Philosophy
One Word, Six Definitions
Charmides offers a way to walk and talk. Critias ends up with a kind of knowledge. A translation has to let readers hear that both are trying to explain the same Greek word.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesBenjamin Jowett lets the English shift from temperance to wisdom. The Diotimos edition keeps one word in play, even when a new answer makes it sound strange.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A boy’s way of carrying himselfCharmides starts with orderly, quiet behavior and then tries modesty. Both proposals are ways the virtue might show up in the young man Socrates has in front of him.
- From conduct to knowledgeCharmides passes along the proposal about doing one’s own business. Under Critias, the inquiry moves through doing good things and knowing oneself to knowledge of knowledge.
- What Jowett makes audibleJowett uses temperance and wisdom to bring out different aspects of the Greek. The variation helps English readers hear the later argument’s intellectual side.
- What a steady term preservesThe Diotimos edition keeps temperance across all six proposals. When the word starts to feel strained, that very strain helps readers follow what each new definition asks of it.
Charmides 159b–d, 160d–e, 161a–b, 163c–164a, 164c–d, 166a–c, Editorial Note · Jowett’s Charmides Introduction, Translation
Picture Charmides walking down the street. He thinks temperance shows up in the quiet, orderly way a person walks and talks. By the time Critias is done, temperance is a kind of knowledge that knows itself and all the other kinds of knowledge. It’s a long way from the street. All along, though, they’ve been trying to say what one Greek word means. The word is sōphrosynē, and the distance between those two answers is the problem the translator has to keep in view.
The word can suggest soundness of mind, good sense, moderation, control of appetite or the good order expected of a well-brought-up youth. You can see why Charmides starts with quietness and then tries modesty. Next he passes along a proposal he heard from someone else, doing one’s own business. Critias defends that account, gives doing good things as the decisive point, and goes on to knowing oneself and finally knowledge of knowledge. You can count six proposals, though two or three of them grow directly out of the answer before.
Every English candidate lights up one corner of the room. Temperance can suggest a balanced character, but it can also send a modern reader straight to the bottle. Moderation conveys a sense of limits and can sound like portion control. Self-control is good for an argument about mastery of appetite, though none of these six answers is simply about holding an appetite in check. Sound-mindedness may help with the turn toward knowledge. Try hearing it as a description of a boy who holds back before speaking, and you’ll notice how much else the Greek has room for.
Benjamin Jowett, in his introduction, says he has used either Temperance or Wisdom as the context calls for. In the dialogue he sometimes gives them together. When Socrates asks what kind of knowledge the virtue could be, you can see what wisdom is doing there. It tells a reader who has been thinking of restraint that this is also a question about understanding. Jowett’s alternative has a point. The late argument can sound less odd with wisdom in the sentence.
Now imagine the freedom carried further. A translator could give us good behavior when Charmides offers quietness, modesty when he turns to shame, and wisdom when Critias brings up knowledge. Each answer would sound more at home in its own sentence. You’d also have made the first two look like answers to different questions, even though it matters that Socrates presses the same question after the boy gives up quietness. Part of what you’re reading for is how he gets from one answer to the next.
There’s another reason to keep the word steady. Quietness doesn’t fail merely because sōphrosynē has other meanings. Socrates and Charmides agree that the virtue is fine, and Socrates gives examples in which doing something quickly is at least as fine as doing it quietly. The particular argument matters. The stable word lets you see both that the question has stayed the same and that the reasons for giving up an answer are changing.
English has words that put us in the same predicament. Think of cool, which can mean calm under pressure, fashionable, acceptable or slightly cold. Suppose two people are arguing about what makes someone cool. One thinks of a person who can take bad news without panicking. The other thinks of the friend who knows all the bands. You could translate one as composed and the other as stylish. You’d have made both remarks quite clear and lost the disagreement that makes them worth putting together.
My verdict is that temperance is worth the occasional odd sound it makes in English. The Diotimos edition keeps it throughout, and its editorial note asks readers to set aside the narrow association with abstaining from drink. When Critias starts talking about knowledge, let the word feel a little stretched. You can still remember the boy walking quietly down the street, and ask what the new account could possibly tell him about the way he’s supposed to live.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
Why does the author prefer keeping one English term for sōphrosynē throughout the dialogue, even when the term sounds strained?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When does consistency in translation illuminate an argument, and when might it instead make the argument unnecessarily obscure?→
- How does remembering Charmides’s original picture of quiet behavior affect your assessment of Critias’s later account of temperance as knowledge of knowledge?→
- If every English translation highlights only one aspect of sōphrosynē, what criteria should a translator use to decide which losses and oddities are acceptable?→