may group several terms when their relation is the substantive subject; a minor term need not become a second article merely because it can be counted separately.

Stephanus references identify the ancient text independently of this companion's pages. A range such as 130a–b can be necessary because a phrase, or even a printed name, crosses a boundary. The passage index covers every section present.

The transliteration convention is a reading aid: ē represents eta, ō omega, y upsilon, ph phi, th theta, ch chi, and h a rough breathing when relevant. Conventional English spellings are retained for familiar persons. It is not a guide to one uniquely correct historical pronunciation. Greek accents and breathings are retained in the source quotations. Brackets and obeli retain their editorial meaning rather than being silently removed to make a quotation easier to interpret.

Scope and limits of completeness

The governing coverage standard is every philosophically or dramatically consequential word-family, comparison, named example and construction in the supplied dialogue. It is not an unfiltered concordance of every article, conjunction and inflected token. The argument has also been checked section by section, so that material absent from a familiar list of “key concepts” still receives a home: the father's planting analogy, peer emulation, the naming exercise with oracle-singers, the hypothetical painter, the exact limits of each sign anecdote and the qualifications of the ending.

The defined register contains real definitions with attested forms and local senses. It is not a list of unexamined candidates. Its records overlap the full articles intentionally because a reader may enter through an individual Greek word rather than a conceptual discussion. Phrase glosses give a separate explanation only when syntax, idiom or argumentative force needs it. The three indexes are navigation and are not counted as additional explanatory coverage.

Several familiar philosophical nouns are not attested in the spoken text: psychē, aretē, sōphrosynē and dikaiosynē among them. Their absence does not make the work unphilosophical. It makes restraint important. Theages' reported improvement should not be silently rewritten as acquisition of moral virtue; Aristides' hexis should not be given a complete later Aristotelian theory; the adjective enkrateis should not become an unattested doctrine of enkrateia. Likewise, the things of love are named by an adjective in the plural, not by a spoken occurrence of erōs.

This is a reading companion to the supplied edition, not a fresh critical edition or a new manuscript collation. External identifications and parallels are attributed to the source's notes unless separately indicated. The uncertainty of authorship, local corruption at 129a, ambiguous social evaluations and the incomplete outcome of the proposed trial remain visible. Completeness is best served by explaining what the evidence does and does not establish.

Argument map

Parental care and an unsafe desire 121a–122b

Demodocus asks for private conversation and finds Socrates at leisure. His comparison with plants makes production easy and subsequent care demanding. The son's desire to become wise is not base, but its risks alarm him. Companions of the same age and deme repeat arguments that seem to have stirred the boy's ambition. The father has tried reassurance and restraint; now he seeks a suitable sophist and welcomes Socrates as the adviser he would most want.

The practical problem is not a refusal to spend money. Demodocus says he is less concerned about the expense than the danger. The case begins with a good-seeming aspiration whose object and educational route remain unclear. Care therefore requires more than generosity or simple compliance with the young person's demand.

Agreement before choosing a teacher 122b–123b

Socrates calls advice sacred and education especially divine as a subject of deliberation. Before deciding, adviser and advisee must agree on what they are discussing. He asks the boy's name, hears that Theages is a fittingly sacred one and turns to the desire itself. Theages identifies the wise with those who have knowledge and acknowledges his previous lessons in letters, cithara-playing and wrestling. Yet those are not the wisdom he wants.

The exchange distinguishes verbal agreement from determination of a subject. “Become wise” can name a general aspiration without identifying which competence is sought. The father's alleged unwillingness cannot be judged properly until the educational demand has been made clear. The language of naming leads from the name of the boy to the names of the activities.

From named skills to rule over human beings 123b–124b

Piloting and charioteering show how an activity supplies a name for the corresponding wisdom. Theages instead says he wants the wisdom by which people are ruled. Socrates tests that answer against medicine, music, gymnastics, farming and carpentry. Those practices have bounded objects or recipients. The boy's intended scope includes everyone in the city, not merely one occupational or situational class.

The reasoning establishes breadth of intended rule but leaves its manner unspecified. This omission matters when Socrates next brings in tyrants. The craft comparisons make a general political object recognizable; they do not yet prove that one constitution or mode of rule is the only possible result.

Rulers titles and the tyrant teacher 124c–125b

Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus and Hippias exemplify rulers over the people of cities or territories. A side question about Bakis, Sibyl and Amphilytus models the assignment of a common title: oracle-singers. Hippias and Periander receive the title tyrants. Socrates then identifies the desire to rule all citizens with a desire for tyrannical power.

Theages concedes that this follows from what he has said. Socrates' comic reproach imagines a tyrant-teacher whom the father has failed to provide. Demodocus agrees that serious counsel is needed, but Socrates postpones the referral until the boy's wish is examined further. The joke depends on the ambiguity still concealed in the broad word “rule”.

Wise company and voluntary leadership 125b–126a

The verse attributed to Euripides says that tyrants are wise through association with the wise. Socrates asks “wise in what?” Farmers, cooks and wrestlers yield recognizable answers; the relevant tyrannical wisdom does not. The Callicrite song supplies a teasing answer rather than a clear subject. Theages protests and clarifies his ambition.

He admits that he might pray for unlimited tyranny or even godhood, and attributes such aspirations broadly. He nevertheless distinguishes that wish from his intended education: he wants to lead willing citizens, not rule by force as tyrants do. Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon become his models. Consent and manner of rule correct the earlier inference from scope alone.

Practitioners and the objection from their sons 126a–127a

Experienced horsemen and javelin-throwers seem the obvious teachers of their own skills. Socrates applies this to statesmen, whose experience spans their own and other cities. Theages answers with the argument attributed to Socrates that their sons are no better than shoemakers' sons. Why expect them to hand wisdom to a stranger if they have not benefited their own children?

Socrates makes Theages imagine a son who wants to paint while rejecting painters. Theages would not know where else to send him; he should understand his father's difficulty. This answer exposes a practical predicament without conclusively establishing the statesmen's teaching ability. The promise of free, reputable association remains available, but Theages names a different preferred associate: Socrates.

The chosen associate questions the choice 127a–128c

Theages invokes Socrates' standing among the fine and good. Demodocus enthusiastically supports the choice, fearing corruption by another associate and offering himself and his resources. Socrates questions why his benefit would exceed that of an older, experienced and honored father. He names the sophists who profess educational ability and attract privileged young men to paid company. He disclaims their subjects, except for a small but supremely mastered knowledge of love.

Theages hears joking or reluctance. He cites peers who became apparently much better after joining Socrates and assumes that Socrates could bring about the same result if willing. The next account directly challenges that assumption of control.

A prohibitory voice and differently supported reports 128d–129e

Socrates describes a daimonic accompaniment present from childhood by divine allotment. Its voice turns him away from actions and never prompts him toward them; it also checks friends who consult him. Charmides disregards a warning about athletic training, but the precise consequences are left to inquiry. Timarchus ignores repeated warnings, secretly departs on a murder plot and later attributes his death to disobedience. The local corrupt phrase remains unresolved.

The Sicilian expedition is a retrospective example. Sannion's current campaign is a prospective test whose outcome the dialogue does not report. The stories illustrate the sign's claimed reach, but their evidence is not uniform. The lexicon preserves the difference between a stated result, an invitation to ask a witness and a prediction awaiting confirmation.

Four outcomes and Aristides account 129e–130e

The same power governs association. It can oppose a person so that no benefit through association is possible; it can permit company without benefit; it can aid immediate progress that is retained; and it can aid progress later lost after separation. The voice's negative signaling and the power's positive educational assistance are related but distinct descriptions.

Aristides illustrates one unstable outcome. After time away he finds Thucydides with Socrates, comments on their rivalry and describes his own diminished conversational confidence. He says the decline was gradual and that he had never learned anything from Socrates. He reports greater benefit with greater proximity, sight and contact, and says the whole condition has drained away. This is an extraordinary reported experience, not a demonstrated physical mechanism or an independently measured acquisition of civic virtue.

Safer alternatives and an agreed trial 130e–131a

Socrates states the condition plainly: if the association is dear to the god, progress can be great and rapid; otherwise it will not occur. Theages can consider the greater predictability of teachers who are masters of the benefit they impart. He chooses instead to test the association. If it is not permitted, they can decide between another associate and an attempt to soothe the divine with prayers and sacrifices under divinatory advice.

Demodocus supports the proposal and Socrates assents. No sacrifice is performed in the text, no contrary sign is overcome and no educational result for Theages is narrated. The decision completes the immediate deliberation by authorizing a trial. It leaves the original aspiration to wisdom dependent on conditions the speakers have not mastered.

The supplied reading edition

Plato, Theages, Greek and English, Diotimos Editions, 2026. The supplied title page identifies the Greek as John Burnet's Oxford text of 1903, in the corrected second impression of 1909, and the English as a new translation. This companion uses the supplied Markdown and PDF as its source. The seventeen Greek pages, English translation, explanatory notes, Key Words, outline, glossary and Editorial Note have distinct evidential roles: the spoken Greek determines attestation; the translation determines the edition's rendering; the apparatus and notes record editorial or contextual information.

Primary passages cited in the supplied notes

The following references identify the principal ancient parallels mentioned in the supplied edition and discussed in the companion. They are guides for further reading, not claims that a fresh collation of all these works was performed for this lexicon.

Diogenes Laertius 3.59: the ancient catalogue and the fifth tetralogy Plato, Apology 19e–20a: the teachers who attract fee-paying young associates; 31c–d: the prohibitory voice; 33e: Demodocus, Paralius and Theages Plato, Republic 496b–c: the condition that keeps Theages from political life; 568a–b: the verse attributed to Euripides Plato, Protagoras 319e–320b: political education and statesmen's sons; 325d–326c: the sequence of ordinary education Plato, Meno 93a–94e: the educational achievements of statesmen and their sons Plato, Gorgias 470d–471d: Archelaus in Polus' example; 503c and 515c–517a: the assessment of prominent Athenian statesmen Plato, Laches 178a–179d: the families of the younger Aristides and Thucydides Plato, Theaetetus 150e–151a: Aristides, departure and the selective reception of returning associates Plato, Symposium 177d and Lysis 204b–c: Socrates' avowal concerning the things of love Plato, Alcibiades I 103a and 105a–c: divine opposition and expansive political ambition; Alcibiades II 141a–e: imagined tyranny and the fate of Archelaus Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.4 and 4.8.1: other presentations of Socratic divine signs; Oeconomicus 7.1: the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios Herodotus 1.62.4: Amphilytus; 8.20 and 8.77: Bakis Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 13.19.2: the report of the disputed verse in Sophocles' Ajax the Locrian Thucydides 4.75.1: a general named Demodocus, whose identification with the speaker remains tentative in the supplied note

These references should be read with their differences intact. In particular, the sign's negative directive function in the Apology does not exhaust the educational power attributed to it here; the criticism of political leaders in the Gorgias is not identical to Theages' argument about their sons; and an ancient catalogue attribution is not a resolution of modern authorship disputes.

Textual cautions worth keeping beside the book

The bracketed διδασκάλου at 125a and τι at 128b are not translated by the supplied edition. The Greek page's εἰ at 127a is a retained print error where the English requires εἶ, “you are”. The words †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου† at 129a remain corrupt and should not ground an independent doctrine. Callicrite's spelling at 125d–e, the phrase “to whose house” at 125a and “who have horses” at 126b reflect the edited text described in the source's apparatus. None of these notices warrants silently substituting every reported variant into the dialogue.

Lexical headings generally use recognizable dictionary forms, while The places and the register show the source's inflections. A clipped quotation can undergo the conventional acute/grave or enclitic-accent adjustment associated with its new quotation boundary; it is not thereby a different lexical reading. The register retains the supplied attested form so that the reader can find it. The possible morphological analyses of παρείκῃ at 131a should not be confused with textual corruption: the permission sense is treated under παρείκειν, “give way or allow”.

What remains open

The dialogue does not establish a definition of political wisdom, prove that every practitioner can teach, independently verify all the sign stories, or narrate the outcome of Theages' association. It gives the speakers a qualified way to proceed. The companion explains the full path to that decision while preserving these limits.