Philosophy
Looking Within, Twice
Socrates asks Charmides to look within and say what temperance seems to be. Critias later offers a kind of knowledge that could explain much more, if he can show what it knows.
The Platonic Dialogues: CharmidesA boy’s pause in the wrestling school gives Socrates something to test. Augustine and an experiment with identical stockings help explain both the value and the limits of looking inward.
Orientation
At a Glance
- A pause before answeringSocrates asks Charmides to attend to what temperance might feel like in his own case. Charmides thinks it over and proposes that temperance is modesty.
- An impression meets a testSocrates brings in Homer’s man in need to test whether modesty is always good. The example challenges the proposed definition while leaving the boy’s experience open.
- What looking inward can tell youA person can notice a preference and still miss what prompted it. Nisbett and Wilson’s stocking experiment makes that gap visible without ruling out every kind of first-person report.
- Critias proposes expertiseCritias offers a kind of knowledge with a claim to explain temperance. Socrates asks what it knows and what good it does, questions that go beyond describing how a disposition seems from the inside.
Charmides 158e–159a, 160d–e, 160e–161b, 164d, 165c–e, 166a–c, 166d–167b · Augustine, On True Religion 39.72 · Nisbett and Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know pp. 243–244, p. 249
Charmides pauses. The first answer he gave, that temperance is quietness, has failed. Socrates tells him to “pay closer attention and look within yourself,” to consider what sort of person temperance makes him, and to say what it seems to be. Charmides thinks it over and proposes modesty. The scene gives us someone trying to learn from his own experience several pages before Critias makes self-knowledge the definition of the virtue.
Socrates had already set out the reasoning behind the experiment. If temperance is present in the boy, it “must give rise to some sense,” and that sense might furnish an opinion about what temperance is. There are two steps there. First the boy notices something about himself, then he tries to say what it tells him about the virtue. It’s a little like noticing what fear feels like and then wondering whether you could tell someone what fear is. The first part gives you something to start from.
Augustine gives that inward turn a different destination. In On True Religion he tells the reader to come back into himself, because truth dwells within. He goes on to say that if you find your nature changeable, you should go beyond yourself too. The comparison is instructive. Augustine’s reader is looking for a truth that can judge his changing impressions. Socrates’ young interlocutor brings one such impression back into a conversation and lets other people have a look at what it might show.
Charmides says temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and takes it to be modesty. There’s something plausible in the association. Earlier Socrates himself described the boy as bashful. But when they test the answer, Socrates recalls Homer’s man in need, for whom modesty can be a bad thing. They’ve agreed that temperance is good. A person might truly feel what Charmides describes and still have some way to go before explaining what all temperate people have in common.
The psychologists Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson made a related distinction visible in 1977. They asked passersby to pick the best of four identical pairs of nylon stockings. The rightmost pair was chosen much more often than the leftmost, but no one volunteered position as a reason. Some explanations appealed to qualities of the stockings. People could tell the researchers what they preferred. Their explanations could miss a factor that helped produce that preference. Charmides’ difficulty is different, but he also has to get from an experience he can report to a claim that takes more evidence.
Critias’ self-knowledge is a different animal altogether. When Socrates asks whether temperance is an epistēmē, a kind of knowledge such as medicine, Critias agrees that it is knowledge of oneself. Socrates wants to know what it does for us. The issue has changed from what a virtue seems like to a person looking within to what an expertise could know and do. Soon the question will be whether it can tell anyone what they know and what they only think they know.
There’s a place for both sorts of inquiry. If you want to know what shame feels like, it helps to hear from somebody who has felt it. If you want to know whether shame makes people better, it helps to have Homer’s man in need in the room too. Critias promises an account that might take in more than anyone’s immediate experience. Socrates has him submit that promise to much the same process he used with the boy. He asks Critias to say what he’s found and then raises questions about it.
My verdict is that looking within does real work in the dialogue. Its value is easier to see if you remember the silence before Charmides answers. The boy comes back with an idea that he gives up after a particular test. That’s progress. Now he knows what he meant when he thought of temperance as modesty, and he has a reason to look again.
Test your understanding
Question 1 of 3
What two-step process does the article identify in Socrates’ invitation to Charmides to look within?
Guided Inquiry
Questions for Socrates
Explore these questions with Socrates, with this Feature as your reading context.
- When can an accurate report of one’s own feelings support a broader definition, and what additional tests would that definition need?→
- Why might giving up a proposed answer after testing it count as progress rather than failure?→
- How do Augustine’s inward search and Socrates’ conversational testing suggest different ways of moving beyond changing personal impressions?→