From the book
Hipparchus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈνδρεῖος means courageous or manly; θαυμάσιος wonderful or remarkable; γλυκύς sweet; βέλτιστος best, here the courteous “my excellent friend”; and ἑταῖρος companion or associate.
- In HipparchusSocrates’ addresses repeatedly soften or sharpen a point at which the companion’s answer is under pressure.
- In this editionThe edition’s introduction explicitly calls attention to these addresses as part of the comedy of the persons and the argument.
- A place to readὦ θαυμάσιε — The wonderful friend is told that the definition appears to have no instances.
Meaning
Ἀνδρεῖος means courageous or manly; θαυμάσιος wonderful or remarkable; γλυκύς sweet; βέλτιστος best, here the courteous “my excellent friend”; and ἑταῖρος companion or associate. In direct address these words manage the relationship between speakers as well as describe qualities. Their politeness does not guarantee literal praise.
The final ἀνδρειότατε is the superlative vocative, “most courageous.” Θαυμάσιε is a vocative, γλυκύτατε a superlative vocative, and βέλτιστε the vocative of βέλτιστος. These actual forms should be distinguished from the dictionary forms in the heading. The companion’s designation ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ likewise tells the reader his role without supplying a personal name.
Use in the book
Socrates’ addresses repeatedly soften or sharpen a point at which the companion’s answer is under pressure. “My wonderful friend” accompanies the conclusion that, on the proposed account, nobody is a lover of gain (226d). “My excellent friend” precedes a reminder that knowingly seeking gain from worthless things has already been excluded (226e). “My sweetest friend” introduces the recall that gaining was agreed to be being benefited (227d). The affection of the wording and the severity of the argument can operate together.
At 232a the address becomes “most courageous of all men” when the goodness of the gainful returns for the third or fourth time. Courage here is not the subject of a definition. The expression can gently honor persistence, tease resistance to repeated refutation, or do both. The text supplies no explicit psychological explanation that would license a single certainty about Socrates’ tone.
The vocatives are consequently part of the dialogue’s method. They maintain personal contact through exchanges whose short answers can otherwise sound mechanical. They also mark an asymmetry: the older Socrates can adopt indulgent or teasing familiarity while controlling the questions. The companion mostly addresses him by name. This is a dramatic pattern rather than evidence that Socrates’ apparent friendliness must be false.
The addresses also matter to the charge of deception. Socrates appeals to friendship as a reason he would not deceive; the companion answers that either the friendship or the obedience to Hipparchus must be in doubt. Warm forms of address cannot settle whether the argument is trustworthy. Their presence alongside suspicion prevents the reader from making courtesy a substitute for logical adequacy.
Finally, “courage” in the final compliment should not be used to import a theory of virtue into the dialogue. Its force is local, conversational and potentially ironic. The article identifies an ethical word employed as address, rather than an otherwise absent systematic treatment of courage.
Places to read
- 226dὦ θαυμάσιε — The wonderful friend is told that the definition appears to have no instances.
- 226eὦ βέλτιστε — A courteous address accompanies the exclusion already reached.
- 227dὦ γλυκύτατε — The sweetest friend is reminded of the benefit equation.
- 232aὦ ἀνδρειότατε πάντων — The final superlative marks persistence under argumentative pressure.
Translation in this edition
The edition’s introduction explicitly calls attention to these addresses as part of the comedy of the persons and the argument. Its “most courageous of all men” translates the superlative and πάντων without turning the phrase into a diagnosis of stubbornness. The Note on this Edition also records uncertainty in a damaged letter of βέλτιστε; the lexical reading is nevertheless printed as such.