From the book
Symposium
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordEikōn is a likeness or image employed in comparison.
- In the SymposiumAlcibiades insists that his likenesses aim at truth.
- In this editionThe edition keeps “likeness,” “statue,” and “image” distinct.
- A place to readDiotima’s different contrast between images and true virtue is an essential comparison.
Meaning
Eikōn is a likeness or image employed in comparison. Agalma is a statue, here divine or precious. Silenus figures open in two, enabling the contrast between an initially comic exterior and valuable contents.
Use in the book
Alcibiades insists that his likenesses aim at truth. He first compares Socrates to the figures made by carvers of herms, represented with pipes and opening to reveal statues of gods. Physical resemblance matters, but the comparison soon becomes an account of mistaken judgement. Socrates’ apparent infatuation and ignorance are an outer covering; within, Alcibiades says, lie temperance and statues so beautiful that he felt bound to obey. The claim to have seen these is Alcibiades’ personal testimony, not an independently described supernatural event.
Marsyas adds a second dimension: Socrates exercises through unaccompanied speech the captivating power associated with the satyr’s music. The comparison does not make an outwardly ugly body irrelevant, since the shock of an unexpected interior depends on the contrast. It instead warns against taking appearance as a sufficient measure of worth.
At 221d–222a the likeness opens again, now around the speeches themselves. Pack-asses, smiths, shoemakers, and tanners make an uninstructed hearer laugh; someone who gets inside discovers sense and statues of virtue, extending to what a person needs to examine to become beautiful and good. Alcibiades’ claim that these alone have sense is an encomiastic superlative, not an editorial judgement on every other discourse.
These valued statues must not be confused with Diotima’s “images of virtue” at 212a. She contrasts images with true virtue using a different word and argument. Alcibiades’ statues, by contrast, name the precious interior of discourse. Both are image-language, but they are not automatically identical grades in one technical ontology.
Places to read
- 212aDiotima’s different contrast between images and true virtue is an essential comparison.
- 215a–c2Sileni and Marsyas introduce two linked likenesses.
- 216c–217a2Exterior, opening, interior temperance, and divine statues become an ethical portrait.
- 221c–222a2The comparison is extended to the speeches and their apparently commonplace language.
- 222c–dSocrates answers by calling Alcibiades’ own performance a satyr-and-silenus play.
Translation in this edition
The edition keeps “likeness,” “statue,” and “image” distinct. Its notes identify the mythic sileni and Marsyas, but the construction of the opening figures is stated by Alcibiades himself. “Statues of virtue” is a figurative development of this object, not a claim that Socrates owns literal cult images within his body.
ἄγαλμα (agalma)
agalma — A statue or precious divine image; figuratively the admirable ethical contents revealed within Socrates and his speeches.
ἀνοίγω (anoigō)
anoigō — To open; here the move from visible guise to an interior of ethical significance.
- 216d — ἀνοιχθεὶς. The opened Socrates is said to contain temperance.
εἰκών (eikōn)
eikōn — A likeness used to make a person intelligible; Alcibiades expressly directs it toward truth rather than mere ridicule.
ἔνδοθεν (endothen)
endothen — Within or from the inside, the location of what an opening reveals.
ἔξωθεν (exōthen)
exōthen — On the outside, describing the visible or audible guise that can mislead initial judgement.
σάτυρος (satyros)
satyros — A satyr, the nonhuman figure through which Socrates’ appearance, insolence, and power of speech are compared.
σιληνός (silēnos)
silēnos — A silenus, especially an opening figure whose unpromising exterior conceals divine statues.