Adequacy and deficiency

Use in the book

Hearing Charmides' figure praised, Socrates says he would be invincible "if he has just one little thing more": that he be "in fact well made" where his soul is concerned (154d–e). Critias, Charmides' cousin and guardian, answers in superlatives: the boy is thought "far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays" (157d). Socrates makes the praise a condition: "And if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest, then blessed is the child, my dear Charmides, … your mother bore" (158b). "Endowed" renders the same Greek verb as "well made", with "well" become "well enough". If he is already "temperate enough", he needs no charms. "But if you seem still to be lacking in these things, the charm must be sung before the remedy is given. So tell me yourself: do you agree with Critias here, and say that you already have a sufficient share of temperance, or that you are lacking in it?" (158b–c).

Charmides blushes and, in Socrates' report, "said that it was not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny what he had been asked" (158c–d2): "For if I say I'm not temperate, … I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, … But if I say I am, and praise myself, that will probably seem obnoxious" (158d). Asked about enough and lacking, he answers about being temperate or not. Socrates proposes that they look into it together, and the question whether temperance is in him becomes the question what it is: "Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me … what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a).

At the centre the words of measure are turned on the inquirer. "It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases," Socrates says: whether nothing has its own power in relation to itself or only some things do, and, if some do, whether among them is the knowledge of knowledge that he and Critias are calling temperance. "I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a). Critias, challenged to make the distinctions, was "ashamed in front of the company" and "kept covering up his perplexity" (169c–d). His position can be read as Charmides' at 158c–d2: unable to own a want without loss of face.

At the end Charmides cannot say whether he has temperance: "But by Zeus, Socrates, I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" (176a). Yet he thinks he very much needs the charm, which by Socrates' condition is for one still lacking: "As far as I'm concerned, nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it's enough" (176b). He leaves the measure to Socrates, who did not trust himself to settle the central question adequately, and Critias turns the condition round: the charm meant for one still lacking becomes, to him, the proof that Charmides is temperate, if he lets Socrates charm him and does not desert him, "great or small" (176b); and he orders it (176c). The conversation that began by asking whether Charmides had enough temperance closes with no measure for the temperance or for the charm.

Places to read

1. 154d–eCharmides would be invincible with "one little thing more": that he be well made where his soul is concerned.
2. 158b–159a2Socrates asks whether Charmides is temperate enough or still lacking; Charmides cannot answer either way without offence, and the question whether temperance is in him becomes the question what it is.
3. 168e–169d2Socrates does not trust himself to be capable of determining adequately whether anything has its own power in relation to itself, or whether knowledge is such a thing; Critias, who cannot do it either, will not admit it.
4. 176a–c2Charmides, not knowing whether he has temperance, offers to be charmed daily until Socrates says it is enough; Critias will take it as proof of his temperance if he lets Socrates charm him and does not desert him, "great or small", and orders it.

Translation in this edition

The adverb ἱκανῶς has four renderings, each fitted to its sentence: "well enough" in "well enough endowed" (158b), "enough" in "temperate enough" (158b) and "until you say it's enough" (176b), "sufficient" in "a sufficient share" (158c), and "adequately" (169a). The adjective ἱκανός is "capable" (169a). The two words of want, ἐπιδεής in Socrates' condition and ἐνδεής in his question, are both "lacking" (158c). Σμικρός is "littlest" (154c), "little" (154d, 156d, 173a) and "small" (165d, 173d, 176b).

ἐνδεής

Attested: ἐνδεής (endeēs; 158c). Lacking, in want. It ends Socrates' question whether Charmides says that he already has a sufficient share of temperance or is "lacking in it" (158c). Lemma: ἐνδεής.

ἐπιδεής

Attested: ἐπιδεής (epideēs; 158c). Lacking, falling short. It comes in the condition Socrates sets before his question: if Charmides seems "still to be lacking in these things", the charm must be sung before the remedy is given (158c). Lemma: ἐπιδεής.

ἱκανός

Attested: ἱκανός (hikanos; 169a); the adverb ἱκανῶς (hikanōs; 158b twice, 158c, 169a, 176b). Sufficient, adequate; of a person, capable. The adverb measures Charmides' temperance (158b, 158c), the task Socrates leaves to "a great man" (169a) and how long Charmides is to be charmed (176b); the adjective is Socrates' doubt that he is "capable of making these distinctions" (169a). Lemma: ἱκανός.

μετέχω

Attested: μετέχειν (metechein; 158c). To have a share in. Socrates asks whether Charmides says that he already has "a sufficient share of temperance" (158c), so that temperance is spoken of as something held in a measure. Lemma: μετέχω.

σμικρόν (smikron)

Attested: σμικρότατος (smikrotatos; 154c), σμικρόν (smikron; 154d, 156d, 173a, 173d, 176b), σμικράν (smikran; 165d). Small, little. Twice it carries weight: Charmides would be invincible with just "one little thing more" (154d), which Socrates then names as a soul well made, and Critias' "great or small" means in anything at all (176b). At its other places it is ordinary: "the littlest" of the boys (154c), "little by little" (156d), "No small benefit" (165d), "even a little" (173a), "one small thing more" (173d). Lemma: σμικρός.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Republic Socrates reminds Adeimantus, Plato's brother, that they had worked out what justice, temperance, courage and wisdom each are, after saying that a longer way round was needed to see them as finely as possible; the hearers had said the shorter account would do, and to Socrates it had seemed to fall short in precision (504a–b). When Adeimantus answers that it seemed to him in due measure, Socrates replies that in such matters a measure which falls short of what is, in any degree, is not in due measure at all, for what is unfinished is the measure of nothing; "yet some people sometimes think that things are already enough, and that there is no need to inquire further" (504c). Many suffer that through idleness, says Adeimantus, and Socrates answers that a guardian of a city and its laws can least afford it, and must go the longer way (504c–d). The words for "enough" there, ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, are the ones with which Charmides leaves the measure to Socrates at Charmides 176b, and among the accounts the Republic finds short is one of temperance. The Charmides can be read against this passage: its account of temperance never reaches the measure, and Charmides, far from thinking that he already has enough, leaves it to Socrates to say when he has.

In the Symposium Diotima of Mantinea, the woman from whom Socrates says he learned about love, uses all three words of this family. No god loves wisdom, for he is wise, and neither do the ignorant; this is the trouble with ignorance, that one who is neither fine and good nor wise thinks himself sufficient (ἱκανόν), and one who does not think himself lacking (ἐνδεής) does not desire what he does not think he needs (ἐπιδεῖσθαι) (204a). By this measure Charmides, who at 176b thinks he very much needs the charm, can be read as free of the ignorance that thinks itself sufficient.

Use in the book

At 204a Miccus is a capable teacher; at 204e Lysis can be recognized by his figure alone. The adverb ἱκανῶς at 209d means understanding well enough to be entrusted with the Athenians’ affairs.

At 215a the good person, precisely insofar as good, is said to be ἱκανὸς αὑτῷ, “sufficient for himself.” From sufficiency the argument moves to needing nothing, cherishing nothing, and therefore not loving.

The adjective also helps describe the healthy body at 217a through the adverb ἱκανῶς: it is in an adequate state and needs no medical assistance. These are local premises and analogies. The passage uses ἱκανός and ἱκανότης, not an attested instance of αὐτάρκης, for the claim commonly summarized as self-sufficiency.

Places to read

1. 215aἱκανὸς ἂν εἴη αὑτῷ — Would be sufficient for himself.
2. 215a–b2
3. 217a
4. 204a
5. 204e
6. 209d