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Facing Pages · Branch 18 of 44
Charmides · 160e–161c
Ancient Greek
p. 26Οὐ δῆτα.
Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
161aἜμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Τί οὖν; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· Ὁμήρῳ οὐ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγειν, λέγοντι ὅτι
αἰδὼς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι;
Ἔγωγ’, ἔφη.
Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.
Φαίνεται.
Σωφροσύνη δέ γε ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ οἷς ἂν παρῇ, κακοὺς δὲ μή.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.
Οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν 161b τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδὼς δὲ [μὴ] οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν.
Ἀλλ’ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι· τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην—ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος— ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. σκόπει οὖν τοῦτο εἰ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων.
Καὶ ἐγώ, Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην, Κριτίου τοῦδε ἀκήκοας αὐτὸ ἢ 161c ἄλλου του τῶν σοφῶν.
Ἔοικεν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοῦ γε.
Ἀλλὰ τί διαφέρει, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὁ Χαρμίδης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτου ἤκουσα;
Οὐδέν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ.
Νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἦ δ’ ὅς.
Νὴ Δία, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ εὑρήσομεν αὐτὸ ὅπῃ γε ἔχει, θαυμάζοιμ’ ἄν· αἰνίγματι γάρ τινι ἔοικεν.
Ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἔφη.
Charmides
p. 27“Certainly not.”
“Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well.”
161a“I think so.”
“Well then,” I said, “don’t you believe that Homer is right when he says
Modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need?”
“I do,” he said.1
“So it seems modesty is both not good and good.”
“It appears so.”
“But temperance is good, if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad.”
“Why, yes, it seems to me to be just as you say.”
“Then temperance would not be modesty, if the one 161b is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than bad.”
“Well, I think that is rightly said, Socrates,” he said. “But look into this: what do you think of it, as an account of temperance? I have just remembered something I once heard someone say: that temperance would be doing one’s own business. So look into whether you think the man who said it was right.”2
And I said, “You rascal! You’ve heard that from Critias here, or 161c from one of the other wise men.”3
“From someone else, apparently,” said Critias. “Certainly not from me.”
“But what difference does it make, Socrates,” said Charmides, “whom I heard it from?”
“None,” I said. “For in any case what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not.”
“Now you are talking sense,” said he.
“By Zeus, I am,” I said. “But I’d be surprised if we even find out how it stands: it looks like a kind of riddle.”
“How so?” he said.
Socrates
Reading Charmides · Charmides · 160e–161c
Ask about a concept, passage, contradiction, or connection.
Socrates will begin with this book and its sources.About This Reading Edition
Socrates, Charmides, and Critias examine temperance, self-knowledge, and the knowledge of knowledge. The complete dialogue appears in Ancient Greek and English, aligned by the supplied edition’s facing pages and Stephanus references.
Historical Text and Translation
Greek: Plato, Charmides, in J. Burnet, ed., Platonis Opera, volume III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), transcribed by the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. The supplied edition omits words marked for deletion, retains supplied words, lightly normalizes punctuation and paragraphing, and removes a stray digital numeral at 163c. The digital Greek transcription and its modifications are provided under CC BY-SA 4.0, with attribution to the Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University.
About Diotimos Editions
Diotimos Editions prepared this independently worded English translation in house. It aims for clear, measured English while preserving Plato’s conversational rhythm, philosophical distinctions, and the unfolding give-and-take of Socratic inquiry.
Rights
Plato's Greek source work is in the public domain. The 2026 English translation and Diotimos editorial matter are original to this edition and remain © 2026 Diotimos.