Organical parts · Lexicon

From the book

The Anatomy of Melancholy

Robert Burton · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordSimilar parts are bodily materials understood as uniform in kind: dividing them produces more of the same substance.
In the Anatomy of MelancholyThe anatomy digression first divides the body into contained and containing parts.
In this edition“Similar parts” becomes “Uniform parts”; “Dissimilar parts” becomes “Composite parts.”
A place to readinborn impairment attributed to organs contrasted with acquired disturbance

Meaning

Similar parts are bodily materials understood as uniform in kind: dividing them produces more of the same substance. Homogeneal is Burton’s equivalent; Dissimilar or Heterogeneal parts combine different materials. He calls these composite parts Organical, or Instrumental, emphasizing their functions. An Organ is an instrument through which a power operates; an organical body is a body furnished with organs. In the account of the soul, inorganical means independent of bodily organs, not composed of what modern chemistry calls inorganic matter.

Use in the book

Materials, instruments and principal organs

The anatomy digression first divides the body into contained and containing parts. Humours and spirits are contained; more solid structures contain them. It then divides those structures into similar and dissimilar parts. Similarity is a test of composition, illustrated by water dividing into water, rather than a comparison of outward appearance. Bones, membranes, nerves and vessels occur in the list of parts thought to arise from generative seed. Fat, skin and flesh receive their own material descriptions. These belong to Burton’s inherited accounts of bodily composition and generation.

Dissimilar parts include both familiar outward members and internal organs. The internal classification names brain, heart and liver as the three principal or noble parts, served by the others. Their positions determine the body’s three main regions. Burton dramatizes the organization politically: the heart is king, the brain its councillor and chancellor, the liver its legate. These metaphors assign functions and relations of service rather than supplying an independent anatomical proof of the hierarchy. The brain supplies sensation and movement through nerves; the heart communicates life through arteries; the liver and related natural organs serve digestion, nourishment and the removal of waste.

The term remains flexible enough to describe a composite organ from another standpoint. When discussing the principal part affected in melancholy, Burton reports the majority view that the brain is affected “as a similar part”: in its substance, whether in itself or through another part’s influence. The following clause contrasts this with obstruction of the ventricles, assigned there to apoplexy or epilepsy. The point is not that the brain has suddenly ceased to be an organ, but that the question now concerns its material condition rather than the arrangement or blockage of its chambers. Later accounts do not all keep the same causal scheme.

The material distinction also enters inheritance. Fernel’s quoted similares spermaticæque partes are uniform parts and parts thought to develop from seed. His statement makes their condition depend upon parental, especially paternal, seed and claims that the father transmits whatever disease he has. Burton’s continuation emphasizes inherited dispositions as well as bodily features. The sweeping transmission claim remains part of the cited historical account, not a rule of modern genetics.

The organ as means of activity

The general sense of instrument connects anatomy to the faculties. In the definitions of the vegetative and sensitive powers, the living body is organical because it has the equipment for nutrition, growth, reproduction, perception and movement. Nutrition’s organ is the liver in creatures with sensation, but the root or sap in plants; organical life is consequently not restricted to the human or animal body. Particular discussions distinguish a faculty’s organ from its object and medium: the eye is an organ of sight, while visible things are its objects and illuminated air supplies the medium. A wider instrumental use calls smell an “Organ of health,” because selecting or avoiding smells can affect bodily condition. Here the sense itself is the means of an end.

The account of movement makes agency especially important. The desired or avoided object supplies the end. In humans, reason or imagination subordinate to it is the efficient cause; in brutes, imagination alone moves appetite. Appetite moves the moving faculty, and that faculty commands the bodily organ through the mediation of spirit. The continuation identifies nerves, muscles and cords as the bodily mechanism. Calling a part instrumental therefore does not make it the principal agent or confuse it with the purpose of the movement.

Independence and dependence of the soul

In the definition attributed to Aristotle, an organical body has the capacity for life, while soul is its first actuality. Burton then reports disagreement about the soul’s nature and its relation to bodily equipment. One reported view explains differences between human and animal reason through differences in organs. His rational-soul discussion retains a more complicated formulation: the soul is incorporeal and inorganical in itself, yet present throughout the body, using its organs and working through them. Understanding is subsequently said to apprehend and judge without instruments or organs. These claims concern the soul’s nature and distinctive powers; the text does not let them erase bodily dependence in lived experience.

In the inward-causes discussion, the condition of organs helps explain why bodily illness affects mental activity. A disordered organ resembles an untuned string that disturbs the whole instrument. The soul’s actions vary with its bodily equipment as a torch’s light varies with its material or wine acquires the flavour of its cask. Burton even reports understanding as unable to exercise its functions without the lower senses, with the weakened will vulnerable to their influence. The philosophical claim of organ-independent understanding and the medical account of dependence remain distinct emphases in his composite treatment.

Disorders, symptoms and treatment

The earlier classification of folly distinguishes an inborn condition, attributed to defective organs and excessive brain matter, from an acquired disturbance accompanying another illness. The disparaging categories and anatomical explanation remain those of the historical text.

Defective or hindered organs can impair imagination; Burton uses this bodily account to explain the oppressive experience popularly described as being witch-ridden. His catalogue of symptoms later names the head, liver, spleen, mesenteric veins, heart, womb and stomach among the Organicall parts from which the immediate symptoms proceed. Their humours and spirits differ in quality, quantity and mixture, producing varied effects. The passage expressly attributes to Hercules de Saxonia the contention that spirits are immaterial; that claim should not be generalized into a definition shared by every author Burton cites. A later explanation also runs in the other direction: organs corrupted by imagination agitate spirits and humours, producing apparent objects before the eyes. Burton attributes this alternative to Lemnius alongside other inward explanations of appearances.

In the religious discussion, bodily instruments also enter Burton’s explanation of involuntary terrifying thoughts. He describes disturbed humours and infirm organs as conditions a devil may exploit, while emphasizing compulsion against the sufferer’s will. The later reassurance limits the devil’s power and allows medicine as part of the response to mixed causes. These passages extend the organ’s role from ordinary faculty psychology into theological consolation. They report Burton’s historical causal model, not a present-day method for identifying supernatural agency.

Related entries

Anatomy; Soul; Cerebral chambers; Heart and cordolium; Anatomical arteries; Anatomical membranes; Ventricle; Lights; Meseraic; Myrach; Imagination; Spirits

Places to read

1.1.1.4inborn impairment attributed to organs contrasted with acquired disturbance
1.1.2.2–3contained and containing parts, homogeneity and the material inventory
1.1.2.4composite parts, functional classification and the three principal organs
1.1.2.5–6organical bodies, disputed souls, sensory organs and smell as an instrument of health
1.1.2.8the chain from reason or imagination through appetite and spirit to the moving organ
1.1.2.9–10organical and inorganical; understanding’s asserted independence
1.1.3.2the brain considered in its substance as a similar part
1.2.1.6similar and seed-derived parts in Fernel’s inherited-constitution account
1.2.3.2defects of organs and disturbed imagination
1.2.5.1organs as the soul’s working instruments and routes of bodily influence
1.2.5.3a competing account includes the membranes and ventricular passages
1.3.1.3, [second occurrence]organ-specific variation in symptoms
First Partitionorgans corrupted by imagination in the explanation of appearances
3.4.2.6bodily vulnerability, involuntary thoughts and mixed remedies in the religious discussion

In this edition

“Similar parts” becomes “Uniform parts”; “Dissimilar parts” becomes “Composite parts.” “Organical, or Instrumental” is rendered “organs, or instruments,” and “as a similar part” becomes “in its substance.” The modern wording makes the material/functional distinction explicit. “Organicall parts” is simply “organs,” without losing the surrounding account of their humours and spirits.

The rendering of organical varies with construction: “organized body” in the faculty definitions, “body furnished with organs” in the rational-soul definition, and “depends on bodily organs” in the question whether the soul is organical or inorganical. The separate assertions that the soul is independent of organs and uses them are both retained. The modern column combines Burton’s Greek, Latin and English formulations of the definition; its whole sentence cannot be assigned to the adjective alone.

defect of the organs

Printed “defect of the organs” (English; phrase).

At a Glance

Meaning

Use in the book

Places to read

In this edition

defect of the organs

dissimilar

heterogeneal

homogeneal

infirm organs

inorganical

instruments or organs

organ · Organ · local use 1

organ · Organ · local use 2

organ · organs

organ · Organs

organ · Organ · local use 3

organ of health

organical body

organical body · Organical Body

organical, or instrumental

organicall parts

similar part

similar parts

similares spermaticæque partes