Theages Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

October 2026

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Introduction and argument map

Theages asks what it would mean for a young man to become wise and what grounds a parent has for entrusting him to another person’s company. Its first answers appeal to familiar practices and public accomplishments. Its last answer concerns an association whose benefit cannot be guaranteed by Socrates’ willingness, a teacher’s reputation or the payment of a fee. Between those points the dialogue distinguishes the scope of rule from its manner, expertise from an ability to impart it, and permission to associate from improvement that endures.

This companion accompanies the supplied Diotimos Editions Greek and English Theages, translated in 2026 from the text of John Burnet’s third Oxford volume, in the corrected second impression of 1909. It follows the article form and reading apparatus of the supplied Lovers Lexicon. The articles are written around the words, examples, persons, constructions and questions actually doing work in this dialogue. A separate defined register supplies shorter lexical explanations; contextual glosses examine phrases; three indexes provide access by wording, passage and theme. These are complementary routes into the same text, not independent piles of items whose totals should be added together.

Authorship title and dramatic setting

The transmitted Greek title is ΘΕΑΓΗΣ, Theages, the name of the young interlocutor. The source’s Introduction reports the ancient subtitle “or On Philosophy” and the work’s position at the beginning of the fifth tetralogy, before Charmides, Laches and Lysis. That catalogue information is not spoken dialogue. In particular, neither

philosophia nor philosophein occurs in the conversation itself. The title and ancient classification can orient a reader without creating an unattested lexical entry.

The work belongs to the transmitted Platonic corpus, but its authorship is disputed. This companion therefore speaks of the dialogue, its argument and its Socrates rather than assuming that every position voiced here is a settled doctrine of Plato or secure testimony to the historical Socrates. It does not adjudicate the attribution. Nor does it flatten the differences between the sign described here, the voice in Apology 31c–d and the selective associations described in Theaetetus 150e–151a. The supplied edition introduces those comparisons; this companion uses them as comparisons.

Demodocus, his son Theages and Socrates speak directly, without a framing narrator. They withdraw into the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios for a private discussion. The father speaks from experience of farming and child-rearing. Socrates' later stories introduce reported voices within this three-person encounter. A statement in those stories can therefore have several levels of attribution: Socrates reports Aristides' account of his own condition, or reports what Timarchus said in the hearing of another witness. Those levels are part of the evidence, not ornamental complications.

The source proposes a dramatic date around the summer of 409 BC from Archelaus' recent rule, the past Sicilian disaster and Sannion's present campaign with Thrasyllus. That is an inference from the internal notices and the historical identifications supplied by the edition. It is not a date of composition. The lexicon does not require a more precise chronology than the text can bear.

What an article establishes

Each full article begins with an English heading and a Greek line. Dictionary citation forms make families recognizable; exact printed inflections appear under The places. A lemma does not have to occur in that precise grammatical form. Where an English heading is an interpretive category, such as the craft model, the article says so rather than presenting it as a quoted Greek technical term.

The word explains lexical sense and relevant distinctions. In Theages follows the expression through its dramatic and argumentative use. The places gives selected exact attestations with Stephanus references and local explanations. In this edition describes the supplied translation or editorial treatment. See also directs the reader to related discussions. An article may group several terms when their relation is the substantive subject; a minor term need not become a second article merely because it can be counted separately.

Stephanus references identify the ancient text independently of this companion's pages. A range such as 130a–b can be necessary because a phrase, or even a printed name, crosses a boundary. The passage index covers every section present. Page locators refer to the matching PDF; EPUB and Word also have linked navigation. References to the edition's numbered notes use its Markdown's continuous identifiers. The edition's PDF restarts note numbers on each translated page: find the corresponding note by the cited Stephanus passage.

The transliteration convention is a reading aid: ē represents eta, ō omega, y upsilon, ph phi, th theta, ch chi, and h a rough breathing when relevant. Conventional English spellings are retained for familiar persons. It is not

a guide to one uniquely correct historical pronunciation. Greek accents and breathings are retained in the source quotations. Brackets and obeli retain their editorial meaning rather than being silently removed to make a quotation easier to interpret.

Scope and limits of completeness

The governing coverage standard is every philosophically or dramatically consequential word-family, comparison, named example and construction in the supplied dialogue. It is not an unfiltered concordance of every article, conjunction and inflected token. The argument has also been checked section by section, so that material absent from a familiar list of “key concepts” still receives a home: the father’s planting analogy, peer emulation, the naming exercise with oracle-singers, the hypothetical painter, the exact limits of each sign anecdote and the qualifications of the ending.

The defined register contains real definitions with attested forms and local senses. It is not a list of unexamined candidates. Its records overlap the full articles intentionally because a reader may enter through an individual Greek word rather than a conceptual discussion. Phrase glosses give a separate explanation only when syntax, idiom or argumentative force needs it. The three indexes are navigation and are not counted as additional explanatory coverage.

Several familiar philosophical nouns are not attested in the spoken text: psychē, aretē, sōphrosynē and dikaiosynē among them. Their absence does not make the work unphilosophical. It makes restraint important. Theages’ reported improvement should not be silently rewritten as acquisition of moral virtue; Aristides’ hexis should not be

given a complete later Aristotelian theory; the adjective enkrateis should not become an unattested doctrine of enkrateia. Likewise, the things of love are named by an adjective in the plural, not by a spoken occurrence of erōs.

This is a reading companion to the supplied edition, not a fresh critical edition or a new manuscript collation. External identifications and parallels are attributed to the source's notes unless separately indicated. The uncertainty of authorship, local corruption at 129a, ambiguous social evaluations and the incomplete outcome of the proposed trial remain visible. Completeness is best served by explaining what the evidence does and does not establish.

Argument map

Parental care and an unsafe desire 121a–122b

Demodocus asks for private conversation and finds Socrates at leisure. His comparison with plants makes production easy and subsequent care demanding. The son's desire to become wise is not base, but its risks alarm him. Companions of the same age and deme repeat arguments that seem to have stirred the boy's ambition. The father has tried reassurance and restraint; now he seeks a suitable sophist and welcomes Socrates as the adviser he would most want.

The practical problem is not a refusal to spend money. Demodocus says he is less concerned about the expense than the danger. The case begins with a good-seeming aspiration whose object and educational route remain unclear. Care therefore requires more than generosity or simple compliance with the young person's demand.

Agreement before choosing a teacher 122b–123b

Socrates calls advice sacred and education especially divine as a subject of deliberation. Before deciding, adviser and advisee must agree on what they are discussing. He asks the boy's name, hears that Theages is a fittingly sacred one and turns to the desire itself. Theages identifies the wise with those who have knowledge and acknowledges his previous lessons in letters, cithara-playing and wrestling. Yet those are not the wisdom he wants.

The exchange distinguishes verbal agreement from determination of a subject. "Become wise" can name a general aspiration without identifying which competence is sought. The father's alleged unwillingness cannot be judged properly until the educational demand has been made clear. The language of naming leads from the name of the boy to the names of the activities.

From named skills to rule over human beings 123b–124b

Piloting and charioteering show how an activity supplies a name for the corresponding wisdom. Theages instead says he wants the wisdom by which people are ruled. Socrates tests that answer against medicine, music, gymnastics, farming and carpentry. Those practices have bounded objects or recipients. The boy's intended scope includes everyone in the city, not merely one occupational or situational class.

The reasoning establishes breadth of intended rule but leaves its manner unspecified. This omission matters when Socrates next brings in tyrants. The craft comparisons make a general political object recognizable; they do not

yet prove that one constitution or mode of rule is the only possible result.

Rulers titles and the tyrant teacher 124c–125b

Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus and Hippias exemplify rulers over the people of cities or territories. A side question about Bakis, Sibyl and Amphilytus models the assignment of a common title: oracle-singers. Hippias and Periander receive the title tyrants. Socrates then identifies the desire to rule all citizens with a desire for tyrannical power.

Theages concedes that this follows from what he has said. Socrates' comic reproach imagines a tyrant-teacher whom the father has failed to provide. Demodocus agrees that serious counsel is needed, but Socrates postpones the referral until the boy's wish is examined further. The joke depends on the ambiguity still concealed in the broad word "rule".

Wise company and voluntary leadership 125b–126a

The verse attributed to Euripides says that tyrants are wise through association with the wise. Socrates asks "wise in what?" Farmers, cooks and wrestlers yield recognizable answers; the relevant tyrannical wisdom does not. The Callicrite song supplies a teasing answer rather than a clear subject. Theages protests and clarifies his ambition.

He admits that he might pray for unlimited tyranny or even godhood, and attributes such aspirations broadly. He nevertheless distinguishes that wish from his intended education: he wants to lead willing citizens, not rule by force as tyrants do. Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon become his models. Consent and manner of rule correct the earlier inference from scope alone.

Practitioners and the objection from their sons 126a–127a

Experienced horsemen and javelin-throwers seem the obvious teachers of their own skills. Socrates applies this to statesmen, whose experience spans their own and other cities. Theages answers with the argument attributed to Socrates that their sons are no better than shoemakers' sons. Why expect them to hand wisdom to a stranger if they have not benefited their own children?

Socrates makes Theages imagine a son who wants to paint while rejecting painters. Theages would not know where else to send him; he should understand his father's difficulty. This answer exposes a practical predicament without conclusively establishing the statesmen's teaching ability. The promise of free, reputable association remains available, but Theages names a different preferred associate: Socrates.

The chosen associate questions the choice 127a–128c

Theages invokes Socrates' standing among the fine and good. Demodocus enthusiastically supports the choice, fearing corruption by another associate and offering himself and his resources. Socrates questions why his benefit would exceed that of an older, experienced and honored father. He names the sophists who profess educational ability and attract privileged young men to paid company. He disclaims their subjects, except for a small but supremely mastered knowledge of love.

Theages hears joking or reluctance. He cites peers who became apparently much better after joining Socrates and assumes that Socrates could bring about the same result if willing. The next account directly challenges that assumption of control.

A prohibitory voice and differently supported reports 128d–129e

Socrates describes a daimonic accompaniment present from childhood by divine allotment. Its voice turns him away from actions and never prompts him toward them; it also checks friends who consult him. Charmides disregards a warning about athletic training, but the precise consequences are left to inquiry. Timarchus ignores repeated warnings, secretly departs on a murder plot and later attributes his death to disobedience. The local corrupt phrase remains unresolved.

The Sicilian expedition is a retrospective example. Sannion's current campaign is a prospective test whose outcome the dialogue does not report. The stories illustrate the sign's claimed reach, but their evidence is not uniform. The lexicon preserves the difference between a stated result, an invitation to ask a witness and a prediction awaiting confirmation.

Four outcomes and Aristides account 129e–130e

The same power governs association. It can oppose a person so that no benefit through association is possible; it can permit company without benefit; it can aid immediate progress that is retained; and it can aid progress later lost after separation. The voice's negative signaling and the power's positive educational assistance are related but distinct descriptions.

Aristides illustrates one unstable outcome. After time away he finds Thucydides with Socrates, comments on their rivalry and describes his own diminished conversational confidence. He says the decline was gradual and that he had never learned anything from Socrates. He reports greater benefit with greater proximity, sight and contact,

and says the whole condition has drained away. This is an extraordinary reported experience, not a demonstrated physical mechanism or an independently measured acquisition of civic virtue.

Safer alternatives and an agreed trial 130e–131a

Socrates states the condition plainly: if the association is dear to the god, progress can be great and rapid; otherwise it will not occur. Theages can consider the greater predictability of teachers who are masters of the benefit they impart. He chooses instead to test the association. If it is not permitted, they can decide between another associate and an attempt to soothe the divine with prayers and sacrifices under divinatory advice.

Demodocus supports the proposal and Socrates assents. No sacrifice is performed in the text, no contrary sign is overcome and no educational result for Theages is narrated. The decision completes the immediate deliberation by authorizing a trial. It leaves the original aspiration to wisdom dependent on conditions the speakers have not mastered.

Full articles

The 62 full articles are arranged alphabetically by English heading. The defined register has 413 consolidated Greek headwords or expressions with 475 contextual records, and the phrase section has 35 subsidiary glosses. These counts describe different levels of explanation; repeated index links are navigation, not further entries.

Advice, counsel, and deliberation

συμβουλή (symboulē); συμβουλεύειν (symbouleuein); συμβουλεύεσθαι (symbouleuesthai); βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai); βουλή (boulē)

The word. Symboulē is advice or counsel. The active symbouleuein means to advise; the middle symbouleuesthai here means to consult someone or take advice. Bouleuesthai is to deliberate, and boulē the counsel or deliberation required. These are related expressions, but their grammatical contrasts identify who gives advice, who seeks it, and who participates in deciding. They should not be collapsed into a single technical “deliberative faculty.”

In Theages. Demodocus arrives with a practical decision: since he can no longer restrain his son, he will supervise the introduction to a sophist. Meeting Socrates interrupts that proposed execution with an opportunity for counsel. The father’s request is not initially for a definition of wisdom, but for guidance about what he is about to do (122a–b).

Socrates solemnizes the request by saying that advice is called sacred and that no subject of deliberation is more divine than one’s own education and that of one’s kin. The language raises the stakes without yet naming a divinely

guaranteed adviser. His first requirement is procedural: adviser and recipient must mean the same thing. He then corrects even that requirement, since agreement between adults would be useless if neither understood the boy's desire. Good deliberation requires identification of its object before selection of means.

At 125a the same vocabulary returns inside the joke about a tyrant-teacher. Socrates proposes that he and Demodocus deliberate where to send the boy. Demodocus answers that the matter needs no trivial counsel. Yet Socrates immediately postpones the decision once more: they must question Theages sufficiently first (125b). The recurrent postponement is philosophically productive. Having obtained "rule everyone" as an answer has not yet established what sort of rule Theages seeks or whether a suitable teacher exists.

At the close Theages himself proposes a sequence: try being with Socrates, and, if the daimonic does not permit it, deliberate immediately about alternatives (131a). The young man has become a participant in the practical procedure that began as his father's consultation. This is no final theory of wise choice: the suggested alternatives include another companion and ritual appeasement. Nevertheless, deliberation now acknowledges a condition outside either person's will. The movement is from advice sought on a seemingly settled educational purchase to a provisional arrangement whose success remains to be tested.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **122a.** συμβουλεύσασθαι; συμβουλεύειν — Demodocus distinguishes his taking advice from Socrates' giving it

- **122b.** συμβουλὴ ἱερὸν χρῆμα — Advice is called a sacred thing
- **122b–c.** περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα — The object of joint deliberation must first be identified
- **122c.** ὁ συμβουλευόμενος — The father as recipient of advice, contrasted with Socrates as adviser
- **125a–b.** κοινῇ βουλευώμεθα; βουλῆς δεῖν — Joint deliberation and the need for serious counsel
- **131a.** βουλευσόμεθα ὅτι δράσομεν — Theages reserves a further decision about what they will do

In this edition. The translation differentiates “advise,” “take advice,” “deliberate,” and “counsel.” At 125a Burnet prints βουλευώμεθα, the deliberative subjunctive, against the indicative recorded for B and T. The printed invitation therefore asks what they should do together; the apparatus should not be mistaken for a second action in the dialogue.

See also. Agreement and the object of inquiry · Education of oneself and one’s kin · Desire · Names and Theages

Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias

Αἴγισθος (Aigisthos); Πηλεύς (Pēleus); Περίανδρος (Periandros); Ἀρχέλαος (Archelaos); Ἱππίας (Hippias)

The word. These are five personal names, not interchangeable titles of office. Their inflected forms mark the persons about whom Socrates asks. The dialogue attaches places and identifying relatives or actions: Aegisthus and Agamemnon in Argos; Peleus son of Aeacus in Phthia; Periander son of Cypselus in Corinth; Archelaus son of Perdiccas in Macedonia; Hippias son of Pisistratus in Athens.

In Theages. The sequence follows Theages' acceptance that the desired wisdom governs craftsmen, private persons, women, and men together. Socrates asks whether each named ruler governed those same categories or some different people (124c–d). Theages consistently accepts the common population. The series gives his abstract ambition recognizable human instances before asking for a collective title.

The opening figure is ominous: Aegisthus is explicitly identified as the killer of Agamemnon. The text therefore includes violence within its chosen examples without yet making violence part of the definition of rule. Peleus is then introduced through his father and place, without a corresponding crime. The sequence is heterogeneous, drawing on figures of heroic narrative and more recent rulers. Treating all five as one historically uniform constitutional class would flatten the passage.

Socrates finally asks for the title of Hippias and Periander, not expressly for a common title borne by all five (124e). Theages answers "tyrants." This narrowing is essential to reconstructing the argument. The earlier series established that many rulers governed the same broad human categories; the final pair supplies an especially recognizable tyrannical designation. Moving from that pair to every desired comprehensive rule remains a further inference.

Archelaus' being "this new ruler" contributes to the dialogue's dramatic chronology. The edition places his accession about 413 BC and combines this with the later campaign references to locate the conversation. The dialogue itself supplies the relative description, not a numbered calendar date. Likewise, the historical dates

attached to Periander and Hippias belong to the notes rather than to Socrates' speeches.

The rulers are therefore more than antiquarian decoration, but less than a complete political typology. Their common subjects prepare the pressure put on Theages; their differences, and the restriction of the final title question to two names, limit what that pressure establishes. A lexicon should preserve both functions.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **124c.** Αἴγισθος ὁ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀποκτείνας; ἐν Ἄργει — Aegisthus is identified through the killing and its setting
- **124c.** Πηλεὺς ὁ Αἰακοῦ ἐν Φθίᾳ — Peleus is identified through parentage and locality
- **124c.** Περίανδρον … τὸν Κυψέλου; ἐν Κορίνθῳ — Periander's rule provides a third case
- **124d.** Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου; ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ — The contemporary or recent Macedonian ruler
- **124d.** Ἱππίαν … τὸν Πεισιστράτου — Athens' former ruler supplies the local case
- **124e.** Ἱππίας καὶ Περίανδρος — The final title question expressly names this pair

In this edition. Notes 10–14 supply the mythic and historical identifications, including Aegisthus' rule of Mycenae in Homer and the Argive setting in Aeschylus. That distinction should remain visible rather than "correcting" the dialogue's Argos to Mycenae. Burnet's printed τοῦτον at 124d follows a correction against τούτων; the translation accordingly says "this new ruler."

See also. Rule and office · Tyranny · Names and titles · City and comprehensive rule

Agreement and the object of inquiry

συνομολογεῖν (synomologein); οἴεσθαι (oiesthai); ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein); διαπυνθάνεσθαι (diapynthanesthai); μετατίθεσθαι (metatithesthai)

The word. Synhomologein is to agree together or jointly acknowledge. Oiesthai and hypolambanein here mark what a speaker thinks or takes something to be. Diapynthanesthai is to inquire or find out thoroughly. Metatithesthai, used by Socrates of his own proposal, is to change or revise a position. These expressions make the inquiry's procedure explicit; they do not name an independently established system of philosophical method.

In Theages. Socrates initially asks Demodocus to agree with him about what they think the deliberation concerns. His reason is strikingly ordinary: two people can continue a conversation while attaching different objects to apparently shared words. Only later may they realize that adviser and advised have been ridiculous. "Wisdom" and "education" are not yet adequate guarantees of a common subject.

The father endorses this as the right procedure. Socrates then qualifies himself: he speaks rightly, but not altogether, and changes the proposal a little. The correction is substantive despite its modest introduction. The adults might agree perfectly with one another and still misidentify the boy's desire. Their first task must therefore be to question Theages himself (122c–d). Agreement is necessary for coherent counsel but insufficient for accurate understanding of the person whose future is at issue.

The ensuing exchange dramatizes the difficulty. Theages says he knows both the desired wisdom and its name, yet

supplies only “wisdom” (123c–d). Socrates then obtains more determinate answers by contrasting named capacities and their fields. The boy’s assent advances the argument, but its force remains local. At the apparent conclusion that he desires tyranny, he grants only that it follows from what he said (124e). His later distinction between force and willing subjects reveals what the earlier description omitted.

It would therefore be misleading to describe all these assents as a completed demonstration that political ambition is necessarily tyrannical. The conversation exposes an inadequately specified desire; it also exposes the risk of taking a shared extension, “everyone in the city,” as a sufficient account of a kind of rule. The initial warning about speaking past one another remains relevant inside Socrates’ own questioning.

The end preserves this practical modesty. Socrates’ consent is conditional on their judgment that they should act so (131a). What is agreed is a trial of association, not an established causal account of its benefits. The dialogue presents agreement as a means of proceeding responsibly while also showing how easily its content needs revision.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **122b.** συνομολογήσωμεν τί ποτε οἰόμεθα — The speakers must jointly identify what they think the subject is
- **122c.** σμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεμαι — Socrates revises his own first proposal
- **122d.** διαπυνθανομένους ὅτι καὶ ἔστιν οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ — The inquiry must reach the boy’s own desire

- **124e.** Ἔοικέν γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον — Theages qualifies assent by reference to his previous words
- **125b.** διαπυθώμεθα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἱκανῶς — Further questioning precedes advice about a teacher

In this edition. “Agree on it together,” “I am changing it a little,” and “finding out thoroughly” preserve the distinctions between joint assent, self-correction, and investigation. The awkwardly emphatic “rightest” at 122d corresponds to ὀρθότατον; it belongs to Socrates’ revised ordering of inquiry, not a claim that everything subsequently accepted is beyond criticism.

See also. Advice and deliberation · Wisdom · Tyranny · Witness, accusation, and family conflict

Analogies and the limits of the craft model

ὥσπερ (hōsper); ταὐτά (tauta); ὁμότεχνος (homotechnos)

The word. Hōsper means “just as” or “as”; tauta is the contracted form of ta auta, “the same things”. Homotechnos means a practitioner of the same craft. These expressions articulate comparisons. Their occurrence does not guarantee that the things compared agree in every respect. “Craft model” is an explanatory heading for the repeated appeal to specialized practices, not a Greek technical expression announced by the dialogue.

In Theages. The early questions identify kinds of wisdom through their activities and objects. Piloting and charioteering have recognizable names; medicine governs the sick rather than every human being indiscriminately. This makes it reasonable to ask what distinctive

competence Theages desires. The subsequent comparisons do a different job. Farmers, cooks and wrestlers suggest that a learner gains the relevant wisdom by association with someone already skilled in that same activity (125b–d). Horsemen and javelin-throwers supply practical experience as a sign of such skill (126a–c).

The transfer to politics is the argumentative pressure point. Statesmen deal with their own and other cities, as horsemen use their own and other horses. Yet Theages objects that the statesmen's sons have not acquired their fathers' competence. Expertise in doing and effectiveness in teaching may therefore come apart. Socrates answers with a hypothetical boy who wants to paint but rejects painters. The comparison exposes the practical difficulty of finding an alternative without demonstrating that the particular statesmen can teach successfully.

The Callicrite joke deliberately strains the model: a man "of the same craft" as a woman who knows "tyrannical things" becomes an imagined instructor of tyranny. The vocabulary of specialization can organize an inquiry while also making its absurdities visible. At the end, Aristides' denial that he learned anything from Socrates prevents association from being reduced to the straightforward transmission envisaged in the craft examples. The dialogue uses the model to formulate the question and then complicates the model's sufficiency.

The places.

- **125c.** τῶν τὰ γεωργικά — The farmers' version specifies the subject in which the associates are wise
- **125d–e.** ὁμότεχνος ὢν Καλλικρίτῃ — Shared craft becomes part of the joke about a tyrant-teacher

- **126c.** τῇ τε αὐτῶν πόλει καὶ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς — Political experience is described through one's own and others' cities
- **127a.** ταὐτὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ποιῶν — Socrates explicitly identifies Theages' conduct with the hypothetical son's

In this edition. The translation preserves "craft", "craftsman" and "fellow craftsman", and the recurring "wise" and "clever". It does not insert "science" or "professional qualification". The analogy must be evaluated at the level of the particular activity and conclusion proposed.

See also. Craft · Knowledge · Statesmen's sons · Learning without instruction

Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names

Ἀριστείδης (Aristeidēs); Λυσίμαχος (Lysimachos); Θουκυδίδης (Thoukydidēs); Μελησίας (Melēsias)

The word. The repeated names belong to two genealogies: Aristides, son of Lysimachus, son of Aristides; and Thucydides, son of Melesias, son of Thucydides. The young companions share their grandfathers' names. Greek patronymic genitives identify the intervening fathers and grandparents. They do not make the speaker's companion identical with the famous older bearer of his name.

In Theages. The young Aristides exemplifies progress that does not last after separation from Socrates. He had advanced greatly in a short time, then a campaign took him away by sea. On returning he finds the young Thucydides spending time with Socrates. Thucydides had fallen out with Socrates in certain arguments the previous

day. Aristides hears that he is giving himself airs and angrily treating himself as someone of consequence; he asks whether Thucydides has forgotten what a “slave” he was before their association.

The insult immediately turns back upon Aristides. He confesses that he himself is now in a laughable condition. Before sailing he could converse with anyone and appear inferior to no one; now educated people make him flee in shame. The frame prevents Aristides from standing simply as the confident judge of another companion. His remembered superiority and present failure are aspects of the same account of unstable progress.

The genealogies add a connection with the earlier problem of statesmen’s sons, but the text does not argue that public excellence has been biologically transmitted or disproved by these young men. The edition’s note identifies their grandfathers as Aristides “the Just” and Thucydides son of Melesias, Pericles’ political opponent. It also links their fathers’ educational concerns with the Laches. Those contexts help explain the prominence of the family identifications; they should not be made into additional episodes narrated here.

The Thucydides in this scene is not the historian, and Aristides is not his own famous grandfather. The passage states neither the target nor date of Aristides’ campaign. Assigning it to the expedition mentioned just before would be an unsupported harmonisation.

The places.

- **130a.** Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου ὑὸς τοῦ Ἀριστείδου — the first three-generation identification
- **130a–b.** Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου ὑὸν τοῦ Θουκυδίδου — the second family sequence

- **130a.** στρατεία τις … ᾤχετο ἐκπλέων — Aristides leaves on an unspecified campaign
- **130b.** δι᾽ ἀπεχθείας ἐν λόγοις τισίν — Thucydides has fallen out with Socrates in argument
- **130b.** οἷον ἦν τὸ ἀνδράποδον — Aristides' disparaging recollection is an insult, not a statement of legal enslavement
- **130b–c.** καὶ αὐτός γε … καταγελάστως ἔχω — he admits his own ridiculous condition

In this edition. Note 37 supplies the family and inter-dialogue context. The printed genealogies retain the forms hyos and hyon rather than silently simplifying the relatives. "Some campaign" respects the source's indefiniteness, and "what sort of slave he was" preserves the speaker's harsh comparison without converting it into biography.

See also. Progress and retention; Rivalry and shame; Learning without instruction; Sicily and the current expedition.

Association, being with, and coming together

συνουσία (synousia); συνεῖναι (syneinai); συγγίγνεσθαι (syngignesthai)

The word. Synousia is being together, company or association. It can refer to conversation, a gathering or a pupil's attendance on someone; elsewhere it can also have a sexual sense. Syneinai means "be with". Syngignesthai describes coming together or coming to be with someone. No single occurrence should be made sexual merely because that meaning is possible, or formal instruction merely because educational benefit is desired.

In Theages. Association is the dialogue's continuous practical question. Demodocus fears an unsupervised encounter that may corrupt his son. Socrates first uses the noun for their present advisory conversation, then asks whose company will make Theages wise. The poetic proposition "wise are tyrants by being with the wise" makes association a supposed means to wisdom. Substituting farmers, cooks and wrestlers exposes the missing specification: wise in what? The Callicrite turn further unsettles the assumption that identifying an associate by a broad label has secured the desired education.

At 126c the proposed route is association with actual statesmen. Theages objects that their sons fail to show the expected benefit. At 127a he chooses Socrates, and father and son treat reciprocal willingness as the immediate obstacle. Demodocus wants Socrates to be with the boy; Theages wants his own association accepted. Socrates' description of sophists at 128a retains the same vocabulary: they persuade youths to abandon civic companions and pay for being with them. The word therefore runs across private conversation, civic mentorship, commercial education and the proposed Socratic relation without identifying these as the same teaching method.

Theages' observational argument at 128c then gives "coming to be with" Socrates a before-and-after structure. Socrates' answer qualifies that structure: attendance is neither sufficient for improvement nor a guarantee that improvement will endure. Aristides later pursued association with cultivated people because he felt capable of holding his own among them; this is an effect of his former confidence, not another description of studying

under Socrates. Finally, Theages proposes “being with one another” as the way to test the daimonic. The reciprocal expression makes a practical beginning possible while leaving its outcome open.

The places.

- **122a.** συγγενόμενός τῳ — the father fears a potentially corrupting encounter without him
- **122c.** τῆς συνουσίας — the current advisory conversation is itself an association
- **122e.** ἀνδρός τινος συνουσίαν — the search is for someone whose company will make the boy wise
- **125a–d.** συνουσίαν; συνουσίᾳ — association supplies the supposed route in the tyrant question and repeated verse
- **125d–e.** τοιαύτης … συνουσίας — the Callicrite comparison tests what kind of association is desired
- **126c.** ἄλλοις τισὶν συγγενόμενος — Socrates asks whether alternative companions could impart the statesmen’s competence
- **127a–c.** συνεῖναι; συνουσίᾳ; συγγενέσθαι; συνουσίαν — father and son choose association with Socrates
- **127e–128a.** συνουσίας; συνεῖναι — civic and fee-paying associations are contrasted
- **128c.** συνεῖναι; συνεγένοντο — Theages describes companionship and its apparent effects
- **129e–130a.** συνουσίας; συνεῖναι; συνόντες; τῆς συνουσίας — Socrates separates access from benefit and lasting progress
- **130b.** συγγενέσθαι — Aristides insults Thucydides’ condition before meeting Socrates

- **130c.** τὰς συνουσίας — Aristides formerly sought cultivated company
- **130d–e.** συνείην; ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία — his remembered experience leads into Socrates' general warning
- **131a.** συνόντας ἀλλήλοις; συνεσόμεθα — trial together, or eventual recourse to another associate

In this edition. "Being with", "be with" and "come to be with" intentionally preserve the family resemblance while distinguishing the third verb's event of coming together. At 122e idiomatic English requires "some man to be with" for the noun construction. The continuity is interpretatively useful: changing every late occurrence into "tuition" would decide precisely what the dialogue leaves unsettled.

See also. Spending time; Benefit; Progress and retention; Learning without instruction; Trial and permission.

Benefit and taking a hand

ὠφελεῖν (ōphelein); ὠφελία (ōphelia); συλλαμβάνεσθαι (syllambanesthai); εὐεργετεῖν (euergetein)

The word. Ōphelein is to benefit or help; ōphelia is the benefit received. Euergetein means to do good to someone or confer a benefit. Syllambanesthai, the middle of syllambanein, can mean to help or take a hand in an undertaking. These expressions concern advantageous effects, but neither a beneficial effect nor a helper's involvement by itself determines the content of a lesson or the measure of moral excellence.

In Theages. Theages first uses the benefit test against the suggested statesman-teachers: anyone capable of helping another would not have left his own son wholly unbenefited. Socrates later asks why Demodocus expects

him to benefit the boy towards becoming a good citizen more than the politically experienced father could. At this point the desired benefit has an explicitly civic direction. Demodocus' request that Socrates "do him whatever good you can" leaves its practical extent open.

Charmides supplies a second and distinct measure of benefit. Even without winning at Nemea, he expects benefit from exercise. The argument separates an activity's general usefulness from success in a contest. Yet it also attempts to override a warning whose full significance Charmides does not know. The story does not establish that bodily exercise is unbeneficial generally.

At 129e benefit becomes the organising term of Socrates' account of association. Some cannot benefit because the power opposes the association; others are allowed to associate but gain nothing. Where the power takes a hand, companions make progress. Even then benefit may either last or disappear after separation. Assistance, access, improvement and retention are therefore four distinguishable matters. The verb syllabētai identifies help without explaining its mechanism.

The final reference to teachers who are masters of the benefit they confer returns to the original search for an effective educator. Socrates presents his own association as less controllable. The resulting advantage is not made measurable in money, instructional units or a demonstrated moral transformation. Aristides' testimony is principally about his former standing in argument.

The places.

- **126d.** μηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι; ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον — Theages tests teaching by benefit to one's son and to others
- **127c–d.** εὐεργετῇς; ὠφεληθῆναι; ὠφελῆσαι — the father's request and Socrates' civic-benefit question

- **128e.** ὠφεληθήσομαι — Charmides expects exercise itself to benefit him
- **129e.** ὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδέν; συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας — permission without benefit contrasts with active assistance
- **130a.** βέβαιον … καὶ παραμόνιμον τὴν ὠφελίαν — some retain a stable benefit
- **130e.** τῆς ὠφελίας ἣν ὠφελοῦσιν — the final recommendation foregrounds control over benefit

In this edition. The repeated “benefit” preserves the argument’s continuity. “Takes a hand” renders the middle verb without adding a theory of divine transmission. “Do him whatever good you can” at 127d corresponds to euergetein, not an otherwise unmarked repetition of ōphelein.

See also. Progress and retention; Power; Learning without instruction; Mastery and chance.

Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things

Καλλικρίτη (Kallikritē); Κυάνη (Kyanē); τυραννικά (tyrannika); ᾄσμα (asma)

The word. Callicrite and Cyane are personal names. The text calls Callicrite “the [daughter] of Cyane”; the supplied translation makes the relationship explicit. Tyrannika is the neuter plural of tyrannikos, “tyrannical”, used substantivally for “tyrannical things”. Asma means a song. None of these words supplies a definition of the particular expertise the song attributed to Callicrite.

In Theages. When Theages cannot say in what the wise associates of tyrants must be wise, Socrates offers the things Anacreon said Callicrite knew. Both interlocutors are represented as knowing the song; the reader receives

only its compressed description. Socrates asks whether the boy wants a man who shares Callicrite's craft, so that he too may become a tyrant. Theages recognizes the teasing and protests (125d–e).

The passage is a miniature test of quotation as an answer. A familiar phrase appears to name the missing knowledge, but "tyrannical things" merely reproduces the problematic adjective. It does not identify a curriculum or show that tyranny is a teachable craft. The song also imports a register different from the preceding examples of farmers and wrestlers. The joke may depend on associations a contemporary listener could recognize more readily than we can. Because the song is otherwise unknown in the supplied evidence, a confident reconstruction of its whole erotic or political situation would exceed what this edition supports.

The important result is Theages' clarification: he distinguishes the limitless power he might pray for from the voluntary civic leadership he means to pursue. Callicrite is therefore part of the argumentative provocation, not an actual teacher proposed in earnest.

The places.

- **125d.** Ἀνακρέων τὴν Καλλικρίτην — The name occurs as the object of what Anacreon said she knew
- **125d.** ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ ᾆσμα; — Socrates appeals to shared recognition of a song
- **125e.** Καλλικρίτῃ τῇ Κυάνης — The proposed associate is called her fellow craftsman
- **125e.** ἐπίσταται τυραννικά — The quoted description names the knowledge without explaining it

In this edition. The note reports that the song is known only here. Burnet prints Callicrite, following Ang. C. 1. 4, while B, T and W have the spelling Callicrete. The companion follows the printed name and records the difference rather than inventing two persons. Anacreon's association with the courts of Polycrates and Hipparchus belongs to the edition's contextual note, not to Socrates' argument.[1]

See also. Poetry and authority · Tyranny · Joking · Voluntary rule

Care, rearing, and the planting analogy

φυτά (phyta); φυτεύειν (phyteuein); φυτεία (phyteia); παιδοποιία (paidopoiia); θεραπεία (therapeia); τροφή (trophē); ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (epimeleisthai)

The word. Phyta in the opening means things that grow and is expressly extended to animals and human beings, not restricted to plants in the modern classificatory sense. Phyteuein is to plant; phyteia planting; paidopoiia the begetting of children. Therapeia is tending or attendance, here horticultural. Trophē is rearing or nurture. Epimeleisthai means to take care of or attend to someone or something. These words connect agricultural work and parental responsibility without making them identical crafts.

In Theages. Demodocus begins from the work of those who farm. Preparation and planting are comparatively easy; once the planted thing lives, continued tending

[1] The supplied note at 125d identifies Anacreon and states that this song is known only through the present passage. That warrants explaining the dramatic allusion while leaving the lost song's fuller situation unreconstructed. The variant Callicrete belongs to the apparatus, not to a second character.

becomes extensive, difficult, and troublesome (121b–c). His inference moves from personal experience to a broader likeness among living things. He expressly says that he judges other cases from his own affairs, so the comparison has the standing of an experienced father's analogy, not an exhaustive biological argument.

Its humor lies partly in the blunt transition to begetting. Demodocus pauses over whether the production of his son should be called "planting" or "begetting," and declares that the easy part is already over. The troublesome task is continued nurture of a growing person whose wishes do not simply obey the cultivator. The son's emerging independence makes care harder than initial production.

The educational complaint develops the same word-family. Theages thinks his father should care for him and pay a sophist (121d). Socrates subsequently asks whether there is some knowledge still missing for which the father ought to care on his behalf (123a). Care therefore becomes a contested practical duty. The boy equates adequate provision with access to the desired teacher; the father fears that precisely such provision might do harm. Neither denies the duty itself.

The later return to farmers in the classification of crafts (124a–b) is an illuminating change of function. There, farming coordinates reapers, planters, sowers, and threshers, and the desired political wisdom is to rule farmers themselves along with everyone else. The opening analogy concerns the difficulty of nurture; the later example concerns the scope of a governing competence. Their common vocabulary should not conceal this difference.

Nor does the ending establish Socrates as a superior cultivator able to produce improvement at will. His

account places benefit under a daimonic condition and distinguishes temporary from lasting growth. That result answers the father's practical anxiety by complicating the picture of education as controlled husbandry. The question remains how to care responsibly when neither parental effort nor selection of a companion guarantees the desired development.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121b.** πάντα τὰ φυτά; τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν — Living growth is considered from the farmer's standpoint
- **121b–c.** θεραπεία τοῦ φύντος — The difficult tending of what has grown
- **121c.** εἴτε φυτείαν εἴτε παιδοποιίαν — The comic hesitation between planting and begetting
- **121c.** ἡ δὲ τροφὴ δύσκολος — Rearing is the troublesome phase
- **121d.** ἐπιμεληθῆναί με ἑαυτοῦ — The son demands paternal care
- **123a.** τὸν πατέρα ἐπιμεληθῆναι — Socrates asks what further care properly falls to the father

In this edition. "Things that grow," "tending," "rearing," and "care" keep the stages and activities distinct. At 121c the apparatus records a different punctuation and distribution of the clause about rearing in B; the supplied translation follows Burnet's printed wording. Therapeia here should not be silently translated "medical therapy": the object is what has grown from planting.

See also. Demodocus · Education · Farming and carpentry · Fear and safety

Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training

Χαρμίδης (Charmidēs); Γλαύκων (Glaukōn); Νεμέα (Nemea); στάδιον (stadion); ἀσκεῖν (askein); γυμνάζεσθαι (gymnazesthai); νικᾶν (nikan)

The word. Askein means to practise or train; askēsis names that training. Gymnazesthai is to exercise or train oneself. A stadion is a stadium-length race as well as the relevant unit of distance or course; here the construction makes the athletic event clear. Nikan is to win or be victorious. These words distinguish preparation, exercise and victory, which Charmides' answer deliberately separates.

In Theages. Charmides son of Glaucon is introduced as someone the listeners know, "who has grown up beautiful". The edition identifies him as the young man of the Charmides and Plato's uncle. Socrates offers him as a witness to the sign's effect on a friend's projected action. The story begins with consultation: Charmides is about to train for a stadion race at Nemea, and the voice occurs as he starts explaining his intention. Socrates tries to stop him and expressly says not to train.

Charmides treats the warning as a prediction that he will not win. He answers that exercise will nevertheless benefit him. This is a plausible distinction between competitive success and bodily advantage, but it is his interpretation of the warning, not a meaning Socrates has supplied. The anecdote therefore turns partly on the danger of narrowing an unexplained sign to the risk one is already prepared to accept. Its immediate point is not that victory is the only legitimate end of training.

The narrative ends by inviting the listeners to ask Charmides what happened as a result. It does not specify

his injury, loss, humiliation or any other outcome. The invitation implies that his experience supports Socrates' warning, but a lexicon should not fill the silence with an invented disaster. Nor does the passage establish that athletic training in general is dangerous or that an aspiring athlete must surrender every ordinary judgement about its benefits.

The later Euathlus is also a stadion-runner, but no connection between the athletes' stories is stated. Athletic vocabulary recurs in distinct biographies and should not merge their roles.

The places.

- **128d–e.** Χαρμίδην … τὸν Γλαύκωνος — the familiar witness is identified by name and father
- **128d–e.** τὸν καλὸν γενόμενον — his beauty is part of the identification
- **128e.** ἀσκήσειν στάδιον εἰς Νεμέαν — training is directed towards the Nemean stadion race
- **128e.** μὴ ἄσκει — Socrates' instruction is against training itself
- **128e.** οὐ νικήσω; γυμνασάμενός … ὠφεληθήσομαι — Charmides distinguishes winning from benefit through exercise
- **129a.** ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως — the actual consequence is left for Charmides to report

In this edition. Notes 30–31 identify Charmides and explain the stadion and the Nemean games. The translation prints "has grown up beautiful", following the text's genomenon; the apparatus records Cobet's proposed legomenon. Neither reading supplies the unstated result of his training.

See also. Voice and sign; Benefit; Witnesses; Timarchus and the murder plot.

The city and the reach of comprehensive rule

πόλις (polis); πολίτης (politēs); ἄστυ (asty); ἰδιώτης (idiōtēs); γυνή (gynē); ἀνήρ (anēr); σύμπας (sympas)

The word. Polis is city or civic community, politēs a citizen, and asty the town or urban center. Idiōtēs here is a private person, contrasted with craftsmen in an inclusive population. Gynē is woman, anēr man, and sympas all together or the whole. The dialogue also uses anthrōpos for a human being or person. These distinctions matter because ruling those present in a city is not expressed everywhere as exactly the same proposition as ruling its citizens.

In Theages. The father's report first distinguishes movement into town from the home deme: Theages' peers come down to the asty and repeat arguments that excite his ambition (121d). The town is thus a source of intellectual exposure, although the text does not say where those arguments originated or that all urban influence is corrupting.

The city later becomes the proposed domain of the wisdom the boy wants. Asked which human beings are governed, he answers "those in the city" (124a). Socrates points out that the sick are included there, so medicine has not yet been adequately distinguished. Theages clarifies that he means the others as well. The exchange concerns extension: a category can include a narrower group without being defined by that group's specialized condition.

Socrates develops the comprehensive answer through craftsmen and non-craftsmen, women and men (124b–c). The enumeration makes the desired authority wider than coordination of one occupation. It should not be read as a historical claim that every listed person possessed Athenian citizenship or shared identical political rights. The explicit women-and-men formulation describes the population ruled, not the franchise.

The subsequent rulers govern these same broad categories. From their shared subjects Socrates moves toward the title tyrant. Theages' later distinction between forced and willing rule exposes why the extension alone is inadequate. The same collection of people may fall under different modes of authority. Calling the comprehensive competence political therefore requires more analysis than adding every occupational group together.

At 125e–126a the wording changes to citizens, and at 127d Socrates describes the proposed educational outcome as becoming a good citizen. These formulations register different perspectives on civic ambition: governing the community, holding public standing, and being a good member of it. The dialogue does not explicitly prove that success at the first entails the last. Its vocabulary leaves that normative problem visible rather than solving it through the word polis.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121d.** εἰς τὸ ἄστυ καταβαίνοντες — Peers travel into the town
- **124a.** τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει — Theages gives the city as the desired domain

- **124b.** τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν — The enumeration reaches private persons and both sexes
- **124e.** τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συμπάντων — The comprehensive population underlies the tyranny inference
- **125e.** πάντων … τῶν πολιτῶν — Socrates reformulates the ambition in terms of all citizens
- **127d.** πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι — Becoming a good citizen is the proposed benefit

In this edition. “Town” for asty and “city” for polis retain the early spatial distinction. “Private persons” for idiōtai avoids the modern pejorative sense of “idiots.” The translation’s alternation between “men” and “citizens” follows different Greek words and should not be normalized into one political category in an index.

See also. Rule and office · Tyranny · Farming and carpentry · Peer emulation

Corruption and choosing an associate

διαφθείρειν (diaphtheirein); ἐντυγχάνειν (entynchanein); προσδέχεσθαι (prosdechesthai)

The word. Diaphtheirein means to destroy, spoil or corrupt. Its precise object matters: the father fears someone able to corrupt his son. Entynchanein is to meet or encounter, and prosdechesthai to receive or accept. These ordinary verbs locate the educational issue in a relationship whose consequences are not guaranteed by its mere occurrence.

In Theages. Demodocus’ first account describes a desire that is not ignoble but is unsafe (121c–d). By 127b–c that general anxiety has a concrete object: an unsuitable

associate. Socrates seems to him the welcome solution because the boy wants Socrates and the father trusts him. Theages says the fear can end if his father persuades Socrates to accept his company. Their exchange treats acceptance as the last remaining obstacle.

Socrates' answer changes that picture. He first questions the assumption that he would be the best person to make the boy a good citizen (127d–e), then describes an association governed by the daimonic power (128d–130e). Even permitted contact may yield no benefit; even rapid improvement may later disappear. Avoiding an obviously corrupting teacher and securing a preferred associate are therefore insufficient conditions for durable improvement.

Nothing here alleges that a named sophist has corrupted Theages. Prodicus, Gorgias and Polus are mentioned as people who profess to educate; the father's feared corrupter remains indefinite. Nor does the passage conduct the prosecution of Socrates known from other works. The irony recognizable to a reader of the Apology is contextual: in this dialogue the father actively seeks Socrates' company as protection against harm. That dramatic reversal should not be turned into a historical verdict about every Socratic associate.

The places.

- **127c.** μή τινι ἄλλῳ ἐντύχῃ οἵῳ τοῦτον διαφθεῖραι — The father fears an encounter with someone capable of corrupting the boy
- **127c.** τὴν ἐμὴν συνουσίαν προσδέξασθαι — Theages makes acceptance of his company the immediate request
- **127d.** πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι — Socrates restates the desired outcome positively, as becoming a good citizen

In this edition. “Corrupt” preserves the active infinitive printed by Burnet. The apparatus records W’s passive διαφθαρῆναι as an alternative. The supplied English follows the printed active construction and thus presents the encountered person as the possible agent of harm.

See also. Fear and risk · Demodocus · Good citizenship · Association

Craft, craftsmen, and the limits of the analogy

τέχνη (technē); δημιουργός (dēmiourgos); ὁμότεχνος (homotechnos)

The word. Technē is a craft, skill, or organized competence. Dēmiourgos denotes a practitioner or craftsman, and homotechnos someone sharing the same craft. Although many examples have identifiable tasks and teachable procedures, the word itself does not prove that every activity described as a technē is successfully taught or produces a transferable possession. Those are questions the dialogue raises.

In Theages. Craft first becomes explicit when Socrates asks whether he understands the technē Theages means (124a). He has already treated piloting, charioteering, medicine, music, and gymnastics as wisdoms distinguished by their fields. Calling the desired activity a craft imports a promising pattern of intelligibility: the aspiration should have a recognizable object, competent practitioners, and an intelligible way of learning.

The farming and carpentry examples make this pattern particularly concrete. Each coordinates several kinds of work, whereas the political wisdom sought by Theages is to rule the craftsmen themselves along with private persons, women, and men (124a–b). The distinction is

between a restricted occupational field and a more comprehensive population. It need not mean that the political expert personally masters every subordinate operation.

Socrates exploits the model comically at 125a, reproaching the father for failing to make his son a “craftsman” of the desired wisdom by sending him to a tyrant-teacher. The very plausibility of craft apprenticeship makes the proposed specialty absurdly conspicuous. At 125e the alleged fellow craftsman of Callicrite extends the joke, while the source gives too little of the song to reconstruct an independent curriculum of “tyrannical things.”

The analogy receives a more serious test in the argument about learning from painters and musicians (126d–127a). Refusing all relevant practitioners while demanding competence appears unreasonable. Yet Theages has just supplied a reason for distrusting the political parallel: famous statesmen’s sons are not conspicuously better than others. The analogy may support seeking relevant experience, but it does not answer the challenge about transmission simply by naming a craft.

Socrates’ own final account sharpens the limitation. Benefit from his presence is governed by a power he does not claim to control, and Aristides denies having learned anything from him. This is not the straightforward production of a trained craftsman envisaged earlier. The dialogue thus uses the craft pattern both to clarify ambition and to reveal what an ordinary teacher-pupil model leaves unexplained.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **124a.** ἣν λέγεις τέχνην — Socrates provisionally classifies the desired competence as a craft

- **124b.** τῶν δημιουργῶν ἁπάντων — All craftsmen belong to the comprehensive population governed
- **125a.** δημιουργὸν ἂν ἐποίησας τῆς σοφίας — The father is teasingly charged with withholding the making of a craftsman
- **125e.** ὁμότεχνος ὢν Καλλικρίτῃ — A prospective companion is described as sharing Callicrite's craft
- **126e.** τοὺς δὲ δημιουργοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου — Painters are practitioners of exactly the activity sought

In this edition. The translation differentiates "craft," "craftsman," and "fellow craftsman." These renderings retain the link between political questioning and artisanal examples. The Key Words' general description of a teachable skill should be read alongside the dialogue's explicit doubt about whether political wisdom can in fact be handed on.

See also. Knowledge · Farming and carpentry · Wisdom · Tyranny

Daimonic and divine

δαιμόνιον (daimonion); θεῖος (theios); θεός (theos)

The word. Daimonion is the neuter of the adjective daimonios, "daimonic"; with an article it can mean "the daimonic thing". The adjective belongs to the vocabulary of divine beings or powers. It does not mean a devil in the later Christian sense. Theios, "divine", is a different adjective, and theos is "god". Their related reference does not make them interchangeable words or establish a precise taxonomy of supernatural beings.

In Theages. Socrates introduces "something daimonic" at 128d to correct Theages' assumption that improvement depends on Socrates' willingness. The initial indefinite

formulation, ti … daimonion, identifies an accompanying phenomenon before specifying that it is a voice. The account then moves among “the voice of the daimonic”, “the customary sign, the daimonic one”, and “the power of this daimonic thing”. Those expressions describe its appearance, communicative function and efficacy; they need not designate separate entities.

The companion adjective theios first occurs in this account in “by a divine lot”. Earlier, at 122b, Socrates had called education a supremely divine subject for deliberation. The recurrence gives the closing account a connection with the seriousness of the opening consultation, without proving that the opening adjective already referred to the sign. At 130e Socrates makes progress conditional on what is dear “to the god”; at 131a Theages moves from “this daimonic thing” to “the divine itself that comes to you”. The change belongs to Theages’ proposal to pray and sacrifice. Socrates agrees to the proposed trial, but does not explain whether its religious language supplies an adequate account of his experience.

Readers should also resist a false extra occurrence as theological evidence. The transmitted phrase †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου† in the Timarchus story is explicitly marked corrupt. Its literal wording cannot securely establish that a condemned man goes towards a divine being.

The places.

- **122b.** θειοτέρου, “more divine” — the comparative marks the importance of education as a subject of counsel
- **128d.** τι θείᾳ μοίρᾳ … δαιμόνιον — “something daimonic” accompanies Socrates “by a divine lot”
- **128e.** ἡ φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου — the voice is attributed to the daimonic

- **129b.** τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον — “daimonic” qualifies the customary sign
- **129e.** ἡ … τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις — the power governs the effects of association
- **130e.** τῷ θεῷ φίλον — success depends on what is dear to the god
- **131a.** τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου; αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον — Theages’ two descriptions within the final proposal

In this edition. “Daimonic” is deliberately distinguished from “divine”; note 29 explains the choice and note 39 draws attention to the final change of adjective. The edition reproduces the obeli at 129a and discusses the corruption in note 32. It does not repair that phrase silently or offer its literal rendering as a sound theological statement.

See also. Voice and sign; Divine allotment; Power; Prayer and sacrifice.

Demodocus and paternal responsibility

Δημόδοκος (Dēmodokos); πατήρ (patēr); ὑός (hyos); οἰκεῖος (oikeios)

The word. Dēmodokos is the father’s personal name. Patēr is father; the edition’s ὑός and its inflected forms mean son, alongside the more familiar dictionary spelling υἱός. Oikeios means belonging to one’s own sphere or household and, substantivally, one’s kin. The family relationship is not incidental background: it determines who has obligations, who pays, and whose welfare motivates the request.

In Theages. Demodocus both opens the dialogue and supports its final arrangement. He is introduced through agricultural experience and anxiety about rearing, then

describes the conflict generated by his son's educational ambition. His stated priority is safety rather than saving money. Because outright restraint is failing, he chooses to make the introduction himself rather than let his son associate with someone unaccompanied (121a–122a). The adjustment is an exercise of care under limited control.

The son supplies another perspective. He accuses his father of pretending not to know what he wants and of refusing introductions (123a). Socrates initially gives both parties a hearing. Later he adopts a comic accusatory posture toward the father for not procuring a tyrant-teacher (125a), then asks the son to imagine facing the same predicament with a child of his own (126d–127a). The hypothetical reverses their positions and makes paternal perplexity intelligible without simply vindicating every refusal.

When Theages selects Socrates, Demodocus is intensely relieved and offers himself and his resources in support of the arrangement (127b–d). Socrates acknowledges that no sensible father could be more earnest about anything than his son's becoming as good as possible. This acknowledgment keeps the paternal concern serious even within the comedy.

Socrates' following argument also changes the reader's picture of the father. Demodocus is older, has held many important offices for Athens, and receives exceptional honor from his fellow Anagyrasians (127e). He is thus no merely unsophisticated farmer standing outside civic accomplishment. Socrates asks why someone possessing those qualifications should expect less capacity to educate a good citizen than the Socrates in whom neither interlocutor sees these distinctions. Yet the father's experience does not by itself settle the question of

transmissibility, already raised against eminent statesmen and their sons.

Demodocus finally asks Socrates to stop opposing the boy's proposal (131a). The father has not disappeared from the educational relationship, but neither has he solved it through authority. His trajectory links responsibility, willingness to seek counsel, and acceptance of uncertainty. The dialogue establishes these actions; it does not establish that every historical Demodocus named in another work is the same man.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121c.** ἡ τοῦ ὑέος τουτουΐ — The son present before the speakers grounds the farming comparison
- **122b.** ὦ Δημόδοκε — Socrates addresses the father while defining their consultation
- **123a.** οὐκ ἐθέλει με οὐδενὶ συστῆσαι — The son's complaint about refused introductions
- **127d.** ὑπὲρ ὑέος αὐτοῦ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται — Socrates recognizes the father's proper concern
- **127e.** ὑπὸ Ἀναγυρασίων τε τῶν δημοτῶν — The father's honor among his fellow demesmen

In this edition. The introduction and note 26 cautiously compare the Athenian general Demodocus in Thucydides 4.75.1, describing the identification as possible. Note 1 supplies the relationship to Paralius reported in the Apology. These are external contextual notices, not additional speeches or biographical facts proven by Theages itself.

See also. Care and growth · Education · Rule and office · Witness and conflict

Desire and its changing object

ἐπιθυμία (epithymia); ἐπιθυμεῖν (epithymein)

The word. Epithymia is desire, and epithymein to desire or want something. Neither word by itself confines the desire to bodily appetite or assigns it to a particular part of the soul. Here the principal object is becoming wise, progressively specified through the inquiry. The noun's initial occurrence names an urgent present concern; the repeated verb keeps asking what its object actually is.

In Theages. Demodocus describes the current desire as frightening and unsafe but not ignoble (121c–d). The report already separates the worth of the aspiration from the risk of acting on it. Theages has been impressed by peers and presses for access to someone who will make him wise. His father is not yet sure what kind of achievement or association is involved.

Socrates insists that they must begin from the boy himself rather than assume the content of his desire (122c–d). "Wisdom" proves too general. Piloting and charioteering show that an intelligible desire can be specified by a named competence. The next series narrows the desired ruling from human beings to the population of the city as a whole, and then apparently identifies its object as tyranny (123b–124e).

Theages' qualified assent is crucial: this seems to follow from what he has said. When the joke becomes pointed, he distinguishes an extravagant prayer to rule the greatest possible number, even to become a god, from what he meant by his present educational desire (125e–126a). He wants the standing of leaders whose subjects are willing. The distinction does not establish that his ambition is

modest or wholly innocent; it does establish that the initial description left out an important condition.

Desire then moves from the kind of achievement to the person with whom he wants to associate. Theages selects Socrates and rejects further searching (127a). At 128c he believes he can become like Socrates' successful companions if Socrates wishes. This relocates the apparent obstacle from the father's refusal to the proposed companion's willingness. Socrates' daimonic account shows that such willingness is insufficient.

The dialogue's last proposal is therefore a trial rather than immediate satisfaction of a fully controllable desire. This conclusion does not condemn wanting wisdom. It changes the account of how the desire can responsibly be pursued: its content must be clarified, the competence of a prospective teacher tested, and the conditions of benefit acknowledged. The repeated vocabulary carries that inquiry across the father's anxiety, the boy's political aspiration, and the choice of Socrates.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121c–d.** ἐπιθυμία; σοφὸς γενέσθαι — The desire initially has becoming wise as its stated object
- **122d.** ὅτι καὶ ἔστιν οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ — Inquiry is redirected to what the boy actually desires
- **123b.** τίς ἐστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς — The general aspiration requires specification
- **124e.** τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς … ἐπιθυμεῖ — Socrates infers desire for the same rule as the tyrants
- **125e–126a.** ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν — Theages distinguishes the present desire from the extravagant wish he admits

In this edition. “Desire” consistently renders this family. “Wish” is reserved for boulesthai and “be willing” for ethelein; those families overlap in ordinary motivation but are not interchangeable lexical records. At 123b Burnet prints the imperfect ἐπεθύμεις in the hypothetical pilot example, following a manuscript correction; its hypothetical force should not be replaced by the reported present reading.

See also. Wish and willingness · Wisdom · Tyranny · Peer emulation

Divine allotment, accompaniment, and childhood

θεία μοῖρα (theia moira); παρέπεσθαι (parepesthai); ἐκ παιδός (ek paidos)

The word. Moira is a share or allotment and, in appropriate contexts, a lot or destiny. The dative expression theiai moirai means “by a divine lot”. Parepesthai is to accompany or follow alongside. Ek paidos, literally “from a child”, is an idiomatic expression for “from childhood”. These are respectively an attribution of source, a description of continuing accompaniment and a point of temporal origin. They do not name a curriculum, hereditary status or acquired professional qualification.

In Theages. The entire formulation occurs when Socrates corrects Theages’ confident inference that he can become like the successful companions if only Socrates wishes. Socrates does not answer by declaring stronger personal resolve. He identifies something that has accompanied him through a divine allotment from childhood. The wording relocates the decisive condition outside an ordinary decision by a teacher. It also presents the phenomenon as

longstanding, rather than a new excuse invented specifically for this applicant.

The childhood reference belongs to Socrates' history, not Theages'. No age is supplied, no first incident is narrated, and no claim is made that children generally possess such signs. The participle "beginning" marks the onset of the accompaniment. It should not be turned into a claim that Socrates had complete philosophical knowledge as a child or that his educational effects were already operating then.

The phrase also leaves more unexplained than a theological paraphrase may suggest. "By a divine lot" does not tell us which god allotted the phenomenon, why Socrates received it, or by what procedure a companion becomes eligible for its assistance. Later "if it is dear to the god" makes the dependence explicit without completing that explanatory gap. Finally, Theages proposes a trial and possibly prayer; neither he nor Socrates demonstrates that human ritual can change a divinely allotted condition.

The places.

- **128c–d.** ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ … Οὔκ — Theages' appeal to Socrates' willingness is expressly corrected
- **128d.** θείᾳ μοίρᾳ — the dative attributes the accompaniment to a divine allotment
- **128d.** παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ — the participle represents something accompanying Socrates
- **128d.** ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον — its beginning is placed in his childhood
- **130e.** ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ — the later conditional restates dependence without explaining its origin

In this edition. The continuous English "has accompanied me by a divine lot, beginning in my childhood" retains all

three elements. The edition does not replace moira with “fate” or identify a named allotting deity. Its note on daimonion explains the religious vocabulary, while the account itself provides the limits of what can be inferred about Socrates’ childhood.

See also. Daimonic and divine; Power; Mastery and chance; Prayer and sacrifice.

Education of oneself and one’s kin

παιδεία (paideia); παιδεύειν (paideuein); διδάσκειν (didaskein); γράμματα (grammata); κιθαρίζειν (kitharizein); παλαίειν (palaiein); ἀγωνία (agōnia); οἰκεῖος (oikeios)

The word. Paideia is education or formation; paideuein is to educate. Didaskein means to teach, with the middle construction at 122e describing the father’s having his son taught. Grammata here means letters or literacy, kitharizein playing the cithara, and palaiein wrestling. Agōnia in this list concerns athletic contests or exercises; it is not the anxiety of an anxious parent. Oikeioi are one’s own people or kin.

In Theages. Socrates presents education of oneself and one’s kin as an exceptionally serious subject for counsel (122b). The addition of oneself prevents the father’s concern from being restricted to the technical management of a dependent child. The person seeking advice also has something to examine and learn. Yet the passage does not formulate a curriculum for adult self-education; its immediate effect is to justify careful deliberation.

Theages has already received the ordinary instruction of boys from “fine and good” fathers: letters, music, wrestling, and the other contests (122e). Socrates therefore asks what knowledge remains missing and appropriately

requires paternal provision (123a). The question is not whether the boy is wholly uneducated. It is how the desired additional wisdom relates to education he demonstrably possesses.

That distinction matters throughout. The sophists profess to educate young men (127e), and Socrates denies knowing their blessed and fine subjects, except for his paradoxically small field of love (128b). The question of further education cannot be settled merely by establishing that someone has a respected teaching occupation. Likewise, the reputation of eminent statesmen does not settle their ability to pass their competence to sons or pupils.

At 130c Aristides says he flees anyone he perceives to be educated. Here the perfect participle describes a person's acquired standing and capacity, as intimidating to someone who has lost confidence in argument. His next statement is even more disruptive to ordinary educational expectations: he never learned anything from Socrates, although he improved in Socrates' presence (130d). Education and benefit are consequently related questions rather than interchangeable descriptions of one proven mechanism.

The final alternative, to be educated by someone who controls the benefit he gives (130e), returns to the practical distinction between a responsible choice and a guaranteed result. Socrates leaves open whether his association should be chosen over such a provider. A lexicon should preserve this unresolved comparison rather than supply a familiar Platonic theory of paideia from another dialogue as the answer given here.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **122b.** περὶ παιδείας καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ οἰκείων — Education concerns self and kin
- **122e.** ἐδιδάξατό σε … καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν — The father has already arranged teaching and education
- **122e.** γράμματά τε καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν — The specified basic accomplishments
- **122e.** τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν — The remaining athletic training or contests
- **127e.** παιδεύειν ἐπαγγέλλονται — Others profess an ability to educate
- **130c.** πεπαιδευμένον — An educated person now intimidates Aristides
- **130e.** παιδεύεσθαι — The option of receiving education elsewhere

In this edition. Note 6 compares the educational sequence in Protagoras 325d–326c. That parallel clarifies the conventional curriculum, but does not make the two passages identical. Burnet retains καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν at 122e, though the apparatus records Cobet's proposed deletion; the translation accordingly includes both teaching and education.

See also. Care and growth · Knowledge · Demodocus · Medicine, music, and gymnastics

Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work

γεωργική (geōrgikē); γεωργός (geōrgos); γεωργεῖν (geōrgein); τεκτονική (tektonikē); τέκτων (tektōn)

The word. Geōrgikē is farming as a competence, geōrgos a farmer, and geōrgein to farm or cultivate land. Tektonikē names carpentry or the woodworker's craft, and tektōn its practitioner. The farming list includes reaping, grape-gathering, planting, sowing, and threshing; the carpentry list sawing, drilling, planing, and turning. The printed verbs describe workers by operations rather than enumerate a formal hierarchy of occupational ranks.

In Theages. Farming is the first practical perspective in the dialogue: Demodocus speaks among those who cultivate land and compares tending growth with rearing a son (121b–c). That analogy establishes care as prolonged and difficult. When farming returns at 124a, its argumentative use changes. It is now a wisdom by which people know how to direct several related operations.

The enumerated activities make the scope of such direction tangible. Reaping and grape-gathering collect produce; planting and sowing establish growth; threshing processes the harvest. The text does not explain agricultural technique, but its list provides a recognizable group whose work can fall under farming expertise. Socrates presents it as a field Theages is not seeking.

Carpentry supplies a parallel case (124b). Sawing, drilling, planing, and turning can be coordinated within one craft. Again the question concerns the competence ruling these workers together, not whether every single worker is separately a master carpenter. The parallel gives Socrates

a basis for distinguishing particular expertise from the desired power to govern the practitioners themselves.

The next formulation includes all these workers, the farmers and carpenters themselves, all craftsmen, private persons, women, and men. Theages enthusiastically identifies this as what he has meant all along. The expansion is important, but limited. It determines the extent of a governed population; it does not establish what political expertise knows, whether it teaches, or which manner of exercising authority is legitimate.

Farmers recur in the variations on the poetic line at 125c. "Wise farmers" are made wise by being with people wise in farming. Here the craft becomes an analogy for the connection between teacher and learner, rather than an example of governmental scope. The sequence places three distinct uses of agriculture before the reader: nurture, coordination, and apprenticeship. Keeping them separate makes the dialogue more exact than treating every farmer reference as one undifferentiated "craft analogy."

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121b.** τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν — Demodocus speaks from cultivation of land
- **124a.** θεριζόντων; τρυγώντων; φυτευόντων; σπειρόντων; ἁλοώντων — Farming's coordinated operations
- **124a.** γεωργική — The named field governing these activities
- **124b.** πριζόντων; τρυπώντων; ξεόντων; τορνευόντων — The woodworkers' coordinated operations

- **124b.** τεκτονική; τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων — The craft and the practitioners included in wider rule
- **125c.** σοφοὶ γεωργοί; τὰ γεωργικά — Farmers and the relevant subject matter in the poetic variation

In this edition. The supplied text prints πριζόντων, while the apparatus records Cobet's πριόντων. An exact register should keep the printed form rather than silently substituting the conjecture. The English "plane" and "turn" make the carpentry context explicit without claiming that the passage provides technical descriptions of particular tools.

See also. Care and growth · Craft · City and comprehensive rule · Wisdom

Fear, danger, and the question of safety

φόβος (phobos); φοβεῖν (phobein); φοβεῖσθαι (phobeisthai); σφαλερός (sphaleros); κίνδυνος (kindynos); ἀσφαλής (asphalēs); φροντίς (phrontis)

The word. Phobos is fear; phobein can mean to frighten, and its middle/passive forms here express being afraid. Sphaleros describes something liable to cause a fall or failure, hence risky or unsafe. Kindynos is danger or risk. The comparative asphalesteron at 130e means "safer." Phrontides are cares or worries. The kinship of "unsafe" and "safer" gives the educational question a recurring vocabulary of exposure rather than a guarantee of security.

In Theages. Fear precedes philosophical classification. Demodocus says that rearing his son has kept him continually afraid; the present desire frightens him particularly, although it is "not ignoble" (121c). This

qualification matters. He does not identify desire for wisdom as intrinsically bad. He fears the means, companions, and consequences of pursuing it. Money is explicitly a lesser concern than the danger toward which the boy is hurrying.

The father chooses supervised introduction because resistance may drive the boy into association without him and so expose him to corruption (122a). His concession is therefore a risk-management decision, not confidence in every sophist or abandonment of paternal responsibility. The threatened harm is prospective. The dialogue does not report that a named sophist has already corrupted Theages.

At 127b–c Demodocus regards Socrates as an escape from fearful worries. Theages reinforces this hope, telling his father not to fear if Socrates can be persuaded to accept him. Their assurance assumes that a trustworthy companion who agrees to help can secure the outcome. Socrates' subsequent account removes that assumption: willingness does not control whether the daimonic permits association, whether association benefits, or whether benefit lasts.

Socrates consequently asks whether education with people who themselves control their benefit might be safer (130e). The opening opposition is now unsettled. The supposedly dangerous search for a professional teacher has led the father to Socrates, who presents his own association as uncertain. This is not an unqualified declaration that sophists are safe or that their claims are true; the alternative is described under the condition that its providers command the benefit they confer.

The military examples also give fear a distinct evidential setting. Socrates is very afraid for the army accompanying

Sannion (129d), on the basis of the sign. This is a prediction within the narrated conversation, not an outcome already witnessed there. Across these uses, fear is neither dismissed as mere weakness nor made infallible knowledge. It prompts inquiry, supervision, warning, and eventually a consciously provisional experiment.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121c.** ἐν φόβῳ; πάνυ με φοβεῖ; σφαλερὰ δέ — The father's continuing fear and the unsafe ambition
- **122a.** οὐκ εἰς μικρὸν κίνδυνον — The direction of the boy's pursuit involves serious danger
- **127b–c.** πολλῶν καὶ φοβερῶν … φροντίδων — Socratic association is hoped to remove fearful worries
- **127c.** Μηκέτι … φοβοῦ — Theages asks his father to cease fearing, conditionally
- **130e.** ἀσφαλέστερον — Socrates raises the comparative safety of another educational arrangement

In this edition. "Unsafe" at 121c and "safer" at 130e preserve the verbal framing. Kindyneuei in the planting comparison (121b) and Demodocus' reply at 122d is rendered "it looks" or "it looks … as though." Those idiomatic uses must not automatically be entered as literal dangers; the cognate noun κίνδυνον at 122a unmistakably is one.

See also. Care and growth · Demodocus · Wish and willingness · Desire

Good citizenship and the standard of improvement

ἀγαθός (agathos); βέλτιστος (beltistos); βελτίων (beltiōn); χείρων (cheirōn); πολίτης (politēs)

The word. Agathos means good, with the relevant respect supplied by the context. Beltistos is “best”; beltiōn and cheirōn are comparative forms meaning “better” and “worse”. Politēs is a citizen. These terms can appraise practical competence, personal worth or civic quality without naming one explicitly defined virtue. The noun aretē is not spoken in this dialogue.

In Theages. The father’s earnestness aims at making his son as good as possible; Socrates then specifies the question as benefit toward becoming a good citizen (127d). That is a more determinate educational goal than the unqualified wish to become wise, yet the conversation does not define good citizenship. Demodocus’ experience, offices and civic honor are offered as reasons to question why Socrates is preferred, not as a sufficient analysis of the good citizen.

The word “better” also figures in Theages’ criticism of the statesmen. Their sons, he has heard, are no better than shoemakers’ sons (126d). The comparison calls their educational success into question; it does not establish that manual workers or their children are bad. Soon afterward Theages says acquaintances who had been worthless appear better than everyone to whom they were previously inferior (128c). Here comparative standing supports his confidence in Socrates.

These assessments must be held apart. Theages reports an appearance and offers no independent measure. Aristides later speaks specifically of his confidence and ability in

discussion, while describing his diminished condition as wretched and shameful (130b–e). The dramatic trajectory connects educational hopes with observable conversational effects without proving that those effects amount to moral goodness or excellent citizenship. “Improvement” in an article about the final story should therefore remain broad unless the stated evidence warrants a narrower sense.

The places.

- **126d.** οὐδὲν βελτίους — The statesmen’s sons are reported to be no better
- **127d.** ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται — The father wants his son to become as good as possible
- **127d.** πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι — The outcome is formulated as good citizenship
- **128c.** πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους — Theages describes a reversal of apparent comparative standing

In this edition. The translation keeps “appear” in the last statement. Omitting it would turn a speaker’s evidential report into the lexicon’s own assessment. “Good” in “good painter” at 126e is occupational excellence; “fine and good” at 127a is a different evaluative expression. These senses should not be collapsed merely because their English shares a word.

See also. Reputation · Statesmen’s sons · Benefit · Rivalry and shame

Joking mockery and serious clarification

σκώπτειν (skōptein); παίζειν (paizein); μιαρός (miaros); σπουδάζειν (spoudazein)

The word. Skōptein is to mock or tease; paizein is to play or joke. Miaros can mean polluted or vile, but the vocative at 124e is rendered “You rascal!” in the teasing exchange. Spoudazein means to be earnest or serious about something. The words mark contrasts of manner and commitment; they do not determine by themselves whether a particular proposition is true.

In Theages. Socrates’ mock reproach makes the father seem culpable for not furnishing a tyrant-teacher. The comic accusation reverses the opening complaint: a supposedly obstructive father now appears to be withholding a manifestly alarming education. Demodocus joins the proposal to deliberate, but Socrates delays the practical decision until the boy’s desire has been examined more thoroughly (125a–b).

Callicrite prompts Theages’ explicit complaint that Socrates has long been mocking and joking with him (125e). The response is not merely wounded pride. Theages gives the missing qualification: he wants leadership over willing citizens rather than force. Comedy has exposed an ambiguity in “rule all the people”. The lexicon should explain the ambiguity instead of treating the joke as proof that the boy secretly seeks the political program of a tyrant.

At 128b–c Theages again attributes joking to Socrates, this time because he does not accept the avowal of ignorance and thinks Socrates is unwilling to spend time with him. Socrates responds with the daimonic account. This second accusation of joking introduces information the boy has

overlooked, rather than leading to a straightforward admission that the disclaimer was false.

The father's earnestness receives explicit recognition at 127d. Socrates says he does not wonder that a sensible father takes his son's improvement seriously. Comic surface and genuine educational concern therefore coexist. Assigning everything to irony would erase the work's sustained inquiry into how such concern can be responsibly acted upon.

The places.

- **124e.** Ὦ μιαρέ — The rebuke introduces the tyrant-teacher joke
- **125e.** σκώπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρός με — Theages explicitly names mockery and play
- **127d.** τὸ μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι σε οὐ θαυμάζω — Socrates acknowledges the father's seriousness
- **128c.** ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει — Theages interprets the disclaimer as joking

In this edition. "Rascal" follows the supplied tone rather than converting the vocative into a serious religious charge. "Joking" is kept for paizein. The broader label "Socratic irony" can help describe the scene, but the noun eirōneia is not printed here and the interpretation should not be mistaken for an attested lemma.

See also. Tyranny · Callicrite · Socrates · Voluntary rule

Knowledge and knowing how

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē); ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn); ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai); εἰδέναι (eidenai); οἶδα (oida)

The word. Epistēmē is knowledge, epistēmōn someone who has knowledge, and epistasthai to know or know how.

Eidenai is the infinitive belonging to the common knowing verb represented by oida. The distinction between “know” and “know how” in this edition often follows construction: epistasthai with an infinitive names a capacity to act. The vocabulary does not, on its own, establish a hierarchy of theoretical science over practical craft.

In Theages. Socrates asks whether Theages calls wise those who have knowledge, whatever its field; the boy agrees (122e). The qualification about subject matter is central. It prevents “wise” from being initially reserved for a single prestigious profession and permits the ensuing crafts to count as genuine knowledge. Socrates then asks which knowledge the already educated boy still lacks (123a).

The repeated phrase “by which we know how to rule” gives knowledge an operational specification (123d–124b). A pilot knows how to rule ships, a charioteer a team of horses, and medicine, music, and gymnastics direct distinct groups of human beings. This identifies expertise through a field and activity. It does not prove that ruling ships and ruling citizens employ one identical causal or ethical structure.

Theages’ claims to know what he wants are tested alongside these examples. He says he knows the desired wisdom and its name (123c), but his generic answer requires further clarification. Later he admits not knowing what tyrants’ wise companions must know (125d). These admissions concern the content and source of his aspiration; they are not an announcement that he knows nothing whatsoever.

Socrates’ own profession at 128b is carefully qualified. He says he knows none of the sophists’ fine subjects and, “so to speak,” nothing except the small subject of love. The

exception and qualification belong to the statement. A blanket entry asserting absolute Socratic ignorance would suppress both. Theages responds with observed improvement among companions, but Socrates tells him that its character has escaped him (128c–d). Familiarity with an outcome is not yet knowledge of its conditions.

A distinct use in the Timarchus story confirms that the verb is not confined to morally admirable skill: Timarchus and Philemon alone knew their murderous plot (129b). Knowing can take an ordinary factual object. The whole dialogue therefore requires contextual definitions instead of imposing a universal technical sense on every member of the family.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **122e.** τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας — Those possessing knowledge are provisionally called wise
- **123a.** τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐλλείπειν — A possible remaining deficit in knowledge
- **123d.** πλοίων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν — Knowing how to rule ships
- **123c.** αὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα — Socrates distinguishes knowing a thing from knowing its name
- **128b.** οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος; τῶν ἐρωτικῶν — Socrates' qualified denial and retained exception
- **129b.** ἠπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτὼ μόνω τὴν ἐπιβουλήν — Only the two plotters know the plan

In this edition. The Key Words specify "knowledge," "one who has knowledge," and "know how" with an infinitive. The plural ἐπιστήμονες is an attested adjective used substantivally, not an occurrence of the noun epistēmē.

Registering both under one explanatory family must preserve their actual forms.

See also. Wisdom · Piloting and charioteering · Craft · Agreement and inquiry

Learning without identifiable instruction

μανθάνειν (manthanein); τρόπος (tropos); ἄπιστος (apistos); ἀληθής (alēthēs)

The word. Manthanein is to learn, come to understand or acquire knowledge. With para and a person in the genitive it can identify the person from whom one learns. Tropos is a manner or way. Apistos can mean unbelievable or untrustworthy; alēthēs means true. Aristides' juxtaposition of unbelievable and true makes the strangeness of his claim explicit rather than concealing it beneath ordinary educational vocabulary.

In Theages. After Aristides says that his former power left him gradually, Socrates asks how it had arrived: by learning something from him, or in another way? The question separates the occurrence of improvement from an explanation through instruction. Aristides denies ever learning anything from Socrates and appeals to Socrates' own knowledge of this. He nevertheless says he progressed whenever they were together. The denial and positive claim are placed side by side, not reconciled through an account of unconscious lessons.

The subsequent account grades benefit by shared location, looking at Socrates while he speaks, and finally bodily proximity and touch. Because speech occurs within that sequence, the story does not portray a wholly mute relation. But it does deny, in Aristides' own description, that his progress came from learning something from Socrates. It would be equally distorting to remove all

conversation from the scene or to translate his statement into a standard lesson narrative.

The claim also remains a self-report. Aristides says “as I seemed to myself” when comparing degrees of progress. Socrates does not supply an independent measurement or spell out a hidden causal explanation. He generalises only that his association is of this sort and that Theages’ rapid progress would depend upon the god. The encounter thus challenges the expectation that a reliable educational gain must be available through a teacher’s controlled transmission, without establishing a general theory that proximity alone produces knowledge.

The earlier craft examples explain why this question matters. They make it natural to seek a practitioner who can teach what he knows. The final story preserves desired improvement while putting pressure on that familiar model. Yet it does not prove that instruction is worthless or that every successful Socratic companion has precisely Aristides’ experience.

The places.

- **130d.** μαθόντι παρ’ ἐμοῦ τι — Socrates asks whether learning something from him explains the acquired power
- **130d.** ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ — another mode of acquisition is expressly possible
- **130d.** ἄπιστον … ἀληθές — Aristides presents his account as incredible but true
- **130d.** ἔμαθον … παρά σου οὐδὲν πώποτε — his denial of having learned from Socrates is emphatic
- **130d.** ἐπεδίδουν … ὁπότε σοι συνείην — he nevertheless associates progress with being together

- **130d.** λέγοντός σου — Socrates' speaking remains part of the described experience

In this edition. "I never learned anything from you" is preserved without softening it to "I learned no formal lessons". "By learning something … or in some other way" keeps Socrates' question open. The edition's Introduction calls attention to the comic and unexplained character of the account, rather than presenting its reported mechanism as a settled educational doctrine.

See also. Association; Spending time; Nearness and touch; Rivalry and shame.

Leisure, privacy, and the stoa

σχολή (scholē); ἀσχολία (ascholia); σχολάζειν (scholazein); ἰδιολογεῖσθαι (idiologeisthai); στοά (stoa); Ζεὺς ἐλευθέριος (Zeus eleutherios)

The word. Scholē is leisure or available time, ascholia its absence or being occupied, and scholazein to be at leisure. Idiologeisthai means to converse privately. Stoa is a roofed colonnade or portico. Zeus Eleutherios is Zeus bearing the epithet associated with freedom; the phrase in the dialogue names his stoa. None of these words by itself makes the conversation an institution called a "school."

In Theages. Demodocus' opening request is tactful but insistent. He asks for a private word if Socrates has leisure and, if his business is not too pressing, asks him to make leisure for his sake. Socrates says he is already free and especially willing to accommodate him. Their initial cooperation is therefore unusually easy in comparison with the later uncertainty over accepting Theages as a companion.

The father proposes moving out of the way into the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios. This makes a public civic structure the setting for a relatively private consultation. “Private” describes the desired manner and audience of the conversation, not an assertion that they enter a privately owned house or achieve secrecy. No narrator identifies spectators, overhearers, or a subsequent change of location. The three named speakers sustain the discussion there as far as the text reports.

This staging suits the father’s concern. He is approaching an acquaintance about a son’s education and possible exposure to unsuitable company. Removing themselves from the immediate flow of public activity allows the concern to be developed through inquiry rather than announced as a public quarrel. Yet the subject steadily expands to rule of the city and the standing of its leaders. Privacy of consultation and public consequence of education are thus held together.

The sacred name of the setting also precedes Socrates’ description of counsel as sacred and of Theages’ name as befitting the sacred. These recurrences support attention to the dialogue’s religious coloring. They do not establish that Zeus himself authorizes the advice or that the stoa’s epithet predicts a philosophical doctrine of freedom. In particular, the later distinction between forced rule and willing subjects should not be treated as an explicit etymological exposition of Eleutherios.

Finally, Socrates’ leisure is availability to speak, not proof that he can provide the educational benefit requested. The dialogue begins with time freely given and ends with association whose success cannot be guaranteed by giving more time. That distance between access and benefit is part of the opening’s retrospective significance.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121a.** ἰδιολογήσασθαι — Demodocus wants to speak privately
- **121a.** εἰ σχολή; εἰ ἀσχολία — Availability and possible competing business frame the request
- **121a.** ποίησαι σχολήν; σχολάζων — Requested and already existing leisure
- **121a.** τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ἐλευθερίου … στοὰν — The proposed setting is the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios
- **121a.** ἐκποδὼν ἀποχωρήσωμεν — The speakers propose withdrawing out of the way

In this edition. Note 2 locates the stoa on the western side of the Athenian Agora and compares Xenophon, Oeconomicus 7.1. Those are the edition's contextual identifications. Burnet prints ἰδιολογήσασθαι; Cobet's conjecture διαλογίσασθαι is recorded in the apparatus but is not the text translated. The distinction matters for an article about the requested privacy.

See also. Advice · Names and Theages · City and comprehensive rule · Wish and willingness

Love as the small subject Socrates knows

τὰ ἐρωτικά (ta erōtika); μάθημα (mathēma); δεινός (deinos)

The word. Ta erōtika is a substantival neuter plural, "the things of love". The supplied text has the genitive tōn erōtikōn, explaining the "small subject" excepted from Socrates' lack of knowledge. Mathēma means a subject learned or a matter of learning. Deinos can mean formidable, remarkable or skilled; here "clever at" expresses the claimed competence. The noun erōs itself does not occur in the spoken text.

In Theages. Socrates contrasts his lack of the sophists' "blessed and fine subjects" with an exception: he knows the things of love and counts himself supremely clever in them (128b). The modest size of the exception is comic beside the extravagant claim to exceed both earlier and contemporary men. Neither half should be removed. "Socrates knows nothing" omits the qualification; "Socrates teaches a doctrine of love" invents a lesson not given here.

The placement matters. Father and son have asked for a beneficial relationship. The sophists attract wealthy young associates away from unpaid civic company; Theages wants Socrates in particular. A claim about recognizing and dealing with love is therefore relevant to the educational desires and attractions organizing the scene, even though Socrates does not explicitly work out that connection. The source note's parallels in Symposium 177d and Lysis 204b–c help a reader recognize the familiar claim, without supplying a missing speech on love to this dialogue.

Theages hears the whole disclaimer as joking or unwillingness. Socrates instead explains the daimonic limitations on association. The exception about love consequently remains neither withdrawn nor developed into a teachable curriculum. It also does not authorize interpreting Aristides' touching as an explicit sexual act: the later narrative describes proximity and contact in an educational story, and the lexicon must preserve that description without adding particulars the text lacks.

The places.

- **128b.** σμικροῦ τινος μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν — The knowledge of love is the specified small exception

- **128b.** παρ’ ὀντινοῦν ποιοῦμαι δεινὸς εἶναι — Socrates counts himself clever beyond anyone in this subject
- **128b–c.** τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν — The comparison includes past and present people

In this edition. “The things of love” retains the plural and avoids importing “erotic theory” or a single named craft. Burnet prints poioūmai in the boast; the apparatus records alternatives proposed by editors. The translation “count myself” follows the printed text rather than silently adopting those proposals.

See also. Socrates · Joking · Subjects of learning · Association

Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings

ἐγκρατής (enkratēs); ἀσφαλής (asphalēs); τυγχάνειν (tynchanein); τῷ θεῷ φίλον (tōi theōi philon)

The word. Enkratēs means having power over or being master of something, commonly with a genitive indicating its object. Asphalēs means secure or safe; its comparative asks what is safer. Tynchanein may mean happen or chance, as well as encounter or obtain in other constructions. With a participle, tynchanein may simply mean “happen to” or “be in fact”; not every occurrence invokes luck. The expression tōi theōi philon, “dear to the god”, places success under divine favour without naming an instructional method.

In Theages. At 130e Socrates sums up the stories: if their association is dear to the god, Theages will progress greatly and quickly; otherwise he will not. He then asks whether it

may be safer to be educated by someone who is himself master of the benefit he gives. The contrast concerns reliable agency over the educational result. The printed adjective enkrateis describes the proposed teachers' control of their benefit. It is not a declaration that they possess the virtue "self-control", nor does the abstract noun enkrateia occur here.

The recommendation returns the decision to Theages. Socrates has neither guaranteed failure nor sold a prospect of reliable success. He has stated possibilities that include no benefit and benefit later lost. In that setting, "safer" makes the uncertainty relevant to the original parental concern about the consequences of education. It does not mean that every alternative teacher is harmless or that Socrates has certified a particular sophist's promises.

The final clause contrasts controlled benefit with coming away from Socrates with whatever chance may bring. This is a practical description of exposure to an outcome beyond his command. It need not contradict his attribution of successful progress to the god: the same result may be divinely conditioned and unpredictable or uncontrollable from the human participant's standpoint. The passage does not offer a theory resolving the relation between chance and providence.

Theages chooses to try. That choice acknowledges enough uncertainty to allow a fallback plan, though it does not explicitly address every distinction Socrates has drawn. The ending is therefore a decision under incomplete assurance, not a proof that divine influence can be converted into a dependable craft on demand.

The places.

- **128e.** ἐτύγχανε … ἀνακοινούμενος — the participial construction presents Charmides as in fact consulting Socrates
- **130e.** ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ — progress depends on divine favour
- **130e.** ἀσφαλέστερον — Socrates asks about comparative safety, not absolute certainty
- **130e.** παιδεύεσθαι — the decision concerns where Theages should be educated
- **130e.** οἳ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοί εἰσιν τῆς ὠφελίας — other educators are represented as controlling their benefit
- **130e.** ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι — association with Socrates may yield whatever happens
- **131a.** εἴτε ἄλλῳ συνεσόμεθα — Theages keeps another association available as an alternative

In this edition. “Themselves masters of the benefit” retains the adjective’s stated object and avoids mistranslation as a moral virtue. “Whatever chance may bring” conveys the uncertainty of the final clause without inserting the noun tychē into the Greek. The apparatus records Bekker’s conjecture tychēis, but the main text prints tychēi.

See also. Benefit; Power; Progress and retention; Trial and permission.

Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise

ἰατρική (iatrikē); μουσική (mousikē); γυμναστική (gymnastikē); κάμνειν (kamnein); ᾄδειν (aidein); χορός (choros); γυμνάζεσθαι (gymnazesthai)

The word. Iatrikē is medicine, mousikē music or musical cultivation, and gymnastikē the expertise of bodily training. Each is a feminine adjective used substantivally to name a field. Kamnein here means to be ill, aidein to sing, choros a chorus, and gymnazesthai to exercise or undergo bodily training. The relevant sense of each is fixed by the activity and group named in the question, not by every wider meaning the word can bear elsewhere.

In Theages. When Theages says the desired wisdom rules human beings, Socrates immediately divides that broad description into familiar cases (123e). Medicine rules the sick; music directs singers in choruses; gymnastics directs those exercising. Theages excludes each. The series shows that “human beings” does not yet distinguish political ambition from recognized specialized activities involving people.

The examples also complicate a simple opposition between rule of things and rule of persons. Piloting and charioteering had offered ships and horses. The present fields already involve human recipients, but their expertise is specified through the activity or condition of those people. A physician’s relevant group is not a permanent human class but those who are sick; singers and exercisers are identified by what they are doing.

Theages next answers “those in the city” (124a). Socrates points out that the sick are in the city too. Merely changing the description from people to city-dwellers does not

remove the overlap. Theages must say he means these and the others as well. Thus the medical example is reused as a test of logical inclusion: an answer can be broader without yet being uniquely identifying.

These examples should not be taken as a developed theory of the coercive authority of doctors, chorus leaders, or trainers. The common verb is “rule,” but the passage does not investigate each practice’s legal powers or relationships of consent. Their argumentative role is classification by field. Importing a full Platonic doctrine of medicine’s ethical superiority would exceed what this dialogue says.

Gymnastic activity later receives a separate treatment in Charmides’ story (128e). He reasons that exercise can benefit him even without victory, whereas Socrates reports a daimonic warning against his intended training. That narrative tests the adequacy of an expected benefit in a particular case; it does not revoke the earlier recognition of gymnastics as a distinct skill. The two passages share bodily training while posing different questions, one taxonomic and the other about warning and outcome.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **123e.** τῶν καμνόντων; Ἰατρικὴ — The sick identify medicine’s field
- **123e.** τῶν ᾀδόντων … ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς; Μουσικὴ — Choral singers identify music’s field
- **123e.** τῶν γυμναζομένων; Γυμναστικὴ — Those exercising identify the trainer’s field
- **124a.** ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ κάμνοντες — The medical group is included among those in the city

- **128e.** γυμνασάμενός γε — Charmides expects benefit from the period spent exercising

In this edition. “Music” at 123e translates Burnet’s printed μουσικὴ, a correction against μουσικῆς in B, T, and W. The nominative supplies the name of the relevant wisdom. The broader associations of mousikē do not justify translating this specifically choral example as every liberal or literary subject.

See also. Knowledge · Education · City and comprehensive rule · Piloting and charioteering

Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources

χρήματα (chrēmata); ἀργύριον (argyrion); μισθός (misthos); προῖκα (proika); χάρις (charis); οἰκεῖος (oikeios)

The word. Chrēmata means resources, possessions or money; argyrion is silver and hence money. Misthos is a payment or fee. Proika means free of charge. Charis can be favor or gratitude; charin eidenai means to be grateful. Oikeios means one’s own, belonging to one’s household or closely connected. These terms describe distinct economic and personal relations, not interchangeable forms of a commercial contract.

In Theages. The initial complaint concerns paying a sophist to make Theages wise, but Demodocus says money worries him less than the danger of the intended undertaking (121d–122a). Socrates later recommends association with an established citizen as both free and socially reputable (127a). The son’s preference for Socrates does not arise from a price comparison, however: Socrates’ company itself would suffice.

Before offering resources, Demodocus calls the prospect a hermaion, a lucky find or “godsend”, and says Socrates would do him a favor. He is ashamed even to say how intensely he wants it (127b). His relief depends on the willingness of both son and associate. These expressions make the exchange a personal appeal grounded in parental fear and gratitude, not simply an offer to purchase instruction.

Demodocus offers himself and what is his as fully at Socrates’ disposal as possible (127c–d). The offer dramatizes his earnestness and willingness to support the relationship. It does not specify a sum, an agreed fee, a transfer of ownership or terms Socrates accepts. Translating the personal idiom as a signed bargain would be misleading.

The sophists provide the sharpest contrast. They persuade the wellborn and wealthy to abandon free associations, pay considerable money and feel grateful besides (128a). The sentence’s admiration can have an ironic edge: the ability to persuade is itself striking. But the fact of payment neither proves the education fraudulent nor shows it effective. No fee is quoted numerically, and the dialogue does not evaluate each sophist’s teaching.

Socrates ultimately declines to guarantee the benefit desired. The sign can forbid association, and even permitted association may not help. The educational result is therefore not represented as something he controls and sells. This is a conclusion about the arrangement portrayed here, not a general historical claim about every source on Socratic economics.

The places.

- **121d.** χρήματα τελέσαι τινὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν — The boy wants payment to one of the sophists

- **127a.** προῖκα συνέσται — The proposed statesman will associate for nothing
- **127c–d.** καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ — Demodocus offers himself and his resources
- **128a.** ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ μισθόν — The paid association involves a substantial fee
- **128a.** χάριν πρὸς τούτοις εἰδέναι — Gratitude is added to payment

In this edition. The translation preserves the contrasts between “pay money”, “for nothing”, “fee” and “grateful”. The apparatus at 128a records competing editorial treatments of argyrion and polu; the companion follows the printed wording and does not infer an exact price.

See also. Sophists · Demodocus · Reputation · Benefit

Names, titles, and the name Theages

ὄνομα (onoma); ὀνομάζειν (onomazein); προσαγορεύειν (prosagoreuein); ἀνώνυμος (anōnymos); ἐπωνυμία (epōnymia); Θεάγης (Theagēs); ἱεροπρεπής (hieroprepēs)

The word. Onoma is a name, onomazein to name, and prosagoreuein to address or call someone. Anōnymos means nameless; epōnymia is a designation or title. Theagēs is the young man’s personal name, and hieroprepēs means befitting the sacred. The dialogue’s naming language ranges from naming a person to identifying a competence and classifying practitioners. These operations are analogous without being the same.

In Theages. The first naming problem is comic: Demodocus wonders whether to call his son’s production planting or begetting (121c). Socrates later asks the young man’s name before questioning him, then praises the name as fine and befitting the sacred (122d–e). The

exchange gives the previously reported object of paternal anxiety his own voice and address. The sacred description also continues the language used for counsel at 122b.

When the boy says he wants wisdom, names become instruments of inquiry. Piloting and charioteering supply recognizable names for determinate competencies. Socrates asks whether the desired wisdom is nameless, whether Theages knows the thing without the name, or knows the name as well (123c). Theages confidently claims both, then answers “wisdom.” His answer retains the generic term where the question requires discrimination among its instances.

The subsequent discussion shifts from naming skills to naming people by a common activity. Bakis, the Sibyl, and Amphilytus have the designation oracle-singers. By that model, Hippias and Periander are called tyrants on account of their rule (124d–e). The move is rhetorically effective because the boy can readily supply the familiar classification. Nevertheless, correctness of a title for those two men does not establish that every conceivable ruler of the same population belongs to that class. Theages’ later appeal to willing subjects exposes the missing qualification.

Names therefore do more than decorate the text. They help Socrates test whether a broad aspiration has an identifiable content and whether an accepted classification fits it. But the dialogue also shows the limits of naming: answering with a recognized label can conceal an underdescribed object or an unproved inference. Neither “wisdom” nor “tyranny” ends the inquiry.

The personal name Theages similarly should not be made into a prophecy. Its sacred coloring is explicit; a claim that its bearer is guaranteed a divine educational destiny is not.

His final proposal still asks whether the daimonic will permit the association.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121c.** δεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν — Demodocus considers naming planting or begetting
- **122d–e.** Θεάγης ὄνομα; ἱεροπρεπές — The boy's name and Socrates' praise of it
- **123c.** ἀνώνυμός τίς ἐστιν ἢ ἔχει ὄνομα — A competence is asked to declare its name
- **123d.** ἀλλ' ἢ σοφίαν — Theages replies with the generic name wisdom
- **124d–e.** τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν — Socrates asks for the collective designations of oracle-singers and tyrants

In this edition. Note 5 says that Theagēs is formed on theos, "god," without presenting a complete etymology as the dialogue's own claim. Burnet retains καλὸν in the question at 122d despite Baiter's proposed deletion. "Fine name" and "befitting the sacred" should therefore both be represented in an account of the supplied text.

See also. Wisdom · Oracle-singers · Tyranny · Agreement and inquiry

Nearness, sight, and touch

οἰκία (oikia); οἴκημα (oikēma); βλέπειν (blepein); ὁρᾶν (horan); καθῆσθαι (kathēsthai); ἔχεσθαι (echesthai); ἅπτεσθαι (haptesthai)

The word. Oikia can mean a house, whereas oikēma is a room or dwelling-space; their contrast here requires "house" and "room". Blepein and horan both concern sight. Kathēsthai means to sit. Echesthai with a genitive

can mean to hold on to someone, and haptesthai to touch or take hold of someone. The particular bodily actions are reported as conditions of Aristides' experienced progress, not named as technical pedagogical procedures.

In Theages. Aristides' account offers a carefully ascending scale. Being merely in the same house as Socrates, even in a different room, was beneficial. The same room produced more progress. Looking at Socrates while he spoke seemed to produce much more than looking elsewhere. Sitting immediately beside him, holding him and touching him, yielded by far the greatest progress. The sequence increases spatial proximity, visual orientation and bodily contact rather than supplying progressively more difficult lessons.

Two qualifications keep the scale from becoming a demonstrated law. First, Aristides says these were his experiences; "as I seemed to myself" explicitly marks his estimate at a crucial comparative point. Second, the larger account has already denied that all admitted companions benefit or that all benefited companions must continue in uninterrupted proximity. Some keep their advantage after separation. Aristides is the specific case of a non-lasting benefit, not the template for every successful association.

The story is open to interpretation as comic exaggeration, intense personal attachment or an extraordinary dependence on Socrates' presence. The text does not identify a magnetic field, transfer of a substance, hypnosis or a physiological process. Nor does touching, by itself, establish sexual conduct. The preceding reference to Socrates' expertise in matters of love gives the scene a suggestive dramatic context, but the actual vocabulary here describes sitting, holding and touching.

The visual contrast also prevents an overly simple reduction to distance. Two people may be in the same room while Aristides looks either towards Socrates speaking or elsewhere. Attention and embodied presence both enter his account, although it remains unexplained how either produces the claimed progress.

The places.

- **130d.** ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ … οἰκίᾳ; μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ … οἰκήματι — shared house is distinguished from shared room
- **130d.** μᾶλλον … ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι — closer shared space increases the reported effect
- **130d–e.** λέγοντός σου βλέποιμι πρὸς σέ … ἄλλοσε ὁρῴην — looking towards the speaker is contrasted with looking away
- **130e.** παρ’ αὐτόν σε καθοίμην — Aristides locates the greatest effect immediately beside Socrates
- **130e.** ἐχόμενός σου καὶ ἁπτόμενος — holding on and touching complete the scale

In this edition. “Same house” and “same room” preserve a distinction essential to the sequence. The comparative expressions and “as I seemed to myself” are also retained. “Keeping hold of you and touching you” gives the bodily detail without substituting an explanatory theory or a euphemism that removes it.

See also. Learning without instruction; Association; State and loss; Progress and retention.

Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed

πείθεσθαι (peithesthai); ἀπιστεῖν (apistein); ἐπέχειν (epechein); λανθάνειν (lanthanein); νοῦς (nous)

The word. Peithesthai can mean to be persuaded, trust or obey; apistein can mean to disbelieve, distrust or refuse compliance. Epechein is to hold back or pause. Lanthanein means to escape someone's notice, often with a participle expressing what occurs unnoticed. Nous in "have one's mind elsewhere" denotes attention, not a technical doctrine of a separate rational faculty.

In Theages. The Timarchus story presents disobedience as a progression. He first says where he intends to go only vaguely and agrees to remain when Socrates reports the sign. After an interval he renews the attempt, receives a second warning and again stays. On the third attempt he changes his procedure: he ceases announcing departure, watches for Socrates' diverted attention and slips away. The third episode reports no new utterance of the voice. It explains how Timarchus evades the human communication and restraint that worked twice before.

The plot is hidden from Socrates, but the desire to leave is initially visible. This distinction matters: successful prevention does not require a narrated disclosure of the murder plot. Conversely, departure during inattention should not be described as Socrates approving the plan. Timarchus arranges the absence of warning in the immediate interaction; he does not receive an affirmative divine permission.

The final statement attributes his death to unwillingness to obey Socrates. The reported explanation later uses apistēsai, translated "disobeyed". In context the practical

refusal, rather than a formulated philosophical denial of divine signs, is decisive. The passage does not say whether Timarchus disbelieved Socrates' experience, dismissed its relevance, hoped to evade its consequence, or simply valued his plan more.

The language has an instructive parallel with the opening father-son negotiation: Demodocus eventually thinks it best to "obey" his son when soothing can no longer hold him back. The shared verb does not equate the two decisions morally. It shows that accepting another's lead may arise from persuasion, trust or practical constraint, and that the relationship and circumstances determine the force.

The places.

- **122a.** πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ — Demodocus decides to comply with his son's demand rather than risk an unsupervised encounter
- **129a.** Σωκράτει οὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι — Timarchus describes a refusal of obedience
- **129b–c.** ἐπέσχε; ἐπισχεῖν — he is twice held back from departure
- **129c.** βουλόμενός με λαθεῖν; λαθών — the third departure is deliberately concealed
- **129c.** ἄλλοσε τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα — Timarchus exploits Socrates' attention elsewhere
- **129c.** διὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι — Socrates' recap attributes the consequence to disobedience

In this edition. "Obey" and "disobey" make the practical connection audible, while "escaping my notice" preserves the repeated concealment language. The translation does not turn the third departure into divine permission. It also

keeps Timarchus' own final explanation distinct from the narrator's account of each preceding action.

See also. Timarchus and the murder plot; Voice and sign; Trial and permission.

Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus

χρησμῳδός (chrēsmōdos); ἐπωνυμία (epōnymia); Βάκις (Bakis); Σίβυλλα (Sibylla); Ἀμφίλυτος (Amphilytos)

The word. Chrēsmōdos is an oracle-singer or utterer of oracles, formed with the language of oracular response and song. Epōnymia is a designation or title. Bakis, Sibyl and Amphilytus supply named examples whose common title Theages recognizes. The word does not mean "tyrant", and the later manteis, "diviners", is a different expression.

In Theages. Socrates inserts the oracle-singers between his list of rulers and the question about the title of Hippias and Periander (124d–e). The interruption models the form of answer he wants. Theages can give a common designation for several familiar names without listing each person's biography. He is then asked to do the same for the rulers and replies "tyrants".

This is a classificatory analogy, not a claim that political rulers possess prophecy or that oracle-singers hold civic power. Nor does the shared designation prove that every ruler named earlier belongs to an identical constitutional class. Socrates selects Hippias and Periander for the final naming question, and then moves from the scope of rule over all citizens to tyrannical rule. Theages subsequently qualifies the manner of rule by requiring willing subjects. The title exercise thus helps make a contested inference look natural; it does not resolve the omitted distinction.

“Our own Amphilytus” is the text’s phrase. The source note adds that Herodotus calls him an Acarnanian and relates him to Pisistratus’ victory. A lexicon can record the difference without claiming to have settled why the dialogue uses a local designation. Likewise, “Sibyl” need not be expanded into a catalogue of all later Sibylline traditions, since none is supplied by the passage.

The places.

- **124d.** τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει — Socrates asks for a common title
- **124d.** Βάκις τε καὶ Σίβυλλα καὶ ὁ ἡμεδαπὸς Ἀμφίλυτος — The three exemplars, including the local description
- **124d.** πλήν γε χρησμῳδοί — Theages’ answer is the plural “oracle-singers”
- **124e.** τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Ἱππίας καὶ Περίανδρος — The same question-form is transferred to the rulers

In this edition. “Oracle-singers” retains a specificity lost in the generic “prophets”. The note supplies Herodotus, Heraclitus and Aristophanes as contextual references. Those reports are secondary to the immediate function here: eliciting a shared name. The final proposal about diviners at 131a concerns ritual advice, a distinct role and setting.

See also. Names and naming · Rulers · Tyranny · Prayer and sacrifice

Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative

ζωγράφος (zōgraphos); αὐλητής (aulētēs); κιθαριστής (kitharistēs); ἀτιμάζειν (atimazein); ἀπορεῖν (aporein)

The word. Zōgraphos means a painter; aulētēs a player of the aulos, conventionally “flute-player” in this edition; kitharistēs a cithara-player. Atimazein is to dishonor or slight. Aporein is to be at a loss or lack a way forward. The noun aporia is not required for the text to portray this ordinary practical perplexity.

In Theages. Theages objects that statesmen cannot pass on their wisdom even to their sons. Socrates asks him to imagine having a son of his own who wants to become a good painter, demands expenditure, and nevertheless slights the painters from whom he would learn (126d–e). Flute-players and cithara-players extend the case. Theages admits that he would not know what else to do or where to send such a boy. Socrates then applies the case to Demodocus’ predicament (127a).

The point is the difficulty of responsible referral when the prospective pupil rejects the practitioners. It vindicates something about the father’s position without fully answering the son’s objection. If doing politics and teaching politics differ, the craft analogy still needs justification in the contested case. Theages’ next move is accordingly to name an alternative: Socrates himself. The exchange changes the practical question from an indefinite search to a particular relationship.

The painting example is not evidence that Theages has actually asked to be a painter; it is counterfactual. Nor does it establish that he despises all manual or musical work. Socrates borrows familiar kinds of instruction to

make him occupy the parental role he has been criticizing. That reversal is as important as the list of occupations.

The places.

- **126e.** ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι ζωγράφος — The hypothetical son wants to become a good painter
- **126e.** τοὺς ζωγράφους, ἀτιμάζοι — He nevertheless slights the practitioners
- **126e.** τοὺς αὐλητάς … τοὺς κιθαριστάς — Two musical practices extend the comparison
- **127a.** εἰ ἀπορεῖ ὅτι σοι χρήσηται καὶ ὅποι πέμποι — The father's perplexity is practical: what to do and where to send him

In this edition. "Flute-player" is the supplied rendering of aulētēs; it should not be taken as an organological identification with the modern transverse flute. "At a loss" preserves the situational force of aporei. The text does not declare the dialogue's final outcome an abstract theory of aporia.

See also. Analogies · Demodocus · Statesmen's sons · Socrates

Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments

ἡλικιώτης (hēlikiōtēs); δημότης (dēmotēs); ἀπομνημονεύειν (apomnēmoneuein); ζηλοῦν (zēloun); διαταράττειν (diatarattein); λόγος (logos)

The word. Hēlikiōtēs is someone of the same age, dēmotēs a fellow member of a deme. Apomnēmoneuein means to recall or repeat from memory; zēloun to emulate, admire competitively, or envy; diatarattein to disturb or unsettle. Logos in this opening context is an argument or piece of discourse being repeated. None of these terms guarantees

either the truth of the reported argument or a settled judgment about the motives of the young people involved.

In Theages. Demodocus thinks his son's peers and fellow demesmen, coming down to town, have unsettled him by repeating certain arguments from memory (121d). He says Theages has come to envy them and consequently demands a paid teacher. This is the father's explanation of how the desire took hold. His prefatory expression marks it as his assessment, rather than an omniscient account supplied by a narrator.

The report identifies a social mechanism distinct from direct instruction. Theages has apparently encountered performances of learned speech among equals before obtaining access to the proposed source of expertise. He wants an accomplishment that others can display. Yet the content of the repeated arguments is never stated, and the dialogue does not say that those peers learned them from a particular sophist. Their association with the desire for sophistic instruction is plausible within the father's report, not a documented chain of transmission.

The later conversation confirms that Theages knows arguments by report. At 126d he has heard those attributed to Socrates about statesmen's sons, and he uses them against Socrates' proposal. Heard arguments therefore need not be mere empty recitation: in that case they give him a relevant objection. The opening's anxiety about repeated discourse should not be generalized into a condemnation of all learning from what others say.

Peers reappear with a different evidential role at 128c. Theages knows contemporaries and somewhat older young men who seemed poor before associating with Socrates and rapidly appeared better afterward. His educational desire now points to observed persons, not

only to reproduced arguments. But observation of comparative improvement does not establish that Socrates can produce the same result whenever he wishes. Socrates' reply concerns the missing explanation of that effect.

The dialogue thus moves between two kinds of socially mediated expectation: aspiring to the verbal accomplishments of peers and judging a companion by changes visible in peers. Both can initiate a serious inquiry; neither, by itself, establishes the content of wisdom or the conditions for acquiring it. The father's fears and the son's confidence are each grounded in partial access to others' experience.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121d.** τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν … καὶ δημοτῶν — Same-age companions from the same local community
- **121d.** λόγους τινὰς ἀπομνημονεύοντες — They repeat unspecified arguments from memory
- **121d.** διαταράττουσιν αὐτόν; οὗς ἐζήλωκεν — The father's account of disturbance and emulation
- **126d.** οὕς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς λόγους — Theages uses arguments reported as Socrates' own
- **128c.** τῶν ἐμῶν ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρεσβυτέρων — Peers and somewhat older companions supply comparative evidence

In this edition. "Repeating … from memory" preserves the active verbal performance in apomnēmoneuein, while "envy" emphasizes Theages' response. Note 3 explains the deme and cautiously infers a country setting from coming down to town. The apparatus questions the difficult δοκῶ γάρ μοι at 121d; Burnet's printed reading is translated as "I think," not converted into an impersonal fact.

See also. Desire · Demodocus · City and comprehensive rule · Knowledge

Piloting and charioteering

κυβερνᾶν (kybernan); κυβερνητική (kybernētikē); ἡνιοχική (hēniochikē); ἡνιοχεία (hēniocheia); πλοῖον (ploion); ἅρμα (harma); ζεῦγος (zeugos)

The word. Kybernan means to steer or pilot. Kybernētikē, an adjective used substantivally, names piloting as a competence. Hēniochikē likewise names charioteering; hēniocheia is a noun for that activity. Ploion is a ship, harma a chariot, and zeugos a pair or team, here of horses. The printed text uses different grammatical forms for the two crafts and should not be normalized into an invented identical expression.

In Theages. Piloting is Socrates' first hypothetical model for an intelligible request for further wisdom (123b). If Theages wanted the wisdom by which people pilot ships, he could name it and explain what his father had failed to arrange. The example simultaneously identifies an educational object and a potential source: those from whom he could become wise in it.

Charioteering follows through the same verb of piloting (123c). The repeated wording places ships and chariots side by side, although their materials and techniques differ. At this stage the analogy's work is modest and useful: the same broad desire to be wise can be differentiated by the task one wants to perform. It does not yet make a claim about political sovereignty.

When Theages supplies only "wisdom" as the name of his actual goal, Socrates asks whether charioteering too is wisdom, rather than stupidity (123d). The concession prevents the generic term from distinguishing the desired

competence. He then reformulates both examples through knowing how to rule: a team of horses in one case, ships in the other. That linguistic move makes possible the next question, what the boy's wisdom is to rule.

The passage therefore has two argumentative stages. Naming crafts demonstrates that "wisdom" needs qualification; describing their direction as rule permits extension of the question to human groups. A reader should not treat the second stage as already proven by the first. Steering vehicles and governing human beings can share a verb without being identical in authority, consent, or moral responsibility.

The distinction becomes decisive when Theages eventually introduces willing citizens at 126a. Ships do not consent to their pilot, and a team is not a city. The dialogue itself does not stop to formulate this limitation of the analogy, but its later correction shows why specifying only what is ruled was insufficient. The examples remain clarifying cases of expertise; they are not a self-sufficient theory of legitimate political leadership.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **123b.** τὰ πλοῖα κυβερνῶσιν; κυβερνητικήν — Piloting ships supplies the first named wisdom
- **123c.** τὰ ἅρματα κυβερνῶσιν; ἡνιοχικήν — The same verb introduces chariots and their competence
- **123d.** ἡ ἡνιοχεία σοφία ἐστίν — Charioteering is explicitly counted as wisdom
- **123d.** ἵππων … ζεύγους ἄρχειν — The craft rules a team of horses

- **123d.** πλοίων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν — The pilot's competence is reformulated as knowing how to rule ships

In this edition. Note 8 expressly draws attention to kybernan being used for chariots as well as ships. The translation retains "pilot" in both places. The apparatus at 123d records ἠνιοχεία in T and W against ἡνιοχία in B; the former is the printed noun and belongs in an exact attestation register.

See also. Wisdom · Knowledge · Rule and office · Wish and willingness

Poetry quotation and the authority of a famous line

Εὐριπίδης (Euripidēs); Ἀνακρέων (Anakreōn); ποιητής (poiētēs); συνουσία (synousia)

The word. Euripides and Anacreon are poets' names; poiētēs is a maker and, here, a poet. The line quoted at 125b connects wise tyrants with association with the wise. Its instrumental dative synousiai says by or through association. It does not specify what the wise know or guarantee that any association has that effect.

In Theages. Socrates proposes making further use of Euripides and puts a question to him in imagination. Who are the wise through whose company tyrants become wise? Recasting the line with farmers, cooks and wrestlers makes the relevant field easy to identify. Returning to tyrants produces Theages' admission that he does not know. The borrowed line is therefore an object of analysis rather than an authoritative answer that ends inquiry.

The precise shifts within the examples are revealing. The farmer response identifies farming matters; the cook

response names cooks; the wrestler response identifies wrestling. The text does not insist on one grammatical pattern, but each answer points to a familiar activity or practitioner. Political wisdom lacks an equally unproblematic specification. Anacreon's Callicrite then supplies an answer whose obscurity and comic effect expose rather than solve that problem.

The attribution requires restraint. The dialogue says Euripides, as does Republic 568a–b according to the edition. Its note also reports Gellius' discovery of the verse in Sophocles' Ajax the Locrian. The lexicon can distinguish the dialogue's attribution from the later report without silently rewriting the speaker's words. The authorship of the line is an ancillary textual question; the philosophical difficulty would remain even if the attribution were certain.[2]

The places.

- **125b.** σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ — The quoted maxim links wisdom and association
- **125b–c.** τῶν τί σοφῶν — "Those wise in what?" is the question the maxim leaves open
- **125c.** τῶν μαγείρων — Burnet's text answers the cooks' version by naming practitioners
- **125d.** Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε — Theages admits that he cannot identify the tyrants' relevant knowledge

In this edition. The verse is set as verse and "wise" is repeated without replacing it by "skilled" in the

[2] Socrates' attribution to Euripides is part of the transmitted dialogue. The source note reports Gellius' finding of the line in Sophocles. Reporting both preserves the difference between what a dramatic speaker says and external testimony about a quotation's author.

occupational versions. The apparatus records proposed alternatives to tōn mageirōn; the supplied translation keeps “the cooks”. That small irregularity should not be normalized in an exact quotation.

See also. Wisdom · Association · Callicrite · Analogies

Power and its uncertain bearer

δύναμις (dynamis); δύνασθαι (dynasthai); οἷός τε (hoios te)

The word. Dynamis is power, capacity or ability. Dynasthai means to be able or have power; hoios te with an infinitive is another ordinary expression for being able to do something. Their range extends from practical competence to effective influence. The noun alone does not establish a physical force, occult substance or fully analysed philosophical faculty.

In Theages. Theages’ initial confidence is expressed through ability: if Socrates wishes, he too will be able to become like the improved companions. Socrates redirects the explanation to the daimonic. The emphatic wording at 129e joins noun and verb: “this power … has all power” over associations. Its scope here is the relevant companionships, not universal omnipotence over every event. The immediately following distinctions explain that scope through prohibition, absence of benefit, assisted progress and differing permanence.

At 130c Socrates asks Aristides whether “this power” left him suddenly or gradually. The referent is now the capacity Aristides had displayed when he could converse with anyone and appear inferior to no one in argument. The lexical repetition connects the two parts of the story, but it does not explicitly identify a transferable divine substance that moved from Socrates into Aristides. The narrative has given the daimonic power an enabling role;

Aristides then describes his own gained and lost ability. The relationship is asserted through the story, not analysed causally.

The distinction also clarifies responsibility. Socrates speaks and keeps Timarchus back, but does not claim personal mastery over the signal. He is able to associate only under its conditions, and he warns Theages that ordinary teachers may offer greater security because they control their educational benefit. Lack of control is not the same as complete inactivity: Socrates can question, relate cases, advise caution and agree to a trial. His account restricts what he can guarantee.

The places.

- **128c.** οἷός τ’ ἔσομαι — Theages expects to become capable through Socrates’ willingness
- **129e.** ἡ δύναμις αὕτη … τὸ ἅπαν δύναται — the power has decisive scope over association
- **129e.** οὐχ οἷόν τέ μοι … συνδιατρίβειν — opposition limits Socrates’ ability to spend time with particular people
- **129e.** ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις — the helped group is defined through the power’s participation
- **130c.** οἷός τ’ ἦ διαλέγεσθαι — Aristides describes his former conversational ability
- **130c.** προύλιπεν αὕτη ἡ δύναμις — Socrates asks how that ability departed

In this edition. The repetition of “power” at 129e and 130c is deliberate, as the Key Words explain. It enables comparison without inserting an explanatory mechanism. The strong “has all power” should be read with its stated domain, “over being with those who spend time with me”, and the carefully differentiated outcomes that follow.

See also. Daimonic and divine; Benefit; State and loss; Mastery and chance.

Practical expertise horses javelins and cities

ἱππικός (hippikos); ἱππεύς (hippeus); ἀκοντιστικός (akontistikos); ἀκόντιον (akontion); χρῆσθαι (chrēsthai); προσομιλεῖν (prosomilein)

The word. Hippikos concerns horses or horsemanship; hippeus is a horseman. Akontistikos concerns javelin-throwing, and akontion is a javelin. Chrēsthai means to use, deal with or make practical use of something; the object determines the appropriate English. Prosomilein is to have dealings or intercourse with. In the political comparison it concerns cities, not an intimate personal relationship.

In Theages. Having clarified that he wants reputable civic leadership, Theages accepts that a would-be horseman should go to accomplished horsemen. Socrates emphasizes their repeated use of many horses, their own and others'. The javelin comparison repeats possession and practiced use (126b–c). The ensuing political case describes statesmen as themselves skilled and accustomed to dealing with their own city and many others, Greek and non-Greek.

The examples give expertise a practical test. A name or general reputation is supported by familiarity with the activity across more than one case. Yet they leave the decisive educational inference open: does practical ability reliably make its possessor able to improve a particular pupil? Theages' objection about the statesmen's sons targets that very inference. This is why an account of the

examples must include the response rather than stopping with an apparently successful analogy.

The possessive contrast also changes its stakes. Horses and javelins are instruments or objects used by an expert. Cities are communities of people with which a statesman deals. The language creates an analogy without erasing that difference. The passage does not license treating political subjects as owned objects, and Theages has just required their willingness.

The places.

- **126b.** οἷς εἰσίν τε ἵπποι — The printed reading identifies men who have horses
- **126b.** καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ ἀλλοτρίοις πολλοῖς — Practice includes many of their own and others'
- **126b–c.** πολλοῖς καὶ ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ οἰκείοις … ἀκοντίοις — The javelin example repeats the pattern
- **126c.** καὶ Ἕλληνίσιν προσομιλοῦντας πόλεσιν καὶ βαρβάροις — The statesmen's dealings extend across Greek and non-Greek cities

In this edition. At 126b Burnet adopts the variant "who have horses", while the source reports that B, T and W read "who are skilled in horsemanship". The translation follows the adopted variant. That choice supports the possession-and-use parallel but should not be represented as unanimous manuscript wording. "Barbarian" renders the Greek/non-Greek contrast here, without a further claim about the populations' capacities.

See also. Statesmen · Statesmen's sons · Analogies · Voluntary rule

Prayer, sacrifice, and soothing the divine

παραμυθεῖσθαι (paramytheisthai); εὐχή (euchē); θυσία (thysia); μάντις (mantis); ἐξηγεῖσθαι (exēgeisthai)

The word. Paramytheisthai can mean to encourage, console or soothe through address; the context determines the object and force. Euchē is a prayer or vow, thysia a sacrifice. A mantis is a diviner or prophetic interpreter; exēgeisthai is to explain, interpret or prescribe. The plural manteis names possible advisers on ritual action, not the named oracle-singers earlier used in Socrates' classification exercise.

In Theages. Theages proposes a sequence. First he and Socrates should try being with one another. If the daimonic does not allow them, they will deliberate whether to turn to someone else or try to soothe "the divine itself that comes to you". Prayers, sacrifices and whatever else the diviners prescribe are possible means within that second alternative. The proposal is conditional twice over: the difficulty has not yet occurred, and the alternative response has not yet been selected.

The recurrence of "soothing" connects the ending with the opening father-son problem. Demodocus had held Theages back by soothing him until that no longer worked. Now Theages imagines addressing a divine impediment by analogous language of appeasement. This is a dramatic verbal correspondence, not proof that the divine can be managed like an unwilling child. The change of object is precisely what makes the suggestion striking.

Theages also changes his designation from "this daimonic thing" to "the divine itself". The edition notes the shift. His ritual proposal treats the phenomenon as something that might respond to worship or expert prescription, but

Socrates supplies no account of how such intervention would relate to a sign received by divine allotment. His closing assent does not confirm that sacrifices can reverse a prohibition or promise to perform a particular rite.

The distinction between these manteis and the earlier chrēsmōidoi is useful. Bakis, Sibyl and Amphilytus are offered at 124d as bearers of an intelligible professional designation. The final diviners are unnamed, prospective sources of ritual guidance. Merging the two references into one body of named advisers would give the ending people and instructions it does not contain.

The places.

- **122a.** κατεῖχον παραμυθούμενος — Demodocus' soothing had temporarily restrained his son
- **131a.** αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοὶ γιγνόμενον — Theages now calls the phenomenon "the divine itself"
- **131a.** πειρασόμεθα παραμυθεῖσθαι — he proposes trying to soothe it, not reporting a successful act
- **131a.** εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ θυσίαις — prayer and sacrifice are the suggested means
- **131a.** οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγῶνται — diviners might prescribe additional measures

In this edition. "Soothe" preserves the opening and closing verbal link. "Prophets prescribe" is the rendering for the final phrase; "diviners" clarifies the Greek role without identifying a modern religious office. Note 39 explicitly marks the change from daimonion to theion. The dialogue ends before any ritual is undertaken or evaluated.

See also. Daimonic and divine; Divine allotment; Trial and permission.

Progress, retention, and loss

ἐπιδιδόναι (epididonai); βέβαιος (bebaios); παραμόνιμος (paramonimos); ἀπέχεσθαι (apechesthai); διαφέρειν (diapherein)

The word. Epididonai can mean to give further, increase or advance; of these companions it means “make progress”. Bebaios denotes firmness or security, and paramonimos that which stays or lasts. Apechesthai is to keep away or remain apart. Diapherein, “differ”, can express comparative distinction, but a claim that someone no longer differs from anyone else is broader and less determinate than a technical diagnosis of lost knowledge.

In Theages. Socrates accepts that Theages has noticed striking improvement in certain companions. He does not accept the proposed general rule that his personal willingness can produce it in any applicant. At 129e–130a he gives a differentiated account. First, the daimonic power opposes some associations, precluding benefit. Second, it does not prohibit others, although they confer no benefit. Third, among associations it actively helps, some companions receive a firm and lasting advantage. Fourth, many aided companions progress wonderfully while present but lose their distinction after separation. The last two are subdivisions of the helped group; flattening the passage into “approved pupils improve, rejected pupils do not” removes its central warning.

Speed and permanence are different variables. Helped companions progress “quickly, at once”; some keep their gain, while others do not. Aristides exemplifies the latter possibility. He improves greatly in a short time, leaves on a campaign and afterwards says that his power departed little by little. Rapid acquisition thus need not be matched

by sudden loss, and the text does not assert a uniform timetable for every companion.

The descriptions are impressive but incomplete measures of education. Theages originally says that companions appear better than people they had previously been worse than. Aristides describes confidence and comparative standing in discussion. Neither report independently demonstrates that the improvement consists in justice, civic competence or stable knowledge of a defined subject. Socrates generalises the uncertainty of the association, not a verified mechanism or universally specified curriculum.

The places.

- **128c.** ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ … βελτίους φαίνονται — Theages reports a rapid reversal in apparent comparative standing
- **129e.** ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν — aided companions progress rapidly
- **130a.** βέβαιον … καὶ παραμόνιμον — some benefits are both firm and lasting
- **130a.** ἐπειδὰν δέ μου ἀπόσχωνται — separation introduces the contrasting loss
- **130a.** πάλιν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ὀτουοῦν — former distinction disappears
- **130a.** πάμπολυ ἐπεδεδώκει — Aristides had made very great progress
- **130c.** κατὰ σμικρόν — he describes gradual loss
- **130e.** πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ — Theages' prospective progress remains conditional

In this edition. "Make progress" consistently translates the verb rather than specifying "learn philosophy" or "become virtuous". "Firm and lasting" preserves the

paired adjectives. The outline at 129e–130a likewise distinguishes opposition, ineffective association, progress and the unequal permanence of its results.

See also. Benefit; Association; Aristides and Thucydides; State and loss.

Reading the text and apparatus

διδάσκαλος (didaskalos); τι (ti); εἰ and εἶ (ei); †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου†

The word. This is an editorial article rather than a claim that “apparatus” is a philosophical lemma in the dialogue. The examples show why printed form, intended sense, manuscript report and conjectural correction must be distinguished. Didaskalos means teacher; ti is an indefinite “something” or “at all” in the relevant use; ei without the circumflex can mean “if”, while eî is “you are”. The obelized phrase at 129a is printed as corrupt.

In Theages. Lexical interpretation depends on the exact source. Burnet brackets didaskalou before tyrannodidaskalou at 125a, following a deletion reported in the apparatus. The resulting English speaks of a tyrant-teacher without separately translating the bracketed duplication. At 128b the bracketed ti is likewise not translated. Brackets are not invitations to count both retained and excluded words as equally secure components of the argument.

At 127a the Greek page retains an accent error in the question whether Socrates is one of the fine and good men. The English follows the required sense “you are”. At 129a the words between obeli occur in the Timarchus report. Their corruption prevents confident theological deductions from their surface wording. The story’s subsequent account of warnings, departure and the fatal result is more

intelligible than that local phrase, but does not retroactively repair it.

Other apparatus choices affect ordinary examples: the name Callicrite, “to whose house” at 125a and “who have horses” at 126b. The companion explains these when relevant rather than treating every manuscript alternative as an independent occurrence of a new philosophical concept. A proposed reading is evidence of editorial judgment, not by itself evidence that the author wrote it.

The supplied source is a reproduction and translation of an edited text. This lexicon checks against that source, not against manuscripts or fresh photographs of the Burnet volume. Its agreement with the source must therefore not be advertised as an independent critical edition.[3]

The places.

- **125a.** [διδασκάλου] τυραννοδιδασκάλου — A bracketed word precedes the compound
- **127a.** εἰ ἀνδρῶν — The printed accent requires correction in sense to “you are”
- **128b.** [τι] — Burnet’s brackets mark a word omitted in the translation
- **129a.** †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου† — Obeli signal unresolved corruption, not an established phrase for divine causation

In this edition. Burnet’s apparatus is reproduced separately from the dialogue, and explanatory notes identify consequential choices. This lexicon quotes the retained wording, marks uncertain items and locates

[3] Agreement with the supplied transcription and explanatory apparatus is a source check, not fresh manuscript evidence. Burnet’s obeli, brackets and adopted conjectures remain visible; the companion does not certify that every transmitted or edited word is the author’s original reading.

variants in their editorial context. A normalized lemma in a heading is a dictionary aid; the exact attestation belongs under “The places” and in the defined register.

See also. Callicrite · Practical expertise · Reputation · Timarchus

Reputation honor and the fine and good

καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos); ἐλλόγιμος (ellogimos); εὐδοκιμεῖν (eudokimein); τιμᾶν (timan); γενναῖος (gennaios)

The word. Kalos kagathos joins “fine” and “good”, often carrying the social resonance of a respected gentleman as well as an evaluative claim. Ellogimos is notable or of repute. Eudokimein means to be well thought of, and timan to honor. Gennaios concerns good birth or nobility in the description of the young customers of the sophists. These expressions overlap in social evaluation while remaining lexically distinct.

In Theages. Theages names the reputable men of the city as the model of rule he desires (126a). Socrates offers an introduction to Athenians fine and good in political matters and says such company will improve the boy’s standing among the many (127a). The advice offers both a proposed route to competence and a reputational advantage. Those goods are not proved identical.

Theages turns the evaluative phrase back on Socrates: is he not one of the fine and good men too? This moves from a politically specified class to a broader personal appraisal. Socrates’ question “What do you mean?” allows the shift to stand as something requiring explanation. Demodocus then urges his own confidence and desire rather than producing a curriculum Socrates has promised.

At 127e Socrates recalls the father's age, high offices and exceptional honor among his fellow demesmen. These are reasons why the preference for Socrates is puzzling on ordinary civic criteria. The Greek says neither father nor son sees those things in Socrates. It does not, by itself, establish the sweeping historical proposition that Socrates has never held any office. The distinction is important because an inference more absolute than the speech would turn rhetorical self-deprecation into an inaccurate biographical rule.

The wellborn and wealthy sophistic clients provide a related test: prominent social position gives them many free associations, yet the paid teachers can attract them away (128a). Prestige, wealth, choice and educational benefit are connected in the scene, but no one of them supplies a sufficient criterion for the others.

The places.

- **126a.** οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλλόγιμοι ἄνδρες — Theages' exemplars are men of civic repute
- **127a.** τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν τὰ πολιτικά — Socrates specifies political respectability or excellence
- **127a.** εὐδοκιμήσεις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις — Association promises a better reputation among the many
- **127e.** ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἑνορᾷ οὐδέτερος ὑμῶν — Socrates says they discern none of the listed distinctions in him

In this edition. "Fine and good" is retained rather than reduced to "aristocratic". At 127a the Greek page preserves Burnet's εἰ misprint where the sense requires εἶ, "you are"; the English renders the intended question. This is a printed

accent error, not an interpretive choice between a question and a conditional sentence.

See also. Good citizenship · Statesmen · Demodocus · Text and apparatus

Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame

ἀπέχθεια (apechtheia); σεμνύνεσθαι (semnynesthai); χαλεπαίνειν (chalepainein); διαλέγεσθαι (dialegesthai); αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai); φαυλότης (phaulotēs)

The word. Apechtheia denotes enmity or hostility. Semnynesthai can mean to behave grandly or give oneself airs; chalepainein is to be angry or resentful. Dialegesthai means to converse or discuss, with no automatic guarantee of a technical philosophical method. Aischynesthai is to feel shame, and phaulotēs here denotes poor quality or inferiority. These evaluative words reveal participants' social self-understanding as well as their argumentative conduct.

In Theages. The encounter between the returning Aristides and Socrates begins with another man's quarrel. Thucydides had fallen out with Socrates "in certain arguments". Aristides interprets the young man's behaviour as self-importance, "as if he amounted to something". He then disparages his earlier condition as that of a slave. The account does not reproduce the disputed arguments, establish who was right, or show that indignation itself proves Thucydides has ceased to benefit.

Aristides quickly admits that his own situation is ridiculous. The evidence he gives is precise but limited: formerly he could talk with anyone and appear worse than no one in argument; consequently he sought the company of the most cultivated men. Now he avoids someone as

soon as he recognises education and feels ashamed of his own poor quality. The movement is from confident engagement to ashamed withdrawal. It is reported as a change in his power, but its principal measure is comparative argumentative standing.

“Appear worse than no one” is not identical with “know the truth about every subject” or “have become morally excellent”. Likewise, the cultivated company he once sought does not constitute an independently certified tribunal of wisdom. The dialogue allows the impressive social effects of association to remain entangled with competition, reputation and self-estimation. Aristides’ confidence might accompany real improvement, yet this testimony does not specify its content well enough to identify the two without remainder.

His shame also differs from a demonstrated ethical conversion. He feels exposed as inferior and flees educated interlocutors. No confession of injustice, settled commitment to a better life or programme of renewed study is reported. The emotional change shows how valuable his lost condition was to him.

The places.

- **130b.** δι’ ἀπεχθείας ἐν λόγοις τισίν — Thucydides’ quarrel is located in discussion
- **130b.** σεμνύνεσθαι … καὶ χαλεπαίνειν ὡς τὶ ὄντα — Aristides characterises his airs and anger
- **130c.** διαλέγεσθαι καὶ μηδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι — former competence is described through conversation and apparent rank
- **130c.** τῶν χαριεστάτων ἀνθρώπων — Aristides once sought highly cultivated company

- **130c.** φεύγω … πεπαιδευμένον — he now avoids the educated
- **130c.** αἰσχύνομαι … τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι — shame attaches to his own perceived poor quality

In this edition. “Appear”, “giving himself airs”, “cultivated” and “poor quality” maintain the testimonial and social texture. Translating the passage simply as “he gained and lost virtue” would erase its actual criteria. The story does not use aretē as the name of Aristides’ gained condition.

See also. Aristides and Thucydides; Progress and retention; Learning without instruction; State and loss.

Rule, rulers, and public office

ἄρχειν (archein); ἀρχή (archē); ἄρχων (archōn); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

The word. Archein means to rule or lead, but also to begin. Archē can mean rule, office, or beginning; archōn a ruler or one holding authority. The middle archesthai appears here with the sense “begin.” Context and construction must distinguish these senses. Not every occurrence of the root concerns politics, and even political occurrences range from holding offices in Athens to the authority of named monarchs and tyrants.

In Theages. The governing sense organizes Socrates’ classification of skills. Charioteering rules a horse team, piloting ships, medicine sick people, music choristers, and gymnastics those exercising (123d–e). Farming and carpentry then direct differentiated groups of workers (124a–b). Repetition of archein allows the inquiry to move across these fields while asking what the boy’s proposed wisdom rules.

Theages' answer expands to the whole city. Socrates names people who governed the same broad population and asks what title Hippias and Periander bear because of their rule (124c–e). The question creates a powerful identification with tyranny, but the common object of rule does not alone prove the same constitutional or ethical character. The boy eventually specifies willing subjects rather than force (126a), introducing a dimension the previous classification omitted.

This qualification is essential for the later description of Demodocus. Socrates says he has already held many great offices for the Athenians (127e), repeating the root in both noun and verb. The father has therefore exercised the kind of public authority that might appear relevant to his son's ambition. Yet he is not called a tyrant. The text's own use of the family warns against treating the earlier tyranny inference as a universal definition of all ruling.

The father's offices also distinguish experienced accomplishment from educational efficacy. Socrates asks why Demodocus cannot better help the boy become a good citizen, but political experience is a proposed qualification, not a demonstrated capacity to transmit wisdom. Theages' objection about statesmen's sons remains relevant.

The nonpolitical sense occurs at important procedural and narrative transitions. Socrates proposes to begin from the boy's desire (122d); the daimonic accompaniment began in his childhood (128d); Charmides begins describing his training plans when the voice comes (128e). These beginnings belong in a lexical register, but should be cross-indexed separately from the article's ruling sense. Shared spelling must not manufacture a political metaphor absent from the context.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **123d.** ἄρχειν — The pilot and charioteer rule their respective objects
- **124c.** ἄρχοντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ — Periander is introduced as ruler in Corinth
- **124e.** διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν — Rule grounds the proposed title
- **127e.** πολλὰς ἤδη ἀρχὰς … ἦρξας — Demodocus has ruled in many offices
- **122d.** ἄρχεσθαι — Beginning the inquiry from Theages himself
- **128d.** ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον — The daimonic accompaniment began in childhood

In this edition. “Ruled in many offices” at 127e preserves the root’s recurrence, though ordinary English might simply say “held office.” The Key Words expressly keep the middle’s “begin” apart. The reader should also retain the distinction between an archōn as a ruler generally and a specifically named Athenian magistracy; the passage about Periander does not identify an Athenian constitutional office.

See also. City and comprehensive rule · Rulers in the comparison · Tyranny · Demodocus

Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition

Σικελία (Sikelia); Σαννίων (Sanniōn); Θράσυλλος (Thrasyllos); Ἔφεσος (Ephesos); Ἰωνία (Iōnia); στρατόπεδον (stratopedon); στρατιά (stratia); στρατεία (strateia); διαφθορά (diaphthora)

The word. Strateia is military service or a campaign; stratia is an army or military force. Stratopedon can mean an encampment or the army encamped; here its destruction concerns the army. Diaphthora is destruction or ruin. The similar-looking military words should not be merged: the campaign is an undertaking, the army the people whose fate causes concern.

In Theages. The Sicilian reference is retrospective. Socrates says the listeners can hear from many people what he had said about the army's destruction. He gives no exact earlier prediction, occasion or personal intervention in the expedition. The supplied note identifies the Athenian expedition of 415–413 BC and its disastrous end. This historical background makes the allusion intelligible without supplying words that the present narrative omits.

The next example is explicitly unfinished. The sign occurred at the departure on campaign of Sannion, described as beautiful. He has now gone with Thrasyllus towards Ephesus and Ionia. Socrates thinks he will die or suffer something close to it and expresses strong fear for the rest of the army. His "I think" marks an inference or forecast; the voice is not quoted as declaring those precise alternatives. The narrative never returns with news of Sannion.

The difference between the examples is part of the argument for testing the sign: the past may be investigated

through people who know, whereas this expedition makes a current test possible. The edition's historical note links Thrasyllus' sailing and defeat at Ephesus to the usual reckoning of 409 BC and says that, taken strictly, Socrates' words place the conversation before the news. That contextual identification is not an internal fulfilment of the individual forecast about Sannion. No independent fate for him is supplied.

Names also require restraint. Sannion's epithet kalos means "beautiful"; the edition rejects the need to take it as a father's name. Thrasyllus is the commander in the reported current expedition, not the later literary arranger of the Platonic tetralogies mentioned in the Introduction. The Nicias named as a murder victim in the preceding story is identified by a different patronymic and must not be assimilated to the famous Sicilian commander.

The places.

- **129c–d.** τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ; διαφθορᾶς τοῦ στρατοπέδου — the Sicilian army's destruction is already past
- **129d.** Σαννίωνος τοῦ καλοῦ — Sannion is the beautiful man, with no stated patronymic
- **129d.** μετὰ Θρασύλλου … Ἐφέσου καὶ Ἰωνίας — his expedition's leader and destinations
- **129d.** οἴομαι … ἀποθανεῖσθαι — Socrates forecasts rather than narrates Sannion's death
- **129d.** τῆς στρατιᾶς τῆς ἄλλης … φοβοῦμαι — fear extends to the remaining army
- **130a.** στρατεία τις — Aristides' separate, unspecified campaign is not identified with either expedition

In this edition. Notes 34–36 provide the historical bearings and explain the old misreading "son of Calus".

The apparatus records the textual choice stratias at 129d. The English rightly preserves the prospective form of the current forecast and the indefinite character of Aristides' later campaign.

See also. Witnesses; Voice and sign; Timarchus and the murder plot; Aristides and Thucydides.

Socrates and the qualification of his competence

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs); ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai); οἷός τε (hoios te); εἰκός (eikos)

The word. Socrates is the speaker's name. Epistasthai is to know or know how; hoios te, with an infinitive, commonly means able to do something. Eikos is what is reasonable or likely. In this dialogue these expressions help distinguish possessing knowledge, having the ability to benefit another and having a reasonable basis for choosing an associate.

In Theages. Socrates begins as the adviser Demodocus most wants to consult. He questions the desired wisdom before recommending a teacher, and tests the boy's political ambition through specialized crafts, rulers and poetry. When the discussion reaches the limits of the statesmen as teachers, Theages identifies Socrates as the companion he wants (127a). The adviser has become the proposed educational solution.

Socrates does not simply accept that role on the terms offered. He questions why his benefit should exceed the father's, points to the sophists who profess to educate, and disclaims their subjects while excepting the things of love (127d–128b). Theages counters with observed changes in acquaintances. Socrates then corrects the boy's assumption that his wish alone can produce an equivalent

result. The daimonic power governs the association, and the range of outcomes prevents a guarantee (128c–130e).

This progression makes Socrates both indispensable to the dramatic inquiry and resistant to the status of an ordinary supplier of lessons. The last agreement is to make a trial, not to announce that Theages has been educated. No curriculum, fee or definite outcome is settled. A reading that treats the ending as the straightforward formation of a school contract misses the qualifications Socrates has just given.

The lexicon describes the Socrates portrayed in this transmitted work. Its disputed authorship and the differences among ancient accounts prevent this characterization from being treated as transparent historical testimony about every aspect of the historical Socrates. Comparisons with Apology or Theaetetus may clarify specific affinities, but they must not erase the expanded functions of the sign here.

The places.

- **127a.** εἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι, ἐξαρκεῖ — Theages says Socrates' willing association would suffice
- **127d.** ὠφελῆσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι — Socrates asks about the capacity to produce civic benefit
- **128b.** ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος — His "so to speak" lack of knowledge is immediately qualified by an exception
- **128d.** ἀλλά σε λέληθεν οἷον τοῦτ' ἔστιν — Socrates says the nature of the phenomenon has escaped Theages

In this edition. The translation preserves the qualification “so to speak”, the love exception and the distinction between wishing and being able. The source’s introductory statement that Socrates “holds no office” goes beyond the narrower wording at 127e; this companion follows the latter and does not repeat the stronger inference.

See also. Knowledge · Love · Daimonic and divine · Trial and permission

Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus

σοφιστής (sophistēs); ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι (epangellesthai); πείθειν (peithein); Πρόδικος (Prodikos); Γοργίας (Gorgias); Πῶλος (Pōlos)

The word. Sophistēs names a person associated with wisdom or expert instruction; its force must be established in context rather than fixed in advance as “fraud”. Epangellesthai means to announce or profess, here the capacity to educate young men. Peithein means to persuade. The three named men are identified by their places of origin: Prodicus of Ceos, Gorgias of Leontini and Polus of Acragas.

In Theages. Demodocus initially reports the boy’s demand that a sophist be paid to make him wise, and says he has brought him to introduce him to those thought to be sophists (121d–122a). The category is therefore present before any kind of wisdom has been defined. Socrates’ questioning shows why the practical referral cannot responsibly precede that clarification.

Near 128a Socrates offers the named teachers as an alternative if Theages despises the statesmen’s company and seeks those who profess educational ability. Their striking accomplishment is that they persuade privileged young men to leave free civic associations, pay a fee and

be grateful. This is an account of attraction and persuasion, not a demonstration of what those pupils learn. Its irony does not justify assigning a false promise to each individual that the text never quotes.

Socrates contrasts their "blessed and fine subjects" with his own limited avowal of knowledge. The language distinguishes a professional educational claim from the uncertain benefits he later describes. Yet the passage neither refutes every sophist nor establishes the wisdom of the statesmen: Theages has already challenged the latter's ability to teach. Both familiar routes have been placed under question.

The source note characterizes Prodicus by verbal distinctions, Gorgias by rhetoric and Polus as Gorgias' pupil. These are useful identifications, not a three-part course syllabus contained in the dialogue. The specific contents of their instruction remain unnamed here. Their geographical labels likewise identify persons and exemplify teachers moving into cities; they do not supply ethnic explanations of ability.

The places.

- **121d.** τινὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν — A sophist is imagined as the paid agent who will make the boy wise
- **127e.** οἳ παιδεύειν ἐπαγγέλλονται οἷοί τε εἶναι — The relevant claim is the professed capacity to educate
- **127e–128a.** Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πῶλος ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος — The named alternatives and their civic origins
- **128a.** πείθουσιν … αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι — Their persuasive success brings the young into their company

In this edition. The supplied note compares Apology 19e–20a, where a similar sentence names Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias. The third name here is Polus. Preserving that difference is preferable to silently harmonizing related passages. The translation “profess” leaves open the question of performance without deciding it by the choice of an accusatory word.

See also. Wisdom · Money and fees · Subjects of learning · Socrates

Spending time and the limits of instruction

διατρίβειν (diatribein); συνδιατρίβειν (syndiatribein); χρόνος (chronos)

The word. Diatribein can mean to occupy or spend time; syndiatribein adds explicit companionship, “spend time with”. The verbs can occur in educational settings, but neither means by itself “give formal lessons”. Chronos is time or a period of time. The duration and company specified in a sentence are therefore important; an English paraphrase such as “study under” may import an institutional relationship the Greek has not established.

In Theages. At 128b Theages complains that Socrates no longer seems willing to spend time with him. He interprets the preceding disclaimers as joking and presents his own readiness as settled. What he wants is access to Socrates, on the evidence of others’ apparent improvement. Socrates’ reply separates willingness and time together from control over the outcome.

The sequence at 129e is especially instructive. Socrates speaks of the associations of people “spending time with me”, then says some cannot benefit while spending time with him, and consequently he cannot spend time with

them. Duration or attendance cannot overcome divine opposition. Other companions may remain without benefiting. The account does not specify that these failures result from too few hours, inattentiveness or deficient fees.

Aristides had made much progress “in a short time” while staying with Socrates. A military expedition interrupts the association. On returning he finds Thucydides spending time with Socrates in his place. The shared expression makes the two young men comparable as companions, but their particular stories differ: Aristides reports loss during absence, whereas Thucydides has just quarrelled with Socrates in discussion. Nothing in the verb itself establishes that either had enrolled in a course or completed a syllabus.

The narrative deliberately juxtaposes time spent with the absence of identifiable teaching. Aristides says he never learned anything from Socrates, yet he progressed whenever he was with him. Time in company is a condition within his remembered experience; the dialogue does not show it to be a universally sufficient cause. The firm benefit retained by some absent companions also prevents a simple rule that improvement always requires uninterrupted attendance.

The places.

- **128b.** ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν — Theages wants Socrates to spend time with him
- **129e.** τῶν μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων — time together supplies the context of the daimonic power’s influence
- **129e.** μετ’ ἐμοῦ διατρίβουσιν; τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν — both simple and compound verbs occur in the account of blocked benefit

- **130a.** ὅσον ἂν μετ’ ἐμοῦ χρόνον ὦσιν — some improve only during continued presence
- **130a.** διατρίβων … ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ — Aristides’ former progress was large and rapid
- **130a.** μετ’ ἐμοῦ διατρίβοντα Θουκυδίδην — Thucydides is another companion, not a named successor in an office

In this edition. “Spend time” and “spend time with” are kept apart from “being with”. The variation makes available a practical distinction between duration in company and the association considered as a relation. It does not impose a rigid technical opposition between two kinds of Socratic school.

See also. Association; Progress and retention; Aristides and Thucydides; Learning without instruction.

State, gradual loss, and draining away

ἕξις (hexis); προλείπειν (proleipein); ἐξαίφνης (exaiphnēs); κατὰ σμικρόν (kata smikron); ἐκρεῖν (ekrhein)

The word. Hexis is a condition or state, often something one has or holds. In later philosophical usage it can acquire highly specific senses, but here its meaning must come from the story. Proleipein means to leave or fail someone. Exaiphnēs means suddenly; kata smikron, little by little. Ekrhein is to flow out; its perfect form exerryēke presents something as having drained away.

In Theages. Socrates asks whether Aristides’ power left him suddenly or gradually. Aristides chooses gradual loss. At the end of his account of increasing benefit through nearness, he summarises the result of absence: “all that state has drained away”. The demonstrative “that” refers back to his former condition. It is not the introduction of a

separately defined philosophical virtue, and no inventory of its constituent knowledge is supplied.

The liquid metaphor makes the loss vivid. What once seemed plentiful and increasing no longer remains. Yet a metaphor does not establish that a literal fluid or substance passed from Socrates into his companion and later leaked out. Likewise, the noun hexis does not warrant importing a developed theory of stable habits merely because such a theory elsewhere uses the same word. Here the condition turns out to be unstable; that is why Aristides exemplifies the class whose benefit fails after separation.

The perfect “has drained away” stresses the resulting present lack. Aristides’ earlier comparison was temporal: before sailing he could engage with anyone; now he flees educated people. The final metaphor gathers that contrast into a single image. The text gives no precise interval for the loss, no named cause beyond the narrative association with absence, and no account of recovery after his return.

The difference between acquisition and retention also matters. He made great progress in a short time, but the power departed gradually. Rapid initial change cannot therefore be treated as proof of durable possession. Socrates tells Theages this before agreeing to begin association, so the new applicant hears a warning about what may happen even after apparent success.

The places.

- **130a.** ἀπόσχωνται … πάλιν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν — some companions lose their distinction after keeping away
- **130c.** ἐξαίφνης σε προύλιπεν … ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν — Socrates expressly asks about the rate of loss

- **130c.** κατὰ σμικρόν — Aristides answers that the process was gradual
- **130e.** πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἡ ἕξις — “all that state” sums up his lost condition
- **130e.** ἐξερρύηκε — the perfect verb presents it as now drained away

In this edition. “State” translates hexis without importing “habit”, “virtue” or “knowledge” as an unargued technical identification. “Has drained away” preserves the image and its completed present result. The same passage calls the lost capacity “power”, allowing the reader to connect the descriptions without treating them as interchangeable technical definitions.

See also. Power; Progress and retention; Rivalry and shame; Nearness and touch.

Statesmen and affairs of the city

πολιτικός (politikos); τὰ πολιτικά (ta politika); Θεμιστοκλῆς (Themistoklēs); Περικλῆς (Periklēs); Κίμων (Kimōn)

The word. Politikos concerns the city and civic affairs. Used of persons in the plural, hoi politikoi is rendered “the statesmen”; ta politika denotes “the affairs of the city”. The adjective does not itself assert that everyone bearing the name has one fully articulated political science. Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon are named examples of accomplished public men.

In Theages. After Theages distinguishes willing leadership from tyranny, Socrates names these three and asks whether he means men who have become clever at civic affairs. Theages emphatically agrees (126a). Their function is to give recognizable content to his ambition. He is not asking to rule patients as a doctor or crops as a farmer, but

to attain the kind of public standing and competence associated with these men.

Socrates next recommends practitioners who deal with their own and other cities, on the model of experienced horsemen and javelin-throwers. Theages answers with an objection about their sons (126c–d). This challenges the educational capacity of the political class without yet denying that the named men possessed political skill. Competence in conducting affairs and competence in transmitting that ability are different claims.

At 127a an introduction to an Athenian fine and good in political matters is still offered as a practical option, with free association and increased reputation. Later the father's own offices and honor make him a plausible source of civic benefit (127d–e). Theages nevertheless prefers Socrates. The dialogue thus refuses an easy equation between public credentials and the particular benefit sought through association.

The source note compares the Gorgias' treatment of Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon. That other dialogue's judgment that they did not make the citizens better must not be imported as an already established conclusion here. Theages argues about the statesmen's sons and their ability to hand over wisdom. The object, scope and evidential basis of the criticism are more specific.

The places.

- **126a.** Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων — The three men clarify the kind of leadership desired
- **126a.** τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν — Their competence concerns civic affairs

- **126c.** τοὺς πολιτικοὺς τούτους — The class is proposed as the source of the corresponding education
- **127e.** τῆς … τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας — Theages' dissatisfaction is with association with statesmen

In this edition. "Statesmen" and "affairs of the city" preserve the distinction between people and subject matter. The main biographical details in the source note identify the examples; they are not needed as premises in the local argument. No separate noun politikē technē is printed in this stretch, and the lexicon does not falsely quote one.

See also. Voluntary rule · Practical expertise · Statesmen's sons · Good citizenship

Statesmen and their sons

ὑός (hyos); σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos); παραδιδόναι (paradidonai); ὠφελεῖν (ōphelein); ἀνόητος (anoētos)

The word. Hyos is the form of "son" printed in this text, alongside inflected forms such as hyeis. Skytotomos is literally a leather-cutter and conventionally a shoemaker. Paradidonai is to hand over or transmit. Ōphelein means to benefit. Anoētos means senseless or unthinking. The conjunction of transmission and benefit makes a teacher's own possession of wisdom only one part of the required claim.

In Theages. Theages has heard arguments attributed to Socrates that the sons of statesmen are no better than shoemakers' sons. He adds that this agrees with what he can perceive (126d). He would therefore be senseless, he says, to expect a statesman to hand his wisdom to him

while failing to benefit his own son, if he were capable of benefiting anyone in those matters.

The reasoning depends on a plausible expectation of parental concern: a father capable of such benefit would use that capacity for his own child. But the text does not separately investigate willingness, the pupil's aptitude, opportunity or differences among fathers and sons. The objection is forceful within the assumptions of the scene, especially because Demodocus' care is conspicuous. It is not a formally exhaustive proof that no political wisdom can ever be taught.

The statement also has a distinctive evidential status. Theages reports what people say Socrates argues. He does not quote a speech Socrates has just made in this conversation. Socrates answers by asking what he would do with a son who rejected painters while wanting to paint. That reply emphasizes the problem of an alternative; it does not explicitly retract the reported argument or supply evidence that the statesmen's sons are in fact excellent.

The comparison with shoemakers does not declare their sons inferior by nature. Its force is precisely the absence of the improvement that might be expected from a politically distinguished father. Treating it as a biological theory of heredity or a blanket condemnation of craftsmen would obscure the educational issue.

The places.

- **126d.** οὕς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς λόγους — Theages cites arguments attributed to Socrates
- **126d.** οἱ ὑεῖς οὐδὲν βελτίους εἰσὶν ἢ οἱ τῶν σκυτοτόμων — The comparison concerns the sons' quality

- **126d.** παραδοῦναι τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν — Wisdom is imagined as something handed over
- **126d.** εἴ τι οἷός τ’ ἦν … ὠφελεῖν — The inference turns on the father’s capacity to benefit

In this edition. The note points to Protagoras 319e–320b and Meno 93a–94e. Those passages supply parallels, not an unnamed list of particular sons asserted in Theages itself. The printed paradounai is “hand over”; the apparatus reports W’s prodounai as a variant. The companion follows the printed transmission language.

See also. Statesmen · Demodocus · Painters · Learning without instruction

Subjects of learning and the promise to educate

μάθημα (mathēma); μανθάνειν (manthanein); παιδεύειν (paideuein); μακάριος (makarios)

The word. Mathēma is something learned, a lesson or subject of study. Manthanein means to learn, and paideuein to educate or train. Makarios is blessed or fortunate; Socrates’ “blessed and fine subjects” is an elevated characterization whose tone has to be heard in the exchange. The vocabulary of learning need not imply a fixed institutional syllabus.

In Theages. Theages’ childhood instruction in letters, the cithara and wrestling establishes that he has already learned recognizable subjects (122e–123a). What he now wants is another wisdom, one associated with ruling. The examples of painters and instrumental musicians later repeat the ordinary expectation that a learner goes to the appropriate practitioners (126e). The sophists are then

introduced as men professing the ability to educate young people (127e–128a).

Socrates says he does not know their fine subjects, except for his small subject of love (128b). The statement leaves the proposed educational content unspecified rather than replacing it with a list of Socratic doctrines. The final Aristides story sharpens the distinction: Aristides says he never learned anything from Socrates, although he improved during their association (130d). The reader must therefore avoid using "learning", "education", "association" and "benefit" as exact synonyms.

The contrast does not show that nothing was said in the meetings. Aristides describes being in the room while Socrates speaks and looking at him. His denial concerns learning something from him in the sense he claims to understand, not the absence of all conversation. Nor does the denial refute the earlier value of letters or music. It concerns the character of one reported benefit, which is not reducible to acquiring a stated subject.

The places.

- **126e.** μὴ ἐθέλοντα παρὰ τούτων μανθάνειν — The hypothetical pupil refuses to learn from practitioners
- **127e.** παιδεύειν … νέους ἀνθρώπους — The sophists profess an ability to educate young men
- **128b.** τῶν μακαρίων τε καὶ καλῶν μαθημάτων — Socrates disclaims the fine subjects
- **128b.** σμικροῦ τινος μαθήματος — The "small subject" of love is an express exception

In this edition. "Subject" follows mathēma, and "learn" follows manthanein. The repeated lexical distinctions preserve the puzzle of benefit without lessons. Modern

labels such as “curriculum” or “knowledge transfer” can summarize a question but should not be passed off as the text’s own terminology.

See also. Education · Love · Sophists · Learning without instruction

Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men

Τίμαρχος (Timarchos); Κλειτόμαχος (Kleitomachos); Φιλήμων (Philēmōn); Φιλημονίδης (Philēmonidēs); Νικίας (Nikias); Ἡροσκάμανδρος (Hēroskamandros); Εὔαθλος (Euathlos); ἐπιβουλή (epiboulē); ἀποκτείνειν (apokteinein)

The word. Epiboulē is a plot or hostile design; apokteinein means to kill. The names establish a small network of actors, witnesses and victims. Patronymics identify people, not additional participants in the action: Philemonides is Philemon’s father, and Heroscamandrus is Nicias’ father. The printed name is Heroscamandrus, not a separate person called Scamander. Namesakes should not be identified without evidence.

In Theages. Timarchus and Philemon son of Philemonides alone know the plot to kill Nicias son of Heroscamandrus. At a drinking party Timarchus announces a temporary departure. Socrates experiences the voice and insists he remain. The same happens on a second attempt. The third time Timarchus waits until Socrates’ attention is elsewhere, leaves silently, and does the deeds for which he is going to die.

The framing narrative supplies two additional figures. Clitomachus is Timarchus’ brother and the person whom the listeners can ask about his final statement. Euathlus, identified as the stadion-runner, sheltered Timarchus when he fled and is represented as going to death with

him. Euathlus is not named as the companion in the original murder plot; that role belongs to Philemon. The passage does not state Philemon's eventual fate or explain every judicial step connecting the actions to the condemned men's deaths.

Timarchus' final attribution is that he dies because he would not obey Socrates. The narrative makes the ignored warning central without saying Socrates knew the plot at the party. Indeed, "the two of them alone knew" excludes that inference at the relevant moment. The sign functions as an effective prohibition whose reason need not be consciously available to Socrates.

The account is retrospective testimony within Socrates' narration. It is not a reproduced court record. The edition's note emphasises how little independent identification is possible: proposed connections for Euathlus and Philemon with other ancient references remain unestablished. Nicias here must especially not be confused with the famous general associated with the subsequent Sicilian example.

The places.

- **129a.** τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον — Clitomachus is the brother and accessible witness
- **129a.** Εὔαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν … ὑπεδέξατο φεύγοντα — Euathlus is the runner who sheltered the fugitive
- **129a–b.** Τίμαρχος καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ Φιλημονίδου — these are the two plotters
- **129b.** ἀποκτενοῦντες Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου — the intended victim is identified with his own patronymic
- **129b.** ἠπιστάσθην … αὐτὼ μόνω τὴν ἐπιβουλήν — dual forms stress the plotters' exclusive knowledge

- **129c.** διεπράξατο ἐξ ὧν ἤει ἀποθανούμενος — deeds and consequent death are linked without a detailed trial narrative

In this edition. Note 33 distinguishes secure roles from uncertain historical identifications. At 129a †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου† is marked corrupt; note 32 records conjectures meaning “the executioner” or “the public prison”. The printed corruption must not be treated as evidence for a religious destination or silently replaced by either conjecture.

See also. Obedience and departure; Witnesses; Sicily and the current expedition; Daimonic and divine.

Trial, permission, and an open ending

πεῖρα (peira); ἀποπειρᾶσθαι (apopeirasthai); παρείκειν (pareikein); διακωλύειν (diakōlyein); ἐναντιοῦσθαι (enantiousthai)

The word. Peira is a trial, attempt or test. Apopeirasthai means to make trial of something; the prefix does not turn every use into a controlled experiment. Pareikein means to give way or yield; here it is to allow the association. Diakōlyein is to prevent or hinder, while enantiousthai is to oppose. Permission and active assistance are therefore distinct notions both lexically and in Socrates’ explicit account.

In Theages. At 129d Socrates offers the still-current military expedition as a test of the sign. Theages takes up the language of trying in his final proposal: they should test the daimonic by being with one another. This is a practical response to uncertain eligibility, not a theoretical refutation of Socrates’ story. If it allows them, that is best; otherwise they will immediately deliberate about another associate or a religious appeal.

The proposal is hopeful but does not settle all the risks just explained. Socrates has distinguished people who are not prevented from being with him but receive no benefit. Even helped companions do not uniformly keep what they gain. Theages' first conditional asks whether they are allowed to associate; it does not explicitly formulate separate tests for benefit and permanence. A reader may observe this limitation without making Theages assert that permission guarantees every educational result.

The daimonic's approval is not actually reported at the close. Demodocus urges Socrates to stop opposing the lad, and Socrates agrees that, if this seems the course to take, they should take it. Agreement between the human participants begins the trial. It is not itself a new occurrence of the sign, a narrated divine verdict or evidence that the proposed sacrifices have worked. No subsequent lesson or progress is shown.

The ending therefore resolves the immediate negotiation while preserving the central uncertainty. The father's wish for a trustworthy associate and the son's attraction to Socrates produce a plan. What this association will yield remains conditional. Reading the last assent as a completed enrolment with guaranteed success erases the very warning that makes the test necessary.

The places.

- **129d.** πεῖραν … λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου — the current forecast is open to testing
- **129e.** ἐναντιοῦται — active opposition excludes some associations
- **129e.** συνεῖναι μὲν οὐ διακωλύει, ὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδέν — permission does not entail benefit

- **131a.** ἀποπειραθῆναι … συνόντας ἀλλήλοις — Theages proposes a trial through reciprocal association
- **131a.** ἐὰν μὲν παρείκῃ ἡμῖν — the first question is whether the power allows them
- **131a.** βουλευσόμεθα ὅτι δράσομεν — alternatives remain subject to further deliberation
- **131a.** εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι … ποιῶμεν — Socrates' assent concludes the conversation, not the trial

In this edition. "Make trial" links the two testing passages. "If it allows us" keeps permission distinct from the earlier "takes a hand". The apparatus records a conjectured deletion of "that is best", but the printed text retains it. Neither text nor translation supplies a successful outcome beyond the final agreement.

See also. Voice and sign; Progress and retention; Prayer and sacrifice; Mastery and chance.

Tyranny, the tyrant, and the tyrant-teacher

τύραννος (tyrannos); τυραννεῖν (tyrannein); τυραννικός (tyrannikos); τυραννοδιδάσκαλος (tyrannodidaskalos)

The word. Tyrannos is tyrant; tyrannein to be or act as a tyrant; tyrannikos tyrannical or pertaining to tyranny. Tyrannodidaskalos combines tyrant and teacher: a "tyrant-teacher," here a comic prospective instructor. The noun "tyranny" is an English organizing title for this family; the argument's relevant printed phrase is tyrannical archē, rule. The lexical family should not be treated as proof that the abstract noun tyrannis occurs here.

In Theages. The designation enters after a list of rulers and a comparison with oracle-singers' common title.

Theages identifies Hippias and Periander as tyrants (124e). Socrates then infers that whoever wants to rule everyone in the city desires the same rule as these men, tyrannical rule. The boy grants that this follows from what he has said, and Socrates jokingly rebukes him for wanting to be "our" tyrant.

The personal pronoun and address sharpen the political comedy. A vague educational aspiration now looks like a threat to the speakers themselves. The father, too, is mockingly blamed for withholding the means of producing a qualified practitioner. The tyrant-teacher turns the familiar request for a sophist into an unsettling apprenticeship (125a).

The inference nevertheless needs qualification. Governing the same population does not by itself establish the same manner or warrant of government. Theages later identifies exactly such a difference: he seeks willing subjects rather than force or the conduct of tyrants (126a). His earlier answer was insufficiently specified; Socrates' inference makes that insufficiency visible. It is not an independent proof that all comprehensive civic leadership is tyranny.

Theages also admits he would pray to become a tyrant over everyone, or as many as possible, and even to become a god (125e–126a). This admission prevents the correction from becoming a simple declaration of republican modesty. He distinguishes an expansive hypothetical wish from the educational desire he was trying to state. The dialogue reports this distinction without resolving all its moral tensions.

The poetic claim that tyrants are wise through association with wise people (125b) then directs attention to instruction. What must such companions know? The craft substitutions do not produce an answer, and the Callicrite

joke provokes protest. No functioning tyrant-school is finally discovered. The term remains an instrument for exposing ambition and testing the teacher model, rather than the name of a program the dialogue endorses.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **124e.** τύραννοι — Theages' designation of Hippias and Periander
- **124e.** τυραννικῆς — The alleged character of the rule he desires
- **124e–125a.** τυραννεῖν … ἡμῶν; τυραννοδιδασκάλου — The personal rebuke and imagined instructor
- **125a.** σοφὸς … τύραννος — The proposed outcome of association
- **125e.** ἐπίσταται τυραννικά — The Callicrite quotation's "tyrannical things"
- **126a.** οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι — Theages' explicit correction concerning mode of rule

In this edition. Burnet brackets διδασκάλου before τυραννοδιδασκάλου at 125a; the English omits the bracketed word. Note 16 describes the compound as perhaps coined for the joke and notes a later occurrence in Cassius Dio. This does not authorize a confident claim about its first invention. The Key Words note that "tyrant" need not mean cruel in every historical use, while this dialogue eventually makes force Theages' explicit contrast.

See also. Rulers · Desire · Wish and willingness · Craft

Voice, sign, and turning away

φωνή (phōnē); σημεῖον (sēmeion); σημαίνειν (sēmainein); ἀποτροπή (apotropē); ἀποτρέπειν (apotrepein); προτρέπειν (protrepein)

The word. Phōnē means “voice” or vocal sound; sēmeion is a “sign”, and sēmainein means to signal or indicate. The noun apotropē expresses a turning away; apotrepein performs that turning, while protrepein turns someone towards an action or urges it. These distinctions separate the phenomenon experienced, its significance, and the response it calls for. None by itself supplies the words of a spoken oracle.

In Theages. Socrates’ first definition is unusually exact: whenever the voice comes, it signals a turning away from what he is about to do, and never turns him towards anything. The qualification “whenever it comes” matters. He does not claim that every projected action produces a sign, and a silent occasion is not expressly an instruction to proceed. Friends’ consultations can occasion the same prohibition. The narrative therefore extends the sign’s practical bearing beyond Socrates while retaining its negative form.

The anecdotes distinguish occurrence from interpretation. Charmides hears Socrates report the voice and supposes that it predicts failure to win. That supposition is Charmides’ interpretation; Socrates’ reported warning was simply not to train. In the Timarchus episode, the voice occurs on two attempted departures. Socrates conveys prohibitions, although the murderous plan is known only to the conspirators. The narrative attributes preventive significance to the sign without saying that it revealed their secret purpose in words.

At 129d the sign prompts Socrates' fear for Sannion and the army. "I think" and "I am afraid" introduce Socrates' forecast. His description does not collapse the occurrence of the sign into an explicit divine statement of all its predicted consequences. Likewise, the later educational account says that the daimonic power sometimes helps an association. This positive efficacy should not be rewritten as a newly reported encouraging voice: the text retains a distinction between the voice's prohibitive signalling and the power's broader effects.

The places.

- **128d.** ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή — Socrates identifies the daimonic occurrence as a voice
- **128d.** σημαίνει … ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε — its stated direction is away, never towards
- **128d.** ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν — the same prevention extends to a consulting friend
- **128e.** ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή; σημαίνει σοι — an occurrence and Charmides' proposed interpretation are distinguished
- **129b.** τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον — the voice is redescribed as the familiar sign
- **129d.** πεῖραν … τοῦ σημείου — the sign's significance is offered for a prospective test

In this edition. "Voice", "sign", "signal" and "turning away" preserve the lexical sequence. The opening account is compared with the Apology in note 29, but the edition's Introduction cautions against transferring all the broader powers described here into that other dialogue. The report gives no account of timbre, volume or private sensory mechanism.

See also. Daimonic and divine; Charmides and training; Witnesses; Trial and permission.

Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition

βία (bia); ἑκών (hekōn); εὔχεσθαι (euchesthai); θεός (theos); ἄρχειν (archein)

The word. Bia is force or violence; biai, its dative, means by force. Hekōn means willing or voluntary; the genitive plural hekontōn supplies the people over whom one rules. Euchesthai means to pray or wish in the form of a prayer. Theos is a god. These words distinguish the manner of rule, the consent of its subjects and the scope of an aspirational wish.

In Theages. Socrates initially identifies a desire to rule everyone in the city with tyrannical rule (124e). Theages later concedes that he would pray to become a tyrant over all people, or as many as possible, and perhaps still more to become a god. He attributes the same wish to Socrates and everyone else (125e–126a). That universal psychological claim is his assertion, not a thesis the dialogue independently establishes or Socrates expressly endorses.

Theages then makes the crucial distinction: this is not what he said he desired. He wants to rule citizens who are willing, neither by force nor as tyrants do. The distinction is not between having power and renouncing all power; it concerns the kind of political relationship he intends. Naming Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon gives the clarification recognizable models.

The exchange reveals the incompleteness of defining a political skill solely by its subjects. A ruler of the whole civic population might be described through the extent of

rule, but consent and mode of exercise are further questions. The earlier inference from “all” to “tyrannical” does not incorporate those qualifications. Theages’ correction therefore has argumentative substance even if his unlimited prayer makes his ambition comic or troubling.

Neither “democracy” nor a constitutional theory of consent is expounded. The genitive “of willing people” identifies the desired relation without specifying elections, laws or institutions. The final agreement to try association likewise concerns the willingness of Socrates and Theages under divine conditions, but that parallel does not turn the dialogue into a systematic theory of voluntary authority.

The places.

- **125e–126a.** Εὐξαίμην … τύραννος γενέσθαι — Theages states a hypothetical prayer for tyranny
- **126a.** ἔτι δέ γε ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι — Becoming a god extends the aspiration, with “perhaps” retained
- **126a.** ἀλλ’ οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν — He distinguishes this from the desire he meant to express
- **126a.** Οὐ βίᾳ γε … ἀλλ’ ἑκόντων — Force is excluded and willing subjects specified

In this edition. The translation keeps “pray”, “desire” and “willing” distinct. Recasting the whole speech as “I want to be a tyrant” would erase its explicit correction; treating it as a clean repudiation of every tyrannical aspiration would erase the preceding admission. Both belong in the interpretation.

See also. Desire · Wish and willingness · Tyranny · Statesmen

Wisdom and being wise

σοφία (sophia); σοφός (sophos); ἀμαθία (amathia)

The word. Sophia is wisdom or skill, sophos wise or skilled. In this dialogue the words can describe recognized practical competencies as readily as the undefined accomplishment Theages wants. Amathia, opposed to sophia at 123d, means lack of learning or stupidity in the edition's rendering. The initial lexical breadth is essential: one cannot assume from the first occurrence that "wisdom" already names philosophy, ethical perfection, or a universal science.

In Theages. Becoming wise is first reported as the son's desire and as the result a paid sophist is expected to produce (121c–d). Socrates gains agreement that wise people are those who have knowledge, whatever the subject of that knowledge (122e). This supplies a provisional general criterion. It does not identify the desired subject or prove that every recognized expert can teach.

Piloting and charioteering then exemplify wisdoms with distinct names (123b–d). When Theages gives the unqualified name "wisdom" for his own goal, Socrates recalls that charioteering too is wisdom, rather than stupidity. He converts the vague contrast between being wise and not wise into the more discriminating question "wise in what?" The next examples locate fields by what or whom a practitioner knows how to rule.

The political ambition emerges as the wisdom governing everyone in the city (124a–b). Its apparent identification with tyranny makes the word's value unstable: "wise tyrant" can name successful power without establishing moral goodness. The Euripidean line at 125b intensifies the

educational issue by saying that tyrants become wise through association with the wise. Repeated substitutions of farmers, cooks, and wrestlers demand the missing specification of what those companions know. Theages cannot name the relevant field (125d).

After he specifies willing subjects, the question becomes whether accomplished statesmen can transmit their wisdom. Theages' objection about their sons (126d) separates possession from transfer. Socrates' later praise of sophists as so wise that wealthy youths pay them (128a) adds commercial persuasiveness to the dialogue's competing evidences of wisdom; it is not an unqualified certification of the content sold.

Finally, Socrates professes almost no knowledge except the things of love, while Theages points to improved companions rather than a curriculum (128b–c). The resulting account explains conditions of benefit without defining the political wisdom first sought. The dialogue thus progressively tests the desire's objects and proposed sources, rather than closing with an authoritative definition that absorbs every use of sophia.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121c–d.** σοφὸς γενέσθαι; σοφὸν ποιήσει — Desired attainment and the expected teacher's production of it
- **122e.** Σοφοὺς … τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας — The provisional identification of wise people with knowers
- **123d.** ἡ ἡνιοχεία σοφία ἐστίν; ἢ ἀμαθία — Charioteering counts as wisdom rather than its contrary

- **124b.** ταύτην … τὴν σοφίαν — The comprehensive governing capacity is called wisdom
- **125b.** σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ — The poetic line links wisdom and association
- **126d.** παραδοῦναι τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν — Transmission becomes the disputed issue
- **128a.** οὕτω σοφοί εἰσιν — Socrates' description of fee-earning sophists

In this edition. The consistent "wise" and "wisdom" permit the reader to hear the breadth and repetition without silently replacing some occurrences with "expertise." Note 9 renders amathia "stupidity" and reserves "ignorance" for agnoia. That is a translation convention, not evidence that the dialogue develops an explicit theory separating two kinds of ignorance.

See also. Knowledge · Craft · Desire · Tyranny

Wish, willingness, and consent

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai); ἐθέλειν (ethelein); ἑκών (hekōn); ἕτοιμος (hetoimos)

The word. Boulesthai means to wish or want, and can also introduce a courteous suggestion. Ethelein means to be willing, sometimes simply to want. Hekōn means willing or acting voluntarily; its genitive plural ἑκόντων describes the people Theages proposes to rule. Hetoimos is ready. The edition differentiates these words without claiming that ordinary Greek always maintains a rigid philosophical taxonomy of desire, wish, and will.

In Theages. Boulesthai first helps establish the conversation: Socrates invites Demodocus to say what he wishes, and the father proposes withdrawing into the stoa (121a). Later Demodocus says he would most wish to

consult Socrates (122a). The language initially describes conversational cooperation rather than an obstacle to education.

Ethelein, by contrast, enters prominently through the son's accusation that his father is unwilling to introduce him to anyone (123a–b). The supposed educational problem is framed as someone else's refusal to act. The same pattern recurs in the hypothetical boy who wants painting but is unwilling to learn from painters (126e), and in Theages' request that Socrates be willing to be with him (127a). Asking who is unwilling gradually becomes as important as asking who is wise.

The political use of hekōn supplies a different but connected distinction. Theages wants to rule willing subjects, not through force or as tyrants do (126a). This corrects the earlier classification based solely on the population governed. Consent identifies a mode of rule, not a different trade or a smaller numerical constituency. Nothing in the passage proves that actual admired leaders always obtained unanimous consent.

The educational plot then tests whether the prospective participants' consent is enough. Demodocus begs Socrates to be willing and urges his son to seek no other companion (127b). Theages says his own part is ready, provided Socrates is willing (128b–c), and treats Socrates' wish as the condition sufficient for his improvement. Socrates rejects precisely that supposition: another power governs the association and its benefit.

The story of Timarchus adds a grave counterpoint. He says he is dying because he was unwilling to obey Socrates (129a), then is described as wishing to escape notice (129c). These are determinate choices within the story, not a general doctrine that all suffering follows unwillingness.

Across the dialogue, willingness makes cooperation possible but does not confer expertise, guarantee safety, or command the daimonic.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **121a.** εἴ τι βούλει λέγειν — Socrates opens a space for the father's wish to speak
- **123a.** οὐκ ἐθέλει — The father is accused of unwillingness
- **126a.** ἀλλ' ἑκόντων — Theages specifies willing subjects
- **127a.** εἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι — The boy makes a direct request for willing association
- **128b–c.** τό γ' ἐμὸν ἕτοιμον; ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ — Readiness and Socrates' supposed power to grant improvement
- **129a.** οὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι — Timarchus identifies his unwillingness to obey

In this edition. The Key Words distinguish "wish," "be willing," and willing subjects. At 128b Burnet brackets τι, but not the readiness clause or the expression of willingness. The latter therefore belongs to the accepted printed dialogue and must not be lost with the deleted particle.

See also. Desire · Rule and office · Demodocus · Fear and safety

Witness, accusation, and family conflict

μάρτυς (martys); μέμφεσθαι (memphesthai); μάχεσθαι (machesthai); κατειπεῖν (kateipein); φθονεῖν (phthonein); αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

The word. Martys is a witness; the accusative singular μάρτυρα and genitive plural μαρτύρων first identify people who could attest what has been said. Memphesthai means to blame or reproach, machesthai to fight or contend, and kateipein to speak out or tell against someone. Phthonein can mean to begrudge; aischynesthai to be ashamed. These words give the consultation a quasi-judicial and adversarial coloring without making it an actual lawsuit.

In Theages. Theages says his father already knows what he wants and presents ignorance deliberately. He describes the refusal of introductions as another way his father fights him (123a). Socrates does not decide the accusation on the strength of either party's prior report. Instead he asks Theages to make him a witness and state the desired wisdom in his presence (123b). The absent record of past conversations is replaced by an answer both can hear now.

The witness motif gives philosophical clarification a concrete interpersonal function. Determining the object of desire may change what counts as adequate care or unreasonable obstruction. Socrates' hypothetical examples retain the son's accusation against an unwilling father, but specify what the father would supposedly have failed to provide. A blameworthy refusal becomes intelligible only when the proposed benefit is identified.

Once tyranny appears to be the desired result, the courtroom coloring becomes comic. Socrates calls the boy a rascal and reproaches Demodocus for being ashamed

neither of his knowledge nor of withholding an appropriate instructor (124e–125a). He says the boy has spoken against him before a witness and proposes joint deliberation. The accusation of begrudging education is voiced by Socrates as part of this teasing reversal; it should not be recorded as the dialogue's established diagnosis of the father's motives.

The painter hypothetical later reverses the son's position: how would he respond to a child who demanded competence while rejecting the practitioners (126d–127a)? This asks him to judge the practical difficulty from the father's side. It does not erase his substantive objection that statesmen may be unable to transmit their wisdom.

At 128d Socrates again promises witnesses, now for the daimonic's action. That second use has a different evidential burden: named people and reported outcomes are offered to support extraordinary claims. The initial witness observes an answer directly; the later witnesses can allegedly confirm past events. The recurrence supports attention to evidence without treating the two contexts as identical proof procedures.

The places. Selected exact attestations and annotated passages.

- **123a.** μάχεταί τε — Theages characterizes his father's conduct as fighting him
- **123a–b.** ἄνευ μαρτύρων; ἐμὲ ποίησαι μάρτυρα — Socrates proposes to witness the boy's present statement
- **123b.** μέμφῃ τῷ πατρὶ — Blame of the father is incorporated into the hypothetical

- **125a.** φθονεῖς τε αὐτῷ; κατείρηκέ σου — Begrudging and speaking against the father appear in the comic reproach
- **125a.** οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ — Socrates asks whether Demodocus is ashamed
- **128d.** μάρτυρας παρέξομαι — Socrates promises witnesses to the daimonic sign's action

In this edition. "Speak out" at 123b and "spoken out against you" at 125a track the change in kateipein's object and function. "Begrudge" distinguishes phthonein here from the son's earlier emulation or envy, expressed by zēloun. The lexical difference matters: similar English emotional descriptions belong to different speakers and argumentative situations.

See also. Agreement and inquiry · Demodocus · Peer emulation · Tyranny

Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence

μάρτυς (martys); πυνθάνεσθαι (pynthanesthai); ἀκούειν (akouein); εἰδέναι (eidenai); πεῖρα (peira)

The word. Martys is a witness, someone able to attest a matter. Pynthanesthai means to inquire or find out, often by asking; akouein is to hear and, with a source specified, to hear from someone. Eidenai means to know. Peira is a trial or test. These words distinguish testimony about an already completed event from experience that may test a claim still open to confirmation.

In Theages. Socrates announces that he will provide witnesses for the sign's effects. The following stories do not all offer evidence of the same kind. Charmides can be asked what resulted from the training undertaken against

the warning, but the audience is not told the result within this dialogue. Clitomachus can report Timarchus' final explanation of why he is going to die. Socrates supplies the preceding party narrative. Concerning Sicily, many people can reportedly attest what Socrates said before the army's destruction. These are invitations to consult named or plural informants, not scenes in which those informants appear and give independent evidence before Theages.

Sannion's case explicitly changes the time structure. Past occurrences can be heard from those who know; now the listeners can test whether the sign says anything of consequence. Sannion has already departed, and Socrates forecasts death or something close and fears for the army. The outcome is not narrated. Treating all four examples as completed and equally verified predictions eliminates the contrast Socrates himself draws.

The later Aristides story has another evidential qualification. It is Socrates' report of Aristides' self-description. Aristides insists that what he says is unbelievable but true, and twice qualifies his remembered advantage by apparent standing or how it seemed to him. The dialogue does not independently measure his progress or reproduce a test of his former and present abilities. His testimony remains important evidence within the dramatic argument; its form also limits what the reader can conclude.

The places.

- **128d.** μάρτυρας παρέξομαι — Socrates promises witnesses for the preventive effects
- **128e–129a.** ἄξιον … πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ — Charmides' outcome is referred to inquiry
- **129a.** Κλειτόμαχον ἔρεσθε — the audience is invited to question Timarchus' brother

- **129c–d.** πολλῶν ἀκούσεσθον — many informants can report the Sicilian predictions
- **129d.** τὰ … παρεληλυθότα τῶν εἰδότων … ἀκοῦσαι — completed events have knowledgeable witnesses
- **129d.** πεῖραν … νυνὶ λαβεῖν — the current expedition supplies a prospective test
- **130d.** ἄπιστον … ἀληθές — Aristides acknowledges the incredibility of his own claim while asserting its truth

In this edition. The translation retains the invitations to ask and hear, and keeps “I think” in the Sannion forecast. Notes 34 and 36 provide historical context without making the dialogue narrate later news. The distinction between a textual assertion and independently established evidence remains indispensable.

See also. Charmides and training; Timarchus and the murder plot; Sicily and the current expedition; Learning without instruction.

Defined vocabulary register

Each headword below has a local definition, an actual printed form and a Stephanus reference. Multiple inflections or senses are grouped under one Greek headword; a repeated form at the same place is not counted twice. Dictionary forms and attested forms remain distinct. The register includes persons and places where they matter to the argument, and ordinary vocabulary where its local force would otherwise be easy to miss. It does not claim to be an unfiltered token concordance.

Accept προσδέχεσθαι

προσδέχεσθαι (prosdechesthai)

Accept. Receive Theages' company, the action he wants his father to persuade Socrates to take. Attested: προσδέξασθαι (127c). Corruption and choosing an associate (p. 40).

Accompany παρέπεσθαι

Accompany. To follow alongside; the participle describes the daimonic phenomenon's continuing relation to Socrates. Attested: παρεπόμενον (128d). Divine allotment, accompaniment, and childhood (p. 51).

Advice συμβουλή

συμβουλή (symboulē)

Advice. The practice described proverbially as sacred. Attested: συμβουλὴ (122b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Advise συμβουλεύειν

συμβουλεύειν (symbouleuein)

Advise. The active contribution Demodocus requests from Socrates. Attested: συμβουλεύειν (122a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Aeacus Αἰακός

Αἰακός (Aiakos)

Aeacus. The father whose name identifies Peleus. Attested: Αἰακοῦ (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Aegisthus Αἴγισθος

Αἴγισθος (Aigisthos)

Aegisthus. The ruler introduced as the killer of Agamemnon and ruler in Argos. Attested: Αἴγισθος (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Affairs πρᾶγμα

πρᾶγμα (pragma)

Affairs. Demodocus' own experience supplies his basis for comparison with other cases. Attested: πραγμάτων (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Affairs of the city τὰ πολιτικά

τὰ πολιτικά (ta politika)

Affairs of the city. The civic matters in which Themistocles, Pericles and Cimon are described as skilled. Attested: τὰ πολιτικὰ (126a). Statesmen and affairs of the city (p. 124).

Agamemnon Ἀγαμέμνων

Ἀγαμέμνων (Agamemnōn)

Agamemnon. The victim whose killing identifies Aegisthus in Socrates' question. Attested: Ἀγαμέμνονα (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Agree together συνομολογεῖν

συνομολογεῖν (synomologein)

Agree together. The adults are first to identify a common object of deliberation. Attested: συνομολογήσωμεν (122b). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

All together σύμπας

σύμπας (sympas)

All together. The woodworking activities are grouped within one competence. Attested: συμπάντων (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Allow ἐᾶν

Allow. To permit; its negation here describes the sign's refusal to let a consulting friend proceed. Attested: ἐᾷ (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Alone μόνος

μόνος (monos)

Alone. Theages specifies that the sick are included but not the sole group he means. Attested: μόνον (124a). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Amphilytus Ἀμφίλυτος

Ἀμφίλυτος (Amphilytos)

Amphilytus. The oracle-singer called “our own” by Socrates; the edition notes Herodotus’ Acarnanian identification. Attested: Ἀμφίλυτος (124d). Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus (p. 87).

Anacreon Ἀνακρέων

Ἀνακρέων (Anakreōn)

Anacreon. The poet of the song about Callicrite invoked to tease out the missing subject of tyrannical knowledge. Attested: Ἀνακρέων (125d). Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things (p. 31).

Anagyrasians Ἀναγυράσιος

Ἀναγυράσιος (Anagyrasios)

Anagyrasians. Demodocus’ fellow demesmen, identified by the deme Anagyrus in the edition’s note. Attested: Ἀναγυρασίων (127e). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Animals ζῷον

ζῷον (zōion)

Animals. Animal life is expressly included alongside plants. Attested: ζῷα (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Answer ἀποκρίνεσθαι

ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

Answer. The hypothetical asks what identifying reply the boy would give. Attested: ἀπεκρίνω (123b). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Appeared παραφαίνεσθαι

παραφαίνεσθαι (paraphainesthai)

Appeared. Demodocus describes Socrates' timely arrival in their path. Attested: παρεφάνης (122a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Archelaus Ἀρχέλαος

Ἀρχέλαος (Archelaos)

Archelaus. The recent ruler in Macedonia included in the same-population comparison. Attested: Ἀρχέλαον (124d). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Are ashamed αἰσχύνεσθαι

αἰσχύνεσθαι (aischynesthai)

Are ashamed. Socrates' mock reproach toward the father for withholding the supposed education. Attested: αἰσχύνῃ (125a). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Feel shame. To be ashamed; Aristides' emotion concerns his present poor quality and inability to face educated people. Attested: αἰσχύνομαι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Argos Ἄργος

Ἄργος (Argos)

Argos. The place in which the dialogue asks about Aegisthus' rule. Attested: Ἄργει (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Arguments λόγος

λόγος (logos)

Arguments. Unspecified pieces of discourse repeated by the peers; their truth and original source are not given.

Attested: λόγους (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Argument; discussion. Conversational or argumentative exchanges in which Aristides formerly seemed inferior to no one. Attested: λόγοις (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Aristides, the young companion Ἀριστείδης

Aristides, the young companion. Lysimachus' son and the older Aristides' grandson; the speaker who reports progress followed by loss during absence. Attested: Ἀριστείδης (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Aristides, the grandfather. The elder namesake in the genealogy, identified by the edition as Aristides the Just; not the returning companion. Attested: Ἀριστείδου (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Army στρατιά

Army; force. The body of troops for whose safety Socrates fears beyond the individual Sannion. Attested: στρατιᾶς (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Army στρατόπεδον

Army. Literally a camp or encamped army; the military force destroyed in the Sicilian disaster. Attested: στρατοπέδου (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Ask ἔρεσθαι

Ask; inquire. To question a person; the imperative directs the listeners to Clitomachus about Timarchus' final statement. Attested: ἔρεσθε (129a). Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence (p. 148).

Asking ἀνερωτᾶν

ἀνερωτᾶν (anerōtan)

Asking. Socrates imagines questioning the boy about the specific wisdom lacking. Attested: ἀνερωτῶν (123b). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

At once παραχρῆμα

At once. Immediately; the helped companions' progress is represented as beginning without delay. Attested: παραχρῆμα (129e). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

At the right time εἰς καλόν

εἰς καλόν (eis kalon)

At the right time. Socrates' encounter is welcomed as opportune for obtaining advice. Attested: εἰς καλὸν (122a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Bakis Βάκις

Βάκις (Bakis)

Bakis. One of the named oracle-singers, serving as an example of a familiar class. Attested: Βάκις (124d). Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus (p. 87).

Be a tyrant τυραννεῖν

τυραννεῖν (tyrannein)

Be a tyrant. The boy is mockingly said to desire tyranny over the present speakers. Attested: τυραννεῖν (124e). Tyranny, the tyrant, and the tyrant-teacher (p. 134).

Be afraid φοβεῖσθαι

Be afraid. To fear; Socrates expresses anxiety for the rest of the army without reporting its eventual fate. Attested:

φοβοῦμαι (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Be angry χαλεπαίνειν

Be angry. To be resentful or irritated; the emotion attributed to Thucydides in his quarrel. Attested: χαλεπαίνειν (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Be at a loss ἀπορεῖν

ἀπορεῖν (aporein)

Be at a loss. Demodocus' difficulty about what to do with his son and where to send him; a practical predicament. Attested: ἀπορεῖ (127a). Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative (p. 89).

Be corrupted διαφθείρειν

διαφθείρειν (diaphtheirein)

Be corrupted. The possible harm to the son from unsuitable association, not an already established injury. Attested: διαφθαρῇ (122a). Corruption and choosing an associate (p. 40).

Corrupt. The harm Demodocus fears an unsuitable associate might do to his son; no particular sophist is accused here. Attested: διαφθεῖραι (127c). Corruption and choosing an associate (p. 40).

Be earnest σπουδάζειν

σπουδάζειν (spoudazein)

Be earnest. The seriousness of Demodocus' concern for his son's improvement, which Socrates expressly acknowledges. Attested: ἐσπουδακέναι (127d). Joking mockery and serious clarification (p. 63).

Be gone οἴχεσθαι

Be gone. To have gone away; the idiomatic present places Sannion's departure before the conversation. Attested: οἴχεται (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Be honored τιμᾶσθαι

τιμᾶσθαι (timasthai)

Be honored. The passive honor Demodocus receives from his fellow demesmen and the wider city; not a claim that honor proves teaching ability. Attested: τιμᾷ (127e). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Be well thought of εὐδοκιμεῖν

εὐδοκιμεῖν (eudokimein)

Be well thought of. The reputational advantage Socrates says would follow association with an established Athenian. Attested: εὐδοκιμήσεις (127a). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Be with συνεῖναι

Be with. To be in someone's company; Aristides says his progress occurred whenever he was with Socrates. Attested: συνείην (130d). Association, being with, and coming together (p. 26).

Befitting the sacred ἱεροπρεπής

ἱεροπρεπής (hieroprepēs)

Befitting the sacred. The explicit religious coloring Socrates attributes to Theages' name. Attested: ἱεροπρεπές (122e). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Begetting children παιδοποιία

παιδοποιία (paidopoiia)

Begetting children. The alternative literal name for the production of a son. Attested: παιδοποιίαν (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Begin ἄρχεσθαι

ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

Begin. Socrates proposes starting from the boy's actual desire; this is not the political sense rule. Attested: ἄρχεσθαι (122d). Rule, rulers, and public office (p. 111).

Begin. To begin; here the participle dates the onset of the accompaniment rather than describing political rule. Attested: ἀρξάμενον (128d). Divine allotment, accompaniment, and childhood (p. 51).

Begrudge φθονεῖν

φθονεῖν (phthonein)

Begrudge. A motive jokingly charged against Demodocus, not established as the true reason for refusal. Attested: φθονεῖς (125a). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Being afraid δεδιέναι

δεδιέναι (dedienai)

Being afraid. The participle reinforces the father's ongoing fear for the boy. Attested: δεδιότι (121c). Fear, danger, and the question of safety (p. 58).

Being at leisure σχολάζειν

σχολάζειν (scholazein)

Being at leisure. Socrates says that he happens already to be available. Attested: σχολάζων (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Being sick κάμνειν

κάμνειν (kamnein)

Being sick. A condition that identifies medicine's relevant human group. Attested: καμνόντων (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Being with συνουσία

Being with; association. Company or conversation; this early occurrence denotes the present consultation, not a formal school or tuition contract. Attested: συνουσίας (122c). Association, being with, and coming together (p. 26).

Association as a means. Dative of the noun in the verse's claim that tyrants become wise through company with the wise. Attested: συνουσίᾳ (125b). Association, being with, and coming together (p. 26).

Companionships. Associations whose outcomes the daimonic power governs; the word alone does not imply successful instruction. Attested: συνουσίας (129e). Association, being with, and coming together (p. 26).

Benefit ὠφελεῖν

Benefit. To confer an advantage; Theages questions an educator's ability through the failure to benefit his own son. Attested: ὠφελῆσαι (126d). Benefit and taking a hand (p. 29).

Be benefited. To receive an advantage; these allowed companions receive none, so admission alone is insufficient. Attested: ὠφελοῦνται (129e). Benefit and taking a hand (p. 29).

Benefit ὠφελία

Benefit. The favourable result of association; some possess it firmly and lastingly, unlike companions whose advantage fades. Attested: ὠφελίαν (130a). Benefit and taking a hand (p. 29).

Best βέλτιστος

βέλτιστος (beltistos)

Best. Demodocus agrees to the revised procedure of first asking the boy. Attested: βέλτιστον (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Best. The superlative in a father's hope that his son become as good as possible. Attested: βέλτιστος (127d). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement (p. 61).

Best κράτιστος

κράτιστος (kratistos)

Best. The father judges that a supervised concession now offers the best available course. Attested: κράτιστον (122a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Better βελτίων

βελτίων (beltiōn)

Better. The comparative denied of the statesmen's sons in relation to shoemakers' sons; the relevant educational advantage is at issue. Attested: βελτίους (126d). Statesmen and their sons (p. 126).

Blame μέμφεσθαι

μέμφεσθαι (memphesthai)

Blame. The son's reproach is retained within the hypothetical pilot example. Attested: μέμφῃ (123b). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Blame. The son's reproach to his father, which the hypothetical-parent example asks him to reconsider. Attested: μέμφῃ (127a). Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative (p. 89).

Blessed μακάριος

μακάριος (makarios)

Blessed. The elevated description of the teachers' subjects, in Socrates' self-deprecating contrast. Attested: μακαρίων (128b). Subjects of learning and the promise to educate (p. 128).

Busyness ἀσχολία

ἀσχολία (ascholia)

Busyness. Possible competing occupation which Demodocus asks Socrates to set aside unless too great. Attested: ἀσχολία (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Call or address προσαγορεύειν

προσαγορεύειν (prosagoreuein)

Call or address. Socrates asks how they should address the boy. Attested: προσαγορεύωμεν (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Callicrite Καλλικρίτη

Καλλικρίτη (Kallikritē)

Callicrite. The woman whose knowledge of tyrannical things is attributed to Anacreon's song; printed spelling differs from principal manuscripts. Attested: Καλλικρίτην (125d). Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things (p. 31).

Campaign στρατεία

Campaign; military service. The unspecified military undertaking that takes Aristides away from Socrates; not identified with the preceding expeditions. Attested: στρατεία (130a). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Care for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (epimeleisthai)

Care for. The son's claim upon paternal attention and provision. Attested: ἐπιμεληθῆναί (121d). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Carpenters τέκτων

τέκτων (tektōn)

Carpenters. Woodworking practitioners are included in the comprehensive population. Attested: τεκτόνων (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Carpentry τεκτονική

τεκτονική (tektonikē)

Carpentry. The craft that coordinates the specified woodworking activities. Attested: τεκτονική (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Carry out διαπράττεσθαι

Carry out; accomplish. To perform the deeds in question; the narrative connects Timarchus' actions after departure with his ensuing death. Attested: διεπράξατο (129c). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Charioteering ἡνιοχεία

ἡνιοχεία (hēniocheia)

Charioteering. The printed noun for the activity that counts as wisdom. Attested: ἡνιοχεία (123d). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Charioteering ἡνιοχική

ἡνιοχική (hēniochikē)

Charioteering. The adjectival name supplied for expertise at directing chariots. Attested: ἡνιοχικήν (123c). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Chariots ἅρμα

ἅρμα (harma)

Chariots. A second object of the repeated verb pilot. Attested: ἅρματα (123c). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Charmides Χαρμίδης

Charmides. Son of Glaucon, the familiar young man whose athletic training against a warning is offered as a case for inquiry. Attested: Χαρμίδην (128d). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Choruses χορός

χορός (choros)

Choruses. The organized singing groups in the musical example. Attested: χοροῖς (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Cimon Κίμων

Κίμων (Kimōn)

Cimon. The third statesman named when Theages clarifies the sort of rule he wants. Attested: Κίμων (126a). Statesmen and affairs of the city (p. 124).

Cithara players κιθαριστής

κιθαριστής (kitharistēs)

Cithara players. Practitioners of the musical skill in Socrates' extension of the painter comparison. Attested: κιθαριστάς (126e). Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative (p. 89).

Citizen πολίτης

πολίτης (politēs)

Citizen. Member of the civic community; the beneficiary's desired quality is expressly civic here. Attested: πολίτην (127d). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement (p. 61).

City πόλις

πόλις (polis)

City. The proposed comprehensive civic domain of the desired wisdom. Attested: πόλει (124a). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Clever or skilled δεινός

δεινός (deinos)

Clever or skilled. The competence Socrates claims in love; it does not by itself mean morally good. Attested: δεινὸς (128b). Love as the small subject Socrates knows (p. 71).

Clitomachus Κλειτόμαχος

Clitomachus. Timarchus' brother and proposed witness to his final explanation; not one of the named murder plotters. Attested: Κλειτόμαχον (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Come γίγνεσθαι

Come; occur. To occur or come into being; here the occurrence of the voice, not an asserted physical movement into Socrates. Attested: γένηται (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Coming down καταβαίνειν

καταβαίνειν (katabainein)

Coming down. The peers' movement toward town, supporting but not proving a rural-home inference. Attested: καταβαίνοντες (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Coming to be with συγγίγνεσθαι

συγγίγνεσθαι (syngignesthai)

Coming to be with. The feared unsupervised association with another person. Attested: συγγενόμενός (122a). Corruption and choosing an associate (p. 40).

Come to be with. To enter into company or encounter someone; Theages uses it for the beginning of the companions' relation to Socrates. Attested: συνεγένοντο

(128c). Association, being with, and coming together (p. 26).

Consult ἀνακοινοῦσθαι

Consult. To communicate a matter for another's consideration; a friend's consultation can occasion the voice. Attested: ἀνακοινῶται (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Contests ἀγωνία

ἀγωνία (agōnia)

Contests. Other athletic exercises or contests, not the father's anxiety. Attested: ἀγωνίαν (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Converse διαλέγεσθαι

Converse; discuss. To speak with another in discussion; Aristides names his former ability to engage anyone, without defining a technical method. Attested: διαλέγεσθαι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Converse privately ἰδιολογεῖσθαι

ἰδιολογεῖσθαι (idiologeisthai)

Converse privately. Demodocus requests a private discussion about his son, not an already established formal lesson. Attested: ἰδιολογήσασθαι (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Cooks μάγειρος

μάγειρος (mageiros)

Cooks. Practitioners substituted into the poetic maxim; their familiar activity makes the question "wise in what?"

easy to answer. Attested: μάγειροι (125c). Poetry quotation and the authority of a famous line (p. 95).

Corinth Κόρινθος

Κόρινθος (Korinthos)

Corinth. The city in which Periander is said to rule. Attested: Κορίνθῳ (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Counsel βουλή

βουλή (boulē)

Counsel. Demodocus says the matter requires serious consideration. Attested: βουλῆς (125b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Count oneself ποιεῖσθαι

ποιεῖσθαι (poieisthai)

Count oneself. The printed verb in Socrates' claim to consider himself exceptionally clever in love; alternative readings are recorded in the apparatus. Attested: ποιοῦμαι (128b). Love as the small subject Socrates knows (p. 71).

Craft τέχνη

τέχνη (technē)

Craft. The desired competence is provisionally classified on the model of recognized expertise. Attested: τέχνην (124a). Craft, craftsmen, and the limits of the analogy (p. 42).

Craftsmen δημιουργός

δημιουργός (dēmiourgos)

Craftsmen. All occupational practitioners are included within the desired scope of government. Attested:

δημιουργῶν (124b). Craft, craftsmen, and the limits of the analogy (p. 42).

Craftsman. The boy's supposed attainable status as practitioner of the desired wisdom. Attested: δημιουργὸν (125a). Craft, craftsmen, and the limits of the analogy (p. 42).

Cultivated χαρίεις

Cultivated; refined. The superlative describes the socially and intellectually polished people whose company Aristides once sought. Attested: χαριεστάτων (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Customary εἰωθέναι

Customary; familiar. Perfect participle used adjectivally for the habitual sign, identifying it as a familiar experience. Attested: εἰωθὸς (129b). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Cyane Κυάνη

Κυάνη (Kyanē)

Cyane. The name identifying Callicrite's mother in the supplied interpretation, not a second proposed teacher. Attested: Κυάνης (125e). Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things (p. 31).

Cypselus Κύψελος

Κύψελος (Kypselos)

Cypselus. Periander's identifying father. Attested: Κυψέλου (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Daimonic thing δαιμόνιον

Daimonic thing. A substantivised neuter adjective for the accompanying divine phenomenon Socrates identifies as a voice; not a later evil demon. Attested: δαιμόνιον (128d). Daimonic and divine (p. 44).

Danger κίνδυνος

κίνδυνος (kindynos)

Danger. The serious exposure the father associates with the direction of the son's pursuit. Attested: κίνδυνον (122a). Fear, danger, and the question of safety (p. 58).

Dear φίλος

Dear; pleasing. In 'dear to the god', the adjective expresses the divine favour on which successful progress depends. Attested: φίλον (130e). Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings (p. 73).

Deliberate βουλεύεσθαι

βουλεύεσθαι (bouleuesthai)

Deliberate. Considering a course of action about education. Attested: βουλεύσαιτο (122b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Are deliberating. The joint activity whose object must be identified before advice can help. Attested: βουλευόμεθα (122b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Let us deliberate. The printed subjunctive proposes joint consideration of an instructor. Attested: βουλευώμεθα (125a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Demodocus Δημόδοκος

Δημόδοκος (Dēmodokos)

Demodocus. The father who seeks counsel, then participates in clarifying his son's educational desire. Attested: Δημόδοκε (122b). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Desire ἐπιθυμία

ἐπιθυμία (epithymia)

Desire. The son's current ambition, whose object and risks require examination. Attested: ἐπιθυμία (121c). Desire and its changing object (p. 49).

Desires ἐπιθυμεῖν

ἐπιθυμεῖν (epithymein)

Desires. The son is reported as wanting to become wise; the content remains to be clarified. Attested: ἐπιθυμεῖ (121c). Desire and its changing object (p. 49).

You desired. Burnet's printed imperfect introduces the hypothetical wish for piloting. Attested: ἐπεθύμεις (123b). Desire and its changing object (p. 49).

Destruction διαφθορά

Destruction. The ruin of the army in Sicily; this occurrence concerns military loss rather than the boy's possible educational corruption. Attested: διαφθορᾶς (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Die ἀποθνῄσκειν

Die. To die; the future participle describes Timarchus as going to his death after the deeds and flight. Attested: ἀποθανούμενος (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Differ διαφέρειν

Differ; stand apart. To be different or distinguished; the negated expression says certain absent companions again differ from no one. Attested: διαφέρουσιν (130a). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Discern in ἐνορᾶν

ἐνορᾶν (enoran)

Discern in. What neither interlocutor sees in Socrates: the listed distinctions attributed to Demodocus. Attested: ἐνορᾷ (127e). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Disobey ἀπιστεῖν

Disobey; distrust. To refuse belief or compliance; in the recap it refers to Timarchus' practical disregard of Socrates' warning. Attested: ἀπιστῆσαι (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Diviner μάντις

Diviner; prophet. An interpreter able to prescribe religious measures; these unnamed prospective advisers are distinct from the earlier oracle-singers. Attested: μάντεις (131a). Prayer, sacrifice, and soothing the divine (p. 101).

Do δρᾶν

Do; act. To carry out an action; Theages leaves the next step for deliberation if the proposed association is not allowed. Attested: δράσομεν (131a). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

Do a favor χαρίζεσθαι

χαρίζεσθαι (charizesthai)

Do a favor. Clarifying the desired knowledge is presented as enabling assistance. Attested: χαρισώμεθα (123a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Do good to εὐεργετεῖν

Do good to. To confer a good on someone; Demodocus asks Socrates to do Theages whatever good he can. Attested: εὐεργετῇς (127d). Benefit and taking a hand (p. 29).

Do your best προθυμεῖσθαι

προθυμεῖσθαι (prothymeisthai)

Do your best. Socrates urges Theages to supply a comparably precise description. Attested: προθυμοῦ (123e). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Drain away ἐκρεῖν

Drain away. To flow out; the perfect gives a vivid metaphor for the present loss of Aristides' entire former condition. Attested: ἐξερρύηκε (130e). State, gradual loss, and draining away (p. 122).

Drilling τρυπᾶν

τρυπᾶν (trypan)

Drilling. Boring holes as a coordinated woodworking operation. Attested: τρυπώντων (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Drinking party συμπόσιον

Drinking party. A gathering for drinking; the setting from which the conspirators intend to leave. Attested:

συμποσίου (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Earth γῆ

γῆ (gē)

Earth. The ground from which growing plants arise. Attested: γῆς (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Easiest ῥᾴδιος

ῥᾴδιος (rhaidios)

Easiest. Preparing and planting are comparatively the easy part of cultivation. Attested: ῥᾷστον (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Educated παιδεύειν

παιδεύειν (paideuein)

Educated. The father has already provided ordinary education. Attested: ἐπαίδευσεν (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Have been educated. Other boys of the relevant social standing provide the comparison. Attested: πεπαίδευνται (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Educate. The capacity professed by the named teachers, whose actual curriculum is not enumerated. Attested: παιδεύειν (127e). Subjects of learning and the promise to educate (p. 128).

Educated. The perfect passive participle marks someone who has received education, whose presence now makes Aristides withdraw. Attested: πεπαιδευμένον (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Education παιδεία

παιδεία (paideia)

Education. The subject of the consultation, extending to oneself and one's kin. Attested: παιδείας (122b). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Encounter ἐντυγχάνειν

ἐντυγχάνειν (entynchanein)

Encounter. Meet with someone, in the father's warning about a potentially corrupting associate. Attested: ἐντύχῃ (127c). Corruption and choosing an associate (p. 40).

Ephesus Ἔφεσος

Ephesus. A destination of the current campaign, named alongside Ionia in the forecast whose outcome remains open in the dialogue. Attested: Ἐφέσου (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Escape notice λανθάνειν

Escape notice. To act without being noticed; Timarchus deliberately conceals his third attempt to leave. Attested: λαθεῖν (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Euathlus Εὔαθλος

Euathlus. The stadion-runner who sheltered the fugitive Timarchus and is represented as going to death with him. Attested: Εὔαθλος (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Euripides Εὐριπίδης

Εὐριπίδης (Euripidēs)

Euripides. The poet to whom Socrates attributes the line about tyrants becoming wise through wise company.

Attested: Εὐριπίδης (125b). Poetry quotation and the authority of a famous line (p. 95).

Ever πώποτε

Ever. At any time; with the negation it strengthens Aristides' denial that he learned anything from Socrates. Attested: πώποτε (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction (p. 67).

Exercising γυμνάζεσθαι

γυμνάζεσθαι (gymnazesthai)

Exercising. The activity identifying the trainer's group. Attested: γυμναζομένων (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Exercise. To take bodily exercise; Charmides expects its benefit even if he does not win the race. Attested: γυμνασάμενός (128e). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Extensive πολύς

πολύς (polys)

Extensive. The amount of continued tending is large. Attested: πολλὴ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Farm γεωργεῖν

γεωργεῖν (geōrgein)

Farm. Demodocus speaks as one of those who cultivate land. Attested: γεωργοῦμεν (121b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Farmers γεωργός

γεωργός (geōrgos)

Farmers. Agricultural practitioners themselves become subjects of the wider proposed rule. Attested: γεωργῶν (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Farming γεωργική

γεωργική (geōrgikē)

Farming. The competence directing the enumerated agricultural operations. Attested: γεωργική (124a). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Father πατήρ

πατήρ (patēr)

Father. The person whom Theages expects to find an educative associate. Attested: πατέρα (122e). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Fear φόβος

φόβος (phobos)

Fear. The father's continuing emotional condition while caring for his son. Attested: φόβῳ (121c). Fear, danger, and the question of safety (p. 58).

Fee μισθός

μισθός (misthos)

Fee. Payment for the paid educational company, distinguished from free association with fellow citizens. Attested: μισθόν (128a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Fellow craftsman ὁμότεχνος

ὁμότεχνος (homotechnos)

Fellow craftsman. A practitioner of the same craft; applied jokingly to a male associate sharing Callicrite's purported expertise. Attested: ὁμότεχνος (125d–e). Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things (p. 31).

Fellow demesmen δημότης

δημότης (dēmotēs)

Fellow demesmen. Companions from the same local Athenian community. Attested: δημοτῶν (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Fights μάχεσθαι

μάχεσθαι (machesthai)

Fights. The boy's adversarial description of the father's refusal. Attested: μάχεταί (123a). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Find ἐξευρίσκειν

ἐξευρίσκειν (exeuriskein)

Find. The practical task assigned to the father: securing a suitable man to be with. Attested: ἐξευρεῖν (122e). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Find out by inquiry πυνθάνεσθαι

Find out by inquiry. To obtain information by asking; Charmides' actual outcome is left for the listeners to investigate. Attested: πυθέσθαι (128e). Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence (p. 148).

Finding out thoroughly διαπυνθάνεσθαι

διαπυνθάνεσθαι (diapynthanesthai)

Finding out thoroughly. The adults should question the boy rather than rely on their own assumptions. Attested: διαπυνθανομένους (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Let us find out thoroughly. Socrates again postpones choosing an instructor until the boy is adequately questioned. Attested: διαπυθώμεθα (125b). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Fine καλός

καλός (kalos)

Fine. Socrates' favorable description of the name, retained in the printed text. Attested: καλὸν (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Fine and good καλὸς κἀγαθός

καλὸς κἀγαθός (kalos kagathos)

Fine and good. The socially esteemed fathers whose sons receive the conventional curriculum. Attested: καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (122e). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Fine and good. The evaluative expression first specified for civic affairs and then applied more broadly by Theages to Socrates. Attested: καλῶν κἀγαθῶν (127a). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Firm βέβαιος

Firm; secure. An adjective describing the stability with which some companions possess their benefit. Attested: βέβαιον (130a). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Flee φεύγειν

Flee. To be in flight; it describes Timarchus when Euathlus received him, without specifying the legal stage of that flight. Attested: φεύγοντα (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Flute players αὐλητής

αὐλητής (aulētēs)

Flute players. Players of the aulos, another obvious source of the corresponding instruction; “flute” follows the supplied translation. Attested: αὐλητάς (126e). Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative (p. 89).

For nothing προῖκα

προῖκα (proika)

For nothing. Free of charge, as in the proposed company of a respected Athenian statesman. Attested: προῖκα (127a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Force βία

βία (bia)

Force. The manner of ruling Theages expressly excludes when clarifying his intended civic ambition. Attested: βίᾳ (126a). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition (p. 139).

Frightens φοβεῖν

φοβεῖν (phobein)

Frightens. The new desire causes the father’s particular alarm. Attested: φοβεῖ (121c). Fear, danger, and the question of safety (p. 58).

From childhood ἐκ παιδός

From childhood. An idiomatic temporal expression placing the beginning of the phenomenon in Socrates' childhood, without specifying an age. Attested: ἐκ παιδὸς (128d). Divine allotment, accompaniment, and childhood (p. 51).

From what I said ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον

ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον (ex hōn egō eipon)

From what I said. The boy expressly qualifies the alleged tyrannical desire by the consequences of his earlier wording. Attested: ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον (124e). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Gathering grapes τρυγᾶν

τρυγᾶν (trygan)

Gathering grapes. Harvesting grapes as a specified agricultural activity. Attested: τρυγώντων (124a). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Get up ἀνίστασθαι

Get up. To rise from one's place; the visible departure attempt that precedes the warning at the party. Attested: ἀνιστάμενος (129b). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Give oneself airs σεμνύνεσθαι

Give oneself airs. To assume a grand or self-important manner; Aristides' description of Thucydides' attitude towards Socrates. Attested: σεμνύνεσθαι (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Give way παρείκειν

Give way; allow. To yield or permit; the subjunctive expresses the hoped-for allowance of their association, not guaranteed benefit. Attested: παρείκῃ (131a). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

Glaucon Γλαύκων

Glaucon. Charmides' father, named in a patronymic; he is not an actor in the training anecdote. Attested: Γλαύκωνος (128e). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Go on campaign στρατεύεσθαι

Go on campaign. To undertake military service; the future participle gives Sannion's purpose in travelling with Thrasyllus. Attested: στρατευσόμενος (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

God θεός

θεός (theos)

God. The further object of Theages' expansive hypothetical prayer; distinct from the divine power later governing association. Attested: θεὸς (126a). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition (p. 139).

God. The god whose favour is made a condition of Theages' progress; no particular god is named. Attested: θεῷ (130e). Daimonic and divine (p. 44).

Gods, in an oath. The plural in Aristides' oath 'by the gods' reinforces his assertion of truth; it does not explain the daimonic mechanism. Attested: θεούς (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction (p. 67).

Godsend ἕρμαιον

ἕρμαιον (hermaion)

Godsend. A lucky find or windfall, used for the prospect that son and Socrates might willingly associate. Attested: ἕρμαιον (127b). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Good ἀγαθός

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Good. Qualifies the citizen Theages is to become; the passage does not define civic goodness exhaustively. Attested: ἀγαθὸν (127d). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement (p. 61).

Gorgias Γοργίας

Γοργίας (Gorgias)

Gorgias. The named teacher of Leontini, grouped with Prodicus and Polus. Attested: Γοργίας (127e). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Gratitude χάρις

χάρις (charis)

Gratitude. In χάριν εἰδέναι, being grateful in addition to paying the teachers. Attested: χάριν (128a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Greek Ἑλληνίς

Ἑλληνίς (Hellēnis)

Greek. Qualifies cities with which statesmen deal; part of the range of their experience. Attested: Ἑλληνίσιν (126c). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Growing φύεσθαι

φύεσθαι (phyesthai)

Growing. Things growing from the earth are one component of the broad living comparison. Attested: φυόμενα (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Gymnastics γυμναστική

γυμναστική (gymnastikē)

Gymnastics. Expert bodily training as one field governing people. Attested: Γυμναστικὴ (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Had taught διδάσκεσθαι

διδάσκεσθαι (didaskesthai)

Had taught. The father's causative middle role in having the boy instructed. Attested: ἐδιδάξατό (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Hand over παραδιδόναι

παραδιδόναι (paradidonai)

Hand over. Transmit one's wisdom to someone else, the ability Theages doubts in statesmen who have not improved their own sons. Attested: παραδοῦναι (126d). Statesmen and their sons (p. 126).

Happen τυγχάνειν

Happen; chance. To turn out in a certain way; the clause warns that the result of Socratic association lies beyond guaranteed control. Attested: τύχῃ (130e). Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings (p. 73).

Have the luck; chance. In Timarchus' conditional promise to return, the verb makes his return uncertain rather than

guaranteed. Attested: τύχω (129b). Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings (p. 73).

Happen to; be in fact. With the participle for consulting, the verb presents what Charmides was doing; this idiom does not independently assert luck or fate. Attested: ἐτύγχανε (128e). Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings (p. 73).

Hard χαλεπός

χαλεπός (chalepos)

Hard. Continued tending demands difficult work. Attested: χαλεπὴ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Has come to envy ζηλοῦν

ζηλοῦν (zēloun)

Has come to envy. The son's admiring or competitive response to the peers. Attested: ἐζήλωκεν (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Have arrived ἥκειν

Have arrived; return. To be present after arriving; Aristides' return introduces the encounter with Thucydides' current association. Attested: ἥκων (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Have dealings with προσομιλεῖν

προσομιλεῖν (prosomilein)

Have dealings with. The statesmen's practical dealings with Greek and non-Greek cities. Attested: προσομιλοῦντας (126c). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Have gone before προγίγνεσθαι

προγίγνεσθαι (progignesthai)

Have gone before. The earlier human beings included in Socrates' extravagant comparison of his erotic expertise. Attested: προγεγονότων (128b). Love as the small subject Socrates knows (p. 71).

Have heard ἀκούειν

ἀκούειν (akouein)

Have heard. The evidential introduction to arguments attributed to Socrates, not arguments spoken earlier in this dialogue. Attested: Ἀκήκοα (126d). Statesmen and their sons (p. 126).

Hear from. To receive a report; the dual future addresses both listeners as able to hear witnesses to the Sicilian prediction. Attested: ἀκούσεσθον (129d). Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence (p. 148).

Have passed παρέρχεσθαι

Have passed; be past. To have elapsed; the participle substantively names completed occurrences contrasted with the current prospective test. Attested: παρεληλυθότα (129d). Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence (p. 148).

Have power δύνασθαι

Have power. To be capable or effective; with 'the whole', the daimonic power's decisive scope over the specified associations. Attested: δύναται (129e). Power and its uncertain bearer (p. 97).

Having killed ἀποκτείνειν

ἀποκτείνειν (apokteinein)

Having killed. The violent action explicitly attached to Aegisthus, not to every named ruler. Attested: ἀποκτείνας (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Kill. To put someone to death; the future participle states the plotters' purpose in leaving. Attested: ἀποκτενοῦντες (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Held back κατέχειν

κατέχειν (katechein)

Held back. The father's formerly successful restraint of his son's plans. Attested: κατεῖχον (122a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Heroscamandrus Ἡροσκάμανδρος

Heroscamandrus. Nicias' father, identifying the victim by patronymic; no separate person named Scamander appears in the story. Attested: Ἡροσκαμάνδρου (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Hippias Ἱππίας

Ἱππίας (Hippias)

Hippias. Athens' former ruler, later explicitly classified as a tyrant with Periander. Attested: Ἱππίαν (124d). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Hold back ἐπέχειν

Hold back. To pause or restrain one's movement; Timarchus stays after the first warning. Attested: ἐπέσχε

(129b). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Hold on to ἔχεσθαι

Hold on to. The middle verb with a genitive denotes bodily holding of Socrates, not mere intellectual adherence. Attested: ἐχόμενός (130e). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

Horseman ἱππεύς

ἱππεύς (hippeus)

Horseman. The skilled rider Theages would want to become in the hypothetical example. Attested: ἱππεύς (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Horses ἵππος

ἵππος (hippos)

Horses. The animals forming the charioteer's team. Attested: ἵππων (123d). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Horses. The animals possessed and repeatedly used in the adopted reading that grounds the practical-experience comparison. Attested: ἵπποι (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Hostility ἀπέχθεια

Hostility; falling-out. An antagonistic relation; the phrase describes the dispute between Thucydides and Socrates in certain arguments. Attested: ἀπεχθείας (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

House οἰκία

House. The larger shared dwelling in Aristides' scale of proximity, expressly distinguished from being in the same

room. Attested: οἰκίᾳ (130d). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

The human being ἄνθρωπος

ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos)

The human being. The printed crasis of ὁ ἄνθρωπος includes humanity among the living cases. Attested: ἄνθρωπος (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Human beings. Theages' first broad specification of the people his desired wisdom would govern. Attested: ἀνθρώπων (123e). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Hurries σπεύδειν

σπεύδειν (speudein)

Hurries. The urgency of the son's movement toward the desired education. Attested: σπεύδει (122a). Desire and its changing object (p. 49).

Ignoble ἀγεννής

ἀγεννής (agennēs)

Ignoble. Negated of the desire: the father does not dismiss wanting wisdom as inherently base. Attested: ἀγεννής (121c). Desire and its changing object (p. 49).

Infer τεκμαίρεσθαι

τεκμαίρεσθαι (tekmairesthai)

Infer. The father expressly reasons from his own affairs to the rest rather than asserting an independently proven universal law. Attested: τεκμαίρομαι (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Introduce συνιστάναι

συνιστάναι (synistanai)

Introduce. The father intends to broker an introduction rather than teach the additional skill himself. Attested: συστήσω (122a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Introduce. The action Theages says his father refuses to perform. Attested: συστῆσαι (123a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Introduce. The father would connect the boy with people from whom he could acquire the skill. Attested: συνιστάναι (123b). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Ionia Ἰωνία

Ionia. The eastern Greek region named as a destination of Sannion's expedition with Thrasyllus. Attested: Ἰωνίας (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Is willing ἐθέλειν

ἐθέλειν (ethelein)

Is willing. Negated of the father in the son's accusation about introductions. Attested: ἐθέλει (123a). Wish, willingness, and consent (p. 143).

It appears φαίνεσθαι

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

It appears. Theages' assent to the inference is phrased as apparent agreement. Attested: Φαίνεται (124e). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Appear. Marks Theages' observation of improved comparative standing; preserves its status as a report of appearance. Attested: φαίνονται (128c). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement (p. 61).

Appear; seem. To present a certain appearance; Aristides' remembered standing is expressed as appearing no worse than others. Attested: φαίνεσθαι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

It is one's part προσήκειν

προσήκειν (prosēkein)

It is one's part. Socrates asks whether further provision properly belongs to the father's responsibility. Attested: προσήκει (123a). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

It is permitted ἔξεστι

ἔξεστι (exesti)

It is permitted. Socrates makes clear that the father may speak. Attested: ἔξεστιν (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

It looks as though κινδυνεύειν

κινδυνεύειν (kindyneuein)

It looks as though. An idiomatic qualification of the growth comparison rather than a literal statement of danger. Attested: κινδυνεύει (121b). Fear, danger, and the question of safety (p. 58).

Javelin throwing ἀκοντιστικός

ἀκοντιστικός (akontistikos)

Javelin throwing. The neuter plural names the skill one would acquire from experienced javelin-throwers. Attested: ἀκοντιστικὰ (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Javelins ἀκόντιον

ἀκόντιον (akontion)

Javelins. The instruments held and used in many cases, one's own and others', by the experts. Attested: ἀκόντια (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Joke παίζειν

παίζειν (paizein)

Joke. Play or joke with someone; named alongside mockery rather than a formal technical theory of irony. Attested: παίζεις (125e). Joking mockery and serious clarification (p. 63).

Just as ὥσπερ

ὥσπερ (hōsper)

Just as. Introduces the hypothetical farmers' version of the poetic maxim; signals a comparison rather than proving identity in every respect. Attested: ὥσπερ (125b–c). Analogies and the limits of the craft model (p. 22).

Keep away ἀπέχεσθαι

Keep away. To remain apart or hold oneself away; the separation after which some companions lose their distinction. Attested: ἀπόσχωνται (130a). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Kin οἰκεῖος

οἰκεῖος (oikeios)

Kin. One's own people whose education also demands serious deliberation. Attested: οἰκείων (122b). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

As fully one's own as possible. The superlative expression conveys how fully Demodocus offers himself

and his resources to Socrates. Attested: οἰκειότατα (127c–d). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Know how ἐπίστασθαι

ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

Know how. Practical competence is expressed through knowing how to rule its object. Attested: ἐπιστάμεθα (123d). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

Knowledge ἐπιστήμη

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge. The kind of additional attainment the boy still thinks he lacks. Attested: ἐπιστήμης (123a). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

Knows εἰδέναι

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

Knows. Theages insists his father already understands his request. Attested: Οἶδεν (123a). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

You know. Knowing the desired thing is distinguished from knowing its name. Attested: οἶσθα (123c). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

Know. To possess knowledge of the past events; the participle identifies people who can provide the retrospective reports. Attested: εἰδότων (129d). Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence (p. 148).

Lack ἐλλείπειν

ἐλλείπειν (elleipein)

Lack. The proposed deficit remaining after conventional schooling. Attested: ἐλλείπειν (123a). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

Lacking ἐνδεής

ἐνδεής (endeēs)

Lacking. The hypothetical educational deficit that would ground blame of the father. Attested: ἐνδεὴς (123b). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

Lad μειρακίσκος

μειρακίσκος (meirakiskos)

Lad. Socrates' age-marked description of the son before asking him directly. Attested: μειρακίσκος (122c). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Lasting παραμόνιμος

Lasting. Remaining or enduring; paired with firm to distinguish retained benefit from improvement lost after separation. Attested: παραμόνιμον (130a). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Laughably καταγελάστως

Laughably. In a ridiculous condition; Aristides turns from ridiculing Thucydides to admitting his own loss of ability. Attested: καταγελάστως (130b–c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Leave προλείπειν

Leave; fail. To depart from or fail someone; Socrates asks how the acquired power left Aristides. Attested: προύλιπεν (130c). State, gradual loss, and draining away (p. 122).

Leisure σχολή

σχολή (scholē)

Leisure. Available time in which Socrates can hear the father's concern. Attested: σχολή (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Let an interval pass διαλείπειν

Let an interval pass. To leave a gap; Timarchus allows time between his first and second attempts to go. Attested: διαλιπὼν (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Letters γράμματα

γράμματα (grammata)

Letters. Literacy is one specified component of the boy's education. Attested: γράμματά (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Little by little κατὰ σμικρόν

Little by little. An adverbial phrase describing Aristides' gradual loss of the earlier power. Attested: κατὰ σμικρόν (130c). State, gradual loss, and draining away (p. 122).

Live βιοῦν

βιοῦν (bioun)

Live. Once what has been planted lives, continued care is required. Attested: βιῷ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Look ὁρᾶν

Look; see. To direct sight; here looking elsewhere supplies the comparison with looking at Socrates. Attested: ὁρῴην (130e). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

Look towards βλέπειν

Look towards. To direct the gaze; looking at Socrates while he speaks increases Aristides' reported benefit. Attested: βλέποιμι (130d). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

Lot μοῖρα

Lot; allotment. A share or allotment; in the dative phrase ‘by a divine lot’, the source attributed to Socrates’ accompaniment. Attested: μοίρᾳ (128d). Divine allotment, accompaniment, and childhood (p. 51).

Lysimachus Λυσίμαχος

Lysimachus. Father of the young Aristides and son of the famous older Aristides; the middle generation in the stated genealogy. Attested: Λυσιμάχου (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Macedonia Μακεδονία

Μακεδονία (Makedonia)

Macedonia. The region assigned to Archelaus’ rule. Attested: Μακεδονίᾳ (124d). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Make ἀναγκάζειν

Make; compel. To cause another to comply; Socrates makes Timarchus hold back on the second attempt, without describing physical force. Attested: ἠνάγκασα (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Make progress ἐπιδιδόναι

Make progress. To increase or advance; here the improvement of helped companions, without a fully specified curriculum or ethical measure. Attested: ἐπιδιδόασιν (129e). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Make time ποιεῖν

ποιεῖν (poiein)

Make time. The father's request that Socrates create an opportunity for conversation even if occupied. Attested: ποίησαι σχολήν (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Will make. The anticipated teacher is expected to produce the boy's becoming wise, an expectation later tested. Attested: ποιήσει (121d). Wisdom and being wise (p. 141).

Make trial of ἀποπειρᾶσθαι

Make trial of. To test through an attempt; Theages proposes discovering whether association with Socrates will be allowed. Attested: ἀποπειραθῆναι (131a). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

Makes trouble πράγματα παρέχειν

πράγματα παρέχειν (pragmata parechein)

Makes trouble. The son's repeated pressure on his father for educational provision. Attested: πράγματα παρέχει (121d). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Master of ἐγκρατής

Master of; in control of. Having control over a specified object, here the benefit teachers confer; not the abstract virtue of self-control. Attested: ἐγκρατεῖς (130e). Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings (p. 73).

Matters μέλειν

μέλειν (melein)

Matters. Money matters less to the father than the risk facing the son. Attested: μέλει (122a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Medicine ἰατρική

ἰατρική (iatrikē)

Medicine. The expertise directing the sick, excluded by Theages as his specific goal. Attested: Ἰατρικὴ (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Melesias Μελησίας

Melesias. Father of the young Thucydides and son of his older namesake; the intervening generation in the family sequence. Attested: Μελησίου (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Men ἀνήρ

ἀνήρ (anēr)

Men. Men are paired with women in the comprehensive enumeration. Attested: ἀνδρῶν (124b). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Mind νοῦς

Mind; attention. The capacity directed elsewhere when Timarchus leaves; ordinary attentional language, not an articulated theory of intellect. Attested: νοῦν (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Mock σκώπτειν

σκώπτειν (skōptein)

Mock. The teasing Theages explicitly attributes to Socrates after the Callicrite comparison. Attested: σκώπτεις (125e). Joking mockery and serious clarification (p. 63).

Money ἀργύριον

ἀργύριον (argyrion)

Money. The silver or money paid as a large fee for the sophists' association; no exact amount is given. Attested: ἀργύριον (128a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Money χρῆμα

χρῆμα (chrēma)

Money. The resources requested to pay a prospective sophist. Attested: χρήματα (121d). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Thing. The generic noun in the expression that counsel is a sacred thing, distinct from plural money at 121d. Attested: χρῆμα (122b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Money or resources. What Demodocus says concerns him less than the danger of the education his son seeks. Attested: χρημάτων (121d–122a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

More divine θεῖος

θεῖος (theios)

More divine. The comparative elevates education of self and kin above other subjects of deliberation. Attested: θειοτέρου (122b). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Divine. Adjective qualifying the lot through which the phenomenon accompanies Socrates; distinct from daimonion in the same sentence. Attested: θείᾳ (128d). Daimonic and divine (p. 44).

The divine. The substantivised adjective used by Theages when proposing a possible religious appeal to the

phenomenon. Attested: θεῖον (131a). Daimonic and divine (p. 44).

Most wellborn γενναῖος

γενναῖος (gennaios)

Most wellborn. The privileged birth of the young men attracted by paid sophistic association. Attested: γενναιοτάτους (128a). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Music μουσική

μουσική (mousikē)

Music. The competence directing choral singers, not the whole desired political field. Attested: Μουσικὴ (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Name ὄνομα

ὄνομα (onoma)

Name. The personal designation needed before Socrates addresses Theages directly. Attested: ὄνομα (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Name ὀνομάζειν

ὀνομάζειν (onomazein)

Name. Demodocus hesitates over the appropriate description of begetting. Attested: ὀνομάζειν (121c). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Nameless ἀνώνυμος

ἀνώνυμος (anōnymos)

Nameless. Socrates asks whether the desired wisdom lacks any distinguishing name. Attested: ἀνώνυμός (123c). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Nemea Νεμέα

Nemea. The site of the games for whose stadion race Charmides proposes to train. Attested: Νεμέαν (128e). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Nicias son of Heroscamandrus Νικίας

Nicias son of Heroscamandrus. The murder plot's intended victim; not to be identified with the famous Sicilian commander on name alone. Attested: Νικίαν (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

No longer able οἷός τε

οἷός τε (hoios te)

No longer able. The father acknowledges the failure of his previous means of restraint. Attested: οὐκέτι οἷός τέ εἰμι (122a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Able. Expresses capacity to benefit the boy; willingness alone is not the same claim. Attested: οἷός τ' (127d). Socrates and the qualification of his competence (p. 116).

Able. An idiom of capacity; negated here because divine opposition prevents Socrates from spending time with certain people. Attested: οὐχ οἷόν τέ (129e). Power and its uncertain bearer (p. 97).

Non Greek or barbarian βάρβαρος

βάρβαρος (barbaros)

Non Greek or barbarian. Qualifies the other cities in the Greek/non-Greek contrast, without an argument about their inherent abilities. Attested: βαρβάροις (126c). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Obey or yield πείθεσθαι

πείθεσθαι (peithesthai)

Obey or yield. Demodocus proposes complying with the boy rather than continuing ineffective resistance. Attested: πείθεσθαι (122a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Obey; comply. To accept another's direction; Timarchus says his unwillingness to obey Socrates explains his impending death. Attested: πείθεσθαι (129a). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Of Acragas Ἀκραγαντῖνος

Ἀκραγαντῖνος (Akragantinos)

Of Acragas. Polus' civic origin in the identification of the educational alternatives. Attested: Ἀκραγαντῖνος (128a). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Of Ceos Κεῖος

Κεῖος (Keios)

Of Ceos. Prodicus' civic origin in the printed Greek; not the different place suggested by a variant spelling. Attested: Κεῖος (127e). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Of freedom ἐλευθέριος

ἐλευθέριος (eleutherios)

Of freedom. The epithet of Zeus in the name of the stoa, not an explicit theory of political freedom. Attested: ἐλευθερίου (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Of Leontini Λεοντῖνος

Λεοντῖνος (Leontinos)

Of Leontini. Gorgias' civic origin, used to identify the teacher. Attested: Λεοντῖνος (128a). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Of oneself ἑαυτοῦ

ἑαυτοῦ (heautou)

Of oneself. The reflexive makes the adviser's or deliberator's own education part of the concern. Attested: αὐτοῦ (122b). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Of repute ἐλλόγιμος

ἐλλόγιμος (ellogimos)

Of repute. The civic standing of the leaders Theages wishes to emulate through voluntary rule. Attested: ἐλλόγιμοι (126a). Reputation honor and the fine and good (p. 107).

Offer or provide παρέχειν

παρέχειν (parechein)

Offer or provide. Demodocus makes himself and his possessions available to support the desired association; no contractual sum is specified. Attested: παρέχειν (127c–d). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

On purpose ἐξεπίτηδες

ἐξεπίτηδες (exepitēdes)

On purpose. The boy attributes deliberate pretended ignorance to the father. Attested: ἐξεπίτηδες (123a). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

One another ἀλλήλων

One another. Reciprocal pronoun, conventionally cited in the genitive plural; the trial involves Theages and Socrates being with each other. Attested: ἀλλήλοις (131a). Association, being with, and coming together (p. 26).

Oppose ἐναντιοῦσθαι

Oppose. To set oneself against; divine opposition makes certain associations unable to confer benefit. Attested: ἐναντιοῦται (129e). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

Oracle singers χρησμῳδός

χρησμῳδός (chrēsmōdos)

Oracle singers. The common designation supplied for Bakis, Sibyl and Amphilytus; the example teaches the form of a naming answer. Attested: χρησμῳδοί (124d). Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus (p. 87).

Others own ἀλλότριος

ἀλλότριος (allotrios)

Others own. Contrasts resources belonging to others with one’s own in the breadth-of-experience comparison. Attested: ἀλλοτρίοις (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Our own ἡμεδαπός

ἡμεδαπός (hēmedapos)

Our own. The local or affiliative description of Amphilytus, whose exact historical implication is not settled by the dialogue. Attested: ἡμεδαπὸς (124d). Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus (p. 87).

Out of the way ἐκποδών

ἐκποδών (ekpodōn)

Out of the way. Their movement seeks a less obstructed or exposed place for the private discussion. Attested: ἐκποδὼν (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Painter ζωγράφος

ζωγράφος (zōgraphos)

Painter. The skill the hypothetical son wants while rejecting the relevant practitioners. Attested: ζωγράφος (126e). Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative (p. 89).

Pay τελεῖν

τελεῖν (telein)

Pay. The financial action the son expects his father to take. Attested: τελέσαι (121d). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Pay down in addition προσκατατιθέναι

προσκατατιθέναι (proskatatithenai)

Pay down in addition. Pay money in addition to choosing the sophists' company; the prefix reinforces the additional charge. Attested: προσκατατιθέντας (128a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Peers ἡλικιώτης

ἡλικιώτης (hēlikiōtēs)

Peers. Same-age companions implicated by the father in arousing the ambition. Attested: ἡλικιωτῶν (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Peleus Πηλεύς

Πηλεύς (Pēleus)

Peleus. The ruler in Phthia, identified through Aeacus. Attested: Πηλεὺς (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Perceive αἰσθάνεσθαι

αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai)

Perceive. A belated realization of speaking at cross-purposes. Attested: αἰσθώμεθα (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Perceive. Theages' own limited observation, which he says supports the report about statesmen's sons. Attested: αἰσθέσθαι (126d). Statesmen and their sons (p. 126).

Perdiccas Περδίκκας

Περδίκκας (Perdikkas)

Perdiccas. The father identifying Archelaus. Attested: Περδίκκου (124d). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Periander Περίανδρος

Περίανδρος (Periandros)

Periander. The Corinthian ruler who later forms one half of the explicitly tyrannical pair. Attested: Περίανδρον (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Pericles Περικλῆς

Περικλῆς (Periklēs)

Pericles. One of the named exemplars of skill in civic affairs and leadership over willing people. Attested: Περικλῆς (126a). Statesmen and affairs of the city (p. 124).

Persuade πείθειν

πείθειν (peithein)

Persuade. Induce wellborn wealthy youths to choose paid company over available free associations. Attested: πείθουσι (128a). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Philemon Φιλήμων

Philemon. Son of Philemonides and Timarchus' partner in the plot against Nicias; distinct from the fugitive's host Euathlus. Attested: Φιλήμων (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Philemonides Φιλημονίδης

Philemonides. Philemon's father, supplied only as a patronymic; no participation in the plot is attributed to him. Attested: Φιλημονίδου (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Phthia Φθία

Φθία (Phthia)

Phthia. The place assigned to Peleus' rule. Attested: Φθίᾳ (124c). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Pilot κυβερνᾶν

κυβερνᾶν (kybernan)

Pilot. The activity by which the first hypothetical expertise is identified. Attested: κυβερνῶσιν (123b). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Piloting κυβερνητική

κυβερνητική (kybernētikē)

Piloting. The name expected for the ship-directing competence. Attested: κυβερνητικήν (123b). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Pisistratus Πεισίστρατος

Πεισίστρατος (Peisistratos)

Pisistratus. Hippias' identifying father. Attested: Πεισιστράτου (124d). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Planing ξέειν

ξέειν (xeein)

Planing. Smoothing or shaving wood in the carpentry list. Attested: ξεόντων (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Plant φυτεύειν

φυτεύειν (phyteuein)

Plant. The agricultural act used as the first term in the analogy with begetting. Attested: φυτεύειν (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Do the planting. The completed act of planting itself is distinguished from subsequent care. Attested: φυτεῦσαι (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Planting. A coordinated agricultural activity, distinct in argumentative role from the opening begetting analogy. Attested: φυτευόντων (124a). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Planting φυτεία

φυτεία (phyteia)

Planting. The father's intentionally earthy possible name for producing his son. Attested: φυτείαν (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Play the cithara κιθαρίζειν

κιθαρίζειν (kitharizein)

Play the cithara. The musical accomplishment already taught. Attested: κιθαρίζειν (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Plot ἐπιβουλή

Plot. The hostile plan known only to Timarchus and Philemon before their departure from the drinking party. Attested: ἐπιβουλήν (129b). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Poet ποιητής

ποιητής (poiētēs)

Poet. The maker of the song, referred to for what he said Callicrite knew. Attested: ποιητής (125e). Poetry quotation and the authority of a famous line (p. 95).

Polus Πῶλος

Πῶλος (Pōlos)

Polus. The teacher of Acragas named here; the parallel list in Apology has Hippias instead. Attested: Πῶλος (128a). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Poor quality φαυλότης

Poor quality; inferiority. The deficiency for which Aristides feels shame; the passage does not specify a particular moral vice. Attested: φαυλότητι (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Power δύναμις

Power. The effective capacity attributed to the daimonic phenomenon in governing the results of association. Attested: δύναμις (129e). Power and its uncertain bearer (p. 97).

Ability; power. The conversational capacity Aristides gained and then lost; repetition of the divine-power noun does not prove material transfer. Attested: δύναμις (130c). Power and its uncertain bearer (p. 97).

Prayer εὐχή

Prayer. A prayer or religious appeal, proposed as one possible means of conciliating the divine phenomenon. Attested: εὐχαῖσί (131a). Prayer, sacrifice, and soothing the divine (p. 101).

Prepare παρασκευάζεσθαι

παρασκευάζεσθαι (paraskeuazesthai)

Prepare. Getting everything ready before planting is contrasted with later tending. Attested: παρασκευάσασθαι (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Prescribe ἐξηγεῖσθαι

Prescribe; expound. To interpret or set out appropriate measures; the diviners might advise further ways of soothing the divine. Attested: ἐξηγῶνται (131a). Prayer, sacrifice, and soothing the divine (p. 101).

Present παρεῖναι

παρεῖναι (pareinai)

Present. The desire now confronting the father is singled out from other troubles. Attested: παροῦσα (121c). Desire and its changing object (p. 49).

Prevent διακωλύειν

Prevent; hinder. To block an action; its negation describes companions permitted to associate even though they receive no benefit. Attested: διακωλύει (129e). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

The previous day ἡ προτεραία

The previous day. The preceding day, with 'day' understood; it dates Thucydides' quarrel relative to Aristides' return. Attested: προτεραίᾳ (130b). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Private persons ἰδιώτης

ἰδιώτης (idiōtēs)

Private persons. Non-specialist or private people contrasted with craftsmen; no modern pejorative meaning is intended. Attested: ἰδιωτῶν (124b). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Prodicus Πρόδικος

Πρόδικος (Prodikos)

Prodicus. The named teacher from Ceos, offered as an example of those professing educational ability. Attested: Πρόδικος (127e). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Profess ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι

ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι (epangellesthai)

Profess. Publicly claim the capacity to educate young people; a claim distinguished from demonstrated benefit. Attested: ἐπαγγέλλονται (127e). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Pursue διώκειν

Pursue; seek. To seek out eagerly; Aristides formerly pursued association with cultivated men. Attested: ἐδίωκον (130c). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Quickly ταχύ

Quickly. An adverb marking speed of progress, which does not by itself imply that the resulting benefit lasts. Attested: ταχὺ (129e). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Rascal μιαρός

μιαρός (miaros)

Rascal. The vocative rebuke introducing the tyrant-teacher joke; the edition reads its tone as teasing. Attested: μιαρέ (124e). Joking mockery and serious clarification (p. 63).

Reaping θερίζειν

θερίζειν (therizein)

Reaping. One agricultural activity under the coordination of farming. Attested: θεριζόντων (124a). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Rearing τροφή

τροφή (trophē)

Rearing. The continuing nurture of the son contrasted with the easy initial begetting. Attested: τροφὴ (121c). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Reasonable εἰκός

εἰκός (eikos)

Reasonable. What Socrates calls the choice of professed educators rather than himself, given the advertised qualifications. Attested: εἰκὸς (128a). Socrates and the qualification of his competence (p. 116).

Receive ὑποδέχεσθαι

Receive; shelter. To take someone in; Euathlus sheltered Timarchus while he was fleeing. Attested: ὑπεδέξατο (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Recently νεωστί

νεωστί (neōsti)

Recently. The relative chronology attached to Archelaus' rule, without a numerical date in the speech. Attested: νεωστὶ (124d). Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias (p. 17).

Repeating from memory ἀπομνημονεύειν

ἀπομνημονεύειν (apomnēmoneuein)

Repeating from memory. The peers' learned verbal performances as reported by Demodocus. Attested: ἀπομνημονεύοντες (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Revise μετατίθεσθαι

μετατίθεσθαι (metatithesthai)

Revise. Socrates changes his own initial procedural suggestion. Attested: μετατίθεμαι (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Richest πλούσιος

πλούσιος (plousios)

Richest. The wealth of the young clients who can afford substantial fees despite access to free company. Attested: πλουσιωτάτους (128a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Ridiculous γελοῖος

γελοῖος (geloios)

Ridiculous. The adults would look foolish if advice proceeded without a shared subject. Attested: γελοῖοι (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Rightest ὀρθός

ὀρθός (orthos)

Rightest. The revised order of inquiry is judged the most correct course. Attested: ὀρθότατον (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Rightly ὀρθῶς

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Rightly. Demodocus endorses the procedure, which Socrates then qualifies. Attested: ὀρθῶς (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Room οἴκημα

Room. The smaller interior space; sharing it is reported to produce more progress than merely sharing a house. Attested: οἰκήματι (130d). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

Rule ἄρχειν

ἄρχειν (archein)

Rule. The shared directing verb applied to ships and a horse team before political extension. Attested: ἄρχειν (123d). Rule, rulers, and public office (p. 111).

Rule ἀρχή

ἀρχή (archē)

Rule. The ruling activity on account of which Hippias and Periander receive their designation. Attested: ἀρχήν (124e). Rule, rulers, and public office (p. 111).

Ruler ἄρχων

ἄρχων (archōn)

Ruler. The participial designation of Periander governing Corinth, not a specifically Athenian magistracy. Attested: ἄρχοντα (124c). Rule, rulers, and public office (p. 111).

Run the stadion σταδιοδρομεῖν

Run the stadion. To compete as a stadium-length runner; the participle distinguishes Euathlus in the narrative. Attested: σταδιοδρομῶν (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Sacred ἱερός

ἱερός (hieros)

Sacred. Sacred: the predicate describes advice generally and is then repeated of this particular educational

consultation. Attested: ἱερὸν; ἱερά (122b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Sacrifice θυσία

Sacrifice. A sacrificial rite proposed conditionally alongside prayer; no sacrifice is performed within the dialogue. Attested: θυσίαις (131a). Prayer, sacrifice, and soothing the divine (p. 101).

Safer ἀσφαλής

Safer; more secure. The comparative asks whether education elsewhere would give Theages a more dependable prospect of benefit. Attested: ἀσφαλέστερον (130e). Mastery, safety, and whatever chance brings (p. 73).

Sail out ἐκπλεῖν

Sail out; sail away. To depart by sea; Aristides' campaign removes him from continued association with Socrates. Attested: ἐκπλέων (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Sannion Σαννίων

Sannion. The beautiful man currently away with Thrasyllus; Socrates forecasts severe danger, but his fate is not reported. Attested: Σαννίωνος (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Sawing πρίζειν

πρίζειν (prizein)

Sawing. The printed form for one woodworking activity; Cobet's alternative is not substituted. Attested: πριζόντων (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Seem good δοκεῖν

δοκεῖν (dokein)

Seem good. Socrates accepts the father's proposal conditionally on his judgment. Attested: δοκεῖ (121a). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Thought to be. The proposed teachers are qualified by reputation as sophists rather than verified competence. Attested: δοκούντων (122a). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Send πέμπειν

πέμπειν (pempein)

Send. The father's proposed role in directing his son to an instructor. Attested: πέμπειν (125a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Senseless ἀνόητος

ἀνόητος (anoētos)

Senseless. How Theages would judge himself if he expected benefit that the statesmen had not given their sons. Attested: ἀνόητος (126d). Statesmen and their sons (p. 126).

Set oneself in motion ὁρμᾶσθαι

Set oneself in motion. To make a move or start out; Timarchus again prepares to leave before the renewed prohibition. Attested: ὡρμᾶτο (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Setting out ἐξορμή

Setting out. Departure on an undertaking; Sannion's setting out on campaign occasions the sign. Attested:

ἐξορμῇ (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Ships πλοῖον

πλοῖον (ploion)

Ships. The objects directed by the pilot's wisdom. Attested: πλοῖα (123b). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Shoemakers σκυτοτόμος

σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos)

Shoemakers. The fathers whose sons furnish the comparison with the statesmen's sons; not a declaration of inherited inferiority. Attested: σκυτοτόμων (126d). Statesmen and their sons (p. 126).

Sibyl Σίβυλλα

Σίβυλλα (Sibylla)

Sibyl. The prophetic figure grouped with Bakis and Amphilytus; no later catalogue of Sibyls is given here. Attested: Σίβυλλα (124d). Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus (p. 87).

Sicily Σικελία

Sicily. The region of the already disastrous Athenian expedition invoked as a retrospective example. Attested: Σικελίᾳ (129c). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Sign σημεῖον

Sign. An indication carrying practical significance; here the familiar daimonic occurrence that occasions a warning against departure. Attested: σημεῖον (129b). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Signal σημαίνειν

Signal. To indicate or signify; the voice signals a turning away from the contemplated act. Attested: σημαίνει (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Singing ᾄδειν

ᾄδειν (aidein)

Singing. The activity identifying those directed by musical expertise. Attested: ᾀδόντων (123e). Medicine, music, and gymnastics as fields of expertise (p. 76).

Sit καθῆσθαι

Sit. To be seated; Aristides places his greatest progress while sitting immediately beside Socrates. Attested: καθοίμην (130e). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

Skilled in horsemanship ἱππικός

ἱππικός (hippikos)

Skilled in horsemanship. The people a prospective horseman would naturally approach for the corresponding competence. Attested: ἱππικούς (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Slave, as an insult ἀνδράποδον

Slave, as an insult. A word for an enslaved person used disparagingly of Thucydides' former condition, not evidence of his legal status. Attested: ἀνδράποδον (130b). Rivalry, argumentative standing, and shame (p. 109).

Slight ἀτιμάζειν

ἀτιμάζειν (atimazein)

Slight. Disregard or dishonor the practitioners from whom the hypothetical pupil would learn. Attested: ἀτιμάζοι

(126e). Painters flute players and the problem of an alternative (p. 89).

Socrates Σωκράτης

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

Socrates. The addressee approached for a private consultation and later selected as the desired companion. Attested: Σώκρατες (121a). Socrates and the qualification of his competence (p. 116).

Son ὑός

ὑός (hyos)

Son. The child whose production and rearing ground the comparison; the printed form belongs to the variant ὑός. Attested: ὑέος (121c). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Song ᾆσμα

ᾆσμα (asma)

Song. The song Socrates assumes Theages knows; the full composition is not supplied by the dialogue. Attested: ᾆσμα (125d). Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things (p. 31).

Soothing παραμυθεῖσθαι

παραμυθεῖσθαι (paramytheisthai)

Soothing. Persuasive reassurance used by the father to restrain the son, not control of the divine. Attested: παραμυθούμενος (122a). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Soothe; conciliate. To address reassuringly or appease; Theages proposes trying to soothe the divine if it blocks the association. Attested: παραμυθεῖσθαι (131a). Prayer, sacrifice, and soothing the divine (p. 101).

Sophist σοφιστής

σοφιστής (sophistēs)

Sophist. A paid educator from whom the boy expects wisdom, before the relevant wisdom has been specified. Attested: σοφιστῶν (121d). Sophists Prodicus Gorgias and Polus (p. 118).

Sowing σπείρειν

σπείρειν (speirein)

Sowing. Putting in seed as one operation directed within farming. Attested: σπειρόντων (124a). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Speak against ἀντιλέγειν

Speak against; object. To oppose a proposal in speech; Demodocus urges Socrates to stop objecting to Theages' plan. Attested: ἀντείπῃς (131a). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

Speak out κατειπεῖν

κατειπεῖν (kateipein)

Speak out. Theages is asked to declare clearly which wisdom he desires. Attested: κάτειπε (123b). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Has spoken against. The boy's statement is treated comically as an accusation made before Socrates. Attested: κατείρηκέ (125a). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Spend ἀναλίσκειν

ἀναλίσκειν (analiskein)

Spend. Expend money; the free association would spare Theages this expense. Attested: ἀναλώσεις (127a). Money fees gratitude and the offer of resources (p. 78).

Spend time διατρίβειν

Spend time. To pass time in someone's company; here Aristides' stay with Socrates during his rapid improvement. Attested: διατρίβων (130a). Spending time and the limits of instruction (p. 120).

Spend time with συνδιατρίβειν

Spend time with. To spend time jointly with another; Theages initially takes Socrates' willingness to do so as the decisive issue. Attested: συνδιατρίβειν (128b). Spending time and the limits of instruction (p. 120).

Stadion race στάδιον

Stadion race. A sprint of one stadium length; the athletic event for which Charmides' training is intended. Attested: στάδιον (128e). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

State ἕξις

State; condition. The former condition Aristides possessed; no technical definition as a stable virtue or habit is supplied. Attested: ἕξις (130e). State, gradual loss, and draining away (p. 122).

Statesmen πολιτικός

πολιτικός (politikos)

Statesmen. The substantival adjective identifies men experienced in civic affairs, proposed as associates for

political learning. Attested: πολιτικοὺς (126c). Statesmen and affairs of the city (p. 124).

Still more absurd ἄτοπος

ἄτοπος (atopos)

Still more absurd. The adults would compound their error by deliberating about an object foreign to the boy's desire. Attested: ἀτοπώτεροι (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Stoa στοά

στοά (stoa)

Stoa. The public colonnade into which the speakers propose to withdraw. Attested: στοὰν (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Stupidity ἀμαθία

ἀμαθία (amathia)

Stupidity. The contrary of wisdom offered and rejected for charioteering. Attested: ἀμαθία (123d). Wisdom and being wise (p. 141).

Subject of learning μάθημα

μάθημα (mathēma)

Subject of learning. A matter learned or studied, here the small subject of love contrasted with the sophists' fine subjects. Attested: μαθήματος (128b). Subjects of learning and the promise to educate (p. 128).

Suddenly ἐξαίφνης

Suddenly. All at once; one proposed manner of loss which Aristides rejects in favour of gradual decline. Attested: ἐξαίφνης (130c). State, gradual loss, and draining away (p. 122).

Sufficiently ἱκανῶς

ἱκανῶς (hikanōs)

Sufficiently. The inquiry must reach enough understanding before deliberation proceeds. Attested: ἱκανῶς (125b). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Take a hand συλλαμβάνεσθαι

Take a hand; help. The middle verb for helping an association; it marks active daimonic assistance beyond merely withholding a prohibition. Attested: συλλάβηται (129e). Benefit and taking a hand (p. 29).

Take advice συμβουλεύεσθαι

συμβουλεύεσθαι (symbouleuesthai)

Take advice. The father seeks consultation before acting on the educational plan. Attested: συμβουλεύσασθαι (122a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Taking advice. The middle participle identifies the father's role as recipient. Attested: συμβουλευόμενος (122c). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Take into account ἐννοεῖν

ἐννοεῖν (ennoein)

Take into account. Socrates notices a further possibility: the boy's desire may differ from their shared assumption. Attested: ἐννοῶ (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Take to be ὑπολαμβάνειν

ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein)

Take to be. Socrates raises the possibility that he and the father construe the object differently. Attested:

ὑπολαμβάνω (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Team ζεῦγος

ζεῦγος (zeugos)

Team. The paired or yoked horses whose direction specifies charioteering. Attested: ζεύγους (123d). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Tending θεραπεία

θεραπεία (therapeia)

Tending. Attendance on what has grown, specifically horticultural rather than medical treatment. Attested: θεραπεία (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Theages Θεάγης

Θεάγης (Theagēs)

Theages. The son's name, then praised as fine and befitting the sacred. Attested: Θεάγης (122d). Names, titles, and the name Theages (p. 80).

Themistocles Θεμιστοκλῆς

Θεμιστοκλῆς (Themistoklēs)

Themistocles. One of the public leaders who clarifies Theages' desired political model. Attested: Θεμιστοκλῆς (126a). Statesmen and affairs of the city (p. 124).

Things of love ἐρωτικός

ἐρωτικός (erōtikos)

Things of love. The substantival adjective naming the small subject Socrates excepts from his lack of knowledge;

not an attestation of the noun erōs. Attested: τῶν ἐρωτικῶν (128b). Love as the small subject Socrates knows (p. 71).

Things that grow φυτόν

φυτόν (phyton)

Things that grow. Demodocus' broad category explicitly includes plants, animals, and human beings. Attested: φυτὰ (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

Think οἴεσθαι

οἴεσθαι (oiesthai)

Think. Their understanding of the subject is explicitly identified as something needing clarification. Attested: οἰόμεθα (122b). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Think; suppose. To form a judgement; it qualifies Socrates' forecast about Sannion rather than quoting an explicit prediction spoken by the voice. Attested: οἴομαι (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Thinking ἡγεῖσθαι

ἡγεῖσθαι (hēgeisthai)

Thinking. The speakers might hold no common understanding despite continuing their exchange. Attested: ἡγούμενοι (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Thinking fit ἀξιοῦν

ἀξιοῦν (axioun)

Thinking fit. The son makes a normative demand that his father provide care and money. Attested: ἀξιῶν (121d). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Those with knowledge ἐπιστήμων

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Those with knowledge. The class Theages accepts as wise, whatever their subject. Attested: ἐπιστήμονας (122e). Knowledge and knowing how (p. 64).

Thrasyllus Θράσυλλος

Thrasyllus. The military leader with whom Sannion has sailed towards Ephesus and Ionia; distinct from the later catalogue arranger. Attested: Θρασύλλου (129d). Sicily, Sannion, and the current expedition (p. 114).

Threshing ἁλοᾶν

ἁλοᾶν (haloan)

Threshing. An agricultural processing activity included in the farming field. Attested: ἁλοώντων (124a). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Thucydides, the young companion Θουκυδίδης

Thucydides, the young companion. Melesias' son and the elder Thucydides' grandson; he has quarrelled with Socrates shortly before Aristides returns. Attested: Θουκυδίδην (130a). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Thucydides, the grandfather. The elder namesake identified by the edition as Pericles' political opponent; neither the young companion nor the historian. Attested: Θουκυδίδου (130a–b). Aristides, Thucydides, and their family names (p. 24).

Timarchus Τίμαρχος

Timarchus. The plotter who twice heeds a warning, then leaves unnoticed and later attributes his impending death

to disobedience. Attested: Τίμαρχος (129a). Timarchus, the murder plot, and the condemned men (p. 130).

Time χρόνος

Time; period. A duration; some companions' progress depends on the period for which they remain with Socrates. Attested: χρόνον (130a). Spending time and the limits of instruction (p. 120).

Title ἐπωνυμία

ἐπωνυμία (epōnymia)

Title. A shared designation for named persons; the oracle-singer example prepares the question about tyrants. Attested: ἐπωνυμίαν (124d). Oracle singers Bakis Sibyl and Amphilytus (p. 87).

To whose house ἐς τίνος

ἐς τίνος (es tinos)

To whose house. The printed question concerns where to send the boy for association. Attested: ἐς τίνος (125a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Together κοινῇ

κοινῇ (koinēi)

Together. The proposed deliberation joins Socrates and Demodocus. Attested: κοινῇ (125a). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Touch ἅπτεσθαι

Touch. To make contact with someone; Aristides includes touching Socrates in the condition of his greatest reported progress. Attested: ἁπτόμενος (130e). Nearness, sight, and touch (p. 82).

Town ἄστυ

ἄστυ (asty)

Town. The urban center into which the peers travel. Attested: ἄστυ (121d). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Train ἀσκεῖν

Train; practise. To prepare through exercise; the future infinitive identifies the training Charmides plans before the warning. Attested: ἀσκήσειν (128e). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Training ἄσκησις

Training. The course of preparation from which Charmides' unspecified consequences resulted. Attested: ἀσκήσεως (129a). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Trial πεῖρα

Trial; test. An opportunity to test a claim; the current expedition is contrasted with completed events known through witnesses. Attested: πεῖραν (129d). Trial, permission, and an open ending (p. 132).

Trivial φαῦλος

φαῦλος (phaulos)

Trivial. Negated of the counsel required, emphasizing the decision's gravity. Attested: φαύλης (125b). Advice, counsel, and deliberation (p. 15).

Troublesome δύσκολος

δύσκολος (dyskolos)

Troublesome. Cultivation after planting is difficult to manage, anticipating the father's complaint about rearing.

Attested: δύσκολος (121b). Care, rearing, and the planting analogy (p. 33).

True ἀληθής

True. Truthful or in accordance with what occurred; Aristides' own assertion about his extraordinary experience. Attested: ἀληθὲς (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction (p. 67).

Turn away ἀποτρέπειν

Turn away. To divert someone from an action; the sign's prohibition can concern a friend consulting Socrates. Attested: ἀποτρέπει (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Turn towards προτρέπειν

Turn towards; urge. To encourage movement towards an action; Socrates explicitly denies that the voice ever does this. Attested: προτρέπει (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Turning τορνεύειν

τορνεύειν (torneuein)

Turning. Working material by turning as one carpentry operation. Attested: τορνευόντων (124b). Farming, carpentry, and coordinated work (p. 56).

Turning away ἀποτροπή

Turning away. A deterrent direction away from something about to be done; the stated content of the voice's signal. Attested: ἀποτροπήν (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Tyrannical τυραννικός

τυραννικός (tyrannikos)

Tyrannical. The kind of rule Socrates infers from the boy's comprehensive ambition. Attested: τυραννικῆς (124e). Tyranny, the tyrant, and the tyrant-teacher (p. 134).

Tyrannical things. The substantival neuter plural for Callicrite's alleged knowledge, whose subject matter remains unspecified. Attested: τυραννικά (125e). Callicrite and knowing tyrannical things (p. 31).

Tyrant-teacher τυραννοδιδάσκαλος

τυραννοδιδάσκαλος (tyrannodidaskalos)

Tyrant-teacher. The comic imagined specialist to whom the father has failed to send his son. Attested: τυραννοδιδασκάλου (125a). Tyranny, the tyrant, and the tyrant-teacher (p. 134).

Tyrants τύραννος

τύραννος (tyrannos)

Tyrants. Theages' familiar title for Hippias and Periander. Attested: τύραννοι (124e). Tyranny, the tyrant, and the tyrant-teacher (p. 134).

Unbelievable ἄπιστος

Unbelievable. Hard to believe; Aristides acknowledges his report's implausibility while insisting it is true. Attested: ἄπιστον (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction (p. 67).

Understand μανθάνειν

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Understand. Socrates asks whether he has now grasped which craft the boy intends. Attested: μανθάνω (124a). Agreement and the object of inquiry (p. 20).

Learn. Acquire the relevant skill from its practitioners in the hypothetical educational example. Attested: μανθάνειν (126e). Subjects of learning and the promise to educate (p. 128).

Learn. To acquire something through learning; Aristides emphatically denies ever learning anything from Socrates despite his reported progress. Attested: ἔμαθον (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction (p. 67).

Unsafe σφαλερός

σφαλερός (sphaleros)

Unsafe. The desire is risky in its pursuit despite not being ignoble. Attested: σφαλερὰ (121c). Fear, danger, and the question of safety (p. 58).

Unsettle διαταράττειν

διαταράττειν (diatarattein)

Unsettle. The effect the father attributes to those performances upon his son. Attested: διαταράττουσιν (121d). Peers, emulation, and remembered arguments (p. 90).

Use χρῆσθαι

χρῆσθαι (chrēsthai)

Use. Socrates asks what task the recognized wisdom serves. Attested: χρώμεθα (123d). Piloting and charioteering (p. 93).

Use. Practical use of horses in repeated experience; the verb later extends to dealing with cities. Attested: χρῶνται (126b). Practical expertise horses javelins and cities (p. 99).

Very greatly πάμπολυ

Very greatly. An intensive quantitative adverb describing the scale of Aristides' progress during a short association. Attested: πάμπολυ (130a). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Voice φωνή

Voice. The occurrence through which Socrates receives a preventive signal; the text supplies no quoted divine sentence or sensory mechanics. Attested: φωνή (128d). Voice, sign, and turning away (p. 137).

Watch for an occasion ἐπιτηρεῖν

Watch for an occasion. To watch attentively for an opportunity; Timarchus waits for Socrates' diverted attention before departing. Attested: ἐπιτηρήσας (129c). Obedience, inattention, and leaving unnoticed (p. 85).

Way τρόπος

Way; manner. A mode of acquisition; Socrates asks whether the power came through learning or in another way. Attested: τρόπῳ (130d). Learning without identifiable instruction (p. 67).

Willing ἑκών

ἑκών (hekōn)

Willing. The consenting people over whom Theages wishes to rule, a qualification absent from the earlier tyranny inference. Attested: ἑκόντων (126a). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition (p. 139).

Win νικᾶν

Win. To be victorious; Charmides supposes the sign predicts failure to win, but Socrates has not supplied that interpretation. Attested: νικήσω (128e). Charmides, Nemea, and athletic training (p. 36).

Wisdom σοφία

σοφία (sophia)

Wisdom. The desired attainment whose particular subject must now be stated. Attested: σοφία (123b). Wisdom and being wise (p. 141).

Wise σοφός

σοφός (sophos)

Wise. The stated attainment which the son wants and a prospective teacher is expected to produce. Attested: σοφὸς (121d). Wisdom and being wise (p. 141).

Wish βούλεσθαι

βούλεσθαι (boulesthai)

Wish. Socrates invites Demodocus to say whatever he wishes to discuss. Attested: βούλει (121a). Wish, willingness, and consent (p. 143).

Would wish. Demodocus identifies Socrates as the person whose advice he most wants. Attested: ἐβουλόμην (122a). Wish, willingness, and consent (p. 143).

Mean to say. Theages identifies the comprehensive formulation as the one he has long intended. Attested: βούλομαι λέγειν (124b). Wish, willingness, and consent (p. 143).

Withdraw ἀποχωρεῖν

ἀποχωρεῖν (apochōrein)

Withdraw. The proposed joint movement into the stoa. Attested: ἀποχωρήσωμεν (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Witnesses μάρτυς

μάρτυς (martys)

Witnesses. Earlier exchanges between father and son are treated as effectively unwitnessed. Attested: μαρτύρων (123a–b). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Witness. Socrates asks to witness the boy's present specification directly. Attested: μάρτυρα (123b). Witness, accusation, and family conflict (p. 146).

Witness. A person able to attest relevant events; Socrates offers witnesses for his account of the preventive sign. Attested: μάρτυρας (128d). Witnesses, reports, and incomplete evidence (p. 148).

Women γυνή

γυνή (gynē)

Women. Women are expressly included among the governed population, without a claim about franchise. Attested: γυναικῶν (124b). The city and the reach of comprehensive rule (p. 38).

Wonderful θαυμάσιος

Wonderful; remarkable. In adverbial use, the remarkable degree of progress some companions make while they remain with Socrates. Attested: θαυμάσιον (130a). Progress, retention, and loss (p. 103).

Worse χείρων

χείρων (cheirōn)

Worse. The earlier comparative position of acquaintances who now appear superior after association with Socrates. Attested: χείρους (128c). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement (p. 61).

Worth ἄξιος

ἄξιος (axios)

Worth. In οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, "worth nothing", Theages' strong appraisal of acquaintances before their association with Socrates. Attested: ἄξιοι (128c). Good citizenship and the standard of improvement (p. 61).

Would pray εὔχεσθαι

εὔχεσθαι (euchesthai)

Would pray. Theages' potential wish for tyranny, distinguished by him from his stated practical desire for civic education. Attested: Εὐξαίμην (125e). Voluntary rule force and unlimited ambition (p. 139).

Wrestle παλαίειν

παλαίειν (palaiein)

Wrestle. One of the bodily accomplishments already taught. Attested: παλαίειν (122e). Education of oneself and one's kin (p. 53).

Wrestlers παλαιστής

παλαιστής (palaistēs)

Wrestlers. The third practical class substituted for tyrants in the verse; wrestling supplies its identifiable subject. Attested: παλαισταὶ (125c). Poetry quotation and the authority of a famous line (p. 95).

Young man νεανίσκος

νεανίσκος (neaniskos)

Young man. The son is addressed as a young person whose own answer is now required. Attested: νεανίσκῳ (122d). Demodocus and paternal responsibility (p. 46).

Zeus Ζεύς

Ζεύς (Zeus)

Zeus. The god whose named stoa is proposed as the setting. Attested: Διὸς (121a). Leisure, privacy, and the stoa (p. 69).

Contextual phrase glosses

These glosses explain idiom, grammatical construction and argumentative force. They are subsidiary to the articles and defined register. The selected Greek is the supplied edition's wording, not a reconstructed sentence assembled from dictionary lemmas.

Make leisure for my sake

121a: ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα ποίησαι σχολήν. "Make leisure … for my sake." Poieisthai scholēn here concerns making oneself available. Demodocus acknowledges possible busyness but appeals to the personal relationship. Socrates replies that he already happens to be free. The exchange establishes a setting for careful counsel; it does not announce a general doctrine that leisure guarantees wisdom. See Leisure and private conversation.

If it seems good to you

121a: Εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ. Socrates accepts the move into the stoa conditionally on Demodocus' preference. Dokein can mark seeming, judgment or an agreed practical proposal; the context determines which. Its recurrence in the final decision, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι at 131a, frames a course of action without establishing that its hoped-for result has already been proved. See Agreement and Trial.

From my own affairs I judge the rest

121c: ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τἆλλα. Demodocus explicitly infers from his own case to others. Tekmairomai marks an inference based on signs or evidence; ta alla, contracted to talla, is "the rest". His plant-and-child comparison is an experienced parent's

generalization, not a biological law the dialogue establishes independently. See Care and growth.

Not ignoble but unsafe

121c: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ. The men/de contrast separates the aspiration's respectable character from its danger. "Not ignoble" is weaker and more guarded than "unconditionally excellent". The father's anxiety does not condemn wisdom as an end; it concerns the hazardous way the son proposes to acquire it. The safer educational alternative at 130e returns to this distinction. See Fear and risk.

Thinking his father ought to act

121d: ἀξιῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναί με ἑαυτοῦ. Theages thinks fit that his father should take care of him. The participle axiōn reports the boy's expectation or demand; it does not independently adjudicate what Demodocus owes. Socrates repeats the formulation to the boy at 122e. The inquiry will ask what kind of care the demand actually specifies. See Demodocus and Desire.

Appearing at just the right time

122a: εἰς καλὸν παρεφάνης. Literally connected with what is fine or fitting, the idiom means that Socrates has appeared at an opportune moment. Kalon here does not designate physical beauty or supply an abstract definition of the good. Demodocus immediately explains the practical fit: Socrates is the person he most wants to consult before acting. See Advice.

Advice is said to be sacred

122b: λέγεταί γε συμβουλὴ ἱερὸν χρῆμα εἶναι. “Advice is indeed said to be a sacred thing.” The passive “is said” marks an appeal to a received saying. Chrēma is “thing” in this expression, not the money denoted by chrēmata in the father’s account. Socrates extends the saying to education without claiming that every recommendation thereby possesses divine authority. See Advice and Education.

Not thinking of the same things

122c: μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενοι. The imagined adviser and advisee have proceeded while understanding none of the same things. The danger is not simply verbal disagreement; identical language might conceal different intended subjects. Socrates then makes a further correction: even the adults’ shared interpretation might miss what the boy wants. Agreement among the advisers is necessary but insufficient. See Agreement and inquiry.

Wise about whatever they know

122e: περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἐπιστήμονες ὦσιν. The indefinite relative construction leaves the field of knowledge open: “whatever” they are knowledgeable about. That openness allows pilots and charioteers to count as wise in their domains. It does not establish that a knowledgeable person is wise about everything. The later question τῶν τί σοφῶν at 125b–d demands the field that the unqualified adjective leaves unspecified. See Wisdom.

Before a witness

123b: νυνὶ δὲ ἐμὲ ποίησαι μάρτυρα. Socrates invites Theages to make him a witness to a clear statement of the

desired wisdom. Earlier exchanges with the father are treated as having occurred without witnesses. This creates a shared present record rather than deciding who was truthful about all past quarrels. Later witnesses concern reports about the sign, a related evidential word in a different setting. See Witness and conflict.

Knowing the thing and knowing its name

123c: αὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε ὄνομα. Socrates distinguishes knowing the wisdom itself from knowing its name. Theages claims both but offers the broad term “wisdom”, which also fits the crafts already named. A correct general label need not identify the distinctive thing sought. The dialogue tests specificity, not merely the ability to remember a word. See Names and Theages.

Not these alone

124a: οὐ τούτων λέγω μόνον. Theages does not exclude the sick from the political population; he denies that only they are meant. Negated monon removes the restriction on scope. This matters because the craft sequence leads toward all the city’s people, not toward a class emptied of every craft’s recipients. Its breadth still leaves manner and consent undetermined. See City and universal rule.

From what I said

124e: Ἔοικέν γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον. Theages’ concession is qualified by the words he has supplied. “It seems so … from what I said” acknowledges the apparent implication of his answer while leaving room to correct that answer’s incompleteness. At 126a he does so by requiring willing subjects. The phrase is not a confession that every fuller statement of his aim must be tyrannical. See Tyranny.

To whose house and through whose company

125a: ἐς τίνος ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν. The supplied translation understands “to whose house we should send him”, with the genitive after es implying the person’s establishment or home. The following question asks through whose association he could become a wise tyrant. Burnet prints Bekker’s es tinos against the reported manuscript wording. This is an adopted editorial reading, not a reason to invent a named tyrant-school. See Text and apparatus.

Wise tyrants through wise association

125b: σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ. The instrumental dative gives association as the means by which tyrants are wise; tōn sophōn identifies those associated with. The construction does not specify their field of wisdom. Socrates’ question asks for that missing complement rather than simply denying that company can educate. The farmer, cook and wrestler substitutions test the same structure. See Poetry and authority.

Would pray but did not mean that desire

126a: ἀλλ’ οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν. Theages distinguishes what he had meant to say he desired from the expansive prayer he has just admitted. The imperfect elegon concerns his earlier statement, not an assertion that limitless ambition never attracts him. A translation or paraphrase should retain both the admission and the clarification. See Voluntary rule and Desire.

Over willing people

126a: Οὐ βίᾳ γε οὐδ’ ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι ἀλλ’ ἑκόντων. The genitive hekontōn depends on the governing idea of ruling. It supplies the subjects’ willingness, whereas biai identifies the rejected mode. This is distinct from a teacher’s or pupil’s willingness to join the association. The statement does not by itself prescribe a particular constitutional institution. See Voluntary rule.

Own and others resources

126b: καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ ἀλλοτρίοις πολλοῖς. The coordinated adjectives refer to horses in the first example, with many cases of one’s own and others’ animals. Javelins and then cities extend the pattern. The repeated contrast supports experienced competence across cases; it does not automatically establish teaching ability or imply that cities are owned as horses are. See Practical expertise.

Arguments people say Socrates makes

126d: οὓς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς λόγους. Theages reports arguments attributed to Socrates. Phasin, “they say”, preserves the mediation of the report. Logos elsewhere can name the peers’ memorized arguments (121d), the conversation now addressed to Socrates (127c) and Aristides’ performance in discussion (130c). It is neither always a technical proof nor one invariant abstract “Reason”. See Statesmen’s sons and Rivalry.

If capable of benefiting anyone

126d: εἴ τι οἷός τ’ ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον ὁντιναοῦν ἀνθρώπων. The conditional clause makes ability the issue: if a statesman could benefit anyone in these things, why

not his own son? Hoios t’ einai is a capacity construction; it does not merely mean being willing. The inference still assumes that opportunity, relationship and pupil do not block the expected benefit. See Statesmen’s sons.

More than any godsend

127b: οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅτι τούτου μεῖζον ἂν ἕρμαιον ἡγησαίμην. The idiom conveys that Demodocus can imagine no greater lucky find than the proposed association. It expresses personal relief and valuation. The word’s association with Hermes, explained by the source note, does not mean the father has received a separate divine sign certifying the arrangement. See Money fees and resources.

Ashamed to say how much he wants it

127b: αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν ὡς σφόδρα βούλομαι. The father is embarrassed by the intensity of his wish. The construction does not say the wish itself is shameful or that he has confessed wrongdoing. Paired with his plea to both parties and later offer of resources, it makes his dependence and earnestness visible. See Demodocus and Money fees and resources.

A fee and gratitude besides

128a: καὶ χάριν πρὸς τούτοις εἰδέναι. Literally “know gratitude in addition to these things”, the idiom means be grateful besides paying. Socrates emphasizes the persuasive achievement of the teachers who can obtain both payment and thanks from young people with free alternatives. The idiom is not a further subject of factual knowledge taught by the sophists. See Sophists.

So to speak nothing except

128b: ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος. “Knowing, so to speak, nothing” is immediately followed by the love exception. The idiomatic hedge and the exception both qualify the claim. Treating it as an unqualified denial of every competence makes the speaker contradict a proposition stronger than he states. The extraordinary boast in the excepted subject remains part of the same speech. See Socrates and Love.

Better than those formerly above them

128c: πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὧν πρότερον χείρους. The relative clause identifies the comparison group: those to whom the young men were previously inferior. Phainontai retains Theages’ report of appearance. The claim is not “better than all human beings in every respect”. The nature and stability of this apparent improvement are precisely what Socrates goes on to qualify. See Good citizenship.

Turning away never turning toward

128d: προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε. The voice never prompts Socrates toward an action. This contrasts with its stated signaling of a turning away. It does not mean the larger daimonic power never assists anyone: the account of association later includes positive assistance. The voice’s directive function and the power’s effect on progress should be described separately. See Voice and sign and Power.

It is worth asking him

128e: ἄξιον οὖν πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ. Socrates directs the listeners to ask Charmides about what followed his disregarded warning. The statement invokes an accessible witness but does not narrate the particular injury or loss. Filling that silence with an imagined defeat or bodily accident would exceed the source. See Charmides and training and Witnesses.

Not merely permission

129e: πολλοῖς δὲ συνεῖναι μὲν οὐ διακωλύει. Lack of opposition to association is not yet positive aid. Socrates immediately distinguishes people who receive no benefit from those whose progress the power assists. The men/de structure organizes different cases; “the sign permits it” must not be used as shorthand for all the favorable outcomes. See Progress and retention.

No lesson but progress

130d: ἔμαθον μὲν παρά σου οὐδὲν πώποτε. Aristides says he never learned anything from Socrates, then contrasts that denial with progress during association. The claim is his self-report within Socrates’ story. It does not prove the absence of conversation, and it does not give a general argument that learning has no educational value. See Learning without instruction.

If dear to the god

130e: ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ. The condition on rapid and great progress is that the association be dear or pleasing to the god. The following εἰ δὲ μή, οὔ makes the negative alternative emphatic. The wording does not identify a

ritual procedure that guarantees favor. Theages' subsequent proposal to attempt propitiation remains a proposal. See Daimonic and divine.

Masters of the benefit

130e: ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοί εἰσιν τῆς ὠφελίας. The genitive identifies what the teachers control: the benefit they impart. Enkrateis is relational here. Replacing it with the abstract virtue "self-control" would change both the grammatical object and the point of the comparison, which concerns predictability for a prospective pupil. See Mastery and chance.

Whatever may happen

130e: ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι. The construction characterizes the uncertain result of choosing Socrates' company. It is not a pronouncement that chance is the ultimate cause of all things. Earlier tynchanein constructions, such as τυγχάνω σχολάζων at 121a, simply present what happens to be the case or is in fact so. Their local functions should not be merged into a metaphysical doctrine. See Mastery and chance.

Testing through being together

131a: ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου συνόντας ἀλλήλοις. The trial is made by associating with one another; the participle describes the circumstance or means of testing. Theages does not ask for a theoretical demonstration in advance, and Socrates does not report a successful result. The genitive marks what is put to the test. See Trial and permission.

Diviners may prescribe

131a: ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ ἂν οἱ μάντεις ἐξηγῶνται. The indefinite relative construction leaves open whatever else diviners may direct. Prayers and sacrifices are named, but no particular rite or diviner is specified. The plan is conditional on the association's not being permitted, and no performance of the rite is narrated. See Prayer and sacrifice.

Oaths in assent and denial

126a: Νὴ Δία τούτους λέγω. The oath reinforces Theages' identification of the statesmen as his intended models. Similar invocations of Zeus occur with both assent and denial throughout the exchanges, including μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε at 126b. Their force follows the accompanying assertion or negation. They are conversational emphasis, not separate revelations that establish the truth of every answer. See Agreement.

Lexical index

The Greek sequence links to every consolidated register headword. The English sequence supplies an additional route to those definitions. Full article headings are listed separately in the contents. Page locators refer to this companion, not to the ancient text.

Greek headwords

- ἀγαθός (p. 184) — good
- Ἀγαμέμνων (p. 153) — agamemnon
- ἀγεννής (p. 190) — ignoble
- ἀγωνία (p. 168) — contests
- Αἰακός (p. 152) — aeacus
- Αἴγισθος (p. 152) — aegisthus
- ᾄδειν (p. 220) — singing
- αἰσθάνεσθαι (p. 207) — perceive
- ᾆσμα (p. 221) — song
- αἰσχύνεσθαι (p. 155) — are ashamed; feel shame
- ἀκόντιον (p. 193) — javelins
- ἀκοντιστικός (p. 192) — javelin throwing
- ἀκούειν (p. 187) — have heard; hear from
- Ἀκραγαντῖνος (p. 203) — of acragas
- ἀληθής (p. 231) — true
- ἀλλήλων (p. 205) — one another
- ἀλλότριος (p. 205) — others own
- ἀλοᾶν (p. 228) — threshing
- ἀμαθία (p. 224) — stupidity
- Ἀμφίλυτος (p. 154) — amphilytus

- ἀναγκάζειν (p. 197) — make; compel
- Ἀναγυράσιος (p. 154) — anagyrasians
- ἀνακοινοῦσθαι (p. 168) — consult
- Ἀνακρέων (p. 154) — anacreon
- ἀναλίσκειν (p. 223) — spend
- ἀνδράποδον (p. 220) — slave, as an insult
- ἀνερωτᾶν (p. 157) — asking
- ἀνήρ (p. 199) — men
- ἄνθρωπος (p. 190) — the human being; human beings
- ἀνίστασθαι (p. 182) — get up
- ἀνόητος (p. 218) — senseless
- ἀντιλέγειν (p. 222) — speak against; object
- ἀνώνυμος (p. 202) — nameless
- ἄξιος (p. 237) — worth
- ἀξιοῦν (p. 227) — thinking fit
- ἀπέχεσθαι (p. 193) — keep away
- ἀπέχθεια (p. 189) — hostility; falling-out
- ἀπιστεῖν (p. 173) — disobey; distrust
- ἄπιστος (p. 232) — unbelievable
- ἀποθνήσκειν (p. 172) — die
- ἀποκρίνεσθαι (p. 154) — answer
- ἀποκτείνειν (p. 188) — having killed; kill
- ἀπομνημονεύειν (p. 214) — repeating from memory
- ἀποπειρᾶσθαι (p. 198) — make trial of
- ἀπορεῖν (p. 158) — be at a loss
- ἀποτρέπειν (p. 231) — turn away
- ἀποτροπή (p. 231) — turning away

- ἀποχωρεῖν (p. 236) — withdraw
- ἅπτεσθαι (p. 229) — touch
- Ἄργος (p. 155) — argos
- ἀργύριον (p. 200) — money
- Ἀριστείδης (p. 156) — aristides, the young companion; aristides, the grandfather
- ἅρμα (p. 165) — chariots
- ἄρχειν (p. 216) — rule
- Ἀρχέλαος (p. 155) — archelaus
- ἄρχεσθαι (p. 160) — begin
- ἀρχή (p. 216) — rule
- ἄρχων (p. 216) — ruler
- ἀσκεῖν (p. 230) — train; practise
- ἄσκησις (p. 230) — training
- ἄστυ (p. 230) — town
- ἀσφαλής (p. 217) — safer; more secure
- ἀσχολία (p. 163) — busyness
- ἀτιμάζειν (p. 220) — slight
- ἄτοπος (p. 224) — still more absurd
- αὐλητής (p. 181) — flute players
- Βάκις (p. 157) — bakis
- βάρβαρος (p. 203) — non greek or barbarian
- βέβαιος (p. 180) — firm; secure
- βέλτιστος (p. 162) — best
- βελτίων (p. 162) — better
- βία (p. 181) — force
- βιοῦν (p. 196) — live
- βλέπειν (p. 196) — look towards

- βούλεσθαι (p. 235) — wish; would wish; mean to say
- βουλεύεσθαι (p. 171) — deliberate; are deliberating; let us deliberate
- βουλή (p. 169) — counsel
- γελοῖος (p. 215) — ridiculous
- γενναῖος (p. 201) — most wellborn
- γεωργεῖν (p. 177) — farm
- γεωργική (p. 178) — farming
- γεωργός (p. 178) — farmers
- γῆ (p. 175) — earth
- γίγνεσθαι (p. 167) — come; occur
- Γλαύκων (p. 183) — glaucon
- Γοργίας (p. 184) — gorgias
- γράμματα (p. 196) — letters
- γυμνάζεσθαι (p. 177) — exercising; exercise
- γυμναστική (p. 185) — gymnastics
- γυνή (p. 236) — women
- δαιμόνιον (p. 171) — daimonic thing
- δεδιέναι (p. 160) — being afraid
- δεινός (p. 167) — clever or skilled
- δημιουργός (p. 169) — craftsmen; craftsman
- Δημόδοκος (p. 172) — demodocus
- δημότης (p. 179) — fellow demesmen
- διακωλύειν (p. 212) — prevent; hinder
- διαλέγεσθαι (p. 168) — converse; discuss
- διαλείπειν (p. 196) — let an interval pass
- διαπράττεσθαι (p. 165) — carry out; accomplish

- διαπυνθάνεσθαι (p. 180) — finding out thoroughly; let us find out thoroughly
- διαταράττειν (p. 233) — unsettle
- διατρίβειν (p. 223) — spend time
- διαφέρειν (p. 173) — differ; stand apart
- διαφθείρειν (p. 158) — be corrupted; corrupt
- διαφθορά (p. 172) — destruction
- διδάσκεσθαι (p. 185) — had taught
- διώκειν (p. 213) — pursue; seek
- δοκεῖν (p. 218) — seem good; thought to be
- δρᾶν (p. 173) — do; act
- δύναμις (p. 211) — power; ability; power
- δύνασθαι (p. 187) — have power
- δύσκολος (p. 230) — troublesome
- ἐᾶν (p. 153) — allow
- ἑαυτοῦ (p. 204) — of oneself
- ἐγκρατής (p. 198) — master of; in control of
- ἐθέλειν (p. 191) — is willing
- εἰδέναι (p. 194) — knows; you know; know
- εἰκός (p. 214) — reasonable
- εἰς καλόν (p. 157) — at the right time
- εἰωθέναι (p. 170) — customary; familiar
- ἐκ παιδός (p. 182) — from childhood
- ἐκπλεῖν (p. 217) — sail out; sail away
- ἐκποδών (p. 206) — out of the way
- ἐκρεῖν (p. 174) — drain away
- ἑκών (p. 234) — willing
- ἐλευθέριος (p. 204) — of freedom

- ἐλλείπειν (p. 194) — lack
- Ἕλληνίς (p. 184) — greek
- ἐλλόγιμος (p. 204) — of repute
- ἐναντιοῦσθαι (p. 205) — oppose
- ἐνδεής (p. 195) — lacking
- ἐννοεῖν (p. 225) — take into account
- ἐνορᾶν (p. 173) — discern in
- ἐντυγχάνειν (p. 176) — encounter
- ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον (p. 182) — from what i said
- ἐξαίφνης (p. 224) — suddenly
- ἐξεπίτηδες (p. 205) — on purpose
- ἔξεστι (p. 192) — it is permitted
- ἐξευρίσκειν (p. 179) — find
- ἐξηγεῖσθαι (p. 211) — prescribe; expound
- ἕξις (p. 223) — state; condition
- ἐξορμή (p. 218) — setting out
- ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι (p. 213) — profess
- ἐπέχειν (p. 188) — hold back
- ἐπιβουλή (p. 210) — plot
- ἐπιδιδόναι (p. 197) — make progress
- ἐπιθυμεῖν (p. 172) — desires; you desired
- ἐπιθυμία (p. 172) — desire
- ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (p. 164) — care for
- ἐπίστασθαι (p. 194) — know how
- ἐπιστήμη (p. 194) — knowledge
- ἐπιστήμων (p. 228) — those with knowledge
- ἐπιτηρεῖν (p. 234) — watch for an occasion
- ἐπωνυμία (p. 229) — title

- ἔρεσθαι (p. 156) — ask; inquire
- ἔρμαιον (p. 184) — godsend
- ἐρωτικός (p. 226) — things of love
- ἐς τίνος (p. 229) — to whose house
- Εὔαθλος (p. 176) — euathlus
- εὐδοκιμεῖν (p. 159) — be well thought of
- εὐεργετεῖν (p. 174) — do good to
- Εὐριπίδης (p. 176) — euripides
- εὔχεσθαι (p. 237) — would pray
- εὐχή (p. 211) — prayer
- Ἔφεσος (p. 176) — ephesus
- ἔχεσθαι (p. 189) — hold on to
- ζεῦγος (p. 226) — team
- Ζεύς (p. 238) — zeus
- ζηλοῦν (p. 186) — has come to envy
- ζωγράφος (p. 206) — painter
- ζῷον (p. 154) — animals
- ἡ προτεραία (p. 212) — the previous day
- ἡγεῖσθαι (p. 227) — thinking
- ἥκειν (p. 186) — have arrived; return
- ἡλικιώτης (p. 207) — peers
- ἡμεδαπός (p. 206) — our own
- ἡνιοχεία (p. 165) — charioteering
- ἡνιοχική (p. 165) — charioteering
- Ἡροσκάμανδρος (p. 188) — heroscamandrus
- θαυμάσιος (p. 236) — wonderful; remarkable
- Θεάγης (p. 226) — theages
- θεῖος (p. 200) — more divine; divine; the divine

- Θεμιστοκλῆς (p. 226) — themistocles
- θεός (p. 183) — god; gods, in an oath
- θεραπεία (p. 226) — tending
- θερίζειν (p. 213) — reaping
- Θουκυδίδης (p. 228) — thucydides, the young companion; thucydides, the grandfather
- Θράσυλλος (p. 228) — thrasyllus
- θυσία (p. 217) — sacrifice
- ἰατρική (p. 199) — medicine
- ἰδιολογεῖσθαι (p. 168) — converse privately
- ἰδιώτης (p. 212) — private persons
- ἱεροπρεπής (p. 159) — befitting the sacred
- ἱερός (p. 216) — sacred
- ἱκανῶς (p. 225) — sufficiently
- ἱππεύς (p. 189) — horseman
- Ἱππίας (p. 188) — hippias
- ἱππικός (p. 220) — skilled in horsemanship
- ἵππος (p. 189) — horses
- Ἰωνία (p. 191) — ionia
- καθῆσθαι (p. 220) — sit
- Καλλικρίτη (p. 164) — callicrite
- καλός (p. 180) — fine
- καλὸς κἀγαθός (p. 180) — fine and good
- κάμνειν (p. 161) — being sick
- κατὰ σμικρόν (p. 196) — little by little
- καταβαίνειν (p. 167) — coming down
- καταγελάστως (p. 195) — laughably
- κατειπεῖν (p. 222) — speak out; has spoken against

- κατέχειν (p. 188) — held back
- Κεῖος (p. 203) — of ceos
- κιθαρίζειν (p. 210) — play the cithara
- κιθαριστής (p. 166) — cithara players
- Κίμων (p. 166) — cimon
- κινδυνεύειν (p. 192) — it looks as though
- κίνδυνος (p. 171) — danger
- Κλειτόμαχος (p. 167) — clitomachus
- κοινῇ (p. 229) — together
- Κόρινθος (p. 169) — corinth
- κράτιστος (p. 162) — best
- Κυάνη (p. 170) — cyane
- κυβερνᾶν (p. 209) — pilot
- κυβερνητική (p. 209) — piloting
- Κύψελος (p. 170) — cypselus
- λανθάνειν (p. 176) — escape notice
- Λεοντῖνος (p. 204) — of leontini
- λόγος (p. 155) — arguments; argument; discussion
- Λυσίμαχος (p. 197) — lysimachus
- μάγειρος (p. 168) — cooks
- μάθημα (p. 224) — subject of learning
- μακάριος (p. 163) — blessed
- Μακεδονία (p. 197) — macedonia
- μανθάνειν (p. 233) — understand; learn
- μάντις (p. 173) — diviner; prophet
- μάρτυς (p. 236) — witnesses; witness
- μάχεσθαι (p. 179) — fights
- μειρακίσκος (p. 195) — lad

- μέλειν (p. 198) — matters
- Μελησίας (p. 199) — melesias
- μέμφεσθαι (p. 163) — blame
- μετατίθεσθαι (p. 215) — revise
- μιαρός (p. 213) — rascal
- μισθός (p. 178) — fee
- μοῖρα (p. 197) — lot; allotment
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Source guide and notes

The supplied reading edition

Plato, Theages, Greek and English, Diotimos Editions, 2026. The supplied title page identifies the Greek as John Burnet's Oxford text of 1903, in the corrected second impression of 1909, and the English as a new translation. This companion uses the supplied Markdown and PDF as its source. The seventeen Greek pages, English translation, explanatory notes, Key Words, outline, glossary and Editorial Note have distinct evidential roles: the spoken Greek determines attestation; the translation determines the edition's rendering; the apparatus and notes record editorial or contextual information.

The preceding Lovers Lexicon supplies the companion's article architecture, distinction between full articles and shorter definitions, and three-index navigation. It is a model of format, not a source for the meaning of a word in Theages. The number of articles and register items has therefore been determined from this dialogue's own needs.

Primary passages cited in the supplied notes

The following references identify the principal ancient parallels mentioned in the supplied edition and discussed in the companion. They are guides for further reading, not claims that a fresh collation of all these works was performed for this lexicon.

- Diogenes Laertius 3.59: the ancient catalogue and the fifth tetralogy

- Plato, Apology 19e–20a: the teachers who attract fee-paying young associates; 31c–d: the prohibitory voice; 33e: Demodocus, Paralius and Theages
- Plato, Republic 496b–c: the condition that keeps Theages from political life; 568a–b: the verse attributed to Euripides
- Plato, Protagoras 319e–320b: political education and statesmen's sons; 325d–326c: the sequence of ordinary education
- Plato, Meno 93a–94e: the educational achievements of statesmen and their sons
- Plato, Gorgias 470d–471d: Archelaus in Polus' example; 503c and 515c–517a: the assessment of prominent Athenian statesmen
- Plato, Laches 178a–179d: the families of the younger Aristides and Thucydides
- Plato, Theaetetus 150e–151a: Aristides, departure and the selective reception of returning associates
- Plato, Symposium 177d and Lysis 204b–c: Socrates' avowal concerning the things of love
- Plato, Alcibiades I 103a and 105a–c: divine opposition and expansive political ambition; Alcibiades II 141a–e: imagined tyranny and the fate of Archelaus
- Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.4 and 4.8.1: other presentations of Socratic divine signs; Oeconomicus 7.1: the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios
- Herodotus 1.62.4: Amphilytus; 8.20 and 8.77: Bakis
- Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 13.19.2: the report of the disputed verse in Sophocles' Ajax the Locrian

- Thucydides 4.75.1: a general named Demodocus, whose identification with the speaker remains tentative in the supplied note

These references should be read with their differences intact. In particular, the sign's negative directive function in the Apology does not exhaust the educational power attributed to it here; the criticism of political leaders in the Gorgias is not identical to Theages' argument about their sons; and an ancient catalogue attribution is not a resolution of modern authorship disputes.

Textual cautions worth keeping beside the book

The bracketed διδασκάλου at 125a and τι at 128b are not translated by the supplied edition. The Greek page's εἰ at 127a is a retained print error where the English requires εἶ, "you are". The words †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου† at 129a remain corrupt and should not ground an independent doctrine. Callicrite's spelling at 125d–e, the phrase "to whose house" at 125a and "who have horses" at 126b reflect the edited text described in the source's apparatus. None of these notices warrants silently substituting every reported variant into the dialogue.

Lexical headings generally use recognizable dictionary forms, while The places and the register show the source's inflections. A clipped quotation can undergo the conventional acute/grave or enclitic-accent adjustment associated with its new quotation boundary; it is not thereby a different lexical reading. The register retains the supplied attested form so that the reader can find it. The possible morphological analyses of παρείκῃ at 131a should not be confused with textual corruption: the permission sense is treated under παρείκειν, "give way or allow".

What remains open

The dialogue does not establish a definition of political wisdom, prove that every practitioner can teach, independently verify all the sign stories, or narrate the outcome of Theages' association. It gives the speakers a qualified way to proceed. The companion explains the full path to that decision while preserving these limits.

The matching PDF supplies stable pagination. EPUB pagination depends on the reading application and its settings; its linked contents and indexes remain stable routes. Word is editable, so substantial editing can change its pagination. The Markdown preserves the same substantive text, Greek quotations, notes and links in an open form.