Plausibility and probability

Use in the book

An imagined wicked person must remain believable even to the best good person. In the proposed reply to Bonnald, plausibility suffices for represented feelings, while actions demand worldly reality; this is Joubert’s argument about poetry and history, not an uncontested rule of drama. The Malebranche-reading note makes a different division: probability can suffice for moral action and for the mind’s satisfaction in physics, but not for practical mechanics. Plausibility can suffice in metaphysics.

The later nominal formula assigns verisimilitudes to metaphysics and probabilities elsewhere, followed by a more specific pairing of metaphysics and logic. The brief quotation that probabilities prove nothing leaves its speaker unnamed. Taken together, these witnesses distinguish credible representation, sufficient grounds for action and proof; they do not allow every occurrence to be replaced by certainty.

Places to read

1. I, p. 285, entry 8, ¶1Credibility must extend even to an audience unlike the person depicted.
2. I, p. 446, entry 5, ¶1The sufficiency of probability depends on the discipline and its practice.
3. II, p. 518, entry 8, ¶1Plausibility suffices for represented feeling in a proposed reply.
4. II, p. 560, entry 9, ¶1An unidentified speaker denies that probabilities prove.
5. II, p. 760, entry 7, ¶1A nominal formula distinguishes verisimilitudes from probabilities.
6. II, p. 760, entry 7, ¶2Metaphysics and logic receive different stated aims.

Translation in this edition

The English translation keeps probabilité separate from vraisemblance, using plausibility or verisimilitude for the latter. The Aristotle statement is reported within Joubert’s Malebranche reading and is not certified as an exact independent quotation. Singular and plural technical forms remain distinct.