Willingness and refusal

Use in the book

The prologue asks whether Charmides would be willing to strip and assumes he is old enough to be willing to converse (154d–e). The medical story then makes treating his head conditional on his willingness to let his soul receive the charm (157c). At 158e Socrates offers to investigate with him if he wishes, or leave the matter if he does not. The boy actively accepts.

Willingness also marks intellectual limits. Charmides initially hesitates to answer (159b). Socrates says Critias treats him as though he already knew and would agree if he chose; he insists that he must first investigate (165b–c2). Later Critias is unwilling to acknowledge his inability before the audience (169c). Wanting to affirm, deny or conceal something does not decide its truth.

The closing promise to continue with Socrates is eager, but it is also placed under the guardian's command and directed at a Socrates jokingly deprived of refusal (176b–d). This juxtaposition prevents consent from being treated as a single uncomplicated fact shared equally by everyone in the scene.

Places to read

1. 154d–eWillingness frames both bodily exposure and conversation
2. 157cTreatment and inquiry are offered conditionally on Charmides’ willingness
3. 158eTreatment and inquiry are offered conditionally on Charmides’ willingness
4. 159bThe boy hesitates before giving his first definition
5. 165b–c2Socrates denies that agreement is merely a matter of willingness
6. 169c–dCritias resists openly admitting his inability
7. 176b–dA willing pupil and a commanding guardian confront Socrates with threatened force

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “will,” “want,” and “be willing” as ordinary English requires. Neither that variation nor the lexical difference between βούλομαι and ἐθέλω establishes a formal partition between rational and irrational choice in this dialogue.

βούλομαι

Attested: βούλει / βούλεται (boulei / bouletai). To want or wish; Socrates will not force Charmides to say what he does not want to say, and the later analogy asks what a wish wants as its object. References: 158e, 167e. Lexical identification: lemma: βούλομαι. See Willingness and refusal.

ἐθέλω

Attested: ἐθέλω (ethelō). Be willing or wish; Socrates proposes a joint inquiry if Charmides agrees. References: 158e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐθέλω. See Willingness and refusal.

Use in the book

Boulesthai first helps establish the conversation: Socrates invites Demodocus to say what he wishes, and the father proposes withdrawing into the stoa (121a). Later Demodocus says he would most wish to consult Socrates (122a). The language initially describes conversational cooperation rather than an obstacle to education.

Ethelein, by contrast, enters prominently through the son's accusation that his father is unwilling to introduce him to anyone (123a–b2). The supposed educational problem is framed as someone else's refusal to act. The same pattern recurs in the hypothetical boy who wants painting but is unwilling to learn from painters (126e), and in Theages' request that Socrates be willing to be with him (127a). Asking who is unwilling gradually becomes as important as asking who is wise.

The political use of hekōn supplies a different but connected distinction. Theages wants to rule willing subjects, not through force or as tyrants do (126a). This corrects the earlier classification based solely on the population governed. Consent identifies a mode of rule, not a different trade or a smaller numerical constituency. Nothing in the passage proves that actual admired leaders always obtained unanimous consent.

The educational plot then tests whether the prospective participants' consent is enough. Demodocus begs Socrates to be willing and urges his son to seek no other companion (127b). Theages says his own part is ready, provided Socrates is willing (128b–c2), and treats Socrates' wish as the condition sufficient for his improvement. Socrates rejects precisely that supposition: another power governs the association and its benefit.

The story of Timarchus adds a grave counterpoint. He says he is dying because he was unwilling to obey Socrates (129a), then is described as wishing to escape notice (129c). These are determinate choices within the story, not a general doctrine that all suffering follows unwillingness. Across the dialogue, willingness makes cooperation possible but does not confer expertise, guarantee safety, or command the daimonic.

Places to read

1. 121aεἴ τι βούλει λέγειν — Socrates opens a space for the father's wish to speak
2. 123aοὐκ ἐθέλει — The father is accused of unwillingness
3. 126aἀλλ’ ἑκόντων — Theages specifies willing subjects
4. 127aεἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι — The boy makes a direct request for willing association
5. 128b–c2τό γ’ ἐμὸν ἕτοιμον; ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ — Readiness and Socrates' supposed power to grant improvement
6. 129aοὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι — Timarchus identifies his unwillingness to obey

Translation in this edition

The Key Words distinguish “wish,” “be willing,” and willing subjects. At 128b Burnet brackets τι, but not the readiness clause or the expression of willingness. The latter therefore belongs to the accepted printed dialogue and must not be lost with the deleted particle.

Is willing — ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

Is willing. Negated of the father in the son's accusation about introductions. Attested: ἐθέλει (123a). Wish, willingness, and consent.

Wish — βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

Wish. Socrates invites Demodocus to say whatever he wishes to discuss. Attested: βούλει (121a). Wish, willingness, and consent.

Would wish — βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

Would wish. Demodocus identifies Socrates as the person whose advice he most wants. Attested: ἐβουλόμην (122a). Wish, willingness, and consent.

Mean to say — βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

Mean to say. Theages identifies the comprehensive formulation as the one he has long intended. Attested: βούλομαι λέγειν (124b). Wish, willingness, and consent.