Nonbeing

Use in the book

A Hermetic summary says that everything existing moves and only what does not exist is motionless. Here nonbeing supplies the limiting contrast for a universal statement about motion. The aphorism should not be combined uncritically with other excerpts that affirm an unmoved intellect or an unmoved actuality of soul.

Places to read

1. I.41.1.7Nonbeing contrasts with the assertion that all existing things move.

Translation in this edition

“What does not exist” clarifies the immediate statement. “Nonbeing” is useful as a headword linking different discussions of negation and existence.

Use in the book

Ficino distinguishes the absence of existence from a recipient that has not yet acquired some actuality. Water not yet hot still has the capacity to receive heat; what does not exist at all has no such underlying capacity for existence. Creation without a prior subject therefore requires infinite power. Pure being, conversely, excludes both privation of being and any potency not to be. The phrase non esse also expresses the dependence of effects: considered apart from their cause, they would not exist, and without continued preservation would not persist. This describes dependence, while still affirming that creatures exist through their cause. In the polemic against two opposed gods, Ficino argues that a wholly evil deity, deprived of every good, could neither act, know, live, nor exist, since these are goods. That argument concerns the incoherence of absolute evil as a first principle; it is not yet a complete account of every experienced evil.

In II.12.16–1823, nonbeing enters a modal argument: contradiction alone includes the character of nonbeing, while what involves no contradiction falls within the potency of being and divine productive power. The actual order therefore does not exhaust what could be made. This use must be distinguished both from a thing's lacking one determination and from prime matter's lowly but nonzero status. Describing matter as next to nothing does not supply an underlying subject to creation from nothing.

Further passage references. II.2.14–152; II.4.2–62345; II.7.7–10234; II.7.20–23234; II.12.16–II.12.1823.

Places to read

1. II.2.15Absolute evil would lack every good, including existence and action
2. II.4.3Pure being excludes both privation and potency not to be
3. II.4.5Nothing lacks even the receptive capacity presupposed by ordinary alteration
4. II.7.20An effect considered without its cause would not exist
5. II.12.16The potency of being includes what does not oppose being’s principle

Translation in this edition

II.7.20’s priority of nonbeing is part of a causal argument just after both temporal-origin alternatives have been allowed. It should not force an earlier date of nonexistence on the hypothetical eternal world. “Next to nothing” for matter at I.3.19 still affirms a recipient and must remain distinct.

nihil / non ens

nihil / non ens. Printed forms: Nihil; non ens.

Nothing / nonbeing in the qualified expression. The modal argument identifies contradiction with the character of nonbeing, not with a receptive matter awaiting form. References: II.12.16, II.12.17. See Nothing and nonbeing.

nihil / non esse

nihil / non esse. Printed forms: nihil; nihilo; nihilum; non esse.

Nothing or nonbeing, distinguished from a receptive thing lacking one determination. Pure nothing contains no capacity to receive being; an effect without its cause would not exist. References: II.4.2, II.4.3, II.4.5, II.7.20. See Nothing and nonbeing.

nihilo proximus

nihilo proximus. Printed forms: nihilo proximam.

Next to nothing, distinguished from nothing. Matter’s extreme passivity motivates the comparison; Ficino explicitly denies that matter is simply nothing. References: I.3.19. See Nothing and nonbeing.

privare / expers

privare / expers. Printed forms: expers; privata; privationis; privatum.

To deprive; to be without a perfection or participation. A wholly evil source would be deprived of being, life, and action because Ficino counts them as goods. References: II.1.3, II.2.15, II.4.3. See Nothing and nonbeing.

Manichaeans (authorities and cited works)

Manichaeans. Named with Gnostic philosophers in the rejected account of a good divine principle opposed by an evil one. Ficino argues that absolute evil would lack being, life, knowledge, and action. II.2.14–152. See Nothing and nonbeing; Good and goodness.