Philosophy

Starting With a Fib

Critias introduces Socrates as a doctor. The promised headache remedy soon gives way to a conversation about temperance.

Charmides comes looking for a headache cure and finds Socrates playing doctor. Can an honest inquiry begin with a ruse, and what becomes of the promised remedy?

Orientation

At a Glance

  • A doctor is supposedly waitingCritias sends for Charmides and offers to introduce him to a doctor. He asks Socrates to pretend he knows a remedy for the boy’s head.
  • The terms of treatmentSocrates says the leaf needs a charm and asks Charmides to agree to treatment of his soul first. Later he explicitly offers to leave the inquiry alone if Charmides prefers.
  • Who may use a falsehood?In the Republic, Socrates compares falsehood to medicine and reserves its use for rulers acting for the city’s benefit. That comparison raises a question about the gym’s private ruse.
  • The headache drops outCharmides asks to keep receiving the charm near the end. The story leaves the promised leaf and the fate of his headache unresolved.

The meeting between Socrates and Charmides starts with a fib, and it’s worth being precise about who tells it. Critias wants Socrates to meet his ward, so he sends a servant to offer to introduce the boy to a doctor, and asks Socrates, “What’s to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?” Socrates answers, “Nothing,” and adds, “Only let him come.” Then, when the boy sits down and asks whether he knows the remedy, Socrates tells us that he “did somehow manage to answer that I did,” so the claim to knowledge isn’t just Critias’ idea anymore, it has been said out loud by the most famously honest man in Athens.

That should bother us, and it’s worth saying why. Socrates is the philosopher who made a life out of exposing people who claim to know what they don’t, and the dialogue he’s about to have will test whether temperance means knowing what you know and what you don’t. Starting that conversation by agreeing to pass for a doctor is like opening a talk on honesty with a fake résumé, or inviting a friend to “dinner” that turns out to be an intervention, and even if the intentions are good, the friend has every right to feel set up. The person being set up here is a young man who has come for help with his head and has heard nothing about the setup.

There’s a defense, and Plato himself supplies the materials for it. In the Republic, Socrates argues that a falsehood is useless to the gods but can be useful to human beings as a kind of medicine, and so it calls for the same care as medicine. He reserves the use of such falsehoods for the city’s rulers when they act for its benefit. The Charmides gives us a supposed doctor in a wrestling school, and the pretense serves what looks like a good end, getting a promising young man into a conversation that might do his soul some good. The comparison gives the fib a possible defense. Whatever we think of that doctrine, and the Republic’s lies for the public good have worried readers ever since, it tells us Plato didn’t think every falsehood was the same.

The stronger defense is what happens to the pretense once it’s told. Socrates doesn’t just hand over an imaginary leaf, he explains that the remedy is useless without a charm, that the charm treats the soul, and that the Thracian doctor who taught him made him swear never to give the remedy to anyone who hadn’t first handed over his soul. Then he turns it into an offer the boy can refuse, saying, “if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian’s charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head. But if not, there would be nothing we could do for you, my dear Charmides.” The pretext gives way to an offer whose terms Socrates makes plain. When he proposes looking into temperance together, he explicitly says Charmides can decline.

Still, a loose thread hangs off the whole thing. The boy came for a headache cure. By the end the charm is back, and the headache and leaf have dropped out of the conversation. We never see him receive the leaf or hear anyone tell him whose idea the introduction was. The pretense isn’t confessed so much as allowed to evaporate, the way a cover story at a surprise party gets forgotten once everyone yells “surprise,” except that here nobody ever yells it, and the boy may still think he walked in to see a doctor. It’s a small thing, but small things matter in a dialogue about knowing exactly what you know.

There’s even a question about whether the Thracian himself was real. Socrates says he learned the charm “out there on campaign” from one of the doctors of Zalmoxis, and we have no way of knowing whether that story is true or a piece of improvisation layered on top of Critias’ ruse. The point Socrates makes to Charmides is clear enough. He calls the charm “beautiful words” and says it cultivates temperance. The conversation will test what that promise amounts to, whether the story of how he learned the charm is true or improvised.

So the dialogue distinguishes, without ever saying so, between a misleading introduction and misleading content. The introduction was a pretense, but everything that follows is an inquiry that keeps exposing pretense wherever it finds it, in the definition Socrates suspects the boy heard from Critias, in Critias’ refusal to admit he’s stuck, and in the later argument about whether anyone could tell a real doctor from a man who “pretends or thinks he does” know his craft. The reader, at least, is let in on the joke from the start, and the inquiry ends up testing the very kind of claim it began with.

My verdict is that a misleading introduction can begin an honest inquiry, but only if the inquiry turns honest fast and makes its own terms plain, and Socrates makes those terms plain when he asks for Charmides’ agreement. The forgotten headache is the cost, a small reminder that the boy who walked in for one thing got another without ever being told why, and the responsibility for that belongs mostly to Critias, the man who designed the setup, rather than to the conversation that rescued it, which seems a fair way to divide the blame.

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Why does the author regard Socrates’ initial claim about knowing a remedy as especially troubling?

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